K. Velayudhan Nair v. State of Kerala — 1962 DIGILAW 137 (KER)

JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this batch of 23 writ petitions, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, though the petitioners are different, all of them claim a common relief, namely, of requesting this Court to issue a writ of mandamus prohibiting the State Government, as well as the concerned Regional Transport Officer and Registering Authority, from enforcing, as against the petitioners, the provisions of rule 324 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961, in respect of the requirement about the painting of the motor cabs, in question, in the colour prescribed under the said rule. 2. Before I advert to the various contentions raised by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these writ petitions, as well as the stand taken by the State Government in these matters, it is desirable to advert to certain provisions of the statute and in particular to the provisions on the basis of which the rule in question is stated to have been framed. I will also advert in that connection, to the provisions of the particular rule, which is under attack in these proceedings. 3. Section 2 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act defines the expression ' contract carriage ' and it will be seen that the said definition includes also a motor cab. Section 2(15) again defines the expression ' motor cab '. At this stage I may mention that the petitioners are owners of motor cabs, as that expression is defined under section 2 (15). Again the expression ' public service vehicle' is defined in section 2 (25). It will be seen from the said definition that it includes also a motor cab in particular. The only other expression to be noted is the expression " transport vehicle " which is denned in section 2 (33) of the Act, as meaning a public service vehicle or goods vehicle. It may be mentioned that the expression ' public service vehicle ' which is taken in by the expression ' transport vehicle ' has already been defined in section 2 (25) which, as I have already indicated, includes motor cabs also. 4. Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with control of motor vehicles. That Chapter contains the group of sections 42 to 68 (2). Section 67 gives power to the State Government to frame rules in respect of stage carriages and contract carriages. 4. Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with control of motor vehicles. That Chapter contains the group of sections 42 to 68 (2). Section 67 gives power to the State Government to frame rules in respect of stage carriages and contract carriages. Section 68 (1) gives power to the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV. Sub-section (2) of section 68 again gives power to the State Government, without prejudice to the generality of the power contained in sub-section (1) to frame rules under the said section with respect to all or any of the matters mentioned in clauses (a) to 2 (a) therein. It is claimed on behalf of the State that the rule in question has been framed by virtue of section 68 (2) (o). It is desirable to set out section 68 (2) (o): " 68 (2). Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely:- * * * * (o) regulating the painting or marking of transport vehicles and the display of advertising matters thereon, and in particular prohibiting the painting or marking of transport vehicles in such colour or manner as to induce any person to believe that the vehicle is used for the transport of mails. " 5. I will now advert to the particular rule framed by the State Government. Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961, have been framed by the State Government and published in the State Gazette on 16th May 1961. As I mentioned earlier there is no controversy that the particular rule, namely, rule 324, is claimed to have been framed only by virtue of the powers contained in section 68 (2) (o) of the Act. Chapter VI of the rules deals with the Construction, Equipment and Maintenance of Motor Vehicles and it contains several parts. In particular Part IV, occurring in Chapter VI, lays down special rules applicable to every motor cab. The relevant rule, that is to be considered is rule 324 regarding the painting and marking of motor cabs and it is as follows : - " 324. In particular Part IV, occurring in Chapter VI, lays down special rules applicable to every motor cab. The relevant rule, that is to be considered is rule 324 regarding the painting and marking of motor cabs and it is as follows : - " 324. Painting and marking of.-No motor vehicle other than a motor cab shall be painted in colour or colours prescribed for motor cabs in this rule, and no motor cab shall be permitted to ply if it does not conform to the provisions of this rule (a) colour of the hood of all motor cabs (except tourers) shall be painted in cream yellow and rest of the body in black ; and (b) the permit number in addition to the registration mark shall be painted on the cab in white in a red circle, the size of the number being two inches in height and one and a half inches breadth at four different places, namely : (i) on the left hand top portion of the windscreen readable from inside ; (ii) on the rear boot against black background ; (iii) on the left front door against black background, and (iv) on the right front door against black background. " Though I have extracted clause (b) of rule 324 also I may state at this stage, that none of the petitioners in these proceedings, has attacked the provisions of clause (b) of rule 324. The only part of the rule that is attacked in these proceedings is clause (a) of rule 324 wherein it is provided that no motor cab shall be permitted to ply if it does not conform to the provisions of the rule, namely, about the hood of the motor cabs being painted in cream yellow and the rest of the body in black. 6. In fact, even the provision contained in the said rule prohibiting other motor vehicles from being painted in colour or colours prescribed for 'motor-cabs ' does not arise for consideration as such, because a challenge can be made regarding such a provision, if at all, only by owners of such motor vehicles, which are not motor cabs. 6. In fact, even the provision contained in the said rule prohibiting other motor vehicles from being painted in colour or colours prescribed for 'motor-cabs ' does not arise for consideration as such, because a challenge can be made regarding such a provision, if at all, only by owners of such motor vehicles, which are not motor cabs. I am referring to this aspect, because, in the course of arguments, it was urged that there is an absolute prohibition regarding motor vehicles being painted with colours prescribed for motor cabs ; and on that ground also the rule is bad. I am not considering this aspect, because, whatever be the merits, such a contention is not available to the petitioners, who are only owners of motor cabs. 7. The relevant Madras and Bombay rules may also be usefully referred. The Madras rule runs as follows: - " 407-A. Motor cab to be painted in double colours.-- (a) Every motor cab in the City of Madras shall be painted in cream yellow colour over the top and in black colour over the rest of the body : Provided that a motor cab already permitted to ply as contract carriage shall be painted in the manner prescribed above within six months from the date of publication of this rule in the Fort St. George Gazette. (b) No motor vehicle other than a motor cab shall be painted in the manner prescribed in the sub-rule (a). " The Bombay rule is as follows :- "139. Painting and marking of motor cabs in certain manner.-(1) The hood of every motor cab shall be painted in cream yellow and the rest of the body in black colour : Provided if the hood of the motor cab is collapsible or removable, a band three inches wide shall be painted in cream yellow on the uppermost part of the body ". 8. As Mr. T. C. N. Menon, learned counsel appearing for some of the writ petitioners, has referred also to rule 233, I will advert to that rule also. Under rule 233, there are certain directions given for observance by the drivers when the motor cabs are parked in motor cab stands. Provision is made therein for the drivers of the first two motor cabs on the stay to stay beside their cabs and be ready to be hired at once by any person. Under rule 233, there are certain directions given for observance by the drivers when the motor cabs are parked in motor cab stands. Provision is made therein for the drivers of the first two motor cabs on the stay to stay beside their cabs and be ready to be hired at once by any person. But the rule also gives a discretion to a hirer to hire any particular cab. There is provision made for the other motor cabs on the stand moving up as vacancies occur. Provision is also made to the effect that no motor cab engaged for some future time shall remain on the stand unless the driver is willing to accept any intermediate hiring that may be offered. There is also provision made to the effect that no disabled motor cab shall remain on the stand unless such disablement is temporary and can be and is remedied at once. Clause (e) of rule 233 provides that every motor cab other than a motor cab referred to in clause (d) which is on the stand shall be ready to be hired and when its turn comes the driver shall accept the first offer of hire which may be made to him irrespective of the length of the journey for which such offer is made. Reliance has been placed on this particular rule by Mr. T. C. N. Menon, learned counsel, to show that there is ample provision made in this rule safeguarding the interests of the public who may require the services of the taxi for their purpose and, therefore, there was no further necessity for clause (a) of rule 324. As to how far this rule will help the contention of the learned counsel, I will consider later. 9. Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 434 of 1962 advanced the leading arguments in these writ petitions attacking the relevant provisions contained in rule 324 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1961. That stand has also been adopted and supported by the learned counsel appearing for the other petitioners. No doubt, Mr. Easwara Iyer, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, and Mr. T. C. N. Menon, appearing for some other petitioners, have also adopted a slightly different line of attack to which I will advert later. 10. That stand has also been adopted and supported by the learned counsel appearing for the other petitioners. No doubt, Mr. Easwara Iyer, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, and Mr. T. C. N. Menon, appearing for some other petitioners, have also adopted a slightly different line of attack to which I will advert later. 10. I may also state that there is no attack made in any of these writ petitions regarding the requirements contained in clause (b) of rule 324 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules. I must also state that none of the petitioners, so far as I could see, has challenged the particular colour prescribed under that rule. Their large ground of attack is not so much about the particular colour prescribed but really regarding the prohibition against the plying of motor cabs unless it is painted in the manner provided in rule 324. 11. Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel, has urged three grounds of attack as against this particular rule. 12. The first ground of attack is that the provisions contained in rule 324 (a) infringe the fundamental right guaranteed to persons like the petitioners, under Article 19 (1) (g) to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The learned counsel further urged that the provisions of the rule are not saved by Article 19 (6) as being reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. Therefore, Mr. Krishnamoorthi Iyer urged that rule 324 (a) must be struck down. 13. The second ground of attack is that rule 324 (a) goes beyond the rule-making power under section 68 (2) (o) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The third ground of attack is that section 68 (2) (o) of the Motor Vehicles Act confers an arbitrary and naked power on the State Government without any guidance having been furnished by the legislature as to the circumstances under which the State Government can frame rules regulating the painting of transport vehicles. 14. Mr. Easwara Iyer, learned counsel, appearing for some of the petitioners, has taken a stand that a direction in the rule to paint motor cabs cream yellow and black really amounts to a total prohibition, as against persons owning motor cabs from painting their cabs in any other colour and therefore the provisions under the rule will have to be struck down. The learned counsel was prepared to accept the position that it may be proper for having a provision prohibiting the painting of motor cabs resembling a colour which is allotted to carriages carrying mail. But, the learned counsel urged, it is not open to the State Government to frame a rule totally prohibiting the motor cabs from painting any colour other than the one prescribed under the rule. 15. Mr. T. C. N. Menon, learned counsel for some of the petitioners, urged that if the power given under section 68 (2) (o) is held to be valid, it will be open to the State Government to prescribe any colour they like under the rule-making power and have that colour changed as often as they please, and that will lead to considerable hardship to motor cab owners. The counsel urged that this is an aspect which has to be taken into account by this court in considering the validity of the untrammelled rule-making power given to the State Government under section 68 (2) (o) of the Act. Mr. T. C. N. Menon, learned counsel, also referred to rule 233, and urged that there is already a provision made in that rule whereby a taxi cab can be hired, and that, therefore, it is absolutely unnecessary for the State Government to frame a rule regarding the painting of motor cabs in the particular manner as they have done under rule 324. The requirement of easy identification of motor cabs is amply met with when taxi stands have been provided. 16. According to the stand that has been taken by the State Government, it has got power and jurisdiction to frame the rule in question, by virtue of the provisions contained in section 68 (2) (o) of the Act. The State further urges that even though the provision contained in rule 324 may amount to a restriction in the matter of the petitioners carrying on a trade or business it is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public and therefore, it is saved under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. 17. The State further urges that even though the provision contained in rule 324 may amount to a restriction in the matter of the petitioners carrying on a trade or business it is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public and therefore, it is saved under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. 17. There are certain matters mentioned in the counter-affidavit filed by the State Government, to which I will have to refer when I consider the main and more serious question that arises for consideration in these writ petitions, namely, whether the restriction imposed by virtue of rule 324 (a) can be sustained, on the basis of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. 18. The learned Government Pleader has also urged that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that rule 324 (a) is beyond the rule-making power under section 68 (2) (o) cannot be accepted. On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the power to regulate, given under section 68(2)(o) does take in the Power to prescribe also the particular colour with which motor cabs are to be painted. Therefore, the learned Government Pleader urged that there is no question of the rule being beyond the rule-making power of the State Government. 19. The learned Government Pleader again urged that there is no question of any arbitrary or excessive delegation of power being vested in the State Government by section 68 (2) (o). In this connection, the learned Government Pleader has also relied upon the provisions of section 133 regarding the procedure to be followed by the State Government in framing of rules. That particular section has been relied upon by the learned Government Pleader to show that it is not as if the legislature has totally abdicated its functions; on the other hand, it is keeping very good and effective control over the rules that may be framed by the State Government from time to time. 20. Before I consider the main contention that arises for consideration, namely, of Rule 324 (a) offending Article 19 (1) (g) and of the rule not being saved by Article 19 (6), I will take up and dispose of the second and third contentions that have been raised and adverted to by me above. 21. As I mentioned earlier, the second contention of Mr. 21. As I mentioned earlier, the second contention of Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel, is that rule 324 (a) is beyond the rule-making power given under section 68 (2) (o). That is, according to the learned counsel, the power to regulate painting given under section 68 (2) (o) must be read along with what follows in the latter part of section 68 (2) (o), namely, of prohibiting the painting of transport vehicles in such colour as to induce any person to believe that the vehicle is used for the transport of mail. That is, according to the learned counsel, the power to regulate is itself restricted or explained by the latter part of section 68 (2) (o), namely, that there can be, if at all, a rule to the effect that no transport vehicle can be painted in a colour which is allotted to vehicles carrying mails. I am not inclined to accept this interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel for the petitioners on section 68 (2) (o) of the Act. On the other hand, in my view, section 68 (2) (o) consists of two parts. It gives two distinct powers of rule-making namely, (1) of regulating the painting, etc., of transport vehicles and (b) in particular prohibiting the painting of transport vehicles in such a colour as to induce any person to believe that the vehicle is used for the transport of mail. That is, it is open to the State Government to frame a rule simply prohibiting the painting of transport vehicles with a colour which is allotted to vehicles transporting mail, or they may go further and also frame a rule to the effect that the transport vehicles will have to be painted with a particular colour. Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the expression 'regulating the painting' occurring in section 68(2) (o) will not confer a positive power on a State Government to frame a rule compelling the owners of transport vehicles to paint their vehicles in a particular manner. Here again, the learned Government Pleader, as I have already indicated, urged that the power to regulate given in section 68 (2) (o) will also give power to prescribe a particular colour which the authorities choose to prescribe. Here again, the learned Government Pleader, as I have already indicated, urged that the power to regulate given in section 68 (2) (o) will also give power to prescribe a particular colour which the authorities choose to prescribe. In this case, I have indicated earlier that none of the petitioners is attacking the particular colour mentioned in rule 324. The expression 'regulate' as the dictionary meaning shows is "to control by rule", "subject to restrictions", 'moderate' ' adept to requirements'. Therefore, having due regard to the dictionary meaning of that expression ' regulate ', in my view, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the expression " regulating " occurring in section 68 (2) (o) does not confer any power on the State Government to frame a rule directing the painting of transport vehicles with a particular colour that they may decide upon. On the other hand, having due regard to the dictionary meaning referred to above, it is open to the State Government, by virtue of section 68 (2) (o) to prescribe a particular colour and direct the owners of transport vehicles to adapt their vehicles to that particular colour. Therefore, I am not prepared to accept the contention that rule 324 (a) prescribing the particular colour is beyond the rule-making power given under section 68 (2) (o). As to whether the requirement is really a reasonable restriction or not, is a totally different matter, which will be considered under the major ground of attack based upon Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 22. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that section 68 (2) (o) confers an arbitrary and naked power on the State Government to frame rule- as they please and that the legislature does not furnish any guidance or factors to be taken into account by the rule- making authority. Frankly, I am not able to appreciate this line of attack taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Section 68 (2) (o) clearly gives power to the State Government to frame a rule regarding the painting of transport vehicles. That rule can be framed only with regard to transport vehicles. I can understand a contention that the legislature has left to the entire discretion of the rule-making authority to prescribe the colour, however obnoxious it may be. Section 68 (2) (o) clearly gives power to the State Government to frame a rule regarding the painting of transport vehicles. That rule can be framed only with regard to transport vehicles. I can understand a contention that the legislature has left to the entire discretion of the rule-making authority to prescribe the colour, however obnoxious it may be. But that is not the line of attack taken by any of the petitioners and the whole ground of attack is that the owners of motor transport vehicles, like the petitioners cannot be compelled to paint their vehicles with the particular colour prescribed under rule 324. 23. Even otherwise, a reference to section 133 will clearly show that it is not as if the legislature has completely effaced itself or abdicated its functions. Section 133 relates to the publication of commencement of the rules that are to be framed under the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 133 provides that the power to make rules is subject to the condition of the rules being made after previous publication. Therefore, the rules that are contemplated have to be previously published. Under sub-section (2) again, it is further provided that all the rules made under the Act are to be published in the official Gazette and shall, unless some other later date is appointed, come into force on the date of such publication. 24. Sub-section (3) of section 133 is, in my view, very important in this connection. It provides : " All rules made under this Act by the Central Government or by any State Government shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modification as Parliament or [such Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. " It will be seen by a reference to the above sub-section that the rules that are made under the Act either by the Central Government or by the State Government are to be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Parliament or the State Legislature as soon as they are made. There is also a further provision that they are subject to such modification as Parliament or State Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. There is also a further provision that they are subject to such modification as Parliament or State Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. It is not the contention of any of the petitioners in these proceedings that the procedure indicated in section 133, particularly, sub-section (3) of section 133, has not been followed before the particular rule came into effect. I am only referring to this aspect to show that it was open to the legislature when this rule was placed before it, under section 133 (3), if it so chose, to effect any modification that it thought fit. Therefore, in this case, the legislature not having chosen to effect any modification in the rule as framed when it came before it, it should be considered that the legislature was in entire agreement with the rule as framed by the State Government. Therefore, far from there being a conferment of any unrestricted or arbitrary and naked power on the State Government, section 133 (3) clearly shows that the legislature exercises a good control over the rule-making power of the State Government and it is also given the power to effect any modification if it chooses. Therefore, the third contention of the learned counsel also to be negatived. 25. Before I close the discussion on this aspect, I may state that in respect of this contention, Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel, has referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 554. No doubt, in this case the learned Judges have considered the permissible boundaries of valid delegation. But it is not really necessary to go into that decision because, in the particular circumstances of this case, I have already indicated that it cannot be stated that there has been any unrestricted or unguided and naked power conferred on the State Government under section 68 (2) (o), especially having due regard to section 133 (3) of the Act. I may also state that in the counter-affidavit of the State, it is mentioned that the rules were previously published under section 133 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and that in respect of Rule 324, no objections were received, though with regard to other rules objections had been received. 26. So far as the contention of Mr. I may also state that in the counter-affidavit of the State, it is mentioned that the rules were previously published under section 133 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and that in respect of Rule 324, no objections were received, though with regard to other rules objections had been received. 26. So far as the contention of Mr. Easwara Iyer that the rules prohibit motor cab owners from adopting any other colour than the one prescribed by the State, I am prepared to hold that the position is really so. Whether the result is one of prohibition of any other colour or a positive requirement of a particular colour, the validity of such a rule can be upheld only if it passes the test of being a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public under Article 19 (6). That is being considered by me later. I am not also impressed by the contention of Mr. T. C. N, Menon that undue hardship will be caused to owners of Motor cabs, if the Government's power to prescribe colour is accepted. According to him, Government can go on altering the colour by amending the rule. This grievance, in my view, is more imaginary than real. One can trust the State Government to act reasonably. Even otherwise there is the safeguard provided by section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act to which I have already referred. 27. The more serious attack that has been made against rule 324 (a) is the one based upon Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. I have also stated that it is the case of the petitioners that such a rule is not saved as being a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public, under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. The stand taken on behalf of the State Government is that the provisions contained in rule 324 may amount to a restriction but that restriction can be sustained as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. The stand taken on behalf of the State Government is that the provisions contained in rule 324 may amount to a restriction but that restriction can be sustained as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. Therefore, in view of the particular stand taken by the State Government in these proceedings it has really become unnecessary for me to consider whether the rules operate as a restriction on the right of persons, like the petitioners, to carry on their trade, because the State Government itself proceeds on the basis that the rule operates as a restriction. Then the only question is whether, in view of the facts mentioned in the counter-affidavit filed by the State Government, in these proceedings, the rule can be sustained, as amounting to a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution, 28. Before I advert to the principles that have been laid down by the Supreme Court in considering a question as to whether a particular rule or a provision can be sustained as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution, it is desirable to set out the various matters mentioned in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government. The counter-affidavits filed in the various writ petitions are, more or less of the same pattern; therefore, I will advert to the counter-affidavit filed in O.P. No. 434 of 1962. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the restrictions imposed by rule 324 are reasonable restrictions and are in the interests of the general public. The State Government also states that the provision in rule 324 ensures uniformity in the appearance of all motor cabs and their easy identification from other classes of motor vehicles. It is further stated that it is to achieve this particular purpose that it has been provided in rule 324 that no other motor vehicle shall be painted in colour or colours prescribed for motor cabs. There is a reference to the position as it existed prior to the introduction of rule 324. It is further stated that it is to achieve this particular purpose that it has been provided in rule 324 that no other motor vehicle shall be painted in colour or colours prescribed for motor cabs. There is a reference to the position as it existed prior to the introduction of rule 324. According to the State Government, prior to the introduction of rule 324, the only means of identification of motor cabs was that the number plate should be in black letters and digits on a white back ground. The State Government further avers that many motor cabs used to have the number plates of private cars hidden in the vehicles for exhibition while going on trips outside the area for which they had permits. It is also averred that the hirer of a motor cab, who engaged such motor cabs, was put to loss and misery when such operation in permitless area was detected by the authorities and the vehicle was seized and taken into custody under section 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is also a reference to the loss of revenue to the State Government in view of these malpractices by some at least of the owners of motor cabs. There is again a further averment to the effect that the restrictions in rule 324 safeguard the interests of the owners of motor cabs themselves inasmuch as they eliminated the competition of motor vehicles operating on the sly. The State Government winds up this part of the case in the counter-affidavit by stating that the restrictions imposed by rule 324 are reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. The State Government no doubt gives a tabular statement showing the number of taxi cabs in the various districts in the Kerala State as well as the number of cabs that have been painted as per rule 324 (a). In my view, that statement is absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of considering the attack that is made against the validity of rule 324 (a). The fact that a major part of the operators of motor cabs had complied with the rule, cannot certainly make the rule, valid if it is otherwise invalid, and cannot be saved under Article 19 (6). 29. The fact that a major part of the operators of motor cabs had complied with the rule, cannot certainly make the rule, valid if it is otherwise invalid, and cannot be saved under Article 19 (6). 29. No doubt, there is a further statement to the effect that all these rules were published as required under section 133 and that there was absolutely no objection so far as the proposed requirement about painting. 30. Therefore, it will be seen that according to the State Government, rule 324 is to be considered imposing a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public inasmuch as uniformity in the appearance of all motor cabs is necessary for their easy identification from other class of vehicles and it is with that particular object that the rule is framed. As I mentioned earlier, they have also stated that the previous requirement of the motor cabs having black letters and digits on a white background as a distinguishing mark was not found adequate and satisfactory for the reasons mentioned therein. Reference is also made to the hardship caused to the public by the malpractice adopted by some of the owners of motor cabs. 31. The point that arises now will be, having due regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the various decisions, to which I will refer immediately whether the statements made by the State Government in the counter-affidavit will enable this court to hold that the requirement under rule 324 (a) about the painting to be adopted by owners of motor cabs, can be considered to be a reasonable restriction in the interests of general public under Article 19 (6), After a consideration of the various aspects that have been presented before me and having due regared to the principles laid dawn by the Supreme Court, in my view, the rule will have to be sustained, as a reasonable restriction in the interests of general public and as such it is saved under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. 32. No doubt, Mr. 32. No doubt, Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, has very strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728 where the learned Judges have held that the right of the public to use motor vehicles on a public road cannot in any sense be regarded as a right created by the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Judges have also held that the right exists anterior to any legislation on the subject and a member of the public is entitled to ply motor vehicles on the public road as an incident of his right of passage over highways and therefore the question is really immaterial, whether he plies a vehicle for pleasure or pastime or for the purpose of trade. In my view, this decision does not at all advance the case of the petitioner that the restriction contained in rule 324 (a) cannot be sustained as a reasonable restriction. The decision referred to will only establish that there is a right in the members of the public to use motor vehicles on the public road for pleasure or pastime or for trade. But it is also seen that the learned Judges, in the same decision, have also laid down that it is open to the State to control and regulate the said user for the purpose of ensuring safety, peace, health and good morals, of the public. Therefore, it will be seen that the decision that has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner itself amply recognises jurisdiction in the State to make any rules or regulations for the purpose of ensuring safety, peace, health and the morals of the public. I must also state that in this case, the question whether prohibition of the exercise of a right was within the meaning of restrictions on the exercise of a right under clause (6) of Article 19, was raised but was not decided. 33. The question as regards the tests to be applied to find out whether a particular provision amounts to a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (6) has been considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430 and Abdul Hakim v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 448. 33. The question as regards the tests to be applied to find out whether a particular provision amounts to a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (6) has been considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430 and Abdul Hakim v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 448. At page 436 in the decision reported in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India , Mr. Justice Das Gupta speaking for the court after referring to the previous decisions on this point, observes as follows : "It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word ' restriction ' to be sufficiently wide to save laws ' inconsistent' with Article 19 (1), or ' taking away the rights' conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt, therefore, that they intended the word 'restriction' to include cases of 'prohibition'' also. The contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot, therefore, be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when, as in the present case, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition, special care has to be taken by the court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction the more need for strict scrutiny by the court. " It will be seen that in this case the Supreme Court has held that the expression " restriction " occurring in Article 19(6) will include cases of prohibition also. No doubt, the learned Judges have sounded a note of caution that when restriction reaches the stage of prohibition, there is need for strict scrutiny by the court. Again, in the latter part of the judgment the learned Judge also lays down what exactly are the tests to find out the reasonableness or otherwise of a restriction. No doubt, the learned Judges have sounded a note of caution that when restriction reaches the stage of prohibition, there is need for strict scrutiny by the court. Again, in the latter part of the judgment the learned Judge also lays down what exactly are the tests to find out the reasonableness or otherwise of a restriction. The learned Judge observes at page 436: ''In applying the test of reasonableness, the court has to consider the question in the background of the facts and circumstances under which the order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the ratio of the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficial effects reasonably expected to result to the general public. It will also be necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint caused by the law is more than was necessary in the interests of the general public. " It will be seen from the extract quoted above that in considering the question of reasonableness or otherwise of a particular provision which is under consideration, the courts must consider the question in the background of facts and circumstances under which the order was made as also taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied and also the ratio of the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy to the beneficial effects reasonably expected to the general public. 34. In the later decision in Abdul Hakim v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 448, at page 454, Mr. Justice Das, after referring to the previous decisions, quotes the observations in the earlier decision in State of Madras v. V. G. Row A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196 " The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. Another consideration which has to be kept in mind is that ' the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community by whose sufferage it comes into existence...' See State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952 S.C.R. 889 ; A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252). Another consideration which has to be kept in mind is that ' the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community by whose sufferage it comes into existence...' See State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952 S.C.R. 889 ; A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252). But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the law must rest with the court and the court must not shirk that solemn duty cast on it by the Constitution . " Therefore, it will be seen from the extract quoted above, that in considering the question of reasonableness or otherwise of a particular provision which is under consideration by the court, the court is bound to see the nature of the right which is alleged to have been infringed as also the underlying purpose of the restrictions that have been imposed and the evil sought to be remedied by the same. At page 455, the learned Judge, quotes with approval an extract from the earlier decision reported in Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118 at 119. " The phrase ' reasonable restriction ' connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word ' reasonable ' implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the. quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality. " It is really having due regard to the various tests laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the decisions referred to above, that the question in this case will have to be considered as to whether the attack made on the provisions of rule 324 (a) by the petitioners in these proceedings, that they do not amount to a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public under Article 19(6) is to be accepted or not. The learned Government Pleader has drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Harman Singh v. R.T.A., Calcutta Region A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 190 where Their Lordships upheld the introduction of small taxis and rejected the contention of the owners of the big taxis that the introduction of such small taxis will totally deprive the business that is being run by the big taxis. This contention was negatived by the learned Judges on the ground that none of the rights of the owners of the big taxis to carry on their occupation and ply taxis as such has been taken away by the provision introducing small taxis in the field. In my view, this observation of the Supreme Court applies with full force to the case of the petitioners also. The decision of the Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India also goes to the extent of holding that the term ' restriction' occurring in Article 19 of the Constitution can amount also to a total deprivation. I am only referring to this aspect because it was urged for the petitioners that if the petitioners do not comply with the requirement regarding painting, they cannot carry on the business of transporting passengers for hire. In this case I am satisfied that there is absolutely no total deprivation of the rights of any of the petitioner's to carry on the business of conveying travelling public for hire in any of their motor cabs. No doubt there is a restriction to this extent, namely, that if any of the petitioners want to run their motor cabs for the purpose of hire by way of carrying travelling public, they must comply with the provisions of rule 324 (a) regarding painting in the particular colour laid down therein. No doubt there is a restriction to this extent, namely, that if any of the petitioners want to run their motor cabs for the purpose of hire by way of carrying travelling public, they must comply with the provisions of rule 324 (a) regarding painting in the particular colour laid down therein. The learned Government Pleader has also invited my attention to a decision of the Madras High Court reported in M. Kevalchand v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 514 where certain restrictions placed by the legislature on the carrying on of activities of pawn-brokers have been accepted by the learned Judges on the ground that as against the large body of public who were availing themselves of loans from these pawn-brokers taken in relation to the small number of pawn-brokers whose rights were sought to be restricted and because of other circumstances, the restrictions were held to be reasonable in the interests of the general public under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. Again, the learned Government Pleader referred me to the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court reported in P.B.M.CM. Union v. Commissioner of Police A.I.R. 1960 CAL. 125 wherein an order of the Commissioner of Police prohibiting the use of cycle carts was challenged, as being opposed to Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution but was negatived. 35. In my view, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, will have to be applied in each individual case and the court will have to come to a conclusion, whether having due regard to these principles, the particular provision under attack can be sustained as a reasonable restriction in the interests of general public under Article 19 (6). Therefore, I am not referring in any great detail either to the decision of the Madras High Court in M. Kevalchand v. State of Madras or to P.B.M.C. M. Union v. Commissioner of Police . 36. From the various matters referred to in the counter-affidavit of the State, it is clear that the requirement about painting of motor cabs is for easy identification. With that object, other motor vehicles have been prohibited from adopting this colour. 36. From the various matters referred to in the counter-affidavit of the State, it is clear that the requirement about painting of motor cabs is for easy identification. With that object, other motor vehicles have been prohibited from adopting this colour. It is also clear that the original requirement prior to the framing of rule 324 (a), viz., of motor cabs having numbers and digits in black against white background as a mark of identification, was not found sufficient. There was malpractice on the part of some at least of the owners of motor cabs and such vehicles were seized under section 129 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act and members of the public were put to hardship. A distinguishing colour for motor cabs whatever the colour is will certainly enable any member of the public, however illiterate he is, to easily identify a motor cab, which he can hire for his use. The restriction may place some hardship on owners of motor cabs. But considering the large body of travelling public who will be benefited by this, the small hardship that may be caused to a small body of motor cab owners must be considered to be negligible and not disproportionate. The limitation imposed on the owners of motor cabs regarding painting cannot, in my view, be considered either as arbitrary, or as being of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the travelling public. Therefore, I am of the view that rule 324 (a) can be sustained under Article 19 (6). 37. No doubt, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that if the object of the State Government was that there should be an easy identification of the taxi cabs, that purpose is served by the requirement which is already in force of having the registration number of the taxi cabs being painted on white boards with black letters and digits. I am not inclined to approach this question from this point of view, because there will be several methods, by which the object is sought to be achieved by the State Government. The question for this court to consider is, whether the requirement prescribed in rule 324 (a) regarding the painting in a particular colour is or is not a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. The question for this court to consider is, whether the requirement prescribed in rule 324 (a) regarding the painting in a particular colour is or is not a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. Even otherwise, I have pointed out earlier that the requirement of number plates was abused by some ot the owners of the motor cabs. 38. Once again, at the risk of repetition, I may mention that none of the petitioners has challenged the particular colour prescribed by the authorities under rule 324 as either obnoxious or not welcome to any of these taxi owners. But the large ground of attack, as 1 mentioned earlier, is regarding the compulsion of the taxi cabs to be painted in a particular manner, i.e., the requirement regarding colour is under attack. 39. Learned counsel Mr. T. C. N. Menon, in particular, as I have already indicated, referred to rule 233 as providing a sufficient safeguard in the interests of the travelling public. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel based upon rule 233. Rule 233 really prescribes the methods by which the taxi cabs are to make themselves available when they are stationary in a motor cab stand. That has nothing to do with the object of rule 324, which is under attack, viz., of easy identification of motor cabs, wherever they may be. 40. Having due regard to all the considerations referred to in the counter-affidavit, to which I have referred, I am satisfied that the limitation in the rule, regarding colour of the motor cabs to be in a particular manner as provided under rule 324 (a) is really a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public, viz., the travelling public, for whose benefit the taxis are run. Therefore, the contention that such a restriction cannot be considered to be a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (6), cannot be accepted in the circumstances of this case. 41. In the result, all the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners fail and all the writ petitions are dismissed. The petitioners in each of these petitions will pay half costs to the respective respondents therein.