Judgment :- 1. The scope and ambit of constructive res judicata in proceedings in execution come up for consideration in this second appeal. Incidentally proviso (c) to S.60 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure is also involved in the case. 2. The second appeal arises out of E. A. No. 694 of 1958, being a petition filed by the appellant before me to release the property from attachment, as it is the house and site belonging to and occupied by him, who is an agriculturist. Both the lower courts have dismissed the application holding that the appellant is debarred by constructive res judicata to raise the question. Both the courts have held that he is an agriculturist and the property is his house exempted from attachment or sale under proviso (c) to S.60(1) of the Code and on that question there is no dispute in second appeal either. The question in second appeal is whether the appellant is precluded from raising his claim for exemption under proviso (c) to S.60 (1) of the Code by reason of his previous conduct, which works as constructive res judicata against him. 3. R.E.P. No. 746 of 1956 was filed by the original decree-holder and the assignee of the decree for recognition of the assignment and for execution of the decree. In that petition the appellant was the 2nd respondent and he was personally served on 24th October 1956. He appears to have signed and affixed his thumb impression on the copy of the notice. The endorsement by him thereon was to the effect that the "notice and copy were received". The wording of the notice served on him, as disclosed by the judgment of the lower appellate court, was "for the recognition of the assignment and execution." The endorsement and the report of the process server, who served the notice on the appellant, was to the effect that he "gave the copies to the appellant on 24th October 1956 and got his signature and thumb impression." These are the materials available for ascertaining the contents of the notice of execution served on the appellant and the effect thereof on the question of constructive res judicata. In pursuance to this notice the appellant did not appear and on 28th March 1957 the assignment was recognised and attachment ordered. In pursuance to this notice the appellant did not appear and on 28th March 1957 the assignment was recognised and attachment ordered. The execution petition was then posted to 8th June 1957 and the attachment was actually effected on 2nd May. Finally, the execution petition was posted to 16th July 1957 for production of draft sale papers. The draft was produced on 19th August and eventually notice was ordered on the draft sale proclamation to the appellant. When the appellant got notice of the draft sale proclamation, he put in his objection stating that the property was not liable for attachment nor for sale, as he was entitled to the benefit of proviso (c) to S.60 (1), Code of Civil Procedure. The execution court held that the appellant was debarred from raising the question at that stage because of constructive res judicata, since he failed to raise the objection at the time of attachment, of which he was duly served; and directed his objection to be recorded. Consequently, the appellant filed E.A. No. 694 of 1958, which has given rise to the second appeal. 4. Two questions are raised before me: (1) regarding the scope of the notice served on the appellant on 24th October 1956 and its effect on constructive res judicata and [2] whether the appellant could not raise his claim for exemption under proviso [c] to S.60[1] of the Code at a later stage of the same execution petition, though he did not raise his objection to the attachment at an earlier stage. Be it noted at this stage that no evidence regarding the service of the notice dated 24th October 1956 has been adduced excepting the endorsement and return of the process server already referred to. The process server has not been examined. There is no evidence to show as to what was the copy or copies that were given to the appellant. As the lower appellate court points out, the notice served on the appellant was only for recognising the assignment and for execution. The notice did not indicate that the execution sought was by attachment and sale of any property, much less the house and site of the appellant exempted under proviso [c] to S.60 [1] of the Code. It is well known that the principles of constructive res judicata should be applied to proceedings in execution with great care and caution. The notice did not indicate that the execution sought was by attachment and sale of any property, much less the house and site of the appellant exempted under proviso [c] to S.60 [1] of the Code. It is well known that the principles of constructive res judicata should be applied to proceedings in execution with great care and caution. It is also settled that, unless the judgment-debtor was appraised by notice of the question that was likely to be considered by the court and he remained ex parte, constructive res judicata cannot be a bar against him so as to prevent him from raising the question, of which he had no notice previously. [Vide Azhakappa Chetti v. S.A. Ramanathan Chettiar (AIR. 1933 Mad. 466); Subramania Ayyar v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai alias Muthuramalinga Sethupathi [ILR. 40 Mad. 1016] and Parameswaran Nair v. Ayyappan Pillai [1958 KLT. 1021). Therefore, before the principles of constructive res judicata are applied against the judgment-debtor in a proceeding in execution, it must be established that he had notice of the particular question, which he seeks to raise now, on a previous occasion and he failed to raise any objection to that question and if, after such failure to appear and raise his objection, the court decided that question against him, the judgment-debtor cannot thereafter be allowed to raise that question at a subsequent stage. I am also of opinion that there is some difference between the case of a judgment-debtor raising an objection which he should have raised earlier, at a subsequent stage of the same execution petition and the case of a judgment-debtor raising an objection, which he should have raised in a previous execution petition, in a subsequent execution petition. I am inclined to think that the judgment-debtor, who fails to raise an objection at a prior stage of the same execution petition, should not be debarred from raising the objection at a later stage of the same execution petition, though, if he raises it in a subsequent execution petition, he would be debarred, if the previous execution petition, in which the objection was not taken, became fructuous. If, on the other hand, the previous execution petition became infructuous either by a dismissal on merits or by a dismissal for default, in such a case the judgment-debtor can raise the objection, which he should have raised in the previous execution petition, in the subsequent execution petition. [Vide pp. 1025 and 1026 of Subramania Ayyar's Case in I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1016 and Genda Lal v. Hazari Lal [A.I.R.1936 All. 21 (F. B.). In the circumstances of the present case I am not satisfied that by serving a notice for recognising the assignment and for execution of the decree, the judgment-debtor was given notice of attachment of a particular property. Unless there is more evidence to prove that the copy or copies served on him were the attachment schedule and other papers which give him sufficient notice of the intended attachment of a particular property, he should not be held to be debarred from raising his objection to the attachment even in a subsequent execution petition. In the present case the objection raised being in the same execution petition at a later stage, the failure to raise it at an earlier stage of the same execution petition is no bar. 5. The next question relates to the appellant's claim for exemption under proviso (c) to S.60 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not disputed that the property sought to be brought to sale is the house belonging to the agriculturist judgment-debtor and occupied by him coming within proviso (c) to S.60 (1). The contention of the learned advocate of the respondents is that the objection to attachability as well as saleability should have been taken at the time, when notice of attachment was given to the judgment-debtor. If the judgment-debtor failed to raise his objection to the attachment, he cannot raise his objection that the property already attached is not liable to be sold; for, according to the learned advocate, attachment goes to the root of the matter and failure to raise objection to attachment is failure to raise objection to sale as well. In support of this contention he relies on the observation of Ghulam Hassan, J. in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee (AIR. In support of this contention he relies on the observation of Ghulam Hassan, J. in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee (AIR. 1953 S.C. 65) to the effect that the failure to raise an objection, which goes to the root of the matter, precludes the judgment-debtor from raising the plea of jurisdiction on the principle of constructive res judicata. But it may be noted that the case before the Supreme Court was one, wherein the plea of jurisdiction was raised after the property was sold to the auction purchaser, who also entered into possession. Therefore, I do not think that the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court can be of any help to the respondents in the present case. In the case before me, even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the notice served on the judgment-debtor on 24th October 1956 was a notice of attachment in pursuance of which the judgment-debtor did not raise any objection to attachment, even then he cannot be prevented from raising his objection to sale of the property attached. The notice served on the judgment-debtor on 24th October 1956 was only a notice under O. XXI, R.54. Subsequent to that the court had to pass an order under R.64 of the same Order for sale of the property attached and thereafter the court had to cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made under R.66. In this case even if it is assumed that an order for sale under R.64 was passed (there is no specific evidence on the point), it is not claimed that any notice was served on the judgment-debtor prior to such order for sale. The earliest notice he got regarding sale was the notice under R.66 and when he got that notice, he came forward with his claim for exemption under proviso (c) to S.60 (1). In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the objection raised by the judgment-debtor to sale was proper and in time. According to me, the judgment debtor can raise his objection under proviso (c) to S.60(1) at the time of attachment as well as at the time of sale. If he does not object to attachment, he does not lose his right to object to sale. In this connection it is interesting to consider the wording of S.60 (1) and proviso (c) thereof. If he does not object to attachment, he does not lose his right to object to sale. In this connection it is interesting to consider the wording of S.60 (1) and proviso (c) thereof. S.60 (1) lays down that the properties mentioned therein are liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. The proviso then provides that the particulars mentioned therein shall not be liable to such attachment or sale. The section speaks of "attachment and sale" and the proviso deals with "attachment or sale". Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned advocate of the respondents, contends that "attachment or sale" in the proviso only means "attachment and sale" as in the section. According to him both the terms are conjunctive; so that the result of his contention is that if the judgment-debtor does not object to attachment, he cannot object to sale and sale follows as a consequence. I am not inclined to accede to this argument. According to me, even if the expression "attachment or sale" in the proviso is only conjunctive as in the section itself and not disjunctive, about which I have some doubt, even then the judgment-debtor can claim exemption under the proviso both at the time of attachment and at the time of sale. This view is supported by a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chagnati Raghava Reddi v. Kondapaneni Krishnayya (AIR. 1960 A.P. 631). I would therefore hold that the judgment-debtor¬appellant is entitled to succeed in the second appeal on both the points raised by his learned counsel. 6. The second appeal is consequently allowed, E.A. No. 694 of 1958 is allowed and the attachment raised. In the circumstances of the case, I direct both parties to suffer their costs throughout. Leave to appeal granted. Allowed.