JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This appeal has come to us on a reference made by Mr. Justice Gupta. 2. The respondent Mohammad Hanif filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif of Bijnor for the recovery of Rs. 1,141-14-0 from the appellant on the allegation that in pursuance of an order of the appellant the respondent had supplied the goods in question but the appellant had not paid the price. The suit was contested on merits and the appellant also raised the question of jurisdiction. He contended that the Court of the Munsif of Bijnor had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. His contention was that he resided at Calcutta and as the order was placed at Calcutta and the price was to be paid there only the Calcutta Courts had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Several issues were framed by the Munsif and one of them related to the question of jurisdiction. Some evidence was necessary for deciding the question of jurisdiction and that evidence would have been common to the other issues too. Learned counsel for the parties, therefore agreed that the question of jurisdiction should be decided along with the other questions in the case, i.e. after the evidence had been recorded. The Munsif, therefore, recorded the evidence of the parties and took up the case for decision. He answered the issue of jurisdiction against the plaintiff but proceeded to record his findings on the other issues also and found that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the amount claimed. As a result of his finding on the question of jurisdiction, however, the learned Munsif directed that the plaint be returned for presentation to proper Court. 3. Against this order of the learned Munsif the plaintiff-respondent filed an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was heard by the Additional Civil Judge of Bijnor. The appeal had been filed under Or. XLIII, R. 1, C.P.C. as a miscellaneous appeal against the order returning the plaint for presentation to proper Court. It, however, appears that the appeal was argued not only on the question of jurisdiction but also on the other issues in the case. The learned Civil Judge differed from the learned Munsif on the issue of jurisdiction. He held that the Munsif had jurisdiction to try the suit. It, however, appears that the appeal was argued not only on the question of jurisdiction but also on the other issues in the case. The learned Civil Judge differed from the learned Munsif on the issue of jurisdiction. He held that the Munsif had jurisdiction to try the suit. In respect of the other findings, however, the view of the learned Munsif was endorsed. The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was decreed with costs. Against that decree this second appeal was filed in this Court. When it came up before Mr. Justice B.D. Gupta for hearing he felt doubtful whether in the miscellaneous appeal against the order directing the plaint for presentation to proper Court the learned Civil Judge could go into merits and pass a decree in the suit itself. No reported decision was brought to the notice of the learned Judge. As he thought that an authoritative pronouncement on the question was needed, he referred the case to a Division Bench. That is how the case has come up before us. 4. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the Munsif having come to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit ought not to have recorded any findings on the other issues involved. If he recorded any such findings they were of no effect. The decision of the learned Munsif should, therefore, be treated as confined to the question of jurisdiction only. The final order he passed was that the plaint be returned for presentation to proper Court. That order was passed under Or. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. The order was appealable under Or. XLIII, R. 1(a) of the Code. The appeal heard by the Civil Judge was, in fact, filed under that provision. In that appeal the learned Civil judge could be concerned only with the question whether the suit was or was not entertain able by the learned Munsif. He should have considered that question only and having arrived at a finding on that question should have ignored the other findings recorded by the Munsif and should not have recorded any findings of his own on those questions He should have sent the case back to the learned Munsif for the decision of the other issues. 5. He should have considered that question only and having arrived at a finding on that question should have ignored the other findings recorded by the Munsif and should not have recorded any findings of his own on those questions He should have sent the case back to the learned Munsif for the decision of the other issues. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand urged that the Munsif had recorded the entire evidence on all the issues involved. He knew that the order he was passing about the return of the plaint was an appealable order. In order to avoid a possible remand he recorded the findings on the other issues also. On the appeal being filed against the order the whole suit became at large before the appellate Court. The powers of the appellate Court were identical with those of the trial Court. If the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the suit was triable by it, it could decide the whole suit. The appellate Court was, therefore, not prevented from dealing with the whole suit and deciding it when it came to the conclusion that the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Learned counsel urged that the case was analogous to that of first appeal from an order of remand. It has been held in more cases than one by this Court as well as some other High Court that in case of an appeal against an order of remand the High Court can go into the merits and decide all the points in the case. Learned Counsel referred in this connection to Badam v. Imrat, I.L.R. III All. 675 Hasan Ali v. Siraj Husain, I.L.R. XVI All. 252 = I.L.R. 16 All. 252 Sankaran v. Raman Kutti, I.L.R. XX Mad. 152 and Somasundaram Chetti v. Nachal Achi, AIR 1935 Madras 707. 6. The issue of jurisdiction that was raised before the learned Munsif was one which went to the root of the matter. It would have been better if the learned Munsif had tried it as a preliminary issue. That is the ordinary practice. It is only when the Court decides that it has jurisdiction that it proceeds to record its findings on the other issues involved. It would have been better if the learned Munsif had tried it as a preliminary issue. That is the ordinary practice. It is only when the Court decides that it has jurisdiction that it proceeds to record its findings on the other issues involved. If it comes to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction it leaves the other questions undecided because the decision in other questions will, according to the view of the Court itself, be without jurisdiction. In the present case, however, the Munsif though he came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction recorded his findings on the other questions also. The final order he passed, was, however, an order for returning the plaint for presentation to proper Court. That order did not amount to a decree. It was only an order against which a miscellaneous appeal could lie under Or. XLIII, R. 1(a). In such a miscellaneous appeal, in our view, the appellate Court was seized only of the single question whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or not. As it was not an appeal involving the whole matter in dispute but was an appeal confined to a single question in that appeal the whole case was not before the appellate Court to enable it to decide it in any manner it liked. In that appeal only two courses were open to the learned Civil Judge. He could come to the conclusion that the learned Munsif's view that he had no jurisdiction was correct. In that case the appeal was to be dismissed. If on the other hand the learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion that the view taken by the learned Munsif on the question of jurisdiction was erroneous he could record his own finding that the suit was triable by the Munsif and send the case back to him for decision on merits. In that case the Munsif would have proceeded to record his findings on the other issues and pass a decree in the suit. 7. In view of Secs. 107 and 108, C.P.C. read with rules 24 and 33 of Or. XLI of the Code the powers of the appellate Court are the same as that of the trial court and the appellate Court can pass all such orders in the case as the trial court could pass and ought to have passed. 7. In view of Secs. 107 and 108, C.P.C. read with rules 24 and 33 of Or. XLI of the Code the powers of the appellate Court are the same as that of the trial court and the appellate Court can pass all such orders in the case as the trial court could pass and ought to have passed. These provisions are by virtue of R. 2 of Or. XLIII of the Code applicable as far as possible to appeals against orders also. But on that account the distinction between an appeal against a decree and an appeal against an order does not get obliterated. The only thing that follows from the fact that the trial and appellate Courts .have identical powers is that when an appeal is filed against a decree the appellate Court can deal with the whole case and pass any decree which the trial court should have passed but did not pass. In the case of an appeal against an order also the appellate court can pass that order which should have been passed by the trial court but was not passed by it. This identity of powers cannot, however, entitle the appellate Court to ignore the scope of the appeal itself. If the appeal relates to a particular matter the powers of the appellate Court can be exercised only in that matter and not the other matters involved in the case. The appeal may, for instance, relate only to an incidental matter which has little bearing on the merits of the case itself. In such an appeal against a miscellaneous order it would be open to the appellate Court to pass an order only in respect of the particular incidental matter. It cannot in that appeal dismiss the suit or pass a decree on merits. Doing that will be ignoring altogether the limited scope of the appeal which is being dealt with by the appellate Court. Learned counsel for the respondent in this connection tried to make a distinction between appeals against orders arising out of proceedings distinct from the suit and appeals against orders arising from the suit itself. He urged that it may not be open to the appellate Court to deal with the suit itself when the appeal is against a miscellaneous order like the issue of a temporary injunction or an order setting aside a dismissal for default. He urged that it may not be open to the appellate Court to deal with the suit itself when the appeal is against a miscellaneous order like the issue of a temporary injunction or an order setting aside a dismissal for default. But, according to him, an order returning the plaint for presentation to proper court stands on a different footing. In an appeal from such an order the whole suit becomes open before the appellate Court and can be disposed of by it. The argument is that an issue of jurisdiction is not an independent proceeding stemming out of the suit as happens when a question of issuing an injunction or attachment before judgment arises. The whole suit is there before the trial Court and also before the appellate Court when the question of jurisdiction is being considered. 8. Learned Counsel thus concedes that as a general rule in an appeal from a miscellaneous order the appellate Court has to deal only with the matter under appeal and cannot deal with the whole suit. He would like to make an exception when the miscellaneous appeal relates to the question of jurisdiction. The exception is, however, not justified. We cannot see why if the appeal is against an order returning the plaint for presentation to proper Court the appellate Court should not confine itself to that particular question and should be entitled to deal with the whole case as if the appeal was against a decree and the whole case was at large before the appellate Court. The question of jurisdiction, as we have said already, is raised as a preliminary question. It is only after that question is decided that the Court can address itself to the merits of the case. Simply because a question of jurisdiction is first taken up by the Court and is decided against the plaintiff and an appeal is filed against that decision it does not follow that the whole case becomes pending before the appellate Court to be dealt with by it. 9. There is a very valid reason why the scope of the appeal against an order should not be increased to cover the whole suit. An order passed by the appellate Court in an appeal against an order is final and not open to any further appeal. 9. There is a very valid reason why the scope of the appeal against an order should not be increased to cover the whole suit. An order passed by the appellate Court in an appeal against an order is final and not open to any further appeal. If it becomes permissible to dispose of the whole case in an appeal against an order the finality of the appellate order is likely to be affected. It will be noted in this connection that an order for returning the plaint for presentation to proper Court has not been given the status of a decree by the Code. An appeal against an order is filed under Or. XLIII, R. I (a). The order of the appellate Court is final and no appeal is provided by the Code against that order. The finality of this question will no longer be there if while dealing with the appeal the appellate Court becomes entitled to pass a decree in the suit against which a second appeal will ordinarily lie. In respect of this particular kind of order, therefore, the distinction between an order and a decree will be obliterated. It is, therefore, not contemplated by the Code that a decree can also be passed while dealing with an appeal from order under Or. XLIII, R. 1 (a) of the Code. 10. The cases relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent are all cases of first appeals from orders of remand. In Badam v. Imrat, I.L.R. III All. 675 the suit was for possession by the enforcement of a right like pre-emption. The defendant had among other pleas raised the plea of limitation. The trial court had dismissed the suit holding that it was barred by limitation. The plaintiff appealed. The lower appellate Court held that the suit was for possession and not to enforce a right of preemption. It further held that the suit was within time and as it differed from the view of the trial Court on the question of limitation it set aside the decree of the trial Court and remanded the case for retrial of two issues. The defendant appealed, to the High Court and one of the questions raised was whether the High Court could go into the question of limitation considered by the trial. Court and decide it. The defendant appealed, to the High Court and one of the questions raised was whether the High Court could go into the question of limitation considered by the trial. Court and decide it. The view taken was that the question of limitation could be considered and determined in the appeal. In Hasan Ali v. Siraj Husain, I.L.R. XVI All. 252at first a suit for recovery for possession was brought by three persons but was dismissed. One of those persons along with another person Siraj Husain then filed another suit against the same defendants for possession over the same property. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court as barred by limitation as well as by res-judicata. An appeal was filed before the District Judge who being of opinion that the suit was neither barred by limitation nor by res-judicata set aside the decree of the trial Court and remanded the case for trial on merits. A first appeal from order of remand was then filed in this court and again the question was whether the questions of limitation or res judicata could be dealt with by this Court. It was held that they could be so dealt with. In Sankaran v. Raman Kutti, I.L.R. XX Mad. 152 some money had been deposited for the redemption of a mortgage. The plaintiff claimed declaration that he was entitled to one-fourth share in the money on the ground that it was joint family property and he was a member of the family. The defendant contested the suit and claimed that the money was not joint family property but belonged to him alone. The Munsif held that a suit for a bare declaration was not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the suit. The Subordinate Judge reversed the decree and remanded the suit for trial. A first appeal from order was then filed against the order of remand and it was contended that the only thing which could be considered was whether the order of remand was justified or not. The Court could not consider whether the suit was actually barred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. It was held that against an erroneous order of remand the Court may, if it thinks fit, pass a final decree instead of merely remanding the suit to the lower appellate Court. The Court could not consider whether the suit was actually barred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. It was held that against an erroneous order of remand the Court may, if it thinks fit, pass a final decree instead of merely remanding the suit to the lower appellate Court. The decision in Somasundram Chetti v. Nachal Achi, AIR 1935 Madras 707 is on the same lines. 11. All these cases appear to be distinguishable from the present case inasmuch as in all these cases the trial Court had passed a decree and the appeal before the lower appellate Court was against that decree so that the whole case was open before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court could while deciding the appeal deal with the whole case and decide all the points in issue and pass a final decree. Instead of doing that, it had remanded the case to the trial Court on some ground or other. The appeal to the High Court was against the decision of the lower appellate Court. Everything that could be done by the lower appellate Court could, therefore, be done by the High Court also. The chief point of distinction between this set of cases and the present one is that in the present case there is no decree ever passed by the trial Court and, therefore, the whole case could not be held to be open before the learned Civil Judge. 12. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that in the present case the learned Civil Judge could not and ought not to have passed a decree at all. He should have confined his consideration to the question of jurisdiction alone and having come to the conclusion that the learned Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain the claim he ought to have sent the case back to the learned Munsif for trial of the other issues framed. The findings recorded by the learned Munsif on the other issues having been recorded when the learned Munsif was under the impression that he had no jurisdiction should have been ignored. 13. The findings recorded by the learned Munsif on the other issues having been recorded when the learned Munsif was under the impression that he had no jurisdiction should have been ignored. 13. That being the position, when the learned Civil Judge wrongly passed a decree instead of an order of remand a second appeal against that decree could be filed here and the validity of the decree as well as the finding on the question of jurisdiction recorded by the learned Civil Judge could be questioned. As the decree ought not to have been passed it is liable to be set aside and the case should go back through the learned Civil Judge to the trial Court for the decision of the issues other than the issue of jurisdiction. 14. An unsuccessful attempt was made in this court to challenge the correctness of the finding of the learned Civil Judge that the Bijnor Court had jurisdiction. The learned Civil Judge has found as a fact that one of the implied terms of the contract under which the goods in question were supplied was that they would be booked at Kiratpur in the district of Bijnor. This implied term has been inferred from the fact that the parties had agreed that the goods would be sent by rail. The goods in question were actually sent from Kiratpur and were taken delivery of at Calcutta. The railway receipts were in favour of self but must have been endorsed in favour of the defendant otherwise the defendant could not have been in a position to take delivery of the goods at Calcutta. It is not suggested that the endorsement was made at Calcutta or that the plaintiff himself took delivery at Calcutta and handed over the goods to the defendant at that place. It is, therefore, clear that after dispatching the goods by rail and obtaining the railway receipts the plaintiff endorsed the railway receipts and sent the same by post to the defendant at Calcutta in order to take their delivery. That being the position the railway or the post-office must be held to have been agents of the defendant and the deli-very must be presumed to have been made at Kiratpur and as the delivery was a part of the cause of action the Bijnor Court had the jurisdiction. 15. That being the position the railway or the post-office must be held to have been agents of the defendant and the deli-very must be presumed to have been made at Kiratpur and as the delivery was a part of the cause of action the Bijnor Court had the jurisdiction. 15. The appeal, therefore, succeeds to this extent that the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge is set aside and his finding that the Bijnor Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit is upheld. The case will now go back through the learned Civil Judge to the Munsif of Bijnor for a decision of the issues in the case other than that of jurisdiction. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs of the second appeal but the rest of the costs shall abide the final result.