Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the Food Inspector of the Kozhikode Municipality and the appeal is against an order of acquittal. The respondent is a manufacturer and dealer in sweet-meats. On 1st July 1960 the appellant purchased from the respondent some sweets from the stock manufactured for sale. A sample of the sweet was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst who certified that the said sample contained a type of coaltar dye not permitted to be used in food under the rules and was therefore adulterated. The learned District Magistrate, Kozhikode who tried the case, refused to act on the certificate as in his opinion it was too vague and general and did not even indicate the particular variety of coaltar dye that was found in the article analysed. 2. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the view taken by the Magistrate that the opinion of the Analyst is too vague and general to be acted upon is erroneous. It is also argued that in the face of R.28 which enumerates the varieties of coaltar dyes or mixtures thereof which can be used the Analyst when he found that the sample contained coaltar dye other than the permitted varieties, was not bound to pursue the matter further and specify the particular variety of coaltar dye that was used. He would contend for the position that the remedy of the accused if he were dissatisfied with the report would have been either to file an application as provided for in S.13 (2) of the Act for sending the sample to the Central Food Laboratory for further analysis, or to have challenged the correctness of the opinion of the Public Analyst by citing him as a witness and examining him in Court. 3. I do not feel that this is a fit case for interference with the order of acquittal. Nor can it be said that the learned Magistrate's hesitation to accept the opinion of the expert as conclusive is unjustifiable. 3. I do not feel that this is a fit case for interference with the order of acquittal. Nor can it be said that the learned Magistrate's hesitation to accept the opinion of the expert as conclusive is unjustifiable. Several decisions of this court and other courts have made the position quite clear that a certificate of this nature should contain not merely the final opinion of the expert on the nature of the article analysed but it has also to furnish the data on which the expert bases his opinion so that the court may be able to satisfy itself as to the correctness of the opinion expressed therein without the necessity of examining the expert himself before Court. As already noted the certificate in this case merely states that the sample analysed is adulterated as it: "contains a coaltar dye other than those permitted to be used in food by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules." Now, not all coalter dyes are forbidden. What is prohibited is the use of coaltar dyes other than those enumerated in R.28. Though it might not be correct to hold with the learned Magistrate that the expert should have specified the particular dye that was found, I feel that it is not unreasonable to say that the court which is confronted with the duty to find that a dye other than the permissible varieties was in fact used, should be told something of the data on which the expert based his opinion that such a dye was used. We do not know how it is that the expert arrived at his final opinion. For instance, we do not know whether he conducted a test to show that some type of coaltar dye was present in the sample and then went on with other tests to eliminate the possibility that the dye was one of the permissible types, or whether having suspected the use of a particular dye of the prohibited varieties he conducted a test to positively prove its presence. As we do not know what tests were conducted by the expert all arguments whether a particular test is of a conclusive nature or whether more than one test is needed for an acceptable verdict are in the realm of conjecture. I therefore think the learned Magistrate was right in refusing to act on the certificate. 4. As we do not know what tests were conducted by the expert all arguments whether a particular test is of a conclusive nature or whether more than one test is needed for an acceptable verdict are in the realm of conjecture. I therefore think the learned Magistrate was right in refusing to act on the certificate. 4. S.13 (5) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only provides that the report of the Public Analyst may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein without insisting on formal proof of the record by examining the Public Analyst. It does not absolve the court of its duty to find whether such evidence is acceptable or not. This naturally necessitates that the information contained in the report has to be such that the court which is not expected to be an expert in these matters can still check up the correctness of the conclusions. It may not be possible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the information to be contained in the report. That will depend upon the article of food analysed, the ground on which it is deemed adulterated and other relevant considerations. What I wish to emphasise is that in cases under the Food Adulteration Act where the main item of evidence to sustain the charge is the Analyst's report, the information given in the report should be as full and complete as could possibly be so that in a given case the court which is competent to treat the report as evidence may not be confronted with lacunae which can only be filled in by examining the expert in court. It is the duty of the Analyst to pay particular attention to this aspect. Otherwise the very purpose with which the provision appears to have been inserted viz., prevention of unnecessary delay and inconvenience - that might result from the Analyst being called upon to appear in court in each case - would be frustrated. I would also wish to emphasise the duty of the prosecutors to see that in cases where the information contained in the certificate is not full and complete to supplement it by citing the Analyst. I would also wish to emphasise the duty of the prosecutors to see that in cases where the information contained in the certificate is not full and complete to supplement it by citing the Analyst. It is needless to mention that in cases where the court experiences any difficulty in acting on the opinion given in the report the court has ample powers to cite the expert and clarify the matter. These observations are made in view of the several food adulteration cases which fail either in the trial court itself or in appeal for want of proper data in the certificate and the failure to supplement or clarify matters by citing the expert. 5. I would have been inclined to send back the case for fresh disposal for the examination of the Analyst but considering the fact that the transaction is almost two years old I am not doing it. 6. The order of acquittal is hence confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. Dismissed.