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1962 DIGILAW 145 (MP)

RATANLAL, MANAGER, SHRI KRISHNADEO WEAVING FACTORY, JABALPUR v. DULICHAND HATHIRAM

1962-08-10

SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA

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ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. This revision raises the question of jurisdiction of the Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, to try a complaint which was filed on April 15, 1961 under sections 42 and 47 of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No. XXIII of 1947. The complaint was filed by an employee against his employer. The maintainability of the complaint and the jurisdiction of the Magistrate were challenged by the employer. The preliminary objections were overruled by the Magistrate. Hence this revision. In order to appreciate the grievance of the employer, the allegations in the complaint may be mentioned at the outset. It was alleged that the complainant was employed by the accused as a weaver in his mills (Shri Krishnadeo Cotton Mills). Since the working conditions of the workers in the mills are bad, the complainant along with one Lalaram has formed a workers Union and got it registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions, The registered number of the Union is 411. The complainant was elected as Vice-President of the said Union. The employer has not adopted any Standing Orders as required under the law. He "misbehaved with the employees rudely". The complainant objected to this and agitated. He also pressed the accused to adopt the Standing Orders and to treat the workers properly. The accused was very much perturbed with the rising of the workers. He adopted various means to suppress the Trade Union activities of the complainant and wanted to remove him and his associates who had formed the Union to safeguard the interests of the workers of the mill. He dismissed Lalaram the Treasurer of the Union and thereafter he dismissed the complainant on October 17, 1960, for the sole reason of his being a Trade Union worker and representative of the employees. It is contended that the dismissal is illegal and amounts to an illegal change and that the accused has committed offences punishable under sections 42 and 47 of the Act. It is urged by Shri Jain that the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No. XXIII of 1947 (hereinafter called the old Act) having been repealed by section 112 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the new Act), which came into force on December 31, 1960, the present prosecution is not maintainable. I see no substance in the contention. I see no substance in the contention. Section 112 of the new Act, while repealing the old Act, saves all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities acquired, created or incurred under the old Act and enables legal proceedings or remedy' in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability to be instituted, continued or enforced as if the old Act has not been repealed and they would continue in operation. This saving clause which is contained in section 112 (b) of the new Act obviously speaks of substantive rights and liabilities which continue to be enforceable as if the 1947 Act has not been repealed. This sub-section has no applicability here. It is then urged for the petitioner that the Labour Court alone is competent to try this case. It seems clear to me that section 61 of the 1960 Act relied on by Shri Jain has no application here because the offences were not committed "under this Act" the offences were committed under the 1947 Act. Shri Jain then relies on sub-section (c) of section 112 of the 1960 Act. But that sub-section comes into play either when a proceeding is pending or is maintainable before an authority specified in the first column of the third schedule (See section 20 of the M. P. Industrial Relations) (Amendment) Act (No. 34) of 1961. Here it is conceded that u/s 57 of the old Act, a Magistrate First Class alone has jurisdiction. No other provision is placed before me which confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court or takes away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to try offences which were committed u/s 42 or 47 of the old Act, even when a complaint is filed after the repeal of that Act. This revision is, therefore, dismissed. Final Result :