MODI, J.—This civil regular second appeal by the plaintiffs Hazarimal and another has been directed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Pali, dated the 4th August, 1960, in a suit for money. 2. The material facts leading up to this appeal are, to a certain extent, common ground between the parties and these may be stated first. Thakur Ram Singh was indebted to one Pukhraj Devichand and in order to pay him off, he borrowed a sum of Rs. 4951/- from the plaintiffs on the 8th April, 1952, and in lieu thereof executed a promissory-note, Ex. 1, in favour of them, stipulating to pay interest thereon at the rate of one per cent per mensem. On the 13th December, 1952, an accounting was done between the parties, and it was found that a sum of Rs. 5430/- was due from the defendant to the plaintiff. This account was settled as follows:— 3. The defendant gave 60 maunds of Til of the value of Rs. 900/- to the plaintiffs, and the latter relinquished a sum of Rs. 100/- and for the balance of Rs. 4430/-, defendant Ram Singh gave over three letters to the plaintiffs: — (1) On Gosain Sewapuri for sum of Rs. 3226/8/- (Ex. 2); (2) On Alikhan Lalkhan for sum of Rs. 662/8/- (Ex. 4) and (3) On Sankalcl and Ja roopji for a sum of Rs. 541/-, (Ex. 3). Of these third parties, Alikhan paid Rs. 662/8/- to the plaintiffs, which was the entire sum which he had been called upon to pay by Ram Singh to them while Sankal Chand paid Rs. 400/- out of the sum of Rs. 541/- which he had been called upon to pay to the plaintiffs; but Sewapuri did not honour the letter of Ram Singh and declined to pay anything to the plaintiffs. In this manner, the plaintiffs received a sum of Rs. 1062/8/- only and thus a sum of Rs. 3367/8/-remained to be received by them. So far, the parties are in substantial agreement. But from this point onwards, they hotly disagree. 4. In this manner, the plaintiffs received a sum of Rs. 1062/8/- only and thus a sum of Rs. 3367/8/-remained to be received by them. So far, the parties are in substantial agreement. But from this point onwards, they hotly disagree. 4. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant Ramsingh had himself undertaken to discharge the liabilities covered by the three letters mentioned above, if and in so far as the third parties concerned on whom the letters had been given failed to pay the amounts which they had been called upon to pay to the plaintiffs and for this position, the plaintiffs rely on what Ramsingh had himself stated on the back of the promissory note Ex. 1 on the 13th December, 1932. The relevant wording is as follows: — ^^:i;k 5430½ Åij ekQd fnjk;k lks olwy b.k izksfetjh uksV jk pqdrk lks b.k fpfV~B;ka jh jde ugha iVh rks ftEesokjh fBdk.kk jh jslhA la- 2009 jk iksg onh 11- n% jkBkSM+] jkeflag** Translated in English), this means that a sum of Rs. 5430/- has been arranged to be paid in the manner mentioned above, and, therefore, has been credited in full payment of the promissory note. If, however, the amounts mentioned in the Various letters are not received (by the plaintiffs), then the responsibility for the same would be that of the Thikana. The position taken up by Ramsingh, on the other hand, was that once he had given the aforementioned letters to the persons concerned calling upon them to pay the various amounts mentioned therein to the plaintiffs, his responsibility had entirely ceased and that he was no longer liable to pay any money whatsoever to the plaintiffs because the latter had agreed to realise those amounts from the persons concerned and had given him the necessary credit with respect to the entire amount of the promissory-note. The defendant placed strong reliance in support of his position on the Khata Ex.A. 1, in which the dealings which took place between him and the plaintiffs had all been entered, and the plaintiffs themselves had squared up this Khata on the 13th December, 1952. 5. I cannot help pointing out here that the written statement filed by Ramsingh is most rambling and a highly unsatisfactory piece of pleading and makes extremely confused reading. This would appear from the further stand taken therein that so far as the amount of Rs. 5. I cannot help pointing out here that the written statement filed by Ramsingh is most rambling and a highly unsatisfactory piece of pleading and makes extremely confused reading. This would appear from the further stand taken therein that so far as the amount of Rs. 541/- for which a letter had been passed by Ramsingh to Sankalchand Jairoopji was concerned, the responsibility to pay this amount to the plaintiffs was still his (Ramsinghs) in case they did not receive this amount from Sankalchand. And it is further remarkable that Ramsingh would have it believed that it was only with respect to this amount that the endorsement as to the Thikanas responsibility in the event of non-payment was made on the back of the promissory-note Ex. 1. Probably this defendant thought that that was the best way of explaining away the highly significant undertaking which he had himself given on the back of the promissory-note, inasmuch as Sankalchand had paid a sum of Rs. 400/-to the plaintiffs before the suit came to be filed, and his further case was that he had declined to pay the balance of Rs. 141/-to the plaintiffs only because the latter had refused to hand over Ram Singhs letter on Sankalchand to him. It may be mentioned straightaway that after the suit was filed, Sankalchand was prepared to and did deposit the sum of Rs. 141/- which he admitted to be due from him to the Thakur along with his written statement and the trial court, under the circumstances, passed a decree against him for a sum of Rs. 24/8/-as interest with proportionate costs by its judgment dated the 2nd August, 1955. 6. Having regard to the attitude adopted by the defendant Sankalchand, it can be easily seen that defendant Ram Singh thought that it would be quite safe to take up the position which be did with respect to the money payable by Sankalchand on his behalf to the plaintiffs in the event the latter failed to receive it from him. 6. Having regard to the attitude adopted by the defendant Sankalchand, it can be easily seen that defendant Ram Singh thought that it would be quite safe to take up the position which be did with respect to the money payable by Sankalchand on his behalf to the plaintiffs in the event the latter failed to receive it from him. Defendant Ramsingh has laboured hard in his written statement to point out that the plaintiff Hazarimal was an Am-Mukhtar of this defendant and that he had the Thikana books with him in that capacity and that during the course of the discharge of his duties as Am Mukhtar, he had auctioned two grass-/ors, one belonging to his (Ramsinghs) wife and the other to his son, and that a sum of Rs. 3226/8/- was to be realised from defendant Sewapuri vide Ex. 2 on account of these grass Jon and this plaintiff had himself a share in this deal and had all the papers with regard to the said auction and consequently it was his duty to have realised the amount of Rs. 3226/8/- from Sewapuri, and if he failed to do so, the responsibility was his own and he had no right, once he had agreed to recover this amount from Sewapuri, to demand it from him (Ramsing) even if he had not received the same from Sewapuri. 7. It would be convenient to point out here that it is not at all in dispute between the parties that the plaintiff Hazarimal had ceased to be an Aam-Mukhtar of the defendant Ramsingh before the happenings of the 13th December, 1952, took place, or, in other words, before the said defendant had done the accounting on that date or had passed the three letters to Sewapuri, Alikhan and Sankalchand. The only other plea from those taken by Ramsingh, which it is necessary to mention is that according to him, the plaintiffs should have given him a notice of dishonour by Sewapuri of the letter which the former had given to the plaintiffs within a reasonable time of it having been so dishonoured, and that as they had failed to do so, he was, on this ground also, not liable to pay the amount of this letter to the plaintiffs. 8. 8. So far as defendant Sewapuri is concerned, he utterly denied that he had anything to pay to Thakur Ram Singh and the position taken up by him, therefore, was that he was not bound to honour the letter which Ram Single had made on him in favour of the plaintiffs. 9. In the replications filed on the 31st July, 1955, the plaintiff Hazarimal adhered to the position taken up by him in the plaint. 10. At this stage, it may also be pointed out that on the 17th December, 1955, the defendant Ram Singh moved an application for amending paragraph (3)(A) of his written statement so as to read that it was only with respect to the letter given on Sankalchand that he had accepted his ultimate responsibility and that the plaintiffs had got the relevant endorsement worded in such a way that this responsibility would extend to the amounts mentioned in all the letters given by the defendant but which was not acceptable to the defendant and had been mentioned by mistake which the defendant did not know at the time and as he had taken the final responsibility for one of the letters, he had signed the endorsement on the back of the promissory note. This amendment was opposed and disallowed by the trial court. 11. Before proceeding further, it may be mentioned that the plaintiffs claimed their relief in an alternative form, to wit, they claimed, in the first instance, a decree against defendant Ram Singh for a sum of Rs. 3367/8/- plus a sum of Rs. 932/8/- as interest at the stipulated rate of twelve per cent per annum, total amounting to Rs. 4300/- and pending and future interest at the same rate until the realisation of the decretal amount, and alternatively they also claimed a decree for Rs. 3226/8/- against both defendant Ram Singh and defendant Sewapuri together with interest at the stipulated rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of Ex. 2, that is, the 13th December, 1952, upto realisation, and a like decree against defendant Ram Singh and defendant Sankal Chand for a sum of Rs. 141/-together with interest at the aforementioned rate from the 13th December, 1952, upto the date of realisation. 12. It was in this state of pleadings that the matter came up before the trial court (Senior Civil Judge, Sirohi) on the 2nd August, 1955. 141/-together with interest at the aforementioned rate from the 13th December, 1952, upto the date of realisation. 12. It was in this state of pleadings that the matter came up before the trial court (Senior Civil Judge, Sirohi) on the 2nd August, 1955. The learned Judge was disposed to hold that as there was no contract of any kind between the plaintiffs and defendant Sewapuri, he could not be impleaded, and his name was accordingly struck out from the suit and he was also allowed Rs. 10/- as costs. Obviously, the learned Judge was of the opinion that there was no cause of action against defendant Sewapuri and as the suit would still remain alive even if it was dismissed against him, he seems to have thought it best to order that his name be struck out from the plaint. As respects Sankalchand, as already stated, he had deposited the sum of Rs. 141/- in court along with his written statement and that was the only amount which was due from him apart of course from interest. The learned trial Judge passed a decree for a sum of Rs. 24/8/- as interest together with proportionate costs and decreed the suit against him to that extent. This having been done, the learned Judge framed issues as between the plaintiffs and Ram Singh on the same date, i.e., the 2nd August, 1955. The trial proceeded accordingly. 13. The learned Judge framed the following issues:— (1) Whether it was the responsibility of the plaintiffs to recover the sum of Rs. 3226/8/- which was due from Sewapuri and was outstanding because the plaintiffs had also a share in the Theka for the Jor along with Sewapuri and all the papers relating thereto were in the possession of the plaintiffs in their capacity as Aam-Mukhtars of the Thikana? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are precluded from realising the sum of Rs. 3226/8/-from the defendant Ram Singh inasmuch as they failed to give notice to him within a reasonable time of Mah Sudi 15, Smt. 2009, it being the due date for payment of the amount? (3) Whether in view of the fact that in the event of the said sum not having been realised from Sewapuri, the responsibility for recovering it being that of the Thikana, Thakur Ramsingh personally was not responsible to pay the same as his Thikana, in the meantime, had been resumed. (3) Whether in view of the fact that in the event of the said sum not having been realised from Sewapuri, the responsibility for recovering it being that of the Thikana, Thakur Ramsingh personally was not responsible to pay the same as his Thikana, in the meantime, had been resumed. (4) Whether the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover interest at the rate of one rupee per cent, per mensem on the sum of Rs. 3226/8/- from the date of the accounting? and (5) What relief? The trial court decided all the issues against the defendant and decreed the plaintiffs suit for Rs. 4300/- and allowed future interest on the same at the rate of four per cent per annum. 14. Defendant Ramsingh then went in appeal to the learned District Judge, Pali, who by his judgment and decree reversed the decree of the trial court and framing a fresh issue sent the case back to the court for a fresh decision after permitting all the parties con cerned to lead evidence on it. That issue reads as follows:— "Is a sum of Rs. 3226/8/- due to Thakur Ramsingh defendant No. 1 from Sewapuri defendant No. 2 and the plaintiffs are, therefore entitled to recover this amount from Sewapuri? The learned District Judge was of the opinion that the learned Senior Civil Judge Sirohi was grossly in error in striking out the name of Sewapuri from the plaint without making any attempt to determine his liability for the payment of the amount mentioned in the Chitti Ex. 2, and that Sewapuri was a necessary party to such a suit, and, therefore, the learned Judge ordered that Sewapuris name be again added in the array of defendants so that it might be possible for the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The learned Judge also found that the dealings between the plaintiffs and Ramsingh constituted an assignment of an actionable claim within the meaning of S. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. He further found that "the transfer being complete, all the rights and remedies of Thakur Ramsingh vested in the plaintiffs respondents whose right it was to have pursued their remedy against Sewapuri by suit even without impleading the appellant." It is this decision which the plaintiffs challenge by the present appeal. 15. He further found that "the transfer being complete, all the rights and remedies of Thakur Ramsingh vested in the plaintiffs respondents whose right it was to have pursued their remedy against Sewapuri by suit even without impleading the appellant." It is this decision which the plaintiffs challenge by the present appeal. 15. Sewapuri has not put in appearance in spite of service. For facility of reference therefore, I shall refer to Ramsingh as the defendant in this case. 16. At the very outset, learned counsel for the defendant raised a preliminary objection that this appeal was incompetent, and in support of this submission, learned counsel placed his reliance on my decision in Punja Vs. Ramlal(1). The facts of that case were that the trial court had decided all the issues in the suit in favour of the plaintiff except the one relating to the maintainability of the suit in the form in which it was instituted, and the suit was therefore dismissed. The appellate court agreed with the trial courts finding as regards the non-maintainability of the suit but came to the conclusion that the plaint should have been allowed to be amended and therefore remanded the suit for allowing the amendment and trying it according to law. It was held that an order of remand like that could be passed under the inherent powers of the Court under S. 151 C.P.C. and no appeal was competent against such an order of remand. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that this ruling is entirely distinguishable on facts and that the order of remand in the present case amounts to a decree to the extent to which it disposed of important rights of the parties and that the court below had actually framed a decree-sheet after it had decided the appeal and that the present case is governed by a Bench decision of this Court to which also I was a party and which is reported as Manak Lal Vs. Madan Lal(2) 17. That was a suit for redemption of a certain shop. The defendants denied the plaintiffs right to redeem. The Munsiff dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had no right of redemption. He also held that the suit was barred by limitation. Madan Lal(2) 17. That was a suit for redemption of a certain shop. The defendants denied the plaintiffs right to redeem. The Munsiff dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had no right of redemption. He also held that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff appealed and the court of first appeal held that the plaintiff had a right to redeem, and on the question of limitation, it found that as no issue had been framed on that question, the parties had been prejudiced and were not able to lead all the evidence that they could have led. That court, therefore, remanded the suit with a direction that an issue of limitation should be framed and that after such evidence as might be adduced by the parties, the suit should be disposed of afresh according to law. Thereupon the defendant appealed to this Court. A preliminary objection was raised before a learned single Judge of this Court to the effect that the appeal was not maintainable, and as the question was of importance, the matter was referred to a Division Bench. After an elaborate discussion of the case law, it was held that: — "Where an appellate court completely disposes of an appeal and frames a decree in accordance with such disposal, and decides some of the matters in controversy in the suit conclusively and then orders a retrial or a remand, the decision amounts to a decree within the meaning of sec. 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as there is a formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to some of the matters in controversy in the suit." And it was further held that in such a case, a second appeal would lie to this Court. This decision was followed in another Bench decision of this Court reported as Yadavchandra Vs. Board of Secondary Education (3). 18. On a careful consideration of this matter, I have definitely come to the conclusion that the principle of these cases fully applies to the case before me. The trial court had decreed the suit against defendant Ramsingh holding that he could not escape his liability under the letter Ex. 2. Board of Secondary Education (3). 18. On a careful consideration of this matter, I have definitely come to the conclusion that the principle of these cases fully applies to the case before me. The trial court had decreed the suit against defendant Ramsingh holding that he could not escape his liability under the letter Ex. 2. When the matter came in appeal before the learned District Judge, it was contended by counsel for Ramsingh that the various letters executed by him in favour of the plaintiffs amounted to an assignment of a debt in favour of the plaintiffs and all the rights and remedies of Ramsingh against Sewapuri became vested in them. This contention which, let me pause to point out here, was raised for the first time before the learned Judge in appeal, prevailed with him. He held that the various letters clearly indicated an intention to assign a debt and that Ramsinghs debt amounting to Rs. 5430/- stood "wholly discharged" on account of the acceptance by the plaintiffs of these letters, and further that it was clear that the plaintiffs had accepted this arrangement in full and final settlement of their claim. The learned Judge concluded his discussion by finding that the transfer being thus complete, all the rights and remedies of Thakur Ramsingh vested in the plaintiffs and it was for them to have pursued their remedy against Sewapuri by a suit even without impleading Ramsing. It was in this view that he held that the trial court had fallen into gross error in striking out the name of Sewapuri from the plaint without making any attempt to determine his liability for the payment of the amount mentioned in the Chithi Ex. 2 which the defendant Ramsingh bad made on him in favour of the plaintiffs, and, therefore, Sewapuri was a necessary party to such a suit, and on this reasoning the learned Judge went to the length of impleading Sewapuri as defendant No. 2 in the suit by his judgment under appeal which is dated the 4th August, 1960, although the said defendant had been discharged from the suit by the trial court by its order dated the 2nd August, 1955. Although the learned Judge has not in so many words said it, this judgment necessarily absolves Ramsing from his liability towards the plaintiffs, though a further issue was framed which has already been cited above, to decide whether Sewapuri owed any money to Thakur Ramsingh defendant. A decision like this, in my considered opinion, amounts to a decree so far as the defendant Ramsingh is concerned and a decree has been actually framed by the lower appellate court although it has remanded the suit to try this further issue between the parties. All that being so I have no hesitation in holding that the decision of the learned District Judge finally decides the rights as between the plaintiffs and Ramsingh, which it would be no longer open for the courts below to question and such a decision fully satisfies the requirement of a decree as defined in S. 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. When an order of remand amounts to a decree, there can be no escape from the conclusion that second appeal would lie from it. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection fails and is hereby repelled. 19. Then to the merits. It has been strenuously debated before this Court on behalf of the plaintiffs that the learned District Judge had failed into a serious error of law when he made out an entirely new case for the defendant in first appeal. The contention of learned counsel is that the question of assignment of an actionable claim which was held proved by the learned District Judge was never raised by the defendant in his written statement which was a long and broad one, and that it was never put in issue or argued before the trial court and that it was not even raised in the grounds of appeal filed on behalf of the defendant Ramsingh in the District Judges Court. The grievance of learned counsel, therefore, is that a question like that which at the best is a mixed question of law and fact should not have been allowed to be raised and made the basis of its judgment by the court below. With all respect to the learned District Judge, it seems to me that this criticism of his judgment has very considerable force. 20. With all respect to the learned District Judge, it seems to me that this criticism of his judgment has very considerable force. 20. As I have already had occasion to point out above, the written statement of Ramsingh is a highly prolix and rambling pleading. I have read it more than once; but its central note appears to me to be that because he had passed on a number of letters to the persons named therein (and Sewapuri was one of them) calling upon them to pay certain sums of money to the plaintiffs and as the latter had accepted these letters, he had thereby fully discharged his liability to repay the debt he owed to the plaintiffs under the promissory-note and thereafter nothing further remained due from him. It is one thing to say this. But it is an entirely different thing to say that he (Ramsingh) had transferred all his rights and remedies with respect to certain debts which these other persons owed to him to the plaintiffs and that thereby they vested in them. There was nothing to prevent the defendant from saying this if he wanted to say so. And then an issue would certainly have been raised on that aspect of the case and both parties would have had the opportunity to lead all the evidence which they thought fit to adduce on it. None of these things was done. 21. The matter does not end there. The question of assignment does not seem to have been raised even in the grounds of appeal filed by Ramsingh in the court of the learned District Judge and yet this point was allowed to be raised for the first time during the course of arguments before that court, and the learned Judge somehow thought fit to give effect to it. I am definitely of the view that a point like this which pertains to the nature or character of the transaction entered into between the parties and which involved an investigation into facts should not have been made the foundation of its decision by the court below when it was not distinctly and specifically raised in the pleading of the party concerned and which, therefore, the other party did not have a fair and full opportunity to meet during the course of the trial. The situation may conceivably be different where the new point sought to be raised in appeal is a matter of pure law and does not require any investigation into facts, but that is not the case here. Now if the salutary principles I desire to emphasise, is not carefully observed, then the very object of insisting on proper pleadings and raising definite issues based on them would be entirely defeated and litigation would become a pure gamble. 22. To illustrate the impropriety of the course adopted by the learned District Judge, I would invite attention to some of the essential requirements and the effect of sec. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with the subject of transfer of actionable claims. Assuming that what was sought to be transferred by the defendant to the plaintiff was an actionable claim in the present case such a transfer could be made not orally but only by an instrument in writing signed by the transferor or his agent and presumably addressed to the transferee though the legal position is by no means clear in our country on the last-mentioned point. Where, however, an assignment is sought to be spelled out from a writing given on a third person by the author of it to the alleged transferee, a complicated situation may occur and a serious question arises whether what was given was an assignment or a mere pay order. The consequences of the two cannot possibly be the same in law. In the case of pay-order the liability of the party on whom the pay-order is given continues towards the maker of the pay-order if he does not pay as desired, but in the case of an assignment, broadly speaking, the assignee becomes entitled as of right to the payment. Again, a pay order is revocable but not so an assignment. Yet again, a pay order fails on the death of a drawer but an assignment does not. It will thus be seen that where there is no instrument executed by the drawer in favour of the payee directly and an assignment is sought to be supported on a writing given by the drawer on a third party, the question of assignment bristles with difficulties. 23. It will thus be seen that where there is no instrument executed by the drawer in favour of the payee directly and an assignment is sought to be supported on a writing given by the drawer on a third party, the question of assignment bristles with difficulties. 23. The next point to note, and that is the crux of the matter is, whether there is a "transfer" of the actionable claim in the sense that all the rights and remedies of the transferor were intended to vest in the transferee with respect to the subject matter of the transfer. The effect of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 130 clearly is that the very moment such a transfer has taken place by the execution of an instrument of transfer, the rights and remedies of the transferor become vested in the transferee, and then the transferor, as it were, gets out of the picture and it is the transferee who takes his place and then is competent to sue the third party in his own name without making the transferor a party thereto. Obviously enough, this is bound to raise a knotty question of mixed law and fact. It also deserves to be pointed out at this place that the assignee takes the actionable claim subject to all the liabilities and equities to which the transferor was subject in respect of it at the date of the transfer (sec. 134 of the Transfer of Property Act). It follows that the plea of his being a bonafide transferee without notice cannot avail him because a person purchasing the chance of a law suit must take his chance as to the exact position in which the party giving it stands, and if nothing is due to the assignor, the assignee gets nothing. The only other thing I wish to point out in passing is that the giving of a notice to the debtor is not essential to effectuate an assignment, but where no such notice is given, the debtor cannot be expected to attorn 10 the assignee, and if, in ignorance of the assignment, he pays the debt to the assignor, the assignee can have no remedy against the debtor. 24. Now let) us scan the circumstances of this case in the light of the characteristics of an assignment propounded above. I have carefully looked into Ex. 24. Now let) us scan the circumstances of this case in the light of the characteristics of an assignment propounded above. I have carefully looked into Ex. 2 and the other letters which the defendant gave to the plaintiffs. But confining our attention to Ex. 2 with which we are principally concerned in this appeal, it was a letter by the defendant on Sewapuri to pay Rs. 3226/8/- to the plaintiffs, being the money which would fall due by him to the defendants son and wife on Mah Sudi 15, Smt. 2009 (corresponding to 19th January, 1953) on account of his having taken a contract of certain grass jors belonging to them. No instrument in writing was as such executed between the defendant on the one band and the plaintiffs, on the other, saying that the debt which Sewapuri had owed to the former was being transferred to the plaintiffs. Nor is there any dependable evidence on the record from which it may be unhesitatingly concluded that the transferees would thence forward be entitled to all the rights and remedies which the defendant had against that third party. Ex. 2 does not say anything of the kind. (I may mention in passing that even the other two letters which the defendant gave to the plaintiffs in the names of Alikhan and Sankalchand are of the same pattern). That being so, the question must arise in this case whether the letter Ex.2 was not in the nature of a pay-order rather than an assignment and that is by no means easy to answer. 25. There is a further difficulty in the way of the defendant as regards Ex. 2, and that is that the money which by this letter the defendant wanted to be paid to the plaintiffs actually belonged to his wife and his son. This important information is revealed by the recitals made in the letter Ex. 2, itself. Ram Singh defendant and his present Kamdar Chunni Lal when they came into the witness box also admitted that the money referred to in the letter belonged not to him (Ram Singh) but to his wife and his son. This important information is revealed by the recitals made in the letter Ex. 2, itself. Ram Singh defendant and his present Kamdar Chunni Lal when they came into the witness box also admitted that the money referred to in the letter belonged not to him (Ram Singh) but to his wife and his son. This raises a further question whether Ram Singh had the authority in law to transfer an actionable claim and the plaintiffs should have been willing to accept an assignment with respect to it in the sense that even if Sewapuri chose not to pay the amount to the plaintiffs, the liability of Ram Singh to pay the money of the promissory-note came to an end. Most remarkable of all, if it was the case of the defendant that his responsibility to pay the plaintiff was intended to come to end, the moment he had given the letter in the name of Sewapuri to the plaintiffs to pay the amount mentioned therein to the latter, then it is amazing that Ram Singh should have been willing to make an endorsement on the back of the promissory note on the very day these letters had been written that if the monies mentioned in the letters given by the defendant on the various third parties were not to be received by the plaintiffs, the defendant himself would be liable to pay them. The defendant has denied that he gave this undertaking in respect of the debt owing to him by Sewapuri or by Alikhan and that he gave it only with respect to the debt which Sankalchand was owing to him. But if I may anticipate my finding on this point with which I propose to deal hereafter, this denial was absolutely false. What I wish to point out, however, is that even this limited admission on the part of the defendant seems to my mind, to knock the bottom out of the theory of assignment. When this difficulty was pointed out to the learned District Judge, he brushed it aside by the following observation: "I regret, however, there is no force in the contention because the undertaking did not constitute anything more than undertaking the liability which the appellant would even otherwise have had under the law." In saying so, the learned District Judge, with all respect, was quite wrong. If the true nature of the transaction as evidenced by Ex. 2 was an assignment as the learned Judge seems to have somehow thought, then the defendants liability thereunder would normally corns to an end so far as the plaintiffs were concerned, and it would be for the plaintiffs then to seek their remedy from Sewapuri only on whom Ex. 2 had been made. In fact, the learned District Judge himself observed latter in his judgment that: — "the transfer being thus complete, all the rights and remedies of Thakur Ram Singh vested in the plaintiff respondents whose right it was to have pursued their remedy against Sewapuri by suit even without impleading the appellant." Therefore, I find it extremely difficult to understand how the learned Judge felt persuaded to think that the defendants undertaking that he would pay himself in case Sewapuri or others did not pay was to use his own words not "anything more than undertaking the liability which the appellant (Ram Singh) would even otherwise have had under the law." 26. From the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation in saying that the learned District Judge was in grave error when he allowed the plea of assignment to be raised before him at such belated stage, and what is more, he accepted it without any proper foundation having been laid for it in the pleadings. His finding therefore that because of the supposed assignment the defendants liability towards the plaintiffs under the promissory note had come to an end by virtue of Ex. 2 cannot be accepted as at all correct. 27. The next point which then arises for decision is, and that is the only point which was properly raised by the defendant at the trial, whether by giving the letter Ex. 2, or for that matter the other letters to the plaintiffs in the name of the various persons concerned who were according to the defendant his debtors, the defendant had thereby fully discharged his liability to them even though the plaintiffs were not paid the amounts mentioned therein by Sewapuri or the others. The finding of the trial court is that he had not. The learned District Judge obviously held a different opinion. The finding of the trial court is that he had not. The learned District Judge obviously held a different opinion. I have carefully weighed the competing considerations and have come to a categorical conclusion that the finding of the learned District Judge is wrong and that of the trial court was right. 28. In order to come to a proper decision on this question we must consider the cumulative effect of the endorsement on the back of the promissory-note Ex. 2 and the khata Ex. A-1. The defendant sets great store by the khata which was completely squared up by the plaintiffs on that very day. The learned District Judge seems to have been greatly impressed by the fact that the totals on both sides of the khata came to Rs. 5430/- and they were signed by the plaintiff Hazarimal and the defendant Ramsingh with an endorsement that the khata had been squared. I have no hesitation in saying that the approach of the learned District Judge was wholly incorrect. The khata cannot be read in isolation from the accounting on the back of the promissory note which was also signed by the defendant and his Kamdar. Both have to be read together. In this accounting the defendant clearly said that if the monies mentioned in the letters did not happen to be received by the plaintiffs the defendant himself would be responsible to pay the same. As I look at the whole matter, this was perfectly natural in the circumstances. The plaintiffs could not have possibly agreed to have their debt discharged fully even if they should not have received the monies from the various persons on whom pay-orders had been made by the defendant. The latter has tried to wriggle hard out of this undertaking. In his written statement, he came out with the story that the undertaking had been given with respect to the debt which Sankalchand Jairoopji owed to him and no other. That position cannot possibly be accepted because the language of the endorsement on the back of the promissory-note is unmistakably clear and it has a reference to all the letters and not to the one which was given on Sankalchand only. Realising this difficulty, the defendant wanted to amend his written statement. I have already referred to his application asking for the amendment which is a most confused one. Realising this difficulty, the defendant wanted to amend his written statement. I have already referred to his application asking for the amendment which is a most confused one. This application was opposed by the plaintiffs and was disallowed by the trial court, and, in my opinion, quite rightly. Even assuming for the sake of argument, though I am not prepared to accept that for a single moment that the defendant was prepared to own his ultimate responsibility to make the payment to the plaintiffs in the case of Sankalchand only, that is, should Sankalchand not pay it, one wonders how the defendants theory that he had completely discharged his liability on the 13th December, 1952, when he gave the three letters to the plaintiffs fits in with that. I am surprised that in this state of affairs, the learned District Judge should have felt persuaded to accept that the writing on the back of the promissory note showed that the plaintiffs "accepted the arrangement in full and final settlement of their claim". Again a little later in his judgment, the learned District Judge has observed as follows:— "Similarly the appellants admission in the written statement that he had undertaken the personal responsibility for the payment of Rs. 541/- due under the Chithi Ex. 3 inspite of the written arrangements shows nothing but the existence of a verbal agreement and from this admission an inference could not be drawn that the documents were all spurious and were intended to be only additional security for the debt." There is not an iota of evidence on the record that there was any verbal agreement such as the learned District Judge seems to have imagined. In fact, the case of the defendant was from the very beginning that the undertaking that he had given on the back of the promissory-note Ex. 1 and which was in writing was with reference to the debt which Sankalchand owed to him and with respect to none of the other two debts and in fact the defendant was at pains to file an application for amendment of his written-statement which, I have already referred to above, and even therein there is not the slightest mention or suggestion that such an agreement had been given orally. It is also difficult to understand what the learned District Judge meant when he said that an inference from such an admission could not be drawn that the documents were all spurious and were intended to be only additional security for the debt. But it is not the case of the plaintiffs that any of the documents were spurious. He very much relies on the writing on the promissory-note which stands fully proved on the record ; nor does he say that the khata was spurious, and his only submission in that connection is that the khata must be read with the writing on the promissory-note and as for the other letters his submission again is not that they are spurious but that they were pay-orders only on certain persons given to them by the defendant with the obvious purpose of collecting the monies from those persons, but if they failed to pay, the defendant was still liable to pay to the plaintiffs as undertaken by him in the writing on the back of the promissory-note which after all was the foundation of the plaintiffs claim. The learned District Judge seems to have laid an entirely undue and mistaken emphasis on the squaring up of the khata which could not possibly have the effect of superseding the writing on the back of the promissory-note which is the main and the original foundation of the plaintiffs case. The defendant has undoubtedly led oral evidence consisting of his own and that of his Kamdar Chunnilal to show that by executing the various letters under reference, the defendant had fully discharged his liability. But here again, their evidence is self-contradictory inasmuch as the debt due From Sankalchand is accepted by them as one for which Ramsingh had assumed ultimate responsibility should Sankalchand not pay. And their whole case is further negatived by the defendants own admission in his deposition at the trial that whatever is mentioned on the back of the promissory-note and the letters was correct. 29. Now I have already discussed above the effect of the writing on the back of the promissory-note and so far as the letters are concerned, they mention nothing whatsover about the discharge of the defendants responsibility even if the persons on whom these letters were made failed to pay the amounts mentioned therein. 29. Now I have already discussed above the effect of the writing on the back of the promissory-note and so far as the letters are concerned, they mention nothing whatsover about the discharge of the defendants responsibility even if the persons on whom these letters were made failed to pay the amounts mentioned therein. The learned District Judge seems to have completely missed this portion of the defendants evidence and I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that by the written undertaking he gave on the back of the promissory-note, he unequivocally agreed that he would be himself liable to pay the money mentioned in the letters to the plaintiffs if the persons on whom those letters had been given refused to honour them. It is admitted by no less a person than Sewapuri himself that he did not pay anything to the plaintiffs in compliance with the defendants letter to him. In fact, material has been brought on the record to show that Sewapuri had gone into account with Ramsingh after the present suit was filed and this included the amount in respect of which Ex. 2 was given to the plaintiffs and had found a certain sum of money due by him to Ram Singh and he had executed a bond for that amount. Now, Sewapuris case is (and it does not seem to be entirely without foundation) that he had paid off this amount to Ramsingh and that it was thereafter that he had returned the khata and the bond duly cancelled to Sewapuri. (See documents Ex. 6 D. W. 4/1 and Ex. 7 D. W. 4/2 in this connection). If I might revert back for a moment to the theory of assignment relied on by the learned District Judge, these documents had certainly a very great bearing on that question and I should have expected the learned Judge to deal with them before he came to a definite conclusion that that story had been proved and that thereby the plaintiffs had precluded themselves from having any remedy against the defendant Ramsingh. 30. From the facts and circumstances mentioned above, I am clearly of the opinion that by the events which took place on the 13th December, 1952, it is not at all established that the plaintiffs had accepted the letter Ex. 30. From the facts and circumstances mentioned above, I am clearly of the opinion that by the events which took place on the 13th December, 1952, it is not at all established that the plaintiffs had accepted the letter Ex. 2 or for that matter the other two letters in full and final settlement of their claim against the defendant under the promissory-note in the sense that even if the plaintiffs should have failed to receive the money from the persons on whom those letters were given by the defendant, they would have no further claim or remedy against the defendant. I hold accordingly. 31. There is yet another aspect of the case which I cannot allow to pass unnoticed and where the learned District Judge seems to me to have fallen into an obvious error. From the narration of facts made in the foregoing part of the judgment, it would be clear enough that the learned Senior Civil Judge had struck out the name of Sewapuri from the array of defendants obviously on the view that there was no privity of contract between him and the plaintiffs. That order was made on the 2nd August, 1955. No appeal was filed against that order by the defendant or by the plaintiffs with the result that that order had become final in favour of Sewapuri. Yet Sewapuri was made a party in the appeal filed by the defendant in the court below, and the learned District Judge thought fit to implead him as a party in this suit also and went to the length of framing an issue which is bound to involve him in further litigation. I am not satisfied that having regard to the pleadings of the parties, the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge striking him out of the array of parties was wrong. But whether it was right or wrong, that order having not been appealed from became final and a valuable right had accrued in favour of Sewapuri. It may be pointed out at this place that an order striking out the name of a party from a suit amounts to a decree as in substance such an order determines the right of the plaintiff to bring the suit against the defendant and he stands non-suited so far as such defendant is concerned. See Lalsa Morisa Shop Vs. It may be pointed out at this place that an order striking out the name of a party from a suit amounts to a decree as in substance such an order determines the right of the plaintiff to bring the suit against the defendant and he stands non-suited so far as such defendant is concerned. See Lalsa Morisa Shop Vs. Bhagwant Ramji (4) and Nand Kumar Sinha Vs. Pashupati Ghosh (5). 32. Again, it is well established law that where a case is raised not only between the plaintiff and the defendant but between the defendants themselves inter se, and the decision therein adversely affects the defendant, he is entitled to appeal against his co-defendants. See Soiru Padmanabh Rangappa Vs. Narayanrao Bin Vithalrao (6) in this connection. It seems to me to follow from this that where it was open to a co-defendant to take a matter in appeal and he failed to do so, such a decision must be held to be final and may even operate as res-judicata in another suit. The order of the learned Senior Civil Judge virtually dismissing the suit against Sewapuri was, therefore, appealable not only at the instance of the plaintiffs but also at the instance of the defendant (Ramsingh) if he should have cared to do so. He, having not done that, could not have impleaded Sewapuri as a party in the appeal in the court below against the ultimate decision of the suit nor was it open to the learned District Judge to have questioned the finality of the trial courts order so far as he (Sewapuri) was concerned when the order passed in his favour had become final and irrevocable and a valuable right had accrued in his favour. The learned District Judge seems to have exercised his powers in adding Sewapuri as a defendant in the suit under O. 1 r. 10(2) C. P. C. But I would point out that such power should not have been exercised against a party when a valuable right of limitation had accrued in his favour. In this view of the matter too, the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge cannot be sustained and I hold accordingly. 33. In this view of the matter too, the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge cannot be sustained and I hold accordingly. 33. The only other point which was faintly argued before me was that the plaintiffs should have given a notice to the defendant to the effect that Sewapuri had dishonoured his letter, and that that having not been done, the defendant was altogether absolved from all liability which might have otherwise rested on him. The short answer to this contention is that the plaintiffs did give a notice to the defendant on the 5th May, 1953, telling him that sewapuri had not paid the money in compliance with the letter which the defendant had passed on to him and that therefore the defendant should pay the amount, otherwise a suit would be brought against him. See Ex. 6. This notice was refused. In my opinion, assuming that a notice was at all required in this case this was a sufficient notice to the defendant, the amount having fallen due on the 19th Jan., 1953, and I am not at all satisfied that this notice was given to the latter after an unreasonably long distance of time after the money had fallen due. By refusing this notice, the defendant cannot improve his position. There is no force in this point either and I hereby over-rule it. 34. No other point was pressed before me in this appeal. 35. The result is that I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge and restore that of the trial court. The plaintiff will have their costs throughout from the contesting defendant.