JUDGMENT S.D. Singh, J. - This special appeal has been filed against the judgment of oui brother Sharma, J. in second appeal no. 298 of 1954 and raises the question of registration of a compromise petition filed in a mutation court. One Smt. Jamwanti Kaur was the limited owner of zamindari property in several villages. Bhaiya Jagdish Ram Datt (to be referred to hereafter as Jagdish Dutt) and Bhaiya Chandrabhan Datt Pandey (to be referred to hereafter as Chandra Bhan) were the collaterals of her deceased husband and claimed to be entitled to succeed to the property in preference to Smt. Jamwanti Kaur. They entered into a compromise on 14th October, 1956 (Ex. A 5), by which they agreed to share the property which they might be able to secure half and half. After this compromise was arrived at, suit no. 2 of 1936 was filed by them in the late Chief Court of Oudh against Smt. Jamwanti Kaur. A compromise was arrived at even in that suit between the two claimants and Smt. Jamwanti Kaur and the suit was decreed in terms of that compromise (Ex. A 2) on 3rd June, 1938. According to the terms of the compromise, Jagdish Dutt and Chandrabhan became entitled to inherit the property after the death of Smt. Jamwanti Kaur half and half. Although in both the compromises Jagdish Dutt and Chandrabhan were to get the property half and half, village Dhanepur was to go exclusively to Chandrabhan. After the suit was compromised Chandrabhan and Jagdish Dutt executed another compromise deed on 4th September, 1943 (Ex. A 6), by which the property was agreed to be divided among the two claimants half and half with this stipulation that village Dhanepur was to go to Chandrabhan exclusively. 2. Smt. Jamwanti Kaur died in December, 1947, and thereupon applications for mutation of names were filed by both Jagdish Dutt and Chandrabhan. A compromise was arrived at in the course of the mutation proceedings and was filed in the mutation court and it is this compromise application (Ex. 1) which is the subject-matter of the present litigation. 2. Smt. Jamwanti Kaur died in December, 1947, and thereupon applications for mutation of names were filed by both Jagdish Dutt and Chandrabhan. A compromise was arrived at in the course of the mutation proceedings and was filed in the mutation court and it is this compromise application (Ex. 1) which is the subject-matter of the present litigation. Both the parties recorded in this compromise application that the dispute between them had already been settled earlier by way of a family settlement and that both parties were jointly entitled to the entire property in dispute; that the property had not till then been actually partitioned by metes and bounds and that the two parties would `hereafter' be the owners of the properties mentioned in lists A and B exclusively. The property mentioned in list A was to go to Jagdish Dutt and the property mentioned in list B to Chandrabhan. Dhanepur is included in list B which was in keeping with the earlier compromise between the parties, but there is a qualifying clause in this compromise application which provides that the income from tahbazari of village Dhanepur will be shared by both the claimants half and half and that both of them would be entitled to manage the holding of the market and the collections of tahbazari in Dhanepur. On this application being filed in the mutation court, the matter was referred by the Naib Tehsildar to the Sub-Divisional Officer who mentioned in his order : "However, the case be decided in terms of the compromise which is a family settlement arrived at between the parties. I, therefore, order mutation as follows." Then follow the names of the villages which were to be mutated in the names of Chandrabhan and Jagdish Dutt respectively. 3. The suit out of which this special appeal has arisen was filed by Jagdish Dutt for the recovery of half share of tahbazari collections for the years 1355, 1356 and 1357F. The plaintiff alleged that Rs. 317 were collected by Chandrabhan in 1355F, Rs. 319 in 1356F and Rs. 320 in 1357F the total collections thus came to Rs. 956. The plaintiff claimed a half share therein together with interest. The suit was thus filed for the recovery of Rs. 536-1-7. 4. The plaintiff alleged that Rs. 317 were collected by Chandrabhan in 1355F, Rs. 319 in 1356F and Rs. 320 in 1357F the total collections thus came to Rs. 956. The plaintiff claimed a half share therein together with interest. The suit was thus filed for the recovery of Rs. 536-1-7. 4. The claim was contested by Chandrabhan and the main contention on his behalf was that the compromise application which was moved in the mutation court was unregistered and that the stipulation relating to the realisation of tahbazari dues was a stipulation in respect of immovable property and required registration under Sec. 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act. It was urged that since the document was not registered, it could not be admitted in evidence and no claim could be based on the same. This contention did not find favour with the Munsif, who decreed the suit. The defendant went up in appeal which was heard by Sri R. A. Rahmani, Civil and Sessions Judge, Gonda. He was of the opinion that the document did require registration and that as it was not registered, no claim can be based on it. The appeal was consequently allowed by him and the suit dismissed with costs. The plaintiff then came up in appeal to this court. His second appeal No. 298 of 1954 was heard by Sharma, J. He was of opinion that although this document required registration, the purpose for which it was being relied upon was a collateral purpose. Relying upon a Privy Council decision reported in R. M. M. C. T. Vyravan Chetti v. V. K. N. S. P. Subramanian Chetti, A.I.R. 1920 PC 33 : 18 ALJ 726 it was held that the document could be relied upon for a collateral purpose and the appeal was consequently allowed and the suit of the plaintiff decreed for the recovery of the amount of the tahbazari dues. It is against that decision that this appeal has been filed. 5. We have heard learned counsel on either side at length. It was contended before us by the appellant that the document in question deals with immovable property and is consequently required to be registered under Cl. (b) of Sec. 17(1) of the Registration Act and that as it has not been registered it cannot be received in evidence. 5. We have heard learned counsel on either side at length. It was contended before us by the appellant that the document in question deals with immovable property and is consequently required to be registered under Cl. (b) of Sec. 17(1) of the Registration Act and that as it has not been registered it cannot be received in evidence. It was further urged that the document varies and modifies the terms of the earlier registered compromise deeds and in order that this variation or modification of the earlier deeds be possible, this later document will also have to be registered. 6. The contentions on behalf of the respondent were threefold, namely, (1) that the document in question is by way of a family arrangement and as such did not require registration; (2) that even if it required registration, it is incorporated in the order of the revenue court and would, therefore, be governed by Cl. (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act and would not as such require registration, and the order being exempt for registration under the aforesaid provision, the particular clause in the compromise application would regulate the relations of the parties even in the absence of registration; (3) that the clause referred to above relates to a collateral purpose and may be relied upon under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. 7. The first question to be considered in this case is whether the document in question is a family arrangement. On this point we have not the least doubt that it is not. The document is clearly a partition deed, which declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes the rights, title and interests of the parties in the property dealt within it. Apart from this, however, it is the language of the document (Ex. 1) itself which give indication of its nature. Referring to the previous transactions, the document says : "...........bad wafat Smt. Rani Jamwanti Kaur saheba jumla mawaziat ke unke qabze men the malik wa kabiz warasan bazarie family settlement wa decree Chief Court ho gae hain." The previous transactions are thus described in this document as being by way of family settlement, but thereafter the document proceeds : "But there has been no partition between the parties about the village so far. We parties have after fully understanding the matter and taking into consideration the conveniences of each other partitioned (the property) amongst ourselves." 8. Thereafter proceed the recitals that the property included in list A was given to Jagdish Dutt and the property in list B to Chandrabhan. The document, therefore, describes itself in very clear terms as a deed of partition and not a deed by way of a family Settlement. It has been the consistent view of this court expressed in more than one Full Bench case, that a document of the naturt we have before us, namely a compromise application intimating to the mutation court that the parties had adjusted their differences and that mutation may be affected in a particular manner, would require registration if it is intended or desired that it should regulate the future rights of the parties in respect of the immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards. The earliest of these Full Bench decisions, which were placed before us, is Ram Gopal v. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1928 Allahabad 641 : 26 ALJ 952. It has been held in that case that a family arrangement may be arrived at orally; but if it is reduced to writing, that writing must be registered. It has been clearly held that though a family arrangement may be made orally, if the terms are reduced to the form of a document and the document is not registered, the absence of registration would make the document inadmissible in evidence and would be fatal to the proof of the arrangement embodied in the document. Even in this Ram Gopal's case, the document was a compromise petition which moved before the mutation court intimating that the contesting party had arrived at a compromise and requesting for mutation being made in the names of the three contesting parties one third each. 9. Then we have another Full Bench decision reported in Mahadei Kunwar v. Padarath Chaube, AIR 1937 Allahabad 578 : 1937 ALJ 627. In this case also an application was addressed to the court. In which it was prayed that the names of the parties may be recorded in the parties may be recorded in the revenue records in a particular manner. In this case also an application was addressed to the court. In which it was prayed that the names of the parties may be recorded in the parties may be recorded in the revenue records in a particular manner. There were certain recitations relating to the rights of the parties and finally a prayer was made that the mutation case may be decided in accordance with the compromise. The petition was not registered, but was acted upon by the court and mutation was ordered accordingly. The case of Ram Gopal v. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1928 Allahabad 641 : 26 ALJ 952 as also other authorities were relied upon, and the document was held to have the defect of want of registration. 10. Then we have recent Full Bench decision Ram Gati Chaube v. Ram Adhar Chaube, 1961 ALJ 440 in which it has been held that where a compromise application declares the parties to be absolute owners of their shares, which are worth more than Rs. 100, if the compromise is unregistered, it is ineffective and inadmissible in evidence. It is thus the established view of this court that a document of this nature does require registration, and if it is not registered it is ineffective and if it is not be relied upon by either side in proof of its title in respect of immovable property dealt with therein. 11. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent on a Full Bench decision of the late Chief Court of Oudh namely Kalawati v. Sri Krishna, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 49 in support of the contention that a compromise application moved before a mutation court, purporting to regulate the future rights of the parties in the property dealt with therein and upon which an order in the proceedings has been founded, would operate conclusively to determine all questions of title between the parties and would be binding upon them even though if it is not registered. That decision is, however, not exactly on all fours with the case before us. In fact that case is not authority at all for a compromise petition, even though not registered, being received in evidence as operating conclusively to determine all questions of title between the parties. A question in the following form namely; "Whether a petition of compromise affecting property more than Rs. In fact that case is not authority at all for a compromise petition, even though not registered, being received in evidence as operating conclusively to determine all questions of title between the parties. A question in the following form namely; "Whether a petition of compromise affecting property more than Rs. 100 in value, filed in mutation proceedings, whether constituting a family settlement or not, which purports to regulate the future rights of the parties in that property and upon which the order in the mutation proceedings has been founded, operates conclusively to determine all questions of title between the parties or is binding on the parties in respect of the property referred to therein even though it is not registered." was certainly referred to the Full Bench. But the Full Bench did not decide the question in the form it was referred to it. The question was restated in the following form: "Whether an order of the mutation court embodying the petition of compromise affecting immovable property worth more than Rs. 100, which purports to regulate the future rights of the parties in that property, is conclusive and binding upon them in respect of the property referred to therein even though it is not registered." 12. The question, therefore, which was considered by the Full Bench was whether an order of the mutation court embodying the petition of compromise affecting immovable property worth more than Rs. 100 could be conclusive and binding upon the parties in respect of their future rights in the property even though it is not registered. The question was answered in the affirmative, but as the wordings of the question itself indicate, it refers to the application of the order of the mutation court and not the compromise petition which is moved in that court. It will be difficult for us even to agree with the view that an order passed by the mutation court, even though it is based on a compromise petition filed before it, could, in the absence of registration of that document, regulate the future rights of the parties in the property and operate conclusively to determine all questions of title between them, as an order can have binding effect only to the extent it determines the dispute between the parties or questions arising as between them for decision before the court. In proceedings before a mutation court, the only question which arises for decision is that of possession. The mutation court has only to determine which of the rival contending parties is in possession of the property in question. Mutation proceedings are generally speaking fiscal proceedings, which may enable the State to realise the land revenue due in respect of the property from the person in possession. The question of title does not come for consideration before a mutation court at all. In fact if it is conceded before a mutation court that while A is the owner of the property, it is B who is in possession, the mutation court will have to direct entries being made in the village records in the name of B and not A. The only decision, therefore, which a mutation court can take is whether one or the other party is in possession, and the order of the mutation court cannot, therefore, determine any question of title between the parties. Even if the order is based on compromise it will have no binding effect beyond an admission of the parties as to who was in actual possession of the property, and nothing more. 13. We do not, therefore, find it possible to accept the view that an order of the mutation court may conclusively bind the party as conclusively determining questions of title between them, where such order is passed on an unregistered compromise petition. We might have even considered the desirability of referring this question to a larger Bench, but in the present case which is before us, even the order which was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the basis of the compromise petition, Ex. 1, does not embody that part of the recitals in the petition, which relate to the collection of tahbazari dues in village Dhanepur. The relevant portion of the order in the mutation court has been quoted by us earlier in this judgment. Although the learned Sub-Divisional Officer said at one place in his order that the case be decided in terms of the compromise, in the operative part of his order he only directs the names of the two contestants being entered in the revenue records in respect of the two different sets of the villages, which were given out to have been allotted to their respective shares. The order being silent in respect of the stipulation about the collection of tahbazari dues, it cannot be said to have been incorporated in the order of the mutation court and the Full Bench decision of the Oudh Chief Court namely Kalawati v. Sri Krishna, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 49 would not be applicable on that account. 14. The position, therefore, is that the compromise petition which was presented before the mutation court is for all intents and purposes a deed of partition and not a family settlement, that even if it is a family settlement it required registration, and that in so far as it is intended to determine all questions of title between the parties, it is inadmissible in evidence and is not binding on the parties. 15. The second contention on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent Jagdish Dutt was that this document was exempt from registration under Cl. (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 17 of Indian Registration Act, XVI of 1908. This clause reads : "(vi) Any decree or order of a court (except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is subject-matter of the suit or proceeding;" While decrees or orders of a court are undoubtedly exempt from the operation of sub-sec. (1) of Section 17 of the Act under this clause, the clause itself excepts out of its operation those decrees or orders which are based on a compromise relating to immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings. The subject-matter of the proceeding in the mutation court was as to who was in possession over the property and not the question as to who was entitled to the property. As has been indicated by us earlier, the order of mutation court which is based on an unregistered compromise would not be binding upon the parties so far as the question of title is concerned. But apart from that consideration, the question relating to the rights of the parties about the tahbazari dues was not at all the subject-matter of dispute before the mutation court, and any reference in the order of the mutation court relating to the collection of tahbazari dues would have been within the exception contemplated in the aforesaid Cl. (vi). But apart from that consideration, the question relating to the rights of the parties about the tahbazari dues was not at all the subject-matter of dispute before the mutation court, and any reference in the order of the mutation court relating to the collection of tahbazari dues would have been within the exception contemplated in the aforesaid Cl. (vi). But as we have it in this case, the order does not even refer to the stipulation in the compromise deed relating to the collection of tahbazari dues. Even if, therefore, the order passed by the mutation court is taken into consideration, the plaintiff would not stand to gain thereby at all, as it will not be possible for him to establish his right on the basis of the order without referring to the compromise petition itself, the whole of which has not been incorporated in the order. 16. There was also some discussion before us as to the stipulation about the collection of tahbazari dues being regarded as a stipulation in respect of an immovable property. Two cases were cited before us in this connection, Sikandar v. Bahadur, ILR 27 All. 462 Golam Mohiuddin v. Parbati, ILR 36 Cal. 665. The expression "immovable property" has been defined for purposes of the Registration Act in Cl. (vi) of Section 2 of the same. Immovable property for the purposes of this Act would include land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened or anything which is attached to the earth; but not standing timber, growing crops nor grass. It would thus be clear that benefits to arise out of land would be included in the expression "immovable property." The tahbazari referred to in the compromise petition (Ex. 1) has been described in detail in reference to the market which is held on a particular piece of land, as being near Kali Ji's temple. Even the boundaries of this land are given in the compromise petition. The tahbazari dues realised from the stall-holders or from those who bring their cattle for sale in this market are certainly benefits arising out of land and would consequently be immovable property within the meaning of Cl. (vi) of Section 2 of the Indian Registration Act. Even the boundaries of this land are given in the compromise petition. The tahbazari dues realised from the stall-holders or from those who bring their cattle for sale in this market are certainly benefits arising out of land and would consequently be immovable property within the meaning of Cl. (vi) of Section 2 of the Indian Registration Act. The same-view has been taken by a Division Bench of this court in Sikandar v. Bahadur, ILR 27 All. 462 and more or less the same view has been taken in the Calcutta case Golam Mohiuddin v. Parbati, ILR 36 Cal. 665. The rights relating to the realisation of tahbazari dues are definitely, therefore, immovable property, and the stipulation in respect of the same required registration, if they exceeded Rs. 100 in value, as they actually did. 17. The next contention on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent was that even though the document required registration and was not admissible in evidence in its absence, the document could in any case be used for a collateral purpose, that collateral purpose in this particular case being the division of tahbazari dues realised by the defendant-appellant. It was this contention of the plaintiff-respondent which was accepted by the learned single judge on the authority of R. M. M. C. T. Vyravan Chetti v. V. K. N. S. P. Subramanian, A.I.R. 1920 PC 33 : 18 ALJ 726. The observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council : "The agreement need not be registered for purpose of its being given in evidence in a suit between the parties where the only question is about the division of money realised, "although it may be that it would require to be registered for the purpose of being given in evidence in a suit relating to the regulation of the rights against the estate itself." was relied upon by the learned single Judge in support of his finding that the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to sue for his share of the tahbazari dues, even though the document which required registration was not so registered. In our view, however, the facts of the case before us are materially different from those in the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In our view, however, the facts of the case before us are materially different from those in the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In the Privy Council case the dispute was between two prior and subsequent mortgagees, who had stipulated that irrespective of their rights as prior or subsequent mortgagees, the entire amount realised from the mortgaged property would be divided amongst them half and half. The agreement to divide the realised money among the two mortgagees half and half did not, therefore, refer to their respective rights as prior and subsequent mortgagees. It was an agreement for the division of the money among the two mortgagees simplicitor, and it was, therefore, either not an agreement in respect of an immovable property at all or it was only an agreement in respect of a purpose collateral to the one which was the main subject of the agreement between the parties. In that case, therefore, that agreement for the division of money could certainly be relied upon, even though the document was not registered. In the case before us, however, the agreement between the parties in respect of the tahbazari dues is not merely an agreement for the division of money which may be realised, but in respect of the ownership of the right to realise tahbazari dues in village Dhanepur. The agreement relates to the rights of the parties to manage the market and the collection of tahbazari dues. It describes the extent of the land over which the market is held and it also provides that both parties would share the dues as and when they are realised. It is, therefore, not merely an agreement to share the money realised, but an agreement to own the rights in respect of the market. The right to share the tahbazari dues is only a consequence of the rights given to both the parties under the agreement in the market. It is not, therefore, a collateral purpose for which the document is sought to be relied upon, but for the main purpose of enforcing the agreement itself. The right to share the tahbazari dues is only a consequence of the rights given to both the parties under the agreement in the market. It is not, therefore, a collateral purpose for which the document is sought to be relied upon, but for the main purpose of enforcing the agreement itself. In Ram Kumar Himmat Singh v. Gajendra Chandra Bora, A.I.R. 1957 Assam 68 a question arose about the right of the vendee to enforce a contemporaneous unregistered agreement under which the vendee agreed to pay compensation, in case he failed to build a hospital on the land sold, and it was held that since the document required registration, the agreement could not be enforced. 18. Fateh Chand v. Radha Rani, 1956 ALJ 625 was referred to in connection with the interpretation of the expression "collateral purpose." It was pointed out by Gurtu, J. in that case that what a collateral purpose is could not be precisely defined and that it must vary with the circumstances of each case. That was a case of a tenant holding over under a lease which required registration, but was not registered. It was held that the unregistered lease could be looked at to find out whether the tenant could be ejected on one month's notice and that this would be looking at the lease for merely a collateral purpose. The facts of this case are materially different from those of the case presently before us. As we have pointed out earlier the suit of the plaintiff is to enforce a specific term in the agreement, the stipulation between the parties to own the market jointly, to manage it together and to collect the tahbazari dues and share the same among themselves. In so far as this part of the agreement is concerned it is the main subject-matter of the agreement. It cannot be said to be a purpose collateral to the main agreement, for if this part of the agreement becomes a collateral purpose, there would be no agreement at all so far as the Dhanepur market is concerned. 19. We are of opinion, therefore, that the compromise petition which provided for the sharing of the Dhanepur market and the income thereof required registration and that since it was not registered, it cannot determine the rights of the parties in respect thereof. 19. We are of opinion, therefore, that the compromise petition which provided for the sharing of the Dhanepur market and the income thereof required registration and that since it was not registered, it cannot determine the rights of the parties in respect thereof. The plaintiff who has based his title on this stipulation in the agreement, cannot rely upon it for the proof of his title. That being so, his suit was bound to be dismissed and was rightly dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge, Gonda, who heard the first appeal. 20. This appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 298 of 1954 is set aside and the decree of the first appellate court dis-missing the suit of the plaintiff with costs is restored. The defendant-appellant will be entitled to his costs of both the appeals in this court from the plaintiff-respondent.