Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality against the order passed by the District Magistrate of Palghat acquitting the accused, who was prosecuted under S.16(1)(a)(i) read with S.7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - hereinafter referred to as the Act - and R.46 of the Rules framed under the Act. 2. The accused is the licensee of a hotel called Grand Hotel in Gandhi Bazar Road, Palghat. On 29-7-'60 P. W.1 the Food Inspector visited the hotel. He found butter being served to the customers and suspecting the butter to be adulterated, purchased some butter from out of the stock kept in the refrigerator. He followed the procedure prescribed in S.10 and 11 of the Act and sent the sample to the Public Analyst. The report of the Analyst Ext. P4 showed that the butter was adulterated. Thereupon P.W.1 launched the prosecution. 3. The case of the accused was that he was not selling butter and the stock of butter seen in the refrigerator was only for his domestic consumption. Besides, the Food Inspector P.W.1 two other witnesses were examined. The learned Magistrate was not prepared to believe the two witnesses regarding the supply of butter to them and acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution has not satisfactorily proved that the butter kept in the refrigerator was for the purpose of sale. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence and he has contended that on the evidence of P.W.1 it could clearly be seen that the accused was in possession and had exposed butter for sale and in any view had actually sold butter to P.W.1 and thereby has committed the offence charged. 5. Sale has been defined in S.2(xiii). It says: " "Sale" with the grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the sale of any article of food whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale; an offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such articles, and includes also an attempt to sell any such articles." 6. P.W.1 has sworn that he went to the hotel, found persons being served with butter, the accused told him that the butter was for sale, the refrigerator was opened, butter was seen kept in a basin, he noticed marks of removal of butter from the bulk, that he asked for three-fourths pound of butter, paid Rs. 1.11 being its price and the accused gave the receipt Ext. P. 2. He has further stated that he gave notice of sampling Ext. P.1 in form No. 6, the accused acknowledged the receipt of the same, and the butter was duly sampled in the presence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 and a mahazar Ext. P. 3 was prepared. Apart from the evidence of P. Ws.1 to 3 the recitals in Ext. P. 3 substantially corroborate the testimony of P.W. 1. The Food Inspector has also stated that other articles for sale to the public like cool drinks were also seen in the refrigerator. Nothing has been brought out to discredit his testimony. It is also not shown that P.W.1 had any motive to foist a false case on the accused. The accused had no case then, that the butter was not stocked for sale and that the butter was kept only for domestic consumption. If he had told so, to the Food Inspector, being a literate person and having heard the mahazar read he would certainly have insisted on that fact being incorporated in the mahazar. On the, other hand he has admitted in Ext. P. 3 that he had sold the butter to P.W. 1. The learned District Magistrate has completely ignored this evidence of P.W.1. If his evidence is accepted, as we have done, then it follows that the accused had exposed for sale, and had in his possession for sale butter which itself amounts to a sale by reason of the definition in S.2 (xiii) of the Act. That articles were really offered or exposed for sale and possession was for the purpose of sale cannot in all eases be proved by direct evidence and is a matter which could reasonably be inferred from the circumstances of a particular case. That articles were really offered or exposed for sale and possession was for the purpose of sale cannot in all eases be proved by direct evidence and is a matter which could reasonably be inferred from the circumstances of a particular case. If articles of food are found in the possession of a person who is in the habit of manufacturing or storing like articles for sale then it may reasonably be presumed that he had manufactured or stocked them for sale and a court would be justified in inferring that the possession of the articles were for the purposes of sale. 7. The learned counsel for the accused brought to our notice that the complaint in this case was not for having been in possession of batter for the purpose of sale, an act which by itself would amount to a sale, but the charge which the accused was actually called upon to answer was that he had sold butter to P. W. 1 which on analysis was found to be adulterated and it is contended that when the Food Inspector takes a sample by virtue of the powers vested in him under S.10 of the Act it would not amount to a sale. We cannot accede to this contention. 8. Under the definition of sale in S.2 (xiii) of the Act, the scope has been amplified by adding the words "or for analysis" and so a sale to the Food Inspector for the purpose of analysis has also been brought in within the ambit of the section. When a person exhibits articles in his shop he is making a general offer to sell them and any person who comes into the shop and offers the price accepts his offer and if possession is handed over it would be a sale irrespective of the purpose for which the purchase is made. It is true that the intending purchaser cannot use physical force or threat to compel the owner to part with the goods. Similarly if any one takes away property without the consent of the owner and subsequently pays him the compensation for the same it could be contended that it does not amount to a sale. It is true that the intending purchaser cannot use physical force or threat to compel the owner to part with the goods. Similarly if any one takes away property without the consent of the owner and subsequently pays him the compensation for the same it could be contended that it does not amount to a sale. One can quite understand that compulsory acquisition by exercise of statutory authority from being held not to be a sale, but if without any such compulsion there has been a transfer of property in goods for price it does not appear that there is any reason why it should be taken out of the Act. If on the facts of a case it is seen that the Food Inspector goes to a person who offers or exposes for sale any article of food and demands the article and buys the article paying its price it will not cease to be a sale, even though, he be a Food Inspector and the purchase, be for analysis. It cannot be presumed that in all such cases it was because of the power given to the Food Inspector under S.10 and the sanction provided in S.16 (1) (b) that the article was handed over to the Food Inspector. If the articles were not really intended for sale nothing prevented the person saying so to the Food Inspector and permitting him to take the sample, but have the fact noted then and there in the mahazar prepared and not agree to take the price and then voluntarily to give a receipt. S.16 (1) (b) only makes it an offence to prevent a Food Inspector from taking a sample. 9. The learned counsel for the accused places reliance on the decision of this court in Food Inspector Calicut v. Parameswaran Chettiar (1961 K.L.T. 308). This decision, we are told, is regarded mistakenly no doubt, as an authority for the position that in no case can there be a sale of food to the Food Inspector who purchases articles of food for analysis. Probably this argument is based on the observation in the judgment: "In my view when a Food Inspector obtains a sample under S.10 of the Act there is no sale". Probably this argument is based on the observation in the judgment: "In my view when a Food Inspector obtains a sample under S.10 of the Act there is no sale". But the learned judge himself stated: "Of course, it is possible for a Food Inspector just like any other human being to effect a purchase in the ordinary course, and the transaction would be a sale notwithstanding that the purchaser is a Food Inspector and that his purchase is to have the article analysed with a view to prosecution". 10. In that case the accused was a servant of a hotel proprietor and he was taking the milk which he had got by milking the buffalow belonging to his master. The milk did not belong to him and was not in his possession for sale and when the Food Inspector took a sample from him it was held on the facts of that case to be a case of seizure and compulsory acquisition of milk and not a sale within the meaning of S.2 (xiii) of the Act. The decision is applicable only to the peculiar facts of that case. 11. In the case in In re Bellemkonda Kanakayya (A.I.R.1942 Mad. 609) referred to in that case, Horwill, J. stated: "If the Sanitary Inspector had not exercised his powers under S.14 but had merely tendered the money and the petitioner had voluntarily handed over the goods, then there would have been a sale; and the fact that it was subsequently found that the goods were required not for consumption but for analysis would make no difference to the nature of the transaction that had been entered into". We cannot agree with the observation of the learned judge: "In this case the petitioner would presumably not have parted with the goods voluntarily when he knew that they would be used for the purpose of bringing a case against him and his master. The petitioner was not therefore guilty of selling ghee". No such presumption can be made. 12. In the case in Akhoy Kumar Ghose v. Corporation of Calcutta (A.I.R.1928 Cal. 320) a Bench of the Calcutta High Court considered that a compulsory sale made under the provisions of S.424 (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act cannot make a person amenable to the punishment under S.488. But there, the Food Inspector seized the consignment of goods at the railway station. 320) a Bench of the Calcutta High Court considered that a compulsory sale made under the provisions of S.424 (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act cannot make a person amenable to the punishment under S.488. But there, the Food Inspector seized the consignment of goods at the railway station. The consignment was not sold to him, nor was any sample taken out of it even though after removal to the Municipal office he offered compensation in the shape of price of the article to the person whose articles were taken by force under legal authority. Therefore all that was said in the case was simply 'obiter dicta' and even this 'obiter dicta' was dissented from and not considered to be binding by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Sir Charu Chander Ghose, Acting Chief Justice and Malik, J. in the case of Davis Hawlet & Co. v. Emperor (A.I.R.1933 Cal. 598) and it has been distinguished in a later ease of the same High Court in Dr. Makhanlal Bhowmik v. Ram Bhakat Sharma (A.I.R.1953 Cal. 485). 13. In this case, as stated already, P.W.1 went to the hotel, found butter actually stocked for sale and being supplied to the customers, the accused admitted they were for sale, P.W.1 demanded butter, the accused did not raise any objection or tell him that it was kept there not for sale but for his domestic consumption, sold the butter, received the price and issued a voucher Ext. P. 2 and admitted in Ext. P3 the mahazar prepared on the spot that the butter had been sold by him to P. W.1. It cannot, therefore, be said that it was a compulsory acquisition under S.10 and that there is no sale as contemplated under S.2 (xiii). 14. Reference may be made to the reasoning of Govinda Menon, J. in the case in Public Prosecutor v. Ramachandrayya (A.I.R.1948 Mad. 329): In Public Prosecutor v. Narayana Singh (A.I.R.1944 Mad. 236), Kuppuswami Aiyar, J. has held that when a Sanitary Inspector purchased milk from the accused, tested it and found that it was adulterated, the transaction amounted to a purchase and therefore the accused was guilty under R.29 (b) of the Rules and S.5(1) (b) read with R.27 of the Madras Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Moreover, in this case, Ext. P. 2 the receipt contains an admission by the second accused that he was selling buffalo milk to the Maruthi Vilas Coffee Hotel and the transaction by which P. W.1 got the sample is also admitted to be a sale. Apart from the admission contained in Ext. P. 2 when Mr. Venkatasubbiah exchanged money consideration for the milk, he was acting as a purchaser and the society a separate legal entity, was performing a contract of sale in delivering milk. Therefore, it may even be unnecessary to decide whether the transaction with P.W.1 was a sale at all, even though I am convinced that is also a sale". The same view has been taken by Ramaswami, J. in Public Prosecutor v. Dada Haji Ebrahim Helari (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 241) and Public Prosecutor v. K.V.R. Annamalai Chettiar (A.I.R.1953 Mad. 852). 15. In State v. Amratlal Bhogilal (A.I.R.1954 Bom. 216) Chainani, J. delivering the judgment of the Bench stated: "When the article supplied to the Inspector is found to be adulterated, there can be no doubt that an offence under cl. (b) of sub-section, (1) of S.4 has been committed for the article which was kept or exposed for sale was not of the nature, substance or quality which it purported to be. There is no reason why in such a case the article should not be held to have been sold to the Inspector who has paid for the article purchased by him like any other customer within the meaning of S.4 (1) (a)". 16. There is thus no substance in the argument of the learned defence counsel that as there is an obligation to sell an article of food exposed or kept for sale to a Food Inspector the sale of the article to him is not a voluntary sale and that consequently it cannot be regarded as a sale. There is no reason why in a case where the Food Inspector asks for an article, pays for it and gets the article though for analysis like any other customer, the article should not be allowed to have been sold to the Inspector. S. 10(1)(a) of the Act empowers an Inspector to obtain an article of food for purposes of analysis. S.10(3) enjoins on him the duty of paying for the article so obtained. S. 10(1)(a) of the Act empowers an Inspector to obtain an article of food for purposes of analysis. S.10(3) enjoins on him the duty of paying for the article so obtained. It is, therefore, clear that the Legislature wanted such a transaction to be regarded as a sale for the purpose of the Act. S.2(xiii) says "sale" for cash whether for human consumption or use or analysis is a sale within the meaning of the Act. 17. We have, therefore, no doubt that the transaction in this case by which PW.1 purchased butter from the accused even though it was for analysis amounts to a sale. It, therefore, follows that the acquittal of the accused is bad in law and cannot be allowed to stand. The appeal is allowed. We convict the accused under S.16 read with S.7 (1) of the Act and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. Time for payment of fine, one month from this date. Allowed.