JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The plaintiff who is the appellant in this second appeal obtained a decree for eviction against the respondent and others on December 21, 1945. Pursuant to it, he took delivery of possession on January 8, 1946. The respondent appealed against the decree and on August 4, 1954, the District Judge set aside the decree and remanded the case for disposal in accordance with the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act as amended by the amendment Act VII of 1954, which had enjoined by S.25(2) that, "All suits, appeals and other proceedings..................which are pending at the commencement of this Act.......... shall, from and after such commencement, be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, as amended by Madras Act XXXIII of 1951 and this Act: Provided that in any such suit or proceeding, the court may award full costs to the plaintiff or applicant if it is satisfied that the claim made in the suit or proceedings was in accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of such suit or proceeding." Under the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, as amended, the appellant had a more stringent condition to establish for eviction. This not having been done, the prayer for eviction was ultimately dismissed by the Trial Court by its judgment dated March 29, 1957. In the meanwhile, after the District Judge remanded the case, the respondent made an application for restitution of the property to him with mesne profits. This was disposed of along with the suit by the Trial Court by allowing restitution of the property and also mesne profits from the date on which the appellant took possession, with interest. In pursuance of this, the appellant redelivered possession of the property to the respondent. When the matter came on appeal, the District Judge confirmed the order for the payment of mesne profits from January 8, 1946, but limited the interest payable thereon to the period commencing from the date of the application for restitution. Hence this second appeal, in which the only question raised relates to the propriety of the order for mesne profits and interest. 2. Hence this second appeal, in which the only question raised relates to the propriety of the order for mesne profits and interest. 2. It was urged in the appeal by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the decree for eviction as it was passed originally by the Trial Court was not erroneous, that it happened to be set aside only by a subsequent change in the law and that therefore the possession of the property held in the interval was not wrongful. I find myself unable to give effect to this contention. That Act VII of 1954 was retrospective in operation cannot be and was not disputed. If so, it is only logical to hold, that the decree as passed originally was opposed to law and could not have been made. When that decree was set aside, possession held under it became wrongful and mesne profits allowed were "properly consequential on such variation or reversal" within the meaning of S.144 C. P. C. The learned counsel however relied on the following observations of the single Judge in Ganpat Gatlu v. Navnitlal Ranchhoddas (AIR 1940 Bombay 30): "Section 144 makes a distinction between restitution which is properly consequential on the variation or reversal of the decree and restitution which is not...................... That distinction recognizes the possibility of a reversal not imprinting on the possession taken a wrongful character within the meaning of S.2, sub-section (12), Civil P. C., containing the definition of "mesne profits"." These observations were relied on to support an argument, that notwithstanding the reversal of the decree, mesne profits could not be held to be properly consequential on such variation ; in other words, the decree was proper when it was made and so possession was not wrongful. As indicated, this view cannot be sustained in view of the retrospective operation of the amending Act. The question that arose in the Bombay case cited above, was one of limitation and it turned on what may be deemed to be the starting point. It was argued that time began to run from the date of the remand order passed in appeal, but the court held that the order of remand did not adjudge the character of the possession of the person against whom restitution was claimed, but left it to the Trial Court for adjudication. It was argued that time began to run from the date of the remand order passed in appeal, but the court held that the order of remand did not adjudge the character of the possession of the person against whom restitution was claimed, but left it to the Trial Court for adjudication. So the order of the latter was the starting point and not the date of the remand. It was in this context that the observation extracted were made, but they do not support the present contention of the appellant. I am therefore unable to find any good reason to differ from the decision of the two courts below, allowing mesne profits from the date on which the appellant took possession. It was argued that in any event the appellants ought not to be made liable for mesne profits before the date on which the subsequent decree was passed by the Trial Court. As I understand it, the effect of that decree was that the appellant was not entitled to possession of the property from the inception. The fact that this adjudication was postponed, cannot alter the true character of the appellant's possession. The appellant is therefore liable for mesne profits as held, though it is a hard case for him, at least for part of the period till the amending Act was passed. 3. As for interest on mesne profits, it is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court. I think in the circumstances, the respondent can be allowed interest only from the date of the subsequent adjudication, that is, the 29th March, 1957, till the date on which the appellant surrendered possession of the property at the rate allowed by the courts below. The second appeal is disposed of as above, but I do not order costs. Leave to appeal asked for is granted.