MODI, J.—This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for declaration and injunction, which was decreed by the trial court but on appeal dismissed by the learned District Judge Udaipur, by his judgment dated the 25th January, 1961. 2. The material facts leading upto this appeal may be shortly stated as follows. The house in dispute is situate in Mohalla Koliwara in Udaipur City. It is admitted between the parties that it originally belonged to one Bhera Koli. The plaintiffs are the representatives of the Koli community, and brought this suit in a representative capacity with the permission of the court. Their case was that Bhera had mortgaged it with possession to one Pyar Chands ancestors in Smt. 1947 for Rs. 181/-. Their case also was that Bhera had willed away this property to the caste Panchayat of Kolis. Consequently the Panchayat had redeemed the mortgage from Pyarchand on Fagun Sudi 3, Smt. 1990 corresponding to some time in 1933 A. D. and got into possession of this property. It is further alleged that they had made constructions on this property at a cost of Rs. 1900/-. In the meantime defendant Ratanlal had obtained a decree for possession of this very property against one Deokishan on the 22nd February, 1947. Ratanlal applied to obtain possession of the same in execution of that decree. The plaintiffs raised an objection under O. 21, r. 97 C.P.C. This was rejected by the execution court. Consequently they instituted the present suit under O. 21, r. 103 C.P.C. praying that a declaration be granted in their favour that they were the owners of the suit property and that the decree obtained by the defendant Ratanlal against Deokishan was not binding on them and they also prayed for injunction restraining the said defendant from interfering with their possession. 3. The defendant resisted the suit. As already stated, he admitted that the suit house did belong originally to Bhera Koli but he denied that Bhera had mortgaged this property to the ancestors of Pyarchand or that he had made any will in favour of the caste Panchayat or further that the latter had redeemed the mortgage from Pyarchand or still further that they had spent any money in improving the house. The defendants case, put in a nut-shell, was that Deokishan from whom he had purchased it was the owner of the house, he being the heir-at-law of the deceased Bhera. 4. The trial court framed as many as ten issues in the case and eventually decreed the suit, by its judgment dated the 9th March, 1959, The defendant went up in appeal as a result of which a fresh issue on the point of adverse possession was ordered to be framed by the learned District Judge and that issue was remitted to the court below for a finding, obviously under O. 41, r. 25 C.P.C. The Civil Judge reported that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their adverse possession with respect to the property in suit, and after this finding was received, the learned District Judge considered the whole case in appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. They have now come up in second appeal to this Court. 5. At the very outset, I may briefly summarise the findings of the learned Judge below. In the first place, he found, in concurrence with the trial court, that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the will on which they had relied to prove their title. Secondly, he found that as the plaintiffs bad failed to prove the will, they had no right to redeem the property from Pyarchand, and, therefore, they were mere volunteers when they did so. Thirdly, the learned Judge also appears to have been disinclined to accept the story of the redemption of the mortgage as correct although he has not given any firm finding on that aspect of the case. All that he stated in this connection was that the person from whom the Panchas obtained the money for purposes of redemption namely Kalulal Chowdhari was not produced in evidence. Fourthly, the finding of the learned Judge was that the story that the Panchas had spent as large a sum as 1000 to 1900 rupees on making improvements to this house was not worthy of belief. 6. Fourthly, the finding of the learned Judge was that the story that the Panchas had spent as large a sum as 1000 to 1900 rupees on making improvements to this house was not worthy of belief. 6. In view of these findings, the learned Judge concluded as follows: — "I fail to understand as to how the learned lower court decided the question of possession or adverse possession of the plaintiffs." and after some further discussion, he reinforced the aforesaid finding by holding that— "In my opinion, therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs should be dismissed as they failed to prove either the will or the new constructions or even possession over the house." In this connection, the learned Judge further proceeded to point out that— "Nanji Koli had been occupying upto 3/4 years back and sometime after his leaving it the Panch Kolies have taken into their possession whether with the connivance of Deokishan or Nanji or otherwise. This does not however create any right of ownership in them." These are in brief the findings of the learned District Judge, and relying on them he allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on the record in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of the present appeal, I feel bound to point out at the very outset that the judgment of the learned District is highly unsatisfactory. One of the most important witnesses upon whom the trial court had placed reliance in this case was Pyarchand, the heir of the mortgagee who had allowed redemption. The learned District Judge for some reasons which I am entirely unable to understand omitted to take into consideration the evidence of this witness. This omission is a very serious one as Pyar Chand was not connected with the parties this way or that and was an independent witness. His evidence clearly was that the Panchas of the Koli community had shown him a writing which he thought was a will executed by Bhera, (who on all account was the owner thereof), in favour of the Panchas, and relying on that he had allowed them redemption of the suit property on having received the mortgage money which was due to him. The evidence of Pyarchand further is that when he had received his mortgage money, he handed over the possession of the suit property to the Panchas and that the latter were thereafter in occupation of the property. On the whole, there is nothing in the evidence of this witness which should condemn him. His evidence was perfectly simple and straight-forward. The trial court believed it in so far as it related to the redemption of the suit property by the Panchas and his delivery of possession to them of the same and in my opinion quite rightly, and before the learned Judge in the court of first appeal could have brushed aside his evidence in the summary manner in which he did, he should have judicially applied his mind to it; but he failed to do so, and, that in my opinion goes a long way to weaken the force of his judgment. Again, the failure of the plaintiffs, if I may point out with all respect, to produce Kalulal from whom they borrowed money to redeem the suit property was altogether immaterial. 8. There is yet: another point which deserves to be mentioned in this connection and that is about the plaintiffs possession at all material times so far as the present suit is concerned. There may conceivably be different opinions on the question whether the plaintiffs were in adverse possession of this property or not. The trial court held without any issue having been framed on that point that the possession of the plaintiffs was adverse, and it was because of that that the learned District Judge in first appeal thought fit to frame a definite issue on that point and called for a finding about it. The learned Civil Judge who then dealt with the case after remand was of the opinion that the plaintiffs had failed to prove adverse possession, and I can understand the learned District Judge sharing that opinion. But what I fail to understand is his further finding that the plaintiffs had even failed to prove their possession with respect to the property in dispute. In the first place, as I have already pointed out above, we have the important evidence of Pyarchand in this connection. But what I fail to understand is his further finding that the plaintiffs had even failed to prove their possession with respect to the property in dispute. In the first place, as I have already pointed out above, we have the important evidence of Pyarchand in this connection. The learned District Judge has not said that he was prepared to disbelieve the evidence of this witness and what he actually did was to have omitted his evidence from consideration whatsoever. I find it very difficult to understand why Pyarchand should have been prepared to swear falsely that he had received the redemption money and parted with the possession in favour of the Panchas if that had not happened. Then, as the learned trial Judge pointed out in his judgment, the plaintiffs had led further evidence to prove their possession of the suit property. This evidence consists of the statement of P.W. 1 Bhagwan, P. W. 2 Ganga Ram, P.W. 4 Harnath and P.W. 5 Bhaironath. According to these witnesses, the Koli Panchayat was in possession of the house in suit and they also stated that Deokishen was never in possession of it. Again according to some of these witnesses, the Kolis had also incurred expenditure in making improvements to the suit house although one may agree with the learned District Judge that the evidence of these witnesses is not enough to prove how much money had actually been spent in this connection. Relying on this evidence, the trial court came to the conclusion that it was satisfactorily proved that the plaintiffs had been in possession of the house since Smt. 1990 and that they had put up constructions over it after redeeming it from Pyarchand. In the first place, the learned District Judge has not discussed the plaintiffs evidence on the point of possession much less has he given any good reasons why that evidence deserves to be discarded. All that he has said in this connection is that there was evidence on the record that the Kolis used to have "Bhav Bhajan" or "Hari Kirtan" in this property occasionally and that this evidence was not enough to hold that the Kolis were in possession of the house. This was, in my opinion, a very unsatisfactory way of dealing with the question of possession. This was, in my opinion, a very unsatisfactory way of dealing with the question of possession. After all is said and done, it cannot be forgotten that the defendant Ratanlal had applied in execution to obtain possession of the property in question. The Panchas offered obstruction. This again shows that they must have been in possession of the property at that time and Deokishan was certainly not in possession of it. It is also significant that even Ratanlal when he came into the witness-box was not prepared to say that Deokishen was in possession of the house in suit. According to his evidence, Nanji was the actual occupant of the house at the time and he was Deokishens tenant as the latter had informed him. Curiously enough, we have it from Ratanlal himself that before he purchased the property from Deokishen, he never thought of finding out whether Deokishen had any documents of title in respect of the suit property. He did not even care to see whether any rent-note had been executed by Nanji in favour of Deokishen or not. He did not even think it necessary to have a talk with Nanji on this point. 9. The only other person whose evidence may be referred to in this connection is Koli Nanji who was examined on behalf of the plaintiffs after remand. In his examination-in-chief, this witness stated that this was the house of their Panchayat and that he had lived in it for a period of fifteen years or so at the instance of the Panchas. He further said that Deokishen never lived in this house. According to the witness, they had redeemed it from Pyarchand, though he had also stated that the Panchas had mortgaged the house to him. But this is an obvious over statement because it is not the case of the Panchas themselves that they had made any mortgage in favour of Pyarchand. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not pay any rent to the Panchas for this house. A question then seems to have been put to him as to from which particular Samvat year he commenced living in this house and the witness replied that he did not know. He is obviously an illiterate person, and no fault can be found with him if he failed to remember the Samvat year from which he started living in this house. He is obviously an illiterate person, and no fault can be found with him if he failed to remember the Samvat year from which he started living in this house. Some further questions were put to him as to whether this house had been put to auction by the State and he said that he did not know. He again reiterated in the course of his cross-examination that he had been allowed to live in the house by the Panchas though when he was further asked about the name of those Panchas, he stated that he did not know. Yet another question was put to him about the relationship between Deokishen and Bhera and he said that he did not know. The witness thereafter seems to have got confused and allowed himself to say that he had not been living in this house for the last 5, 10, 15 or 20 years and that nobody had been living in it during all that period and that the house remained vacant, and yet in the next sentence, he again said that he had lived in the house for a period of about 20 years. The learned District Judges summary of the evidence of this witness was as follows:— "P.W. 6 Nanji was examined after the case had been remanded. In cross-examination he pleads ignorance on every matter that was put to him and even as to the period of his residing in the house. He says he left living in the house some 5, 10, 15/20 years ago although other witnesses have said that he was living therein upto 3/4 years back. No other witness comes forward to say that he lived in the house nor is there any person other than Nanji named as occupant of the house." This criticism of Nanjis evidence is only partially true, and, in my opinion, it fails to bring out the substance of the evidence given by this witness. It is not even the case of the defence that Nanji was not living in the house, and, therefore, the witnesss confused statement cannot be discarded to such an extent that his living in the house was doubtful. It is not even the case of the defence that Nanji was not living in the house, and, therefore, the witnesss confused statement cannot be discarded to such an extent that his living in the house was doubtful. As I have already pointed out above, this witness repeatedly said both in his examination-in-chief as well as in his cross-examination that he had been living in the house in dispute for a number of years and that he lived there with the permission of the Panchas. This, in my opinion, is fairly good evidence of the possession of the Panchas. 10. The upshot of the entire discussion made above is that the learned District Judges finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their possession of the suit house is wholly untenable and almost borders on perversity. My finding on this point, therefore, is that the learned trial Judge was perfectly correct when he found that the plaintiffs possession over the suit house right from the date of redemption, that is, from about 1933 A.D. upto the date of suit was satisfactorily proved. 11. Learned counsel for the defendant at this stage pointed out that for part of the period in between 1933 to the date of the suit, the Udaipur State, as it then was, had taken possession of the property in connection with certain escheat proceedings. In fact, the learned District Judge has also referred to certain documents in this connection, namely, Exs.A-1 to A-5 towards the end of his judgment. That, in my opinion, does not change the true position for a variety of reasons. In the first place it was never the plea of the defendant, among the various pleas raised by him in his written statement, that the suit property even though it belonged to Bhera had escheated to the State and that Deokishen having proved himself to be the heir-at-law of Bhera was restored this property and that was how Deokishen became the owner of it. If that was Ratanlals case, as learned counsel sought to make out at this stage of appeal, it was absolutely incumbent upon the defendant to have made a specific allegation to that effect in his written statement. That he entirely failed to do. If that was Ratanlals case, as learned counsel sought to make out at this stage of appeal, it was absolutely incumbent upon the defendant to have made a specific allegation to that effect in his written statement. That he entirely failed to do. Not only that ; there was no issue invited on that point, and, therefore, the plaintiffs had no opportunity to lead evidence on it, and the learned District Judge was not at all justified in referring to all this material in his judgment which, with all respect, seems to me to be entirely irrelevant for the purposes of the present litigation. Again, it may be that so far as the escheat court was concerned, it might have thought that Deokishen was the heir at law of Bhera. But that was not a proceeding to which the present plaintiffs were parties, and any decision which an executive authority might have arrived on a point like this could not possibly be held to be binding on them. Last but not the least, if the State held the property in its possession for a part of the time such possession would only be for and on behalf of the true owner, and it is for the civil court to adjudicate on the question of ownership. 12. It only remains for me to point out in this connection that the mere circumstance that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the will alleged to have been executed in their favour by Bhera does not and would not detract from the position that rightly or wrongly the Panchas came into possession of the suit property in 1933 A.D. and continued to remain in such possession until the present suit was brought on the nth August, 1958, that is for a period of 25 years or so. In view of this finding, I am clearly of opinion that it is not at all necessary for this Court to address itself to the question whether the plaintiffs possession over the suit property was adverse or not. 13. As against this evidence of long possession, there is no gainsaying the fact that the defendant has entirely failed to prove firstly that Deokishen was the heir of Bhera or that he was ever in possession of the suit property. 13. As against this evidence of long possession, there is no gainsaying the fact that the defendant has entirely failed to prove firstly that Deokishen was the heir of Bhera or that he was ever in possession of the suit property. There is not an iota of evidence on the side of the defendant on these aspects of the case. On the other hand, as already pointed out above, we have it from Ratanlal defendant himself that before he purchased this property from Deokishen, he did not care to investigate whether he had any marketable title with respect to this property, and if in such circumstances what he purchased from Deokishen turns out to be a mere rope of sand, the fault is entirely his own. 14. The next contention of learned counsel, however, is that even if this Court came to the conclusion to which it has, the plaintiffs suit must still be dismissed because under O. 21, r. 103 C.P.C. the plaintiffs cannot succeed in their suit until they should have proved the will which is alleged by them to have been executed in their favour by the original owner Bhera, and, further, until they succeeded in proving that they had a right to redeem this property from Pyarchand. It was submitted by learned counsel in this connection that once the finding was reached that the will had not been proved, the plaintiffs would be mere volunteers so far as payment of Pyarchands debt was concerned and by paying such a debt they could not possibly be subrogated to any rights possessed by him (Pyarchand). 15. Now learned counsel is right in so far as he says that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the will relied on by them. There is a concurrent finding of the two courts below on this question, and that finding is binding upon this Court in second appeal. He is also right in my opinion, in his further submission that in the absence of proof of the will, they had no business to pay Pyarchands mortgage debt, and, therefore, they were mere volunteers and they cannot claim by subrogation the rights which Pyarchand had with respect to the suit property. He is also right in my opinion, in his further submission that in the absence of proof of the will, they had no business to pay Pyarchands mortgage debt, and, therefore, they were mere volunteers and they cannot claim by subrogation the rights which Pyarchand had with respect to the suit property. The law is well settled that a volunteer cannot claim the right of subrogation by paying off a mortgage-debt, the reason being that no one is entitled to thrust a benefit on another and claim to be reimbursed : or, putting it in a slightly different way, a voluntary payment does not create any obligation to repay. See Gurdeosingh Vs. Chandrikasingh(1) and Venkatachalam Vs. Alagarswami(2). So far, learned counsel is on fairly strong ground. But I have no doubt that he is wrong when he says that the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to succeed in this suit by virtue of having proved their long possession with respect to the property in suit, because according to learned counsel under O. 21, r. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they must prove their title before they can succeed and the establishment of such possession does not prove any title with respect to the suit property. Learned counsel has referred me in this connection to Krishnarao Vs. Ghamon(3), Kaleswarar Mills Vs. Govindaswami(4), Bhimavva Vs. Nagappa(5) and Ramlaxmi Vs. Bank of Baroda(6). 16. Now what has been laid down in these rulings is that the scope of a suit under O. 21, r. 103 is not the determination of a mere question of possession of the parties concerned but the establishment of a right or title by which the plaintiffs claim the present possession of the property. It has also been laid down in some of these cases that there is a distinction between a suit under O. 21, r. 63 and that under O. 21, r. 103 and that distinction is that while the former contemplates the establishment by the plaintiff of the right claimed by him to the property in dispute and the question of ownership or title, if at all, does not call for any elaborate investigation in such a suit, the latter relates to the proof of the right of title which the plaintiff claims to the present possession of the property. 17. 17. Relying on these cases, learned counsel has advanced a strong argument that the plaintiffs in the present case cannot be allowed to succeed in their action because they have failed to establish their title, to wit, the will on which their case was founded, and that the finding at which I have arrived above in concurrence with the trial court, namely, that the plaintiffs have proved their long and peaceful possession over the property in dispute extending over a period of about 25 years or so is not sufficient for the purpose. This argument, in my opinion, is wholly fallacious. It is true that in a suit under O. 21, r. 103, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove actual possession and he may still succeed if he establishes his title. That is, to my mind, the clear effect of the various decisions on which learned counsel relies. To say that much is one thing. But it would be an entirely different thing to say that in a case under O. 21, r. 103, the plaintiffs cannot possibly succeed by proving their long and peaceful possession of the property in dispute. It is entirely incorrect, in my view, to think that long and peaceful possession will not or cannot be the basis of a decree in a suit under O. 21, r. 103. The reason is that it is one of the incontrovertible fundamental principles of the civil law relating to possession that possession gives a good title to the holder of it against all the world except the true owner. A suit founded on possession of this kind cannot but be held to be based on title or what may appropriately be called possessory title and where a plaintiff succeeds in establishing this kind of title apart from anyother title on which he may have also founded his suit, it must be held that he has established "the right which he claims to the present possession of the property" within the meaning or O. 21, r. 103, and such a result cannot by any means be said to be contrary to the provisions of O.21, r. 103. I should like to mention in this connection that so far as the Madras cases are concerned, the leading case on the point is Unni Moidin Vs. Pecker(7), upon which the latter rulings seem to have been based. I should like to mention in this connection that so far as the Madras cases are concerned, the leading case on the point is Unni Moidin Vs. Pecker(7), upon which the latter rulings seem to have been based. The following observations from that case Dear reproduction:— "The suit referred to in the rule, by whichever party instituted, is a suit to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property. In a suit by the decree-holder, if it were shown that the defendant was in possession at the date of the order under r. 99, the decree-holder could only succeed by proving his title, because a person in actual possession has a possessory title against the world and can only be dispossessed by the true owner and those claiming under him. So too,.......if it be found that the plaintiff was in possession at the date of the summary order against him under he is entitled to succeed by virtue of that posses sion unless the defendant (decree-holder) proves a subsisting title carrying with it the right to present possession." 18. To the same effect is the ruling in Lakshman Vs. Dattatraya (8). At page 380, the learned judges pointed out that— "The suit contemplated by R. 103, O. 21 is not confined, in our opinion; to a suit for possession of the property. It is a suit to establish a right which the plaintiff claims to the present possession of the property. And this right may be established either on account of his to possession or on account of his title. Again in Ramlaxmi Vs. Bank of Baroda (Supra) it was laid down that a suit under O.21, r. 103 is to establish a right which the plaintiff claims to the present possession of the property and (it is important to note) This right may be established by the plaintiff in any manner whatever available to him. He may do it by establishing that under the terms of a deed of partition he is entitled to the possession of the property as the sole owner thereof. He may also establish the claim to the present possession of the property in his right as a tenant-in-common with the judgment debtor. He may establish the right to the present possession of the property by any other vestigate of title which he may have acquired. He may also establish the claim to the present possession of the property in his right as a tenant-in-common with the judgment debtor. He may establish the right to the present possession of the property by any other vestigate of title which he may have acquired. The question is what is the plaintiffs claim to the Present possession of the property not whether he is the sole owner of the property. The same view finds support from Ouseph Chackoo Vs. Krishna Pillai (9). 18. From the aforesaid review of the cases, there can be no doubt whatsover that in a suit like the present, it would be perfectly open to the plaintiffs to base their suit on a title founded upon a will and/or upon a title based on long and peaceful possession, and it can be no argument that because the plaintiffs have failed to establish their case on the first branch they cannot be allowed to succeed on the second branch thereof provided ofcourse they have established their case relating to it. 19 Applying these principles to the present case, the position boils down to this, it is clear that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their title in so for as they based it upon the will. Equally clearly, the plaintiffs have succeeded in establishing that they have been in long and peaceful possession of the property in dispute for a period of about 25 years from 1933 to 1958 when the present suit came to be filed. The title of the plaintiffs albeit posses sory is good against the entire world except the true owner. 20 The only other question then is whether the defendant has succeeded in establishing that Deokishen, his predecessor-in-interest was the true owner of the property in dispute I have already discussed this point above, and from that discussion it necessarily follows that he has miserably failed to prove that. Of the two titles to the present possession which it was for the parties to prove, the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving theirs and the defendant has failed to do so. In the net result, they are entitled to have the suit decreed. I hold accordingly. 21 The result is that for the reasons mentioned above, this appeal must be allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge set aside, and those of the trial court restored. In the net result, they are entitled to have the suit decreed. I hold accordingly. 21 The result is that for the reasons mentioned above, this appeal must be allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge set aside, and those of the trial court restored. The plaintiffs will have their costs throughout. Leave for further appeal is prayed for and is hereby refused.