JUDGMENT P. Govinda Nair, J. 1. This appeal is by defendants 2 to 6. The second defendant is the wife of the first defendant, who is no more, and the daughter of one Rama Poduval, also deceased. Rama Poduval was admittedly the Karnavan of a tarwad. He took a lease deed for about 6 acres of land in 1094 by Ext. B1. The controversy in this case is only about a building that has been erected in a part of the property covered by that lease deed. It was claimed by the plaintiff, a member of the tarwad of the said Rama Poduval, that the building was erected by the plaintiff and that the second defendant and her brothers and sisters were allowed to stay in that building. The appellants, including the widow of Rama Podual, contended that it was Rama Poduval who erected the building for their benefit and they, his wife and children, were staying there. They went further and said that the plaintiff's tarwad had no right whatever to the property which is taken on lease under Ext. B1, that it was and it remained the exclusive separate property of Rama Poduval and on his death in 1113 devolved on his wife and children. They prayed for a dismissal of the suit. 2. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff was entitled only to a third of the suit property which is the building on the leasehold property and directed the plaintiff to take appropriate steps, if so advised, for partition. During the course of the Judgment, it also considered the rights of the parties to the leasehold property and came to the conclusion that the property did not belong to the tarwad. The lower appellate court has taken a different view and has held that the leasehold property as well as the building belonged to the tarwad of the plaintiff and allowed recovery of possession sought for. 3. In this appeal, it is contended that in the absence of proof of a nucleus of tarwad funds at the time of the acquisition of Ext. B1, it must be presumed that the property belonged exclusively to Rama Poduval in whose name Ext. B1 lease deed has been executed, notwithstanding the fact that he was the Karnavan of the tarwad at that time. B1, it must be presumed that the property belonged exclusively to Rama Poduval in whose name Ext. B1 lease deed has been executed, notwithstanding the fact that he was the Karnavan of the tarwad at that time. The property covered by the lease deed being the self acquired property, it is further contended that there is no material in this case to come to the conclusion that he relinquished his separate interest in the property and gave it to the tarwad. As the property itself belonged to Rama Poduval, it is said that the building necessarily belonged exclusively to him and therefore the suit should have been dismissed. 4. It appears to me that counsel for the appellant is justified in his contention that there is an initial presumption in favour of his client that the property belonged to Rama Poduval. There is no evidence in the case regarding any tarwad assets and nucleus at the time of Ext. B1. But admittedly no consideration passed under Ext. B1 and the presumption that the property belonged to Rama Poduval because Ext. B1 was in his name is not an irrebuttable one. If the subsequent conduct of the parties clearly shows that there was no intention on the part of Rama Poduval to acquire a separate interest in the property covered by Ext. B1, the presumption would he rebutted. The Supreme Court in Abdulla Ahmad v. Animendra Kissen Mitter (AIR 1950 S. C. 15) said with reference to the subsequent conduct of parties in understanding the terms of a contract embodied in a letter : "The evidence of such conduct is relevant in this case because, as pointed out by Viscount Simon L. C., in the case already referred to, the phrase 'finding a purchaser' is itself not without ambiguity. Here the phrase is 'securing a purchaser'. This phrase similarly is not without ambiguity. The evidence of conduct of the parties in this situation as to how they understood the words to mean can be considered in determining the true effect of the contract made between the parties. Extrinsic evidence to determine the effect of an instrument is permissible where there remains a doubt as to its true meaning. The evidence of conduct of the parties in this situation as to how they understood the words to mean can be considered in determining the true effect of the contract made between the parties. Extrinsic evidence to determine the effect of an instrument is permissible where there remains a doubt as to its true meaning. Evidence of the acts done under it is a guide to the intention of the parties in such a case and particularly when acts are done shortly after the date of the instrument." 5. This Court also had occasion to consider the question as to how far the subsequent conduct of the parties can be made use of for ascertaining the intention expressed ambiguously in a document which comes up for interpretation. Reference may be made to the decision in Souriyar v. Lakshmikutty Amma reported in 1962 KLJ 411 . 6. The expressions used in Ext. B1 and Ext. A4 appear to me to be not without ambiguity. No doubt, it is said that the property has been taken on lease by Rama Poduval. Rama Poduval at that time had a dual capacity, if that expression may be used, one that of being the Karnavan of the tarwad. It appears to me, therefore, possible and necessary to refer to his own conduct as expressed in subsequent documents to find out what was his intention at the time he acquired or took Ext. B1 lease in 1094. The property taken on lease is said to have been in the possession not merely of Rama Poduval but of the plaintiff and another member of the tarwad, Kannan Poduval. It is said in those documents that they improved the property. (Vide Exts. A5 to A8). It is seen from Exts. A6 and A8 that certain other properties have been mortgaged for the purpose of raising funds to improve the leasehold property. These other properties, if the statements in Ext. A9, a document executed by all the then living members of the tarwad, are taken into consideration, were tarwad properties. It means, therefore, that tarwad properties have been mortgaged and funds raised for the purpose of improving the leasehold property. It is clear from these that Rama Poduval never intended that he should have any separate right in the property. But it is contended by counsel for the appellant that Rama Poduval was not a party to Ext. It means, therefore, that tarwad properties have been mortgaged and funds raised for the purpose of improving the leasehold property. It is clear from these that Rama Poduval never intended that he should have any separate right in the property. But it is contended by counsel for the appellant that Rama Poduval was not a party to Ext. A9 and that no where has he clearly expressed that he is giving up his right in this property in favour of the tarwad. Rama Poduval was dead at the time of Ext. A9. It is significant that the first defendant, the husband of the second defendant, who is one of the appellants before me, was a party to Ext. A9, and I am unable to see any reason why the first defendant should make a statement in Ext. A9 which is against the interests of his wife. It is stated that they have fallen out. But this enmity between them is said to have set in only in 1944 and admittedly they were living on good terms when Ext. A9 was executed. Considering the nature of this evidence, it appears to me that Rama Poduval never intended to have any separate right in the leasehold property and hence the initial presumption in favour of the appellants that the property belonged to him exclusively stands rebutted. 7. Assuming that the property was Rama Poduval's, counsel for the appellant relied on a ruling in Naina Pillai v. Daivanai Animal (AIR 1936 Madras 177) and he said that the statements in Exts. A4 to A8 are not sufficient to spell out a clear intention on the part of Rama poduval to relinquish his separate right in favour of the tarwad. It seems to me that the facts of the case decided by the Madras High Court are different from the facts that have to be considered here. There was dealing with the property, which was admittedly separate, as if it was tarwad property, in the Madras case, and it was said that such dealing was not sufficient to import a clear expression of intention of relinquishment. In this case, the fact that properties which are construed to be tarwad properties, have been dealt with and encumbered for the purpose of raising funds for improving the plaint property which is clear from the statements in the documents, Exts. In this case, the fact that properties which are construed to be tarwad properties, have been dealt with and encumbered for the purpose of raising funds for improving the plaint property which is clear from the statements in the documents, Exts. A6 and A8 and that joint labour has been expended by the members of the tarwad for improving the plaint property which is also clear from the statements in the documents, Exts. A5 to A 8, make a vital difference. In the ruling in Ammukutty v. Sankarankutty Nair reported in 1957 KLT 547 this Court has held that it is unnecessary that tarwad funds must be utilised for establishing that a given property is tarwad property, and if joint labour of the members of the tarwad, if found, is sufficient to establish that the property is tarwad property. It is clear from the facts of this case that it was the members in the tarwad who were in possession of the property. It is further clear on the findings that have been entered regarding the nature of the properties dealt with under Exts. A6 and A8 that tarwad funds have been expended for the improvement of the property. I therefore conclude that the property covered by Ext. B1 belongs to the tarwad and confirm the finding entered in that behalf by the lower appellate court. I dismiss this appeal with costs.