Bhargava, J.—This is an application in revision by Ganeshilal and two others. Briefly stated the facts are :— Against the petitioners and 6 others a challan was submitted under sec. 147, 323 I.P.C., in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate Pali, who by his order dated 12.1.60 discharged the petitioners under sec. 251 A(2) Cr.P.C., but framed charges against the remaining 6 persons. Against the order of discharge a revision was preferred before the District Magistrate Pali who by his order dated 30.7.60 accepted the revision and sent the case back directing that charges under sec. 147 I.P.C. be framed against the petitioners. When the case came back before the the trial Magistrate an objection was raised on behalf of the petitioners that the order of the learned District Magistrate was wrong as the procedure prescribed under sec. 251A Cr.P.C. did not envisage any inquiry. This objection was overruled by the learned Magistrate. A revision was then taken up against this order dated 10.3.61, to the court of the Sessions Judge Pali. Although the revision was directed against the order of the trial Magistrate dated 10.3.61, but it appears that the order of the District Magistrate dated 30.7.60, was also challenged before him on the ground that sec. 251 A Cr.P.C., did not contemplate any inquiry. The learned Sessions Judge held that it was too late to challenge the order of the District Magistrate. He also repelled the contention that the District Magistrate was not competent to make an order for further inquiry into the case under sec, 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners urges that the order of the learned District Magistrate is bad in law on two grounds. Firstly no further inquiry into the case could have been ordered and secondly no direction for framing charges against the petitioners could be given under sec. 436 Cr.P.C. On the merits it is conceded that there was sufficient material on record to frame charges against the petitioners. 3. It may be mentioned at the outset that under sec. 436 Cr.P.C., an order for further inquiry in the case of any person accused of any offence who has been discharge can only be made. Under this section no direction can be given to frame charges against the accused. 3. It may be mentioned at the outset that under sec. 436 Cr.P.C., an order for further inquiry in the case of any person accused of any offence who has been discharge can only be made. Under this section no direction can be given to frame charges against the accused. All that can be done is to direct the Magistrate to hold further inquiry and then to proceed in accordance with law. If upon inquiry the Magistrate finds that charges should be framed he can do so. If on the other hand he finds it unnecessary to frame charges he can discharge the accused again but no directions can lawfully be given to a Magistrate to frame charges against the accused. It is the function of the Magistrate to decide whether the charges should be framed or not, and his discretion should not be fettered by instructions or directions from any other court. The order of the learned District Magistrate, therefore, is bad in so far as it directs the trial Magistrate to frame charges under sec. 147 Cr. P.C. against the petitioners. 4. The next question is whether an order for further inquiry into the case can be made where an order of discharge has been passed under sec. 251A(2) Cr.P.C. It is urged that sec. 251A Cr.P.C., does not contemplate any inquiry by the Magistrate. From the very beginning the proceedings under sec. 251A Cr.P.C. partake the nature of a trial and hence an order for further inquiry under sec. 436 Cr.P.C. is not warranted. It is pointed out that the words "at the commencement of the trial" occurring in sub-sec. 1 of sec. 251 A Cr.P.C. clearly indicate that the Magistrate is not required to hold any inquiry in such cases. In support of this argument reliance is placed on Govindaswamy Vs. The State(l). 5. Sec. 436 Cr.P.C. becomes applicable when a complaint has been dismissed under sec. 203 or sub-sec. 3 of sec. 204 Cr.P.C., or when any person accused of any offence has been discharged. On the terms of sec. 436 it is quite clear that an order for further inquiry can be made in all cases where any person accused of any offence has been discharged. Sec. 251 A (2) lays down: — "If, upon consideration of all the documents referred to in sec. On the terms of sec. 436 it is quite clear that an order for further inquiry can be made in all cases where any person accused of any offence has been discharged. Sec. 251 A (2) lays down: — "If, upon consideration of all the documents referred to in sec. 173, and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless he shall discharge him." Thus the order under the above sub-section is an order of discharge and cannot be construed as an order of acquittal. Sub-sec. 11 of sec. 251 A itself speaks of an order of acquittal where a charge has been framsd and the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty. Order of discharge under sub-sec. (2) cannot be equated with an order of acquittal passed under sub-sec. (11). To regard an order under sec. 251 A (2) as an order of acquittal would be opposed to principle of legal justice, as there cannot be acquittal without proper trial of accused. Thus an order under sec. 251 A(2) being an order of discharge can be revised under sec. 436 Cr.P.C. and an order for further inquiry can be legally passed on it. 6. It is well known that sec. 251 A (2) was introduced by Act 26 of 1955 in the Code of Criminal Procedure with a view to simplifying and expediting the procedure relating to cases instituted on police report. Sec. 251 A occurs in Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure which relates to the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. In the same chapter there are provisions from sec. 252 to sec. 256 which deal with the procedure applicable to cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Under sec. 252 the Magistrate himself makes an inquiry and hears the complainant and his witnesses who are likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case. If upon taking all the evidence referred to in sec. 252 and making such examination if any of the accused he finds that no case against the accused has been made out he passes an order of discharge under sec. 253(1). Sub-sec. (2) of sec. If upon taking all the evidence referred to in sec. 252 and making such examination if any of the accused he finds that no case against the accused has been made out he passes an order of discharge under sec. 253(1). Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 253 empowers a Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage if he considers the charge to be groundless. There is ample authority for the view that accused can be discharged even before any evidence is taken if he finds that the charge against the accused is groundless. If that is so, then it would seem that there is no real difference between the nature of order passed under sec. 251 A (2) and sec. 253(2) Criminal Procedure Code and both can equally be revised under sec. 436 Cr.P.C. 7. The difference in the procedure in cases instituted on police report and those instituted otherwise than on police report is for obvious reasons. When the case is instituted on police report an inquiry by responsible officer has already been made and the Magistrate is empowered to act upon the inquiry and is not required to make an inquiry himself. Though under the procedure laid down in sub-sec.(l) and (2) of sec. 251 A there is no express provision for taking evidence but at the same time there is no inhibition either. There appears to be no reason why a Magistrate be precluded from examining under sec. 540 Cr.P.C., any person as a witness whose evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case even at the stage when he is required to consider the question of framing a charge against the accused, whether the proceedings under sec. 251 A(l)(2) are in the nature of inquiry or not. Inquiry as defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure "includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court." This definition is not exhaustive and should be read as subject to the context. This is however, beyond doubt that inquiry is something different from a trial. The proceedings under sec. 251 A (1) and (2) Cr.P.C., cannot be regarded as in the nature of a trial. The procedure laid down in sub-secs. This is however, beyond doubt that inquiry is something different from a trial. The proceedings under sec. 251 A (1) and (2) Cr.P.C., cannot be regarded as in the nature of a trial. The procedure laid down in sub-secs. 3 to 11 of sec.251 A indicates that the trial under these sections in fact begins in the accepted sense of that term when the charge is read and explained to the accused and he is asked whether he is guilty or claims to be tried. The proceedings in my view which precede the order of discharge are in the nature of inquiry notwithstanding that they do not involve the taking of evidence. As observed by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Desai Vs. Ramnaresh Pandey (2): — "The word trial is not defined in the Code. Trial according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary means "the conclusion, by a competent tribunal of question in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal" (Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. 4, P. 3092), and according to Whartons Law Lexicon means" the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal, before a Judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land" (Whartons Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 1011). The words tried and trial appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words tried and trial have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration. 8. The use of the word "at the commencement of trial" in sub-sec. (1) cannot be regarded as conclusive to hold that the proceedings are in the nature of trial and not inquiry. Looking to the nature, scope and content of the proceedings under sec. 251 A the word trial cannot be construed as excluding the preliminary stages such as inquiry. The use of the word "at the commencement of trial" in sub-sec. (1) cannot be regarded as conclusive to hold that the proceedings are in the nature of trial and not inquiry. Looking to the nature, scope and content of the proceedings under sec. 251 A the word trial cannot be construed as excluding the preliminary stages such as inquiry. I am, therefore, of the view that under sec. 436 Cr.P.C. an order for further inquiry into the case can be made even where an order of discharge has been made under sec. 251 A (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. With great respect I do no, share the view expressed by Krishna Rao, J. in 1960 Andhra Pradesh 391, which has since been overruled by a Division Bench of that Court In Fakruddin Vs. State Police(3). A learned Judge of Madras High Court in In re Pakkirisamy Pillai(4) has also disagreed with the view taken in Govindaswamy Vs. the State, A. I. R. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 391. The case will, therefore, go back to the trial Magistrate for making a further inquiry. Revision is therefore, rejected.