JUDGMENT P. Govinda Nair, J. 1. This appeal by the Municipal Council, Kozhikode, raises the vexed questions as to the jurisdiction of the civil courts in interfering with the orders passed by statutory authorities. The statute in question is the Madras District Municipalities Act (V of 1920), and to state in a nutshell, the point to be decided is whether the action that has given rise to this second appeal is barred by S.354(2) of that statute, reading : "354(2), No suit shall be brought in any Court to recover any sum of money collected under the authority of this Act or to recover damages on account of any assessment, or collection of money made under the said authority; Provided that the provisions of this Act have been, in effect, complied with." 2. The suit was for recovery of money paid by the plaintiff to the said Municipality as property tax for the seven half years starting" from the first of October 1949. It is the case of the plaintiff that the revision of the annual letting value of the three items of properties scheduled in the plaint, items 1 and 2 being mere garden lands without any building and item 3 being a similar compound with a building thereon, was arbitrary. At the time the suit was filed, the annual letting value stood fixed at Rs. 540/- for these three items which of course include the building. This assessment was claimed to be made by the authority not in accordance with the provisions of the statute, and therefore, it was contended, in effect, without complying with the provisions thereof and also quite arbitrarily. The Trial Court did not accept this contention and consequently dismissed the suit. In appeal, however, the learned Subordinate Judge held in favour of the plaintiff on one of the six points raised and this, according to the learned Judge, was sufficient to set aside the assessment that has been made and holding that the suit is maintainable, decreed the same and allowed refund of a portion of the amount claimed, since, according to the learned Judge, the tax which was fixed in 1939-40 was payable for these seven half years also. Hence deducting that tax from the plaint amount, a decree for the balance was given and the parties were directed to suffer their costs in the appellate court as well as in the Trial Court. 3. Counsel for the appellant raised various points in his arguments before me. The main point was that the suit is not maintainable. There was, according to him, materials for fixing the annual letting value available before the assessing authority, that the assessing authority acted in accordance with the provisions of the statute and that assuming that he has erred, the remedies are exclusively those provided under the statute. I do not think that the question as to whether a suit is maintainable or not can be decided in the abstract without reference to the facts of a given case. It is now more or less well settled, and no decision has been quoted before me which has taken a contrary view that if a statutory authority under colour of the statute acts in an arbitrary manner and makes an order or an assessment purporting to be under the statute, the same can always be challenged before the ordinary courts of the land. The case before me can be disposed of in the short question as to whether the assessing authority in this case had or had not acted arbitrarily. 4. S.82(2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act (V of 1920) provides : "82(2). The annual value of lands and buildings shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which they may reasonably be expected to let from month to month or from year to year (less a deduction in the case of buildings, of ten per cent of that portion of such annual rent which is attributable to the buildings alone, apart from their sites and the adjacent lands occupied as an appurtenance thereto;)" 5. Recently, the Supreme Court had to construe the meaning of the word 'reasonably' occurring in a similar section and it was ruled in the case reported in Corporation of Calcutta v. Sm. Recently, the Supreme Court had to construe the meaning of the word 'reasonably' occurring in a similar section and it was ruled in the case reported in Corporation of Calcutta v. Sm. Padma Debi (1962 S. C. 151) that the failure of the authorities functioning under the District Municipalities Act to be guided by the fair rent fixed under a different statute for a particular building and the fixing by the Municipal authorities of an annual letting value at a figure higher than the one that would be reached if calculation is made on the basis of the fair rent fixed, amounted to the fixation not of a 'reasonable' letting value. 6. It is equally well established that the annal letting value of similar neighbouring buildings and property are relevant considerations for arriving at the annual letting value of a particular building and / or a property. Reference may be made to the decisions in 1940 Calcutta 47, 1953 Calcutta 428 and 1954 Calcutta 20. 7. The plaint properties originally belonged to one Bhaskaran who entered into an agreement to sell these items of properties first to a stranger, who assigned his rights later to the plaintiff. Before this transaction of the sale was concluded, the plaintiff took these properties on rental from the said Bhaskaran and the rent deed is Ext, A1. This was in April 1948 and the rent fixed for the building in that document was Rs. 15/- per mensem and for the properties was Rs. 30/- per mensem. Later, the plaintiff purchased these properties. 8. Even when these properties continued to belong to the above said Bhaskaran, there was a proposal to revise the annual letting value and it was suggested by the Municipality that the same may be fixed at Rs. 840/-. Bhaskaran moved the authorities by Ext. B1 petition and prayed that it may be fixed at a lower figure. The Municipality considered the petition and fixed the annual letting value at Rs. 600/-. Thereafter the plaintiff came on the scene and a revision petition -- Ext. B4 in the case -- was moved by her before the same authority. It is necessary to refer to that petition. It is alleged therein in paragraph 3 : "Assessment No. 754 relates to a house at d its site. The building is about hundred years old. The assessment up to 1943 was Rs. B4 in the case -- was moved by her before the same authority. It is necessary to refer to that petition. It is alleged therein in paragraph 3 : "Assessment No. 754 relates to a house at d its site. The building is about hundred years old. The assessment up to 1943 was Rs. 2-5-6 and thereafter till 1949 it was Rs. 6-6-3, the maximum rent for which the house has been let prior to 1948 even during the War boom days being only Rs. 5/- per mensem. In April 1948, the petitioner was constrained by force of circumstances to take the house on lease on a rent of Rs. 15/- per mensem and the usufructs in the compound were also taken on lease then on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/- though the building or compound can and will never fetch this exhorbitant rent. The petitioner agreed to pay this high rent only because she was unable to find another suitable accommodation of which she was very badly in need." The order passed in that petition is Ext. B5 and reads: "The petitioner was originally a tenant of this house and a kychit executed to N. Bhaskaran stipulating Rs. 30/- rent per mensem for land and Rs. 15/- for building is produced. He (this must be 'she') has purchased these properties in December 48 for 10,000/-. AV is reduced to 360/- for SV, and 180/- for house. Confirmed." It is not clear what is the basis on which this assessment has been made. However, it is quite evident that the complaint made and the specific stand taken in Ext. B4 petition that the rent mentioned in Ext. A1 rent deed does not at all represent the true rent of the property has not been even adverted to in this order. There is no reference to any other material on the basis of which the rent could have been fixed, though on an arithmetical computation it is clear that the basis adopted has been the rent provided in Ext. A1. A further attempt by the plaintiff by Ext. B6 petition to reduce the value proved equally futile as is seen from Ext. B7 order and an attempt to question that order by way of appeal ended in failure too, since the appeal was filed out of time. 9. A1. A further attempt by the plaintiff by Ext. B6 petition to reduce the value proved equally futile as is seen from Ext. B7 order and an attempt to question that order by way of appeal ended in failure too, since the appeal was filed out of time. 9. In the plaint, it is clearly stated in paragraph 2 : "Further, the annual value fixed was arbitrary and capricious and out of all proportions to its real rental value as such bigger and more substantial houses with better amenities in the neighbourhood in that locality fetch only a monthly rent of Rs. 3/- and Rs. 4/-" Again, in paragraph 4 of the plaint: "Furthermore, even on the wrong basis adopted by the defendant, the annual value fixed is arbitrary and unfair. The rent, annual value and tax of similar properties in the neighbourhood which, as stated above, is only between Rs. 3/- and Rs. 4/- has not been taken into account." 10. Apparently confronted with these pleadings, D.W. 2, the Commissioner, who has been examined in the case appears to me to have completely changed his stand which he took in Ext. B5 of fixing the annual letting value on the basis of Ext. A1, stated twice in his evidence that he has not accepted the rent fixed in Ext. A1. To find a basis for the assessment he proceeded to say that he took into consideration the annual letting value of the neighbouring properties. But he could not give any details in regard to which property and what rent that was the criterion for the fixation in Ext. B5. In fact, his evidence shows a lamentable lack of knowledge about the relevant factors, which must necessarily guide any statutory authority, particularly one who has been invested with the power of imposing a tax on a citizen of this country. In one place, he says that he visited the house and formed certain impressions. There are no records of those impressions and in his deposition he also says that he had a casual look at the rooms. This belated attempt of the Commissioner to find out a basis for the assessment, according to me, has completely failed. Further, he has accepted what is stated in Ext. There are no records of those impressions and in his deposition he also says that he had a casual look at the rooms. This belated attempt of the Commissioner to find out a basis for the assessment, according to me, has completely failed. Further, he has accepted what is stated in Ext. C3, the report of the commissioner, who has been deputed by the Trial Court to find out the annual letting value of the neighbouring similar properties. D. W. 2, when asked about this report, has admitted that he had nothing to say about the correctness or otherwise of what is stated in that report. The annual registers maintained by the Municipality have been produced at the instance of the plaintiff in this case and these show the annual letting value of buildings and properties in the same block in the neighbourhood. The Commissioner, as D. W. 2, has sworn: "As far as I know the entries in those registers are correct". D. W. 1 a clerk of the Municipality has also given evidence that the annual letting value fixed for the buildings and properties entered in the annual registers have been correctly fixed. These exhibits, which have been relied on by the lower appellate court, clearly indicate that the annual letting values of the plaint properties have been fixed at many times that fixed for such properties in the neighbourhood. In the light of the above evidence it is impossible for me to come to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower appellate court that the assessment has been arbitrary is not correct. I confirm that finding and dismiss this appeal with costs. 11. Various other points have been argued before me on the memo of cross objections pertaining to the several contentions of the respondent which have been found against her by the lower appellate court. In the view 1 have taken on the main point, it is unnecessary for me to express any opinion on those points. I need only add that I make no alteration whatever on the discretion exercised by the lower appellate court regarding the costs of the parties in the Trial Court and the lower appellate scourt. As I said already, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondent in this appeal.