Judgment :- 1. The second appeal raises a short question, whether the transaction evidenced by Exts. P1 and D1, the latter being an otti and the former its counter-part or ethir, is a lease or a mortgage. The second appeal arises in execution and the primary court held that the transaction was a lease and not a mortgage and in that view refused recovery of possession. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Alleppey held that the appellant was not entitled to fixity of tenure and therefore allowed the appeal. In second appeal the question for decision is whether the reversing judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is sustainable. 2. The reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge is a little strange. He concludes in Para.4 of his judgment that the relationship as disclosed by Exts. P1 and D1 cannot be construed as that of a debtor and creditor. He also observes in Para.5 that the appellant may come under the definition of the word 'tenant' in Kerala Act IV of 1961, because he has agreed to pay consideration for his being allowed by the respondent to possess and to enjoy the land of the latter. Notwithstanding that the learned judge says that the term "tenant" has been defined in the Act "very broadly and rather loosely" and the enumeration in S.2 (50) (i) "is not exhaustive, but illustrative". He then says that the transaction is not a kanom falling under S.2 (18) of Act IV of 1961 and therefore the appellant is not entitled to fixity of tenure. This is the reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge, which is being attacked by Mr. S. Bhoothalingam Iyer, the learned advocate of the appellant. 3. The object of interpretation of any document is to get at the intention of the parties to the document; and this intention has to be normally gathered from the language used by them and from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The name given by the parties to the transaction also forms part of the language or circumstances and therefore the name should not be altogether ignored in the enquiry for getting at the intention of the parties. But courts should not be obsessed unduly by the name given to the transaction. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Bihari Saran (AIR. 1958 SC. But courts should not be obsessed unduly by the name given to the transaction. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Bihari Saran (AIR. 1958 SC. 941), where the question is whether a transaction is a lease or mortgage, the intention of the parties must be looked into and once a debt with security of land for its redemption is found, then the arrangement is a mortgage by whatever name it is called. Raman Nayar, J. in Hussain Thangal v. Ali (1961 KLT. 1033) observes: "The courts have never allowed themselves to be unduly oppressed by the name given to a transaction in the deed effecting it, and, where the terms of the deed clearly spell a different transaction, have felt themselves free to ignore the name. xxx xxx xxx xxx But the name is prima facie a valuable indication of the purport of a deed, especially when the transaction named is a well-known transaction carrying with it certain well-defined legal incidents; and when the terms themselves are equivocal, the name may be conclusive. xxx xxx xxx xxx What the court has to ascertain is the purport of the document, that is all that matters. But, in doing so, it will pay due heed to the name given to the transaction in the document itself, for, that is a valuable prima facie indication of its purport and, where the terms of the document do not yield any definite result one way or the other, can be conclusive as to its nature." I am in entire agreement with this observation of my learned brother. According to me, this passage means that if the provisions of a document clearly indicate the nature of the transaction, even if the name points in a different direction, courts should not be carried away by the name and they should ignore the name. If, on the other hand, the terms of the document do not give sufficient indication as to the nature of the transaction, in other words, when the terms themselves are equivocal, then the name given to the transaction by the parties may be a deciding factor, which will conclude the question one way or the other. If, on the other hand, the terms of the document do not give sufficient indication as to the nature of the transaction, in other words, when the terms themselves are equivocal, then the name given to the transaction by the parties may be a deciding factor, which will conclude the question one way or the other. Therefore, in investigating the nature of a transaction, courts have to consider the provisions of the document first; and the name should be taken into consideration only if the terms of the document do not help to reach a decisive conclusion. 4. The provisions in the documents evidencing the transaction and the surrounding circumstances may now be noted. Four items of properties are involved in the transaction, the amount advanced being only 1781/2 fanams, i. e., about Rs. 25/-. The first item is a paramba having an extent of 39 cents in one sub-division and 44 cents in another sub-division; item 2 is a purayidom with an extent of 7 cents with several coconut trees thereon; item 3 is a nilom having an extent of 1 acre and 16 cents; and item 4 is another nilom of 43 cents. Out of the annual income from these properties, after deducting the interest on the amount advanced, the transferee is to pay Rs. 37/- and 34 paras of paddy every year to the transferor as michavarom. There is also provision for making improvements on item 1; and on item 2, since there is no space for planting, no further improvements are allowed. A term of 12 years is fixed in the document and thereafter, if everything goes well, the transferee is allowed to take on lease all the coconut trees on item 1, which may have started yielding by that time. There is no provision creating a charge on the properties; nor is there any provision authorising the transferee either to claim or to recover the money advanced by him. These are the relevant provisions of the document and the circumstances which have to be considered. 5. Mr. V. Rama Shenoi, on behalf of the respondent, contends an otti in the Travancore area is a mortgage and even if there is no provision in the document creating a charge or for the recovery of the money, such provisions are implied in the transaction by its being an otti by the custom of Travancore. 5. Mr. V. Rama Shenoi, on behalf of the respondent, contends an otti in the Travancore area is a mortgage and even if there is no provision in the document creating a charge or for the recovery of the money, such provisions are implied in the transaction by its being an otti by the custom of Travancore. In support of this proposition he invites my attention to Bhagavathi Narayani v. Valliamma Kaliyamma (14 TLR. 218) and R.N. Krishna Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai Thanu Pillai (30 TLJ. 785). He also urges that in the Travancore area no kanom is created on pandaravaka lands. When I point out to the learned counsel that item 1 covered by the documents in this case was already outstanding on a kanom in spite of its being pandaravaka land, he discreetly withdraws that second contention. The effect of the first contention of Mr. Rama Shenoi, as I have understood it, is that, because this document is styled otti, the court has to attach all importance to that name and interpret the provisions of the document so as to hold that the transaction is an otti, though the written terms of the document do not fully support this conclusion. This, I am afraid, is against the decision of the Supreme Court as well as the decision of Raman Nayar, J. It is difficult to conceive that three substantial items of properties were handed over as security for the paltry sum of Rs. 25/- over and above the fairly substantial first item, which was already held on kanom for the same amount. The annual michavaram payable, is itself twice or thrice the amount advanced. These circumstances are reconcilable only with the creation of a lease and not of a mortgage. Therefore, I cannot possibly agree with the contention of Mr. Rama Shenoi. 6. The recitals in Exts. P1 and D1 clearly show that the parties did not intend to create a debtor and creditor relationship, but intended only to create a landlord and tenant relationship. It may be that the transaction does not fall within the definition of kanom under S.2 (18) of Act IV of 1961. But quite contrary to the normal practice in otties in the Travancore area, there is a provision for payment of michavaram in the documents. It may be that the transaction does not fall within the definition of kanom under S.2 (18) of Act IV of 1961. But quite contrary to the normal practice in otties in the Travancore area, there is a provision for payment of michavaram in the documents. There is also provision for making improvements; and the properties involved are very substantial and the michavarom payable is also substantial in relation to the amount advanced. There cannot be any doubt regarding the intention of the parties, which could only have been to create a lease and not a mortgage. 7. The decision of the lower appellate court is therefore reversed and that of the primary court is restored. The respondent is directed to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court as well as in the lower appellate court. Leave granted. Allowed.