JUDGMENT A. P. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal against a decision of Mr. Justice Broome allowing a petition filed by the respondents 1 to 3 under Article 226 of the Constitution by an order dated 13-2-1962. 2. The respondents 1 to 3 claimed to be Adhivasis of the land in dispute on the ground that they were entered as occupants in 1356F. Alleging that they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the petitioner in Asarh 1357F, they made an application under Sec. 232 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act praying for restoration of possession. The application was contested by the appellant mainly on two grounds. One was that it was not maintainable under Sec. 232 of the Act as there had been no dispossession through Court. The other was that the appellant having acquired Bhumidhari rights could not be dispossessed. 3. The trial court allowed the application of the respondents. In appeal by the appellant both the grounds mentioned above found favour with the Additional Commissioner and he allowed the appeal. An application in revision was then filed by a respondent before the Board of Revenue but the Board dismissed it as it agreed with the Commissioner on the first point about the non-maintainability of the application under Sec. 232 of the Act. The respondents filed the Writ petition out of which this appeal has arisen and contended that the view of law taken by the Additional Commissioner as well as the Board on the question of the maintainability of the application of the respondents under Sec. 232 was erroneous and the orders of the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were liable to be quashed. This contention was accepted by the learned single Judge who heard the writ petition and by an order dated 13-2-1962 he allowed the petition and quashed the orders of the Additional Commissioner and the Board by a writ of certiorari. 4. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant does not question the correctness of the view taken by the learned single Judge. It is conceded that the application of respondents 1 to 3 under Sec. 232 of the Act was maintainable even though the respondents had not been dispossessed through Court. 4. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant does not question the correctness of the view taken by the learned single Judge. It is conceded that the application of respondents 1 to 3 under Sec. 232 of the Act was maintainable even though the respondents had not been dispossessed through Court. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, urges a point in support of the appeal which does not appear to have been argued either be-fore the learned single Judge or the Board. That point is that the Additional Commissioner had dismissed the application under Sec. 232 of the Act on a second ground also and that ground has not been held to be invalid by the learned single Judge. That ground was that as the appellant had acquired Bhumidhari rights in the land he could not be dispossessed under Sec. 232 at the instance of the respondents. In support of this contention learned counsel relied on a decision of the Board of Revenue in Raghunath Singh v. Ram Kishun Singh, 1955 R.D. 330. His contention is that if the view of the Additional. Commissioner on this point was correct his order dismissing the application of the respondents could not have been quashed. 5. It has been found as a fact that the respondents 1 to 3 had acquired on the coming into force of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act Adhivasi rights in the land because they were entered as occupants in 1356F. It has also been found that they had been dispossessed by the appellant. They had therefore applied for restoration of possession under Sec. 332 of the Act. The argument urged on behalf of the appellant is that as he had acquired Bhumidhari rights on the coming into force of the Act, he was immune from ejectment under Sec. 199 of the Act. As the rights which the respondents had acquired under Sec. 20 of the Act were subject to the other provisions of the Act they were subject to Sec. 199 also. That being so, it was not open to the respondents to have the petitioner ejected under Sec. 232 of the Act. 6. Prior to the introduction of Chap. As the rights which the respondents had acquired under Sec. 20 of the Act were subject to the other provisions of the Act they were subject to Sec. 199 also. That being so, it was not open to the respondents to have the petitioner ejected under Sec. 232 of the Act. 6. Prior to the introduction of Chap. IX A in the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act Adhivasi rights and Bhumidhari rights could co-exist in respect of the same land i.e. in respect of the same land one person could claim Adhivasi rights and another person could claim the higher Bhumidhari rights. After the introduction of Chap. IX A Adhivasis became Sirdars the rights of the Bhumidhars in the land came to an end after compensation payable to them had been determined. The fact that the two kinds of rights could be claimed in respect of the same land did not mean that the two persons claiming the different rights could be in actual occupation of the land at the same time. The person entitled to immediate occupation was naturally the Adhivasi whose claim was based on possession. Bhumidhari rights being superior rights, the person who was claiming Bhumidhari rights could have the higher rights and enjoy them subject to the right of the Adhivasi. In certain circumstances if the rights of the Adhivasi came to an end he could take actual possession of the land. On the coming into force of Chap. IX A he became entitled to compensation for his Bhumidhari rights. His rights came to an end and the Adhivasi became a Sirdar holding the land directly under the State. So even if the appellant could claim Bhumidhari rights, the respondents being Adhivasis were entitled to immediate and actual possession of the land. They were in fact in such possession but were wrongfully dispossessed. Sec. 232 gave them a right to claim back restoration of possession from the person who had dispossessed them. That person in the present case was the appellant. Under Sec. 232 therefore the respondents could claim back possession from the appellant who had dispossessed them otherwise than in accordance with law. 7. The interpretation sought to be placed on Sec. 199 of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act by the learned counsel for the appellant does not appear to be justified. Under Sec. 232 therefore the respondents could claim back possession from the appellant who had dispossessed them otherwise than in accordance with law. 7. The interpretation sought to be placed on Sec. 199 of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act by the learned counsel for the appellant does not appear to be justified. It will be noted the word used in the Sec. is `ejectment' and not `dispossession'. In Sec. 232 the words used are `put into possession.' In Sec. 199 the word `ejectment' seems to have been used not in the general sense of dispossession but in a technical sense. In our opinion the only reasonable interpretation which can be put on Sec. 199 is that it confers security of tenure on Bhumidhars, puts them on a footing better than that of Asami and Sirdars and declares that they will not be liable to ejectment in the way in which an Asami or Sirdar is able to be ejected. The two Secs. 199 and 288 occur in the same Act. On the principle of harmonious construction the two sections must be interpreted in such a way that they become complementary to each other, and one does not nullify the effect of the other. If the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted Sec. 199 will' make the provisions of Sec. 232 useless and nugatory. If an Adhivasi has been dispossessed by a Bhumidhar wrongfully he will not be able to be put back in possession under the section and the rights conferred on him by the statute will become illusory. There is nothing in Sec. 232 to justify the interpretation that it will not apply if the person who dispossesses is a Bhumidhar and that its operation shall be confined to those cases only where Adhivasi is claiming possession only against a non-Bhumidhar. If, therefore, Sec. 232 applied and the respondents had been wrongfully dispossessed by the appellant they were entitled to be put back in possession under that section and a direction to that effect could be issued even against the appellant. The appellant could not therefore avoid the effect of Sec. 232 on the ground that he had acquired Bhumidhari rights and was on that account not liable to be ejected under Sec. 199. The appellant could not therefore avoid the effect of Sec. 232 on the ground that he had acquired Bhumidhari rights and was on that account not liable to be ejected under Sec. 199. We are, therefore, unable to accept as correct the interpretation put on Sec. 199 and 232 by the Board of Revenue in Raghunath Singh's case 1955 R.D. 330. The view taken by the Additional Commissioner on the second point too was, therefore, untenable in law and his decision on that point could not prevent his order from being quashed by a writ of certiorari. 8. This appeal has, therefore, no force. It is rejected.