Bhargava, J.—This is a reference by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jodhpur recommending that the order of the Magistrate, First Class No. 1, Jodhpur dated 21st November, 1951 be set aside. 2. The facts giving rise to the order of the learned Magistrate are that on 24th April, 1956, Smt. Bachibai wife of Meghraj made an application under sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for allowing maintenance to her and to Shakuntala a daughter by that marriage. The proceedings continued for a pretty long time in the court of the City Magistrate, Jodhpur and then before the Magistrate, First Class No. 1, Jodhpur. Eventually the parties came to a compromise on 11th October, 1958. On the basis of this compromise the learned Magistrate passed the following order on 15th October, 1958. That in terms of the compromise. (1) Meghraj will give Rs. 30/- p. m. as maintenance to Smt. Bachibai. (2) Rs. 20/- p. m. will be paid to Shakuntala till she is married and goes to her father-in-laws house. (3) Meghraj will get the small house situated in village Loharda vacated for Smt. Bachibais residence. Till then she will reside in the house where she was then residing. (4) Meghraj will deliver house-hold articles mentioned in the compromise deed to Smt. Bachibai within a period of fifteen days. 3. The learned Magistrate after making the above order stated in the last paragraph "in the result the non-petitioner would deposit Rs. 50/- p. m. as maintenance in the court before 7th of every month." It appears that Meghraj continued to pay for sometime this monthly allowance to Smt. Bachibai. But thereafter he stopped paying it. On 7th October, 1960, Smt. Bachibai made an application before the Magistrate for the enforcement of the order saying that the amount of maintenance allowed by the court had not been paid to her for the last fourteen months. Notice of this application was given to Meghraj who by his reply dated 23rd March, 1961, raised several objections. The learned Magistrate without going into the objections dealt with the matter in a very cursory way and rejected the objections and ordered Meghraj to pay arrears of maintenance. Meghraj preferred a revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge who came to the conclusion that the order of the learned Magistrate dated 15th October, 1958, was beyond the scope of sec. Meghraj preferred a revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge who came to the conclusion that the order of the learned Magistrate dated 15th October, 1958, was beyond the scope of sec. 488 of the Code and was thus unenforceable. He says that the as said order incorporates terms which the Magistrate acting under sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not give effect to, the whole order is bad and unenforceable. He has therefore, recommended that the order of the learned Magistrate be set aside. In support of his conclusion he has referred to Shankergar Trithvigar Vs. Bachibai Sambhugar(l) and Ram Saran Das Vs. Mst. Damodri(2). 4. Shri Umrao Chand Bapna appears in support of reference and in addition to the cases referred to by the learned Judge, he relies on Pal Singh Vs. Mt. Nihar Kaur(3) and Makhin Yi Vs. Edward Khin Moung(4). The learned Additional Sessions Judge has further held that the order of the Magistrate also provides for separate residence of Smt. Bachibai which amounts to separate living of husband and wife by mutual consent within the meaning of Sub-clause 4 of sec. 488 of the Code and as such Smt. Bachibai is not entitled to receive any allowance. Shri Umrao Chand feels unable to support the reference on the second ground and he has confined his arguments to the first point only. Shri S.T. Porwal opposes the reference. 5. Sub-sec. 4 of sec. 488 lays down that a wife is not entitled to receive any allowance from her husband if they are living separately by mutual consent. In terms of the compromise and the order Meghraj undertook to get the small house vacated for her residence and there is a further provision that till then she would continue living in the existing house. It does not follow from this condition that their conjugal relations had come to an end. She was still to reside in the house of her husband. Moreover, it is to be remembered that Smt. Bachibai had started living separately on the ground of cruelty on the part of her husband. Agreement to live in the small house at Loharda was not the outcome of her free will but was due to the alleged ill-treatment by her husband. There was thus no mutual consent of the parties to live separately. As observed by Allsop J, in Ram Saran Das Vs. Agreement to live in the small house at Loharda was not the outcome of her free will but was due to the alleged ill-treatment by her husband. There was thus no mutual consent of the parties to live separately. As observed by Allsop J, in Ram Saran Das Vs. Mt. Ram Piari(5), that: "The mutual consent as used in Sub-Sse (4) Sec. 488, Criminal P. C, means a consent on the part of the husband and wife to live apart no matter what the circumstances may be. Where wife refuses to live with her husband on some specific ground such as cruelty or the fact that he is keeping another woman, it cannot be said that the husband and wife are living apart by mutual consent even if the husband does not insist that wife should live with him." 6. In my opinion the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 488 are not attracted in this case and the application for enforcing the order cannot be thrown out on that ground. 7. The next question is whether the whole order passed by the learned Magistrate on 15th October is bad and un-enforceable. It is true that under sec. 488 a Magistrate is empowered to fix cash allowance only for maintenance and has no jurisdiction to pass any order with regard to other matters, but does the whole order become bad for the reason that it also includes terms other than one for maintenance. In my opinion the answer would depend upon the facts of each case. If the terms are such that the order for maintenance cannot be enforced independently of other conditions which the Magistrate is not competent to enforce the whole order would become unenforceable. But where the other terms in the order are quite independent and separable and the order for maintenance does not depend for its performance upon other conditions then I do not see why it cannot be enforced. The proceedings under sec. 488 are quasi civil proceedings. Just as in a civil case effect can be given to a compromise decree with regard to the subject matter of suit even though it includes terms which do not relate to the suit, in the same manner the order of the Magistrate under sec. 488 allowing cash allowance to a wife can be enforced and is valid to that extent. 488 allowing cash allowance to a wife can be enforced and is valid to that extent. This would be in consonance with the object underlying these proceedings which aim at the husband to support his wife who is unable to maintain herself. Driving her to file a civil suit on the basis of compromise or to submit a second application for maintenance would work great hardship on her and would deprive her of the summary remedy provided under sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The cases relied on by Mr. Umrao Chand are all distinguishable. In Pal Singhs case(3) the compromise was that the wife would receive as maintenance Rs. 200/- per annum as well as a separate residence in her husbands village in which she and her daughter would reside. If she did not live in this house in the village it was stated that she would not be entitled to any maintenance. She was permitted however to leave the village on the usual festive occasions and on occasions of mourning with her husbands permission. She was also allowed to visit her relations with similar permission. Since the compromise in this case allowing maintenance to the wife was made to depend upon her living in the house in the village, it was held that this condition could not be enforced under sec. 488 of the Code and a wife can only enfore that order in a civil case. This case is clearly distinguishable because the order was conditional and that condition could not be enforced in proceedings under sec. 488. Ram Saran Dasss case(2) follows the above case Pal Singh Vs. Mst. Nihal(3) and also goes a little further. Although the report does not contain the terms of the compromise and the order of the Magistrate was merely with regard to allowing of maintenance yet the learned Judge held that : "the order purports to be based on a compromise and it is obvious that it could not justly be enforced separately from and without regard to the other conditions agreed upon by the par ties which conditions a criminal court has no jurisdiction to enforce. A judicial order based on a compromise must be one giving the com promise effect as a whole. A judicial order based on a compromise must be one giving the com promise effect as a whole. Such an order in the present case the Magistrate could not pass." It therefore, appears that the terms of the compromise in this case also were such that the order of maintenance could not be enforced separately from the other conditions agreed upon by the parties. The case of Shankergar (l) is not an authority for the view that the whole order which contains terms other than the cash allowance is bad. In this case the Magistrate had ordered to get the house vacated and place it on the opponents disposal and till then to pay Rs. 6/- p. m. by way of monthly rent. It was with regard to this part of the order that the court held that : "the order is quite in contravention of the terms of sec. 488, which authorises the Magistrate to award only monthly payments for maintenance and not to decree residence also." In Ma Khin Yis case(4) the order was passed on a compromise petition which provided that the husband would keep his three children with the wife from the date of the application for maintenance ; that the wife educate, feed and clothe the children properly \ and that the husband pay the wife Rs. 20/- a month from the date of the application and Rs. 25/- a month from a date a year from that for the maintenance of his wife and children. It was held that : "The compromise and the order based thereon clearly contained terms and conditions which were not within the jurisdiction of the criminal court to order or enforce." In this case too certain conditions were imposed on the wife i. e., to educate, feed and clothe the children in order that she may get maintenance. All these cases therefore, which have been referred to by the learned Judge and have been relied upon by the learned counsel for Meghraj are distinguishable and do not lay down that the whole order becomes bad even though the other terms may be quite separable and the order for maintenance may not be dependent on the fulfilment of those conditions. Reference may however, be made to some cases where effect has been given to the order for maintenance even though the order incorporated the conditions of terms which were beyond the scope of sec. 488. In Ramsaran Dass case(5) it was agreed between husband and wife that the husband would pay a sum of Rs. 4,- a month to the wife provided she did not go to any other persons house to cook for him. It was held that : "There was no reason why the parties should not come to terms on conditions arranged by themselves and that the Magistrate should then not pass an order for maintenance. When the Magistrate comes to enforce the order it will again be open to the husband to show cause why the payment should not be made. In sub-sec. 3 of sec. 488 if the husband agrees to pay on certain conditions afterwards, it may be a sufficient cause on his part before issuing an order,. In that case it was found as a fact that the condition which had been laid down that his wife was not to go to may other persons house to cook for him was obeyed and the original order held to be enforceable." In Balbir Singh Vs. Mst. Balwant Kaur(6) the order of the Magistrate contained terms which were not enforceable under sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but those terms were separate from the other portion regarding the monthly allowance as maintenance. It was held that : "The defect in the order was separable from that portion and the order to pay Rs. 20/- p. m. as maintenance to the wife was enforceable." In Gangar Laxmana Vs. Bhojawa(7) it was held that : "Where in a proceeding under sec. 488, Cr. P.C. the parties came to a compromise and the compromise contains a clear term as to maintenance which is independent of other terms, the criminal court can base its order as to maintenance on the compromise and enforce it." 8. It would thus appear from a review of these decisions that if the order for maintenance is independent of the other terms of compromise it can be enforced. I have already quoted the order which was passed by the Magistrate in this case. The concluding paragraph of the Magistrates order which only says that the husband would deposit Rs. It would thus appear from a review of these decisions that if the order for maintenance is independent of the other terms of compromise it can be enforced. I have already quoted the order which was passed by the Magistrate in this case. The concluding paragraph of the Magistrates order which only says that the husband would deposit Rs. 50/- p. m. by seventh of every month in the court is quite valid and enforceable. But assuming that he passed an order which contained the other terms also still the terms with regard to the payment of maintenance is quite independent of the other terms. Besides providing maintenance of Rs. 30/-to the wife and Rs. 20/- to the daughter the order says that Meghraj would get the small house situated in village Loharda vacated for the residence of Smt. Bachibai and till then she would continue living in the present house. It also provided that within fifteen days he would deliver certain household articles to her. No application for enforcement of other terms was made by Smt. Bachibai before the Magistrate. She only prayed that the husband may be ordered to pay her arrears of maintenance which had fallen due. Neither the compromise deed nor the order provided that the wife was bound to reside in the house which the husband would get vacated. Nor is the payment of maintenance made to depend on her living in that house. In my opinion the order with regard to maintenance is quite separable from other terms and can be given effect to. 9. Before I conclude I must say that the learned Magistrate should not have rejected the objections filed by Meghraj summarily but should have decided them in a judicial manner. The reply contained several objections with regard to limitation payment of maintenance allowance upto March, 1960 and non-liability for payment of maintenance to Shakuntala on the grounds stated therein. All these objections should have been determined judicially after making a proper inquiry. 10. I, therefore, reject the reference and hold that the order of the learned Magistrate dated 15th Oct., 1958, is enforceable to the extent it relates to payment of maintenance to Smt. Bachibai and her daughter Shakuntala. The case will go back to the learned Magistrate who will decide the other objections and take further proceedings according to law.