JUDGMENT S. D. Singh, J. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment of our brother V.D. Bhargava, in First Execution Appeal No. 24 of 1958. The appellants, who are the judgment-debtors, filed the first appeal against the judgment of Civil Judge, Lucknow, dated 12th September, 1958, by which their objection under Section 47, C.P.C. was dismissed. That appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 2. The question raised in this special appeal is whether the execution application, filed by Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., Lucknow, the decree-holder, is within or beyond time. The decree under execution is of the Court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, but the property against which the decree-holder wanted to proceed lay within the jurisdiction of subordinate Judge, Ambala in Punjab. The decree holder filed seven applications in all either at Lucknow or Ambala as below : 1. First application filed on 2nd February, 1951, at Lucknow for the transfer of the decree to the Court of the subordinate Judge, Ambala, decided on 14th February, 1951. 2. Second application filed on 14th February 1951, at Ambala and decided on 30th April, 1951. 3. Third application filed on 6th February, 1954, at Lucknow for necessary certificate about non-execution of the decree being obtained from Ambala and the decree transferred afresh to the Court at Ambala for execution decided on 1st October, 1954. 4. Fourth application filed on 21st October, 1954 at Ambala and decided on 10th February, 1956. 5. Fifth application filed on 18th April, 1956, at Lucknow and decided on 7th May, 1956. 6. Sixth application filed on 4th August, 1956 and decided on 6th August, 1956. 7. Seventh application filed at Lucknow on 16th August, 1956. It is out of the last execution proceeding that this appeal has arisen. 3. While the objection under Section 47, C.P.C. was raised during the pendency of the 1st execution application, it actually relattes to the third application, which was moved at Lucknow, on 6th Feb., 1954. 7. Seventh application filed at Lucknow on 16th August, 1956. It is out of the last execution proceeding that this appeal has arisen. 3. While the objection under Section 47, C.P.C. was raised during the pendency of the 1st execution application, it actually relattes to the third application, which was moved at Lucknow, on 6th Feb., 1954. The contention of the judgment-debtors was that the decree having already been transferred to the Ambala Court in connection with the first application, the Lucknow Court ceased to have jurisdiction to execute the decree so long as a certificate under Section 41, C.P.C. was not received from Ambala, that no such certificate was sent by the Ambala Court after the second execution application filed there on 14th February, 1951, was dismissed on 30th April, 1951 and that, therefore, the Lucknow Court could not entertain the application moved on 6th February, 1954. 4. It was, therefore, urged that this third application having been moved in a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the same, cannot be treated as a step-in-aid of the execution and since the fourth application was moved at Ambala on 21st October, 1954, it was filed more than three years after the disposal of the second application and was consequently barred by time and that all subsequent applications moved in execution would also, therefore, be barred by time. 5. The main question for consideration, therefore is whether the third application dated 6th February, 1954, could be filed at Lucknow and can be regarded as a step-in-aid of the execution. 6. Reliance was placed by the appellants in support of their contention on Ram Babu v. Sanwal Das, AIR 1938 Allahabad 412 : 1938 ALJ 553, Parsottam v. Raj Narain, AIR 1957 Allahabad 336 and Prahlad Prasad v. Thakur Prasad, AIR 1961 Patna 149. Our attention was also invited to cases dealing with the question whether or not simultaneous execution proceedings can be taken in the transferee Court and the transferor Court. Before we consider these cases, however, it would be necessary to examine the evidence as to whether or not the provisions of Section 41, C.P.C. were actually complied with and if so, in what form. 7. The decree-holder respondent has filed a copy of the order of the Ambala Court, dated 30th April, 1951, Ex. A-5, by which the second application was dismissed by the subordinate Judge, Ambala. 7. The decree-holder respondent has filed a copy of the order of the Ambala Court, dated 30th April, 1951, Ex. A-5, by which the second application was dismissed by the subordinate Judge, Ambala. The order when translated into English would read: - "Application for execution of decree for the recovery of Rs. 14,383-1-0 principal together with costs and interests. Lala Jawahar Lal Kapur, Vakil, is present. The evacuee property has not been attached. The record of the execution case be consigned to record room as infructuous. The Court concerned be informed. 30-4-1951" 8. It will thus be seen that so far as the executing Court was concerned, the provisions of Section 41, C.P.C. were duly complied with inasmuch as the Court concerned, i.e., the Court at Lucknow was directed to be informed that the execution case had been consigned to the record room as infructuous. There is no evidence on record to show that this information was actually communicated to the Lucknow Court in compliance with the order dated 30th April, 1951. When, however, the decree-holder moved its third application at Lucknow, it made a prayer that the certificate regarding the non-satisfaction of the decree may be sent for from Ambala and thereafter the decree may besent for execution again to the Ambala Court under Section 39 of the Code. It had obviously to make this request as according to the order, Ex. A-5, the Ambala Court had already certified to the Lucknow Court under Section 41 of the Code that the execution of the decree had remained infructuous. When this third application was moved in the Lucknow Court, it was reported by the office that the transfer certificate which had been issued earlier under Section 39 of the Code had not been returned by that Court and was still pending in Ambala. A reference was then made to the Ambala Court and after several reminders were sent to that Court, the Lucknow Court received a letter (copy of it is Ex. A-7) in which the Ambala Court intimated that the execution application was consigned to the record room as unsatisfied on 30th April, 1951, and that nothing was realised by the decree-holder through that Court. It was urged on the basis of this letter that the Ambala Court had not issued the certificate under Section 41 earlier. It is not, however, possible to accept that contention. It was urged on the basis of this letter that the Ambala Court had not issued the certificate under Section 41 earlier. It is not, however, possible to accept that contention. It is true that there is no evidence either way relating to the question whether the certificate under Section 41 had actually been sent by the Ambala Court in compliance with the order of that Court dated 30th April, 1951, but under Section 114, illus. (e) of the Evidence Act we can presume that all judicial acts were regularly performed. When Section 41 of the Code requires the transferee Court to certify to the transferor Court the re-suit of execution and when the transferee Court did actually pass an order to that effect, the presumption contemplated under illus. (e) of Section 114 can be easily raised. The decree-holder is, therefore, entitled to rely upon the presumption under the section that the order passed by the Court on 30th April, 1951, was duly complied with and that the certificate was issued by the Ambala Court under Section 41, C.P.C. It might not have been received at Lucknow or even if received it might have been misplaced or not placed in the record. The mere fact that when the third application was moved by the decree-holder, it was found that it had not been received does not rebut the presumption or prove that the Ambala Court had not complied with Section 41 of the Code. 9. Reliance was placed upon Ram Babu v. Sanwal Das, AIR 1938 Allahabad 412 : 1938 ALJ 553, in which it was held by Bennet and Verma, JJ. that where the transferee Court merely directed that the Court which had sent the decree should be informed of the result of the execution it was not sufficient compliance with Section 41, C.P.C. and that mere giving of information of the result of the execution was not sufficient to terminate the jurisdiction of the transferee Court to further execute the decree. The learned Judges observed in the course of their judgment :- "There is, further, in the General Rules (Civil) of 1934 for Courts subordinate to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Vol. The learned Judges observed in the course of their judgment :- "There is, further, in the General Rules (Civil) of 1934 for Courts subordinate to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Vol. 2, p. 59 a list of printed forms authorised by the High, Court of which No. 6 on the list is "Certificate of execution of decree transferred to another Court (Sec. 41)." Therefore when the Court at Allahabad desired to comply with the provisions of Section 41 it would direct the preparation of the certificate under that section and when such a certificate was prepared it would be sent to the Court at Agra." It was thus believed that a form of certificate to be sent under Sec. 41,. C.P.C. was prescribed under the General Rules (Civil), Vol. 2. The entry in General Rules Civil, Vol. 2, referred to above is certainly as mentioned in the judgment, but the full entry would read : Part and number Appendix and number of form in the Code. Description of form. IV-8 E. 5. Certificate of execution of decree transferred to another Court (Section 41). 10. The list on page 59 of Vol. 2 of General Rules (Civil), 1934 is a list of printed forms authorised by the High Court and obtainable from the Government Press. The form referred to in the above quoted entry is the one which is given as form No. 5 in Appendix E of the First Schedule of the C.P.C. The heading of the form is the same as is given on page 59 of the General Rules (Civil) Vol. 2, namely, "Certificate of execution of decree transferred to another Court" and against it is mentioned "(O. 21, R. 6)." This entry clearly indicates, therefore, that form No. 5 in Appendix E aforesaid is the form which is prescribed under Or. 21, R. 6 and not Section 41, C.P.C. and the reference to Section 41 on page 59 of the General Rules (Civil), 1934, Vol. 2 has been given by mistake. No form has, in fact, been prescribed either under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the General Rules (Civil), 1934 for the certificate under Section 41 of the Code. Reference in this connection may also be made to the observations of Dalal, J. in Shiam Lal v. Koerpal, 22 ALJ 1039. 2 has been given by mistake. No form has, in fact, been prescribed either under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the General Rules (Civil), 1934 for the certificate under Section 41 of the Code. Reference in this connection may also be made to the observations of Dalal, J. in Shiam Lal v. Koerpal, 22 ALJ 1039. He observed: - "It may be pointed out that there is a mistake in the heading of the form certified of execution of decree transferred to another court (appendix E No. 5, C.P.C.). The reference in brackets after the heading should be Section 41 and not Or. 21, R. 6. The attention of the Registrar of this Court will be drawn to this mistake. The mistake is in the form prescribed by the Act itself and has been followed in the forms printed by the High Court No. 32-XX." Reference may also in this connection be made to the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants to form 4 of Appendix E of the First Schedule of the C, P. C. which is headed "Certificate of non-satisfaction of decree." His contention was that it is this form which has to be sent by the transferee Court to the transferor Court when the decree transferred to that Court remains unsatisfied. But even the heading aforesaid on form No. 4 is followed by "(Or. 21. R. 6)." It will thus be seen that neither form No. 4 nor form No. 5 refers to Sec. 41; this refers to the provisions of Or. 21, R. 6 of the Code. Even form 3 is the form for an "order sending decree for execution to another Court," and is a form under Or. 21, R. 6. If reference is made to the provisions of Or. 21, R. 6 it will at once be clear that all these three forms are under that provision and neither of them is under Sec. 41. Even form 3 is the form for an "order sending decree for execution to another Court," and is a form under Or. 21, R. 6. If reference is made to the provisions of Or. 21, R. 6 it will at once be clear that all these three forms are under that provision and neither of them is under Sec. 41. R. 6 aforesaid reads :- "The Court sending a decree for execution shall send - (a) a copy of the decree; (b) a certificate setting forth that satisfaction of the decree has not been obtained by execution within the jurisdiction of the Court by which it was passed, or, where the decree has been executed in part, the extent to which satisfaction has been obtained and what part of the decree remains unsatisfied; and (c) a copy of any order for the execution of the decree, or, if no such order has been made, a certificate to that effect." Cl. (c) of this rule, therefore, requires a copy of any order for the execution of the decree being sent to the transferee Court and it is form No. 3 prescribed in Appendix E. Cl. (b) contemplates one of the two certificates being sent to the transferee court. Either the transferor Court shall send a certificate setting forth that satisfaction of the decree has not been obtained in that Court or where the decree has been executed in part, the extent to which the satisfaction has been obtained and as to the part of the decree which remained unsatisfied. Form 4 refers to the former two certificates referred to in Cl. (b) and form 5 to the latter. Both these forms 4 and 5 are thus under Cl. (b) of R. 6 and have to be sent in the alternative along with the copy of the decree under Cl. (a) and a copy of the order in form 3 under Cl. (c). No other form either in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the General Rules (Civil) was referred to us as having been prescribed for use under Section 41 of the Code. (a) and a copy of the order in form 3 under Cl. (c). No other form either in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the General Rules (Civil) was referred to us as having been prescribed for use under Section 41 of the Code. In fact, even if a form were prescribed under General Rules (Civil), it would not be binding upon the transferee Court if it happens to be out side the Uttar Pradesh, unless there is a corresponding form prescribed in the State in which that Court happens to be. The question whether any particular form of a certificate is prescribed under Section 41 of the Code was considered by Sarjoo Prasad, C.J. and B.P. Beri, J. of the Rajasthan High Court recently in Ramkumar Chunilal v. Hazarimal Banshilal, A.I.R. 1961 Rajas 157. It was held that there is no particular form for a certificate under this section and that if information is sent to the Court concerned about the result of the execution case, that in itself is sufficient to amount to a certificate within the meaning of Section 41 of the Code. This was also the view taken by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Darshan Singh v. Baldeo Dash, AIR 1946 Patna 365 it being held :- "Sec. 41 prescribes no particular form of the certificate. Intimation by the transferee Court that the execution case is dismissed as infructuous is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the section." These observations have not been followed in a recent case of that Court Prahlad Prasad v. Thakur Prasad, AIR 1961 Patna 149. The view taken in that case is that the act of sending a certificate under Section 41 is something in the nature of a judicial act and a formal order of the transferee Court to that effect would be necessary to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 41. The view taken in that case is that the act of sending a certificate under Section 41 is something in the nature of a judicial act and a formal order of the transferee Court to that effect would be necessary to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 41. In that case, however, there was no order of the transferee Court directing that a certificate be issued under Section 41 or that such a certificate be sent to the transferor Court nor did it appear from the order sheet that any such certificate was, in fact, prepared and signed by the transferee Court and sent to the transferor Court though the entry in the said registers indicated that the information was sent to the transferor Court relating to the dismissal of the execution case. The facts may, therefore, be distinguishable to some extent. If the result of the execution case was not certified to the transferor Court and all what the transferor Court was told was that the execution case had been dismissed, it may be said that the provisions of Section 41, C.P.C. were not strictly complied with. In the instant case, however, what the Court directed was that the execution case be consigned to record room as infructuous and that the transferor Court be informed accordingly. This clearly means, therefore, that the transferor Court was to be informed that the execution case had been consigned to record room as infructuous. We agree with respect with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramkumar Chunilal v. Hazarimal Banshilal, A.I.R. 1961 Rajas 157 and the Patna High Court in Darshan Singh v. Baldeo Das, AIR 1946 Patna 365. 11. In our opinion no particular form of certificate is required for compliance with the provisions of Section 41, C.P.C. and if the result of the execution case has in substance been certified to the transferor Court, that is enough compliance with that provision of law. As we have pointed out earlier, there is clear evidence that certificate under Section 41 aforesaid was directed to be sent to the Lucknow Court. As we have pointed out earlier, there is clear evidence that certificate under Section 41 aforesaid was directed to be sent to the Lucknow Court. Even if what the transferee Court was required to do under Section 41 were a judicial act, as was said in Prahlad Prasad v. Thakur Prasad, AIR 1961 Patna 149, that judicial act was duly performed by the transferee Court when an order for the result of the execution being intimated to the transferor Court was passed by it. All what remained to be done was the ministerial act and even that act must, in view of illus. (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, be presumed to have been duly performed. 12. It was urged that only the Court at Ambala had jurisdiction to receive any subsequent application for execution and the Court at Lucknow. did not and reliance for the purpose was placed on Maharajah of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Peda Srinhulu, 43 I.A. 238 and several other cases which will be referred to presently. The Privy Council case aforesaid, was under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, but the provisions relating to execution in that Code were the same as those in the present one. The fourth paragraph of Section 223 made the same provision as has now been made under Section 41 of the present Code. Sec. 224 of the old Code corresponds to Or. XXI, R. 6 and Section 225 to the present R. 7 of Or. XXI. In Maharajah of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Peda Srinhulu, 43 IA 238 a decree of a District Court was sent to the Munsif for execution. The Munsif dismissed the execution case after attachment had been made for want of further prosecution and when subsequent application for execution was moved in the District Court, it was held that that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and since no application for execution was moved within the period of limitation prescribed for the same in the Court of the Munsif, execution had become barred by time. In that case, however, it was found as a fact that the provisions of Section 223 of the old Code corresponding to Section 41 of the present one were not complied with. In that case, however, it was found as a fact that the provisions of Section 223 of the old Code corresponding to Section 41 of the present one were not complied with. If the result of execution was not certified by the transferee Court as is required under the law, it could of course be said that jurisdiction to take further proceedings in execution of the decree remained with that Court. In Abda Begam v. Muzaffar Husen, ILR 20 All. 129 it was held that the Court to which the decree was sent for execution retains its jurisdiction to execute the decree until the execution has been withdrawn from it, or until it has fully executed the decree and has certified that fact to the Court which sent the decree or has executed it so far as that Court has been able to execute it within its jurisdiction and has certified that fact to the Court which sent the decree or until it has failed to execute the decree and has certified that fact to the Court which forwarded the decree. It has also been held in this case that the mere striking off of an application for execution on the ground of informality in the application does not terminate the jurisdiction of the Court to execute the decree, nor does it render it necessary for the Court to send any certificate to the Court which had forwarded the decree for execution. Neither of these two cases is, therefore, of any help to the appellants, as it has been found by us as a fact that the provisions of Section 41 of the Code were duly complied with by the Ambala Court and thereafter only the Lucknow Court could have jurisdiction to execute the decree. 13. Reference was also made to Parsottam Pasi v. Raj Narain Sharma, AIR 1957 Allahabad 336. It has been held in this case that the provisions of Section 41 and Or. XXI R. 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure make it clear that reporting in regard to the state of execution of the decree has to be made at both ends, both by the transmitting Court and by the Court to which the decree has been transmitted and the obvious reason is said to be that without such certificate the Court concerned would not know to what extent .the decree had been executed. Even this case is not of any help to the appellants in view of what has already been found by us earlier. The execution case was struck off by the Ambala Court in April, 1951, and as we have pointed out above, the result of execution was duly certified to the Lucknow Court under Section 41 of the Code. It was because the certificate was miscarried or misplaced that the decree-holder had to make a request to the Lucknow Court that the certificate regardineg non-satisfaction be obtained from the Ambala Court; the Lucknow Court granted the request and it was only after the result of the execution had been (again) certified by the Ambala Court that the decree was transferred for execution afresh by the Lucknow Court. 14. We, are clearly, therefore, of opinion that the third application moved at Lucknow on 6th February, 1954, was within time and was clearly a step-in-aid of execution and when the fourth application was moved at Ambala on 21st October, 1954, it was clearly within three years of the last step-in-aid of execution under Article 182 of Schedule I of the Indian Limitation Act. 15. It was urged on behalf of the respondent Bank that the objection relating to the execution being barred by time has been raised in the last application for execution and that since it was not raised in the earlier applications, this objection should be barred by the principle of res judicata. It is not, however, the contention of the decree holder that any of the previous execution applications was fructuous. It is not, however, the contention of the decree holder that any of the previous execution applications was fructuous. The argument raised is fully answered by a Full Bench of this Court in Genda Lal v. Hazari Lal, AIR 1936 Allahabad 21 in which it has been held that a judgment-debtor is not precluded by the principle of res judicata from raising the plea of limitation in an execution proceeding unless (1) there was an express adjudication on the question of limitation against him in an earlier execution proceeding or at an earlier stage of the same proceeding; or (2) there was adjudication implied in an order which taken with the surrounding circumstances, should be taken to imply a conscious determination of the question of limitation adversely to the judgment-debtor, or (3) where the judgment debtor might and ought to have taken the plea of limitation, but failed to do so, and the final result of the application was to grant the relief of partial satisfaction of the decree to the decree-holder. 16. The bar of res judicata does not, therefore, arise in this case, but as we have held earlier, the Lucknow Court had jurisdiction to entertain the third application and the fourth execution application moved at Ambala was clearly within time. The plea of limitation raised by the judgment debtors is, therefore, of no avail. 17. This appeal has thus no force and is consequently dismissed with costs to the respondent.