JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by the State against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge of Kottayam acquitting the accused who had been tried for the offence of murder. The case was that at 10.15 a. m. on 5th August 1961 he intentionally caused the death of one Kumaran by stabbing him with a dagger. 2. The incident is alleged to have taken place in Muthimala Rubber Estate. P. W. 1 is the owner of the Estate. It is the prosecution case that the accused and the deceased Kumaran were on inimical terms for some time. On the date of the incident deceased Kumaran had gone to P. W. 4's estate and helped him in tapping rubber and at about 10 a. m. left the place to take his bath in the channel on the western side. After Kumaran left, the accused went to P. W. 4 and made enquiries about Kumaran and was informed that he had gone to the canal to take his bath. He then left the place. A little later the accused met Kumaran on the foot path. He caught hold of Kumaran's cloth and saying that he was all the while searching for him, stabbed Kumaran on his chest and when he turned to run away and escape, the accused stabbed him again two or three times on his back. On receipt of the injuries he fell down and in a few minutes succumbed to his injuries. 3. P. W. 2 who had witnessed the incident ran to the west in fright. When he reached the eastern bund of the canal he saw P. W. 3 and his brother Avirachan coming to the estate from the western side. He told them what he had seen and they all together came to the scene of occurrence. While proceeding to the scene they saw the accused running east from the place where Kumaran lay injured with a Malapuram knife in his hand. P. W. 4 also saw the accused running away with a knife and when he reached the scene he saw Kumaran lying injured. 4. P. W. 2 then went to the owner of the estate P. W. 1 and informed him about the occurrence. P. W. 1 came to the scene and saw Kumaran lying dead. P. W. 4 also saw the accused running away with a knife and when he reached the scene he saw Kumaran lying injured. 4. P. W. 2 then went to the owner of the estate P. W. 1 and informed him about the occurrence. P. W. 1 came to the scene and saw Kumaran lying dead. He then proceeded to the Meenachil police station and laid the complaint Ext. P. 1 before the Sub Inspector of Police P. W. 13. P. W. 13 came to the scene and held the inquest. He questioned P. Ws. 2 and 3 at the inquest. After the inquest, P. W. 9 the Assistant Surgeon attached to the Secondary Health Centre at Palai conducted the autopsy. Ext. P. 2 is the post mortem certificate. P. W. 13 made enquiries about the accused, but he was not available. He surrendered before the court on 7-8-61. The accused was questioned by P. W. 13 on 11-8-61 and on information furnished by him M." O. 2 the dagger and M. O. 3 the sheath were recovered from underneath a big stone in the western courtyard of the Magistrate's Court. They were suspected to be stained with blood and on chemical analysis human blood was noticed on the blade of the dagger. After completing the investigation charge was laid against the accused. 5. The plea of the accused was one of complete denial. He denied having caused injuries on the deceased and stated that the evidence of the witnesses was false. He denied having given any information to the Sub Inspector of Police, and the recovery of the dagger in pursuance of such information. He denied the extra judicial confession spoken to by P. W. 6. No witnesses were examined on his side. 6. The fact that Kumaran received serious injuries and died as a result of the injuries is amply proved and is not disputed. Ext. P. 2 the post mortem certificate shows that Kumaran had sustained five injuries, of which injury No. 1 is the most serious injury. It was an oblique penetrating incised injury 3/4" x 1/8" in the right second intercostal space directed backwards and downwards. On dissection it was noticed that there was an incised injury 1/2" X 1/4" on the antero-medial border of upper lobe of right lung corresponding to injury No. 1. The right lung was seen collapsed. It was an oblique penetrating incised injury 3/4" x 1/8" in the right second intercostal space directed backwards and downwards. On dissection it was noticed that there was an incised injury 1/2" X 1/4" on the antero-medial border of upper lobe of right lung corresponding to injury No. 1. The right lung was seen collapsed. According to the doctor it was a necessarily fatal injury and death in this case was almost instantaneous. 7. The learned additional Sessions Judge who tried the case disbelieved the evidence of the eye witness P. W. 2, the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 that they saw the accused running away from the scene with the dagger and the extra judicial confession sought to be proved through P. W. 6 and acquitted the accused. The State has come up in appeal. 8. Before proceeding to consider the evidence in the case, we may dispose of one point strenuously urged on behalf of the accused. It is contended that in an appeal against an order of acquittal the appellate court would not ordinarily interfere with the Trial Court's appreciation of the oral evidence of the witnesses unless there are strong grounds to show that the Trial Court has grossly misconducted itself in the appreciation of the evidence on record. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquital had been dealt with in the decision of the Privy Council in Sheo Swamp v. King Emperor (AIR 1934 P. C. 227). It was stated : "Ss. 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this however is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." 9. These principles have been subsequently affirmed and reiterated by the Supreme Court in a series of cases. In some of these cases, it is true, their Lordships have emphasised the necessity of interference only on "substantial and compelling reasons." What really is 'compelling and substantial reasons' has been made clear in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1962 S. C. 439) where Das Gupta J. speaking for the Bench has observed as follows: "But, on a close analysis, it is clear that the principles laid down by the court in this matter have remained the same. What may be called the golden thread running through all these decisions is the rule that in deciding appeals against acquittal the court of appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must exam no also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting Judge is clearly unreasonable. Once the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is a "compelling reason" for interference. Once the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is a "compelling reason" for interference. For, it is a court's duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused when such guilt is not so established." 10. When the expression "compelling reasons" is understood in the manner explained by the Supreme Court it is clear that the expression is not intended to place any restriction or to impose any limitation on the appellate court's powers while hearing appeals against acquittals. Even in an appeal against the acquittal the appellate court has full power to review the entire evidence on record and to come to its own independent conclusion on the question as to whether such evidence is sufficient to conclusively establish the guilt of the accused, 11. Bearing these principles in mind we will now see as to how far the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused beyond reasonable doubt. P. W. 2 Mathai Varkey is a person who had actually witnessed the occurrence. According to him at about 10 a. m, on the date of the occurrence he was collecting latex from the Muthimala rubber estate belonging to P. W. 1. He has sworn that while he was doing his work he heard some sound from the eastern side, he came up and saw the accused catching hold of the deceased's cloth and inflicting stab injuries on him. The accused was saying that he was searching for the deceased After receiving one or two stabs, the deceased turned for the purpose of running away, but before he could do so the accused again inflicted two or three more injuries. P. W. 2 stated that on seeing this he got frightened and ran away towards the west. On reaching the channel he saw P. W. 3 and his brother Avirachan coming. He told them that the accused had stabbed the deceased. All of them then proceeded towards the place and while so going they saw the accused running away to the cast with a dagger in his hand and when they reached the place they saw deceased Kumaran lying with bleeding injuries. He told them that the accused had stabbed the deceased. All of them then proceeded towards the place and while so going they saw the accused running away to the cast with a dagger in his hand and when they reached the place they saw deceased Kumaran lying with bleeding injuries. By that time people gathered and P. W. 2 went and informed P. W. 1, his master, what had happened. They came and saw Kumaran lying dead. P. W. 1 then went to the Meenachil police station and laid the complaint Ext. P. 1 before the Sub Inspector of police P. W. 13 without any avoidable delay. This complaint is substantially in conformity with the evidence given by P. W. 2. 12. The evidence of P. W. 2 is corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 3. He has sworn that on that day morning while himself and his brother one Avirachan was coming to the estate they saw P. W. 2 coming running towards them near the channel and told them that the accused had stabbed Kumaran, that they ran up to the place and while proceeding to the place they saw the accused running away from the place with a dagger in his hand. They went to the place and saw Kumaran lying injured and Kumaran told them that he will soon die. He sent his brother Avirachan to inform Kumaran's people and P. W 2 went to inform P. W. 1. Within ten minutes after they left P. W. 3 stated that Kumaran succumbed to his injuries. Both these witnesses P. Ws. 2 and 3 were questioned at the time of the inquest itself. Cross examination of these witnesses has not revealed that they are in any way inimical with the accused or that they had any reason to falsely implicate the accused in a case of this nature. The only suggestion that was made was that the accused is on inimical terms with P. W. 1, but it has been denied by P. W. 1. Beyond the bare statement of the accused there is nothing to show that P. W. 1 is inimically disposed towards the accused. 13. P. W. 4 is another witness. He is also a tapper working under P. W. 1 in another block of the estate. Beyond the bare statement of the accused there is nothing to show that P. W. 1 is inimically disposed towards the accused. 13. P. W. 4 is another witness. He is also a tapper working under P. W. 1 in another block of the estate. He has given evidence that at about 9-30 a. m., on the date of occurrence deceased Kumaran came to the place and enquired whether his work had not been finished and when he said that he had not completed his work, deceased volunteered to help him. So he gave his tapping knife to him and went to P. W. 5's house and got another knife. P. W. 5 also came to the place and tapped a few trees, that by that time it started drizzling and so they stopped the work and Kumaran left the place saying that he was going to the channel to take his bath. The witness stated that a little later the accused came to him and made enquiries as to whether he had seen Kumaran, that he told him that Kumaran was there and had gone to take his bath. The accused then went towards the channel. The witness further deposed that a few minutes later he saw the accused coming running through his estate with a dagger in his hand. He then went to the place where Kumaran was lying dead and saw P. Ws. 2, 3, his brothers Avirachan and P. W. 5 there. Apart from saying that he is also a tapper like P. W. 2 in P. W. 1's estate no enimity has been suggested between him and the accused. The evidence of all these witnesses leaves no room for doubt that it was the accused who inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased. 14. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has disbelieved the evidence of all these witnesses. We will, therefore, scrutinise the reasons for the rejection of their evidence. In paragraph 7 of the judgment the learned Judge gives his reasons why he thinks that it would be unsafe to act on the evidence of P. W. 2. P. W. 2 in his evidence had stated that the deceased's towel M. O. 1 was on his left shoulder when he was being stabbed by the accused. In paragraph 7 of the judgment the learned Judge gives his reasons why he thinks that it would be unsafe to act on the evidence of P. W. 2. P. W. 2 in his evidence had stated that the deceased's towel M. O. 1 was on his left shoulder when he was being stabbed by the accused. The learned Judge says the probabilities are that the towel must have been spread over the breast and back of the deceased when the occurrence took place, and therefore the evidence of P. W. 2 could not be true. Reliance is placed on the evidence of P. W. 5 that he used to protect his body with a cloth when he is tapping and the learned Judge thinks that the deceased also must have covered his body with the towel M. O. 1 and therefore P. W. 2 would not have witnessed the incident. The learned Judge has overlooked that even P. W. 5 has admitted that covering with a cloth is not an invariable rule and all the persons who tap do not cover their body with any cloth. He has also stated that he did not see deceased Kumaran having covered the body with the cloth on that day. Even assuming that he had covered the body when he was tapping he need not have it in the same position when he was going to take his bath. 15. To probabilise that the deceased must have covered his body with the cloth the learned Judge says five big holes are seen on the towel and those holes correspond to the five injuries noted in the wound certificate. A mere look at the holes would show that the holes were made for the purpose of chemical analysis and were not caused when he was stabbed. The learned Judge says the Circle Inspector has stated that his enquiry showed that the tears seen on M, O. 1 were caused when the accused stabbed Kumaran, but it has not been brought out that the tears referred to by him are the once that are now seen. In fact they would not have been there when the Circle Inspector took the towel into custody. 16. In fact they would not have been there when the Circle Inspector took the towel into custody. 16. Another reason given by the learned Judge to disbelieve P. W. 2 is that in cross examination he stated that he was standing at the place witnessing the incident for fifteen minutes and during all this period the accused was going on stabbing the deceased and if that were so, then more than the number of injuries noted in Ext. P. 2 would have been found on Kumaran. That the witness has no clear idea about time and particularly about minutes or seconds is clear from his answers in cross examination. When questioned as to how much time it would take for collecting latex from ten trees he stated that it would take less than a minute. That would give us an idea of his conception of time. 17. Another reason given for disbelieving the witness is that he has stated that he heard a talk and proceeded to see what it was about and he saw the accused catching hold of the deceased's cloth and telling him that he was all the while going in search of him. The learned Judge says that if the accused had really told him like that, that must have been the first thing that he would have told the deceased when he met him in which case P. W. 2 would not have heard him say this. All this is pure conjucture. Even assuming that the accused had asked him like that the first thing when he met, it does not follow that when he was stabbing the deceased he did not say so as spoken to by P. W. 2. 18. The practice of running down the evidence of witnesses on such trifling reasons has to be deprecated. When a person gives evidence on oath the presumption should be that he has spoken the truth and the burden must lie on him who challenges the veracity of that statement to show that it is not true and if that burden is not discharged by any recognised legal methods, then a court can have no legal justification for not relying on the evidence of a witness given on oath. The learned Judge has commented on the non examination of one Velayudhan Chettiar who was said to have been tapping rubber in the block to the east of where P. W. 2 was tapping rubber. It has not come out in evidence that Chettiar had actually witnessed the incident and no oblique motive has been suggested for withholding his evidence from court. 19. The reasons given for rejecting the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 that they saw the accused running away from the scene with the knife cannot also be accepted. ' The mere fact that another witness P. W. 5 did not see the accused running away from the scene cannot displace the positive evidence given by these witnesses. Probably by the time P. W. 5 proceeded to the scene the accused had already made good his escape. The learned Judge says that it is not known why the accused did not meet Velayudhan Chettiar and make enquiries about the deceased, instead 1 of asking P. W. 4. There is no evidence that the accused had in fact met Velayudhan Chettiar. Witnesses cannot be disbelieved on such flmsy grounds. 20. The evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 that they saw the accused running away with the dagger M. O. 2 is probabilised by the recovery of M. O. 2 on information furnished by the accused. This is spoken to by the investigating officer P. W. 13. Whether his evidence can be believed or not has not been discussed by the learned Judge. The evidence has been rejected purely because no member of the staff of the Magistrate's court has attested the seizure list. Chemical analysis showed that ;he dagger was stained with human blood. It is difficult to accept the suggestion of the learned counsel that a responsible police officer like P. W. 13 would concoct such false evidence. The learned counsel argued that the place where from it was alleged to have been recoved would be the last place where the accused would secrete the knife. The evidence is that the accused came to the Magistrate's court to surrender. There is, therefore, nothing surprising if without anybody seeing, the accused hid the dagger underneath the stone. The learned counsel argued that the place where from it was alleged to have been recoved would be the last place where the accused would secrete the knife. The evidence is that the accused came to the Magistrate's court to surrender. There is, therefore, nothing surprising if without anybody seeing, the accused hid the dagger underneath the stone. If as suggested by the defence this evidence is entirely false, nothing prevented the Sub Inspector of Police from saying that it was recovered from some hidden place in the compound of the accused himself. 21. There is then the evidence of P. W. 6. He has sworn that the accused was a mazdoor working for him and on the date of the occurence he came to his house at about 12 noon and took food and while taking food he admitted having stabbed Kunjan's son and that he advised the accused to go to the police station. The reasons given in paragraph 8 of the judgment for rejecting the evidence of P. W. 6 is most unconvincing. But it is seen that this witness was questioned only on 28-8-'61, twenty days after the incident. No explanation has been offered as to why he kept the precious information to himself until the police questioned him and nothing has been stated as to why the police could not have contacted him earlier. The extra judicial confession has been retracted and we feel it safer not to place any reliance on this piece of evidence even though nothing has been brought out as to why this witness should have come and given false evidence against the accused. 22. The prosecution has attempted to prove a motive for the accused to have committed the crime. P. W. 8, the father of the deceased has deposed that the accused wanted to marry his daughter Sarojini, but since he and the deceased did not like the alliance they did not agree and the feelings between them were strained. There is also evidence that there were some criminal complaints between P. W. 8 and the accused's brother. It is true that the case was compromised, but the prosecution case is that the feelings between the parties continued to be bitter. There is also evidence that there were some criminal complaints between P. W. 8 and the accused's brother. It is true that the case was compromised, but the prosecution case is that the feelings between the parties continued to be bitter. P. W. 7, a disinterested witness has given evidence that about a year before the occurrence there was some trouble between the deceased Kumaran and the accused and the deceased chased the accused and he had to take shelter in his shop. The deceased left the place for Malabar and the evidence is that he returned to his native village only recently, a few days before the date of occurence. The accused has denied the incident, but there is no reason to disbelieve P. W 7's evidence. But whatever that may be, where there is direct and credible evidence of witnesses to prove the occurrence absence of proof of a satisfactory motive for the crime is immaterial. 23. Where the case depends only on the appreciation of oral evidence the appellate court normally is reluctant to interfere. But where, as in this case, there is total absence of any justification for rejecting the evidence of the witnesses and the Judge makes no real effort to assess the credibility of the evidence and gives no understandable reasons to brush aside the evidence, this court is bound to examine the evidence and to give effect to its own independant conclusions on the evidence. On a careful and anxious consideration of the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 keeping in view the criticisms made by the learned Judge, we have no hesitation in holding that their evidence is true and acceptable. The judgment of the learned Judge is wholly erroneous and the conclusions reached that the witnessess are not reliable and that the guilt of the accused has not been proved are unreasonable and even perverse and we fee! no doubt that the accused has been wrongly acquitted of the offence of murder resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The order of acquittal has, therefore, to be set aside. 24. What remains then to be considered is only the question of sentence. Though there are no extenuating circumstances as such, there is no evidence as to how the quarrel started and what transpired just before the stabbing took place. The order of acquittal has, therefore, to be set aside. 24. What remains then to be considered is only the question of sentence. Though there are no extenuating circumstances as such, there is no evidence as to how the quarrel started and what transpired just before the stabbing took place. It is probable that when they met there ensued an altercation and the accused would have lost his balance and in that excited mood would have inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased. We, therefore, do not think that it is necessary in the interests of justice to award the extreme penalty of law. 25. In the result we set aside the order of acquittal, find the accused guilty and convict him of the offence of murder punishable under Section 302, I.P.C., and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The appeal field by the State is allowed. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the concerned Sessions Judge.