ORDER:- This is an application in revision filed by the plaintiff in T.S. No.121 of 1958 in the Court of the Munsiff, Manipur, against the order of the District Judge, Manipur, dated 20-1-1961 in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.12 of 1960, by which he confirmed the injunction order dated 19-4-1960 granted by the Munsiff in Miscellaneous Case No.14 of 1960, to the first respondent herein who was the defendant in the suit. 2. The petitioner filed T.S. No.121 of 1958 before the Munsiff on 19-11-1958 for a declaration of his title to certain land. His case was that the second respondent herein, who is the second defendant in the suit, sold the said land to him on 4-1-1957 and delivered possession to him and that ever since then he has been in possession of the said land. He further alleged that in the course of the patta transfer proceedings he came to know that there was a fictitious sale deed dated 3-6-1949 in the name of the first respondent-first defendant and his allegation was that the said sale deed was a forgery and did not convey any title or possession in the said land to the first respondent. The second respondent as second defendant filed written statement supporting the petitioners case. The first respondent in his written statement defended the sale deed dated 3-6-1949 in her favour and stated that after the said sale deed patta was transferred in her name and that she has been in possession of the land ever since. She, therefore, contended that the petitioner had no cause of action for the suit and that proper court-fee has not been paid. 3. The Munsiff raised issues 1 and 2 on the question of title. He raised the 3rd issue as to who has been in possession of the said lands. The 4th issue related to the question whether the plaintiff had any cause of action and the 5th issue was whether proper court fee has been paid for the suit. After the issues were thus raised on 13-1-1959, the suit underwent 6 adjournments upto 21-12-1959. On 21-12-1959, the plaintiff was not ready and the first respondent also did not object to an adjournment and the case was posted to 23-2-1960. 4. After the issues were thus raised on 13-1-1959, the suit underwent 6 adjournments upto 21-12-1959. On 21-12-1959, the plaintiff was not ready and the first respondent also did not object to an adjournment and the case was posted to 23-2-1960. 4. On 23-1-1960, the first respondent filed a petition which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No.14 of 1960 praying for an injunction restraining the plaintiff from alienating the land and further restraining the plaintiff and respondent 2 and their men from entering upon the suit land. In that petition, the first respondent alleged that she has been in actual physical possession and enjoyment of the suit land continuously from 1949 and that she apprehended that the plaintiff on a false plea of possession was attempting to cultivate the land to deprive the first respondent of her interest and right in the land, that she further felt that the plaintiff and the second respondent may cause waste or disturbance to the peaceful possession of the suit land by the first respondent and further that the plaintiff was trying to alienate the suit land before the Manipur Land Reforms Bill became an Act. 5. This petition was taken up by the Munsiff on 25-1-1960 and without any notice to the plaintiff or to the second respondent he issued an interim order restraining the plaintiff and second respondent from interfering with respondent 1s possession till the hearing of the petition which he posted to 23-2-1960. On 23-2-1960, the plaintiff filed a counter to the petition, in which he stated that the land was in his possession, that no petition for injunction under Order 39 C.P.C. was maintainable, as the question of possession of the land was an important issue for the adjudication of the rights of parties in the suit itself. The Munsiff heard arguments on this petition on 22-3-1960 and fixed it for orders on 18-4-1960. On 18-4-1960, he did not pronounce orders, but he did so on 19-4-1960, confirming the interim injunction already issued by him in favour of the first respondent. A perusal of the order shows that the only point considered by the Munsiff was that the first respondent had purchased the land on 3-6-1949 from the second respondent and on the strength of this, the Munsiff held that the first respondent had a prima facie case for injunction. 6. A perusal of the order shows that the only point considered by the Munsiff was that the first respondent had purchased the land on 3-6-1949 from the second respondent and on the strength of this, the Munsiff held that the first respondent had a prima facie case for injunction. 6. The petitioner took the matter in appeal to the District Judge. The learned District Judge held that the sale in favour of the first respondent being anterior to the sale in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner must prevail, that the name of the first respondent has been mutated in the Revenue Register and this perhaps showed that respondent 1 was in possession and further that respondent 1 had filed an affidavit swearing that she has been in possession and that the said allegation of respondent 1 was not controverted by the plaintiff by filing a counter affidavit and hence there were no merits in the appeal. He accordingly dismissed the appeal. Now the petitioner has come up in revision. 7. Before I proceed to deal with the merits of the case, I must express my disapprobation of the manner in which such serious cases are dealt with by the Munsiff. The application for temporary injunction by the first respondent was filed a year after the issues were framed in the suit and the suit itself was ripe for hearing. A specific issue was also raised in the suit as to who was in possession of the property, as both parties were claiming possession of the property. If under such circumstances, an application for temporary injunction was filed by a party, no court should normally grant an ex parte injunction in favour of any party without issuing notice of the application to the opposite party, particularly, when the opposite party was represented in Court by a pleader. The application in this case was filed on 23-1-1960 and the Munsiff took it up for orders on 25-1-1960. It would have been easy to serve notice on the plaintiffs pleader before hearing the application. The attention of the Munsiff is drawn to Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C., which specifically provides that the Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The attention of the Munsiff is drawn to Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C., which specifically provides that the Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The Munsiff appears to treat Order 39 Rule 3 as a dead letter. There is nothing in the order of the Munsiff granting the ex parte injunction to show that the object of granting the injunction would have been defeated by the delay. Nay, there is nothing even in the petition filed by the first respondent to show that the matter was so urgent that an ex parte injunction was necessary without notice to the plaintiff. In fact, he had not prayed for an ex parte injunction in the petition. Under such circumstances, it was highly wrong on the part of the Munsiff to have granted an ex parte injunction without even a prayer by the first respondent. The Munsiff must remember that by passing such orders he will be prejudging the rights of parties, who are before him, without even giving an opportunity to allow them to have their say in the matter. This is not the first order of its kind which I have seen this Munsiff pass. If he persists in such conduct, his bona fides in such matters will have to be questioned. 8. I shall now come to the merits of the case. The application for injunction was filed under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C., which, no doubt, provides that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging and alienation as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. I have omitted the portions in the said rule which have no relevancy in the present petition. I have omitted the portions in the said rule which have no relevancy in the present petition. This rule, no doubt, gives the Court the power to grant a temporary injunction in favour of either party in a suit if any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by the other party to the suit. Thus, first there must be a property in dispute and secondly, the Court must be satisfied that the said property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated before the Court can grant the injunction. 9. The question first arises whether there is any property in dispute in the suit. I have already stated that the suit relates to declaration of title to a land by the plaintiff on the allegation that he is already in possession. I have held in my decision in Konjengbam Babudhom Singh v. Hemam Romonyaima Singh, Civil Revision Case No.10 of 1961 : ( AIR 1962 Manipur 18 ) that in a suit claiming a mere relief of declaration of title on the basis that the party is in possession, it cannot be said that there is a property in dispute within the meaning of Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C. I have relied in that decision on a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Fakira Mahadaji v. Mt. Rumsukhibai, AIR 1946 Nag 428 in which it was held that in a suit for declaration simpliciter, there is really no property in dispute in the suit, but that only an incorporeal right in the property is litigated, that the fight is not about the property and that in such a suit, Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C. will not entitle a party to get a temporary injunction in the suit. Thus, in a suit for mere declaration of title, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant will be entitled to apply for a temporary injunction to restrain the other party from interfering with his possession. This appears to have been pointed out in the counter statement filed by the petitioner. But neither the Munsiff nor the District Judge appears to have considered this question of law at all. Thus, this petition for temporary injunction should have been dismissed straightway as incompetent. 10. This appears to have been pointed out in the counter statement filed by the petitioner. But neither the Munsiff nor the District Judge appears to have considered this question of law at all. Thus, this petition for temporary injunction should have been dismissed straightway as incompetent. 10. Even granting that the application was competent and that there was a property in dispute in the suit, the Court has to be satisfied further that the property was in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit. In the present case, there was an allegation that the petitioner was trying to alienate the property. But no injunction was granted against the alienation. The ex parte injunction granted was to restrain the petitioner and respondent 2 from interfering with respondent 1s possession. But in the final order, it was stated that the application for temporary injunction was allowed and the ad interim order for injunction has become absolute till the disposal of the suit. But the appellate Court treated this order, only as granting injunction against interference with the possession of respondent 1 and on that basis dismissed the appeal. We have to take it therefore that there is. no injunction against alienation. 11. Even, if there is an injunction against alienation, such an order cannot be allowed to stand. Before granting any such injunction, the Court has to be satisfied that the applicant for injunction has got a prima facie case, that irreparable injury would be caused to the applicant if the injunction was not granted and further that the balance of convenience was in favour of granting the injunction. Both the Munsiffs order and the learned District Judges order show that the only question considered was the prima facie case and the questions of irreparable injury and balance of the convenience were not gone into at all. One fails to understand in what manner the alienation of the land by the plaintiff would affect the first respondent at all, in case she succeeded in the suit. A person to whom the petitioner alienates the land pending the suit cannot get any better rights than the petitioner himself and if the petitioner loses his case, then such alienation will not, in any way, affect the first respondents rights. Hence, no injunction against the alienation can be granted by any Court to the first respondent. 12. A person to whom the petitioner alienates the land pending the suit cannot get any better rights than the petitioner himself and if the petitioner loses his case, then such alienation will not, in any way, affect the first respondents rights. Hence, no injunction against the alienation can be granted by any Court to the first respondent. 12. The only other ground on which a temporary injunction can be granted under Order 39 Rule 1, C.P.C. will be that the property in dispute is in danger being wasted or damaged. But the ground on which the injunction was granted to the first respondent was not that the property was in danger of being wasted or damaged, but that the first respondent had a prima facie case of title and was in possession of the land and that therefore the plaintiff should be restrained from interfering with the said possession. Such an injunction cannot be granted under Order 39 Rule 1. Interfering with the possession of the property is not the same as the property being wasted or damaged. There was no finding either by the Munsiff or the first appellate Court that it was proved that the property was in danger of being wasted or damaged. Hence no injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 should have been granted to the first respondent at all in this case. I have already pointed out that even with regard to the interference with the first respondents possession, there was no discussion by the Munsirf or the lower appellate Court regarding the irreparable injury or balance of convenience. It is clear therefore that the injunction order cannot be supported. 13. An application against interference with, possession can be claimed only by a plaintiff to the suit and that too only under Order 39 Rule 2 in a suit which is for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind. Under Order 39 Rule 2 C.P.C. a defendant cannot ask for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from interfering with his possession. Thus, neither could any injunction have been granted to the first respondent under O.39 Rule 2, C.P.C. 14. More than all this, this was a suit, as I said, only for a declaration of title by the plaintiff. In such a suit, the question of possession of the property is not material at all. Thus, neither could any injunction have been granted to the first respondent under O.39 Rule 2, C.P.C. 14. More than all this, this was a suit, as I said, only for a declaration of title by the plaintiff. In such a suit, the question of possession of the property is not material at all. Whether the plaintiff or the defendant succeeds in the suit, the court has not got to give any finding regarding possession. It is true that, in the present case, the plaintiff has alleged that he was in possession, while the first respondent has contended that she was in possession and that an issue also has been raised as to who was in possession. Such an issue was really not material in the suit unless, of course, the defendant by way of defence to the suit contended that a suit for mere declaration of title was not maintainable under Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act, on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession and that the plaintiff should therefore have claimed the further relief of possession also and paid the necessary court fee for it. But the first respondent has not contended in his written statement that the suit was not maintainable under Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act. She has, no doubt, stated in the written statement that she was in possession, that the plaintiff had no cause of action and that proper court fee has not been paid. Such allegations will not amount to a contention that the suit will be barred under S.42 of the Specific Relief Act for want of claim of further relief. Thus, the question of possession did not have to be gone in the suit and no issue regarding possession also was necessary. If no such issue was necessary, it follows that a decision in the suit will not decide the question of possession and no party will be getting any relief as far as possession was concerned and hence no party will be entitled to any injunction regarding possession during the pendency of such a suit. 15. If no such issue was necessary, it follows that a decision in the suit will not decide the question of possession and no party will be getting any relief as far as possession was concerned and hence no party will be entitled to any injunction regarding possession during the pendency of such a suit. 15. Even granting that the question of possession had to be gone into and the issue regarding possession was correctly framed by the plaintiff, what the Munsiff should have done was to treat the issue regarding possession as a preliminary issue and decide the question, in order to see whether the suit for mere declaration of title filed by the plaintiff would lie at all under S.42 of the Specific Relief Act. But what the Munsiff actually did by granting the injunction to the first respondent on the basis of the first respondents possession was to prejudge the issue regarding possession and to decide it without giving opportunity to either party to let in evidence regarding possession. No Court should proceed in this fashion in deciding a case before it. 16. From what has been stated above, it follows that the temporary injunction order of the Munsiff and the confirmation of the said order in appeal cannot be allowed to stand. The said oders are set aside and the application for temporary injunction filed by the first respondent is dismissed. I must not however be understood as expressing any opinion that the plaintiff or the first respondent is in possession of the property. That is a matter, which, it is for the lower Court to decide, if it finds it necessary to do so in the light of the observations contained in this order. The first respondent will pay the costs to the petitioner. Advocates fee Rs.25/-. Revision Petition allowed.