Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal from the judgment of a single judge of this Court in S.A. No. 17 of 1959 and the only question for consideration in this appeal is what is the nature of the estate which a Christian widow takes under Act II of 1092. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The property involved in this case belonged to one Sebastian, the husband of the 1st defendant and father of defendants 2 to 5. The 1st defendant executed a promissory note in favour of one Eliswa after the death of Sebastian. Eliswa endorsed the note in favour of the plaintiff who instituted O.S. No. 245 of 1114 in the District Munsiff's Court of Parur against defendants 1 to 5 for recovery of the amount. The suit was decreed only as against the 1st defendant. In execution of that decree the share of the 1st defendant in the suit properties was sold in court auction and was purchased by the plaintiff. By the present action he seeks a partition of the 15th share belonging to the 1st defendant in the suit properties and of which he became the owner by virtue of the purchase in execution of O.S. 245/1114 of the Munsiff's Court. 2. The learned Munsiff dismissed the suit holding that the 1st defendant had no saleable interest in the property. That decision was reversed by the Subordinate Judge in A.S. 312 of 1956 preferred by the plaintiff. Against this decision the 3rd defendant filed S.A.17 of 1959 and the learned single judge, by his judgment under appeal, confirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. 3. In this appeal the main contention urged by counsel for the appellant is that the 1st defendant in O.S. No. 245 of 1114 had no transferable interest in the property as she had only an estate terminable with death or remarriage. It was contended on the strength of S.6 Clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act that an interest in the property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be transferred or taken in execution against the owner. It was contended on the strength of S.6 Clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act that an interest in the property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be transferred or taken in execution against the owner. On an analysis of the relevant sections of the Christian Succession Act the learned single judge came to the conclusion that the intention of the legislature was to provide the widow with an estate in the property of the deceased which is terminable with her death or remarriage and that interest is transferable by her. As we are in full agreement with the learned single judge in his conclusion we need not travel the grounds which he has covered in his judgment, but state only the reasons which induced us to come to the same conclusion. The relevant sections are S.15,16 and 24. S.15 says that the property of an intestate devolves upon the wife or the husband or upon those who are kindred of the deceased in the order and according to the rules prescribed. S.16 states that if the widow exists along with lineal descendants a share equal to that of a son shall be allotted to her. S.24 quantifies the interest which the widow is to take in respect of the share to which she becomes entitled under Ss. 16, 17, 21 and 22. S.24 says: "Over any immovable property to which a widow or mother becomes entitled under S.16,17,21 and 22, she will have only a life-interest terminable at death or remarriage. On the determination of the limited estate of the widow or the mother, the property over which she had such limited interest shall be distributed among the heirs of the original intestate, as if the holder of the life-estate had not survived the intestate." From these sections it is clear that a Christian widow is entitled to a share in the property of the deceased, and the nature of the interest she is to enjoy is a life interest terminable at death or re-marriage. It is not stated either in the Christian Succession Act or in any other rule of law or custom that the estate inherited by a Christian widow shall be enjoyed personally by her. The enjoyment may be either by herself or by a person claiming under a voluntary transfer or a transfer in invitum. It is not stated either in the Christian Succession Act or in any other rule of law or custom that the estate inherited by a Christian widow shall be enjoyed personally by her. The enjoyment may be either by herself or by a person claiming under a voluntary transfer or a transfer in invitum. But it was contended by the learned counsel that the fact that her interest in the property is to cease on her re-marriage indicates that she is to enjoy the property only so long as she retains the status of a widow. It might be that that is the intention of the legislature. But has that anything to do with the question which we have to decide? Estates vary in size according to the time for which they are to endure. "Proprietary rights in land are, we may say, projected upon the plane of time." See Pollock and Maitland History of English Law, Vol. II Page 10. The suggestive language used in the course of the argument in Walsingham's Case (1579), 2 Plowd. 547. at p. 555 is instructive: "The land itself is one thing and the estate in the land is another thing, for an estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time, and there are diversities of estates which are no more than diversities of time, for he who has a fee simple in land has a time in the land without end." The fact that the duration of the estate of a Christian widow is dependent upon her re-marriage has reference only to quantum of the estate in point of time and has nothing to do with the question that she is to enjoy that time in the land personally. If, as a matter of fact she owns an estate, like any other owner, she is entitled to transfer that interest. One of the attributes of property is the right to transfer. Unless there are indications in the Act restricting that right we have to hold that that right attaches itself to the share inherited by the widow under the Act. Counsel then relied upon the ruling in Velayudhan Pillai v. Daniel (ILR.1954 TC. 442) and particularly upon a passage occurring at page 448: "But the position of a widow under the Travancore Christian Succession Act is entirely different. Counsel then relied upon the ruling in Velayudhan Pillai v. Daniel (ILR.1954 TC. 442) and particularly upon a passage occurring at page 448: "But the position of a widow under the Travancore Christian Succession Act is entirely different. Under S.24 of the Act what the widow gets is only a life interest terminable at death or re-marriage. She can only enjoy the property till her death or re-marriage. She has absolutely no power to alienate the property. In no sense can she be said to be the owner of the property." In the first place we are of opinion that these observations taken in their setting would only show that the widow has absolutely no power to alienate the property itself. The learned judge there, was comparing the interest which a Hindu widow gets in the property of her deceased husband with the right which a Christian widow takes under the Christian Succession Act. In contrasting the position of a Hindu widow with that of a Christian widow the learned judge observed that unlike in the case of a Hindu widow a Christian widow cannot be said to be the owner of the property. We fail to see how the observation of the learned judge affords any help to the appellant. What the learned judge said was that in the case of a Hindu widow the property itself is vested in her which she can alienate under certain circumstances; but that a Christian widow can under no circumstances transfer the property, meaning thereby fee simple interest in the property. In other words, the learned judge makes a distinction between the property and an interest in the property. The distinction made by the learned judge is supported by the authorities. We need only cite a passage from Cheshire on Modern Real Property, 8th Edn. page 35: "there may be different degrees or gradations of estate ownership. The tenant in tail and the tenant for life, no less than the tenant in fee simple, are owners of their estates. As compared with the tenant in fee simple, they must, indeed, be described as limited owners, since their estates have not the same capacity of infinite duration. None the less they are owners, and their ownership differs from that of the tenant in fee simple only in degree - in quantity. There is no difference in kind or quality. As compared with the tenant in fee simple, they must, indeed, be described as limited owners, since their estates have not the same capacity of infinite duration. None the less they are owners, and their ownership differs from that of the tenant in fee simple only in degree - in quantity. There is no difference in kind or quality. The same remedies for the recovery of land, the same powers of dealing with the estate by way of alienation are available, irrespective of the size of the estate. The different freehold estates, in other words, represent various grades in the hierarchy of ownership." We have to understand the observations of the learned judge with the aforesaid distinction in mind. The learned judge does not say that she is incompetent to transfer her interest in the property. Therefore what he means can only be that the widow cannot transfer the full ownership in the property and not the estate which she owns. We do not find anything in the judgment which would militate against the conclusion to which we have arrived; and we do not think that the learned judge intended to lay down that a Christian widow under the Christian Succession Act has no power to transfer her life interest or that that interest is capable of being taken in execution of a decree against her. 4. We are satisfied that there is no merit in this appeal and that it has to be dismissed, and we do so with costs. Dismissed.