Seth Ramrichhpal Sirya v. Ajmer Traders — 1962 DIGILAW 172 (RAJ)

CHHANGANI, J.—The appellant Seth Ramrichpal Sirya, on behalf of himself and as manager and karta of the joint Hindu family known as Tilokchand Dilsukhrai, resident of Ajmer, has filed this appeal under sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, dated 16.2.1960, over-ruling the appellants objections to the validity of the award and making award a rule of the Court and directing a decree in terms of award. 2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly these. 3. The respondent M/s. Ajmer Traders, a registered partnership firm, Naya Bazar, Ajmer, through its partner Birdhichand of Ajmer put in an application in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, on 18th March, 1958, against Seth Ramrichpal Sirya of Ajmer, praying for a judgment and decree on the basis of an award. The respondent applicants case was that the respondent and the appellant having had some dispute in regard to certain shop situated outside Railway Good-shed, Ajmer, known as "Sirya Market Ajmer" referred their dispute for arbitration to Shri Krishna Gopal Garg under an agreement dated 25.7.1956. The arbitrator Shri Krishna Gopal Garg gave his award on 25.10.1956. The respondent produced the award with the application and, as stated earlier, prayed for a judgment and decree on its basis. It appears that without notice to the appellant, the court began ex parte proceedings. On 19.11.1958, the appellant appeared before the court and applied for setting aside the ex parte proceedings. The court by its order dated 17.11.1959 set aside the ex parte proceeding and the appellant was granted time to file his objections on or before 21st December 1959. The appellant actually filed his objections on 18.12.1959 urging various grounds against the validity of the award and prayed for either setting aside of the award or for remitting it for reconsideration. Apart from these objections the appellant also raised a legal objection that the award having not been filed by the arbitrator or by anybody else acting under the authority of the arbitrator, there was no proper filing of the award in court and, therefore, the court could not entertain an application for making the award a rule of the court and passing a decree in terms of the award. The respondent in its turn pleaded that the appellant having failed to file a proper application for setting aside the award within the period of 30 days from 19.11.1958, these objections were barred by limitation. The trial Judge formulated the following three points for its determination — (1) Whether the application of the applicant for getting the decree according to terms of the award is valid under sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act or under any other section of the Act? (2) Whether that application is within limita tion? (3) Whether the objections filed by the oppo site party are time-barred? On the first point, the trial Judge substantially held that the respondents application could not be treated as an application under sec. 14 of the Act. However, on the basis of a few cases, namely, Jaikishen Vs. Ramlal Gupta (1), Radhakishen Vs. Madho Krishna and another (2) and Gangaram Vs. Radhakishan (3) he held that sec. 14(2) of the Act is not exhaustive and that independently of that an application can be made by a party to the arbitration for making the award rule of the court if the award can be produced and that sec. 14 of the Act would not come into play in such a case. Such an application, according to him, was maintainable under Sec. 17 of the Act. 4. On the second point, he held that Art. 178 of the Limitation Act applies only to applications under sec. 14 of the Act and cannot govern an application which does not request tor the filing of an award but which merely prays for a judgment and decree in "terms of an award and which is accompanied by the award itself. Such a case, according to the trial Judge, would be governed by three years rule prescribed by Art.181 of the Limitation Act. 5. With regard to the third point, the trial Judge held that the Act contemplates only one application to get the award set aside and that such an application must be filed within 30 days of the date of the service of the notice of filing of the award, under Art.158 of the Limitation Act. 5. With regard to the third point, the trial Judge held that the Act contemplates only one application to get the award set aside and that such an application must be filed within 30 days of the date of the service of the notice of filing of the award, under Art.158 of the Limitation Act. Purporting to hold that the parties received notice of the filing of the award on 17th November, 1959, the respondents objections having been filed on 18th December, 1959, i.e. one day after the expiry of 30 days, he treated the objections as time-barred. 6. In the result, he made the award a rule of the court and passed a decree in terms thereof. The appellant has challenged this judgment and decree of the trial Judge in this appeal. 7. Mr. Jindal, appearing for the appellant, contended that it is not open to a party to obtain a judgment and decree on the basis of an award without causing the award to be filed under the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act by merely putting an application along with an award and praying for judgment and decree in terms thereof. The view of the law taken by the trial Judge, according to him, is clearly erroneous. He mainly relied upon Amod Kumar verma Vs. Han Prasad Burman (4) and Kumbha Mawji Vs. Dominion of India (5). 8. In the alternative, he contended that if an application for making the award the rule of the court and praying for a judgment and decree on the basis of the award be treated as maintainable, the opposite party should be held entitled to raise all objections to the validity of the award in its written statement irrespective of the period of 30 days prescribed by Art.158 of the Limitation Act. Art.158 of the Limitation Act is applicable to a case where an award is properly filed under sec. 14 of the Act and notice of filing the award has been served on the parties. Where filing of the award is not relied upon as in the present case, Article 158 of the Limitation Act cannot be attracted. 9. Mr Chandmal supported the judgment of the trial Judge and relied upon the authorities referred to in the judgment of the trial Judge as also on Pedapudi Vissanna Vs. Pedapudi Vuswabrahmam(6) and some observations in M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. 9. Mr Chandmal supported the judgment of the trial Judge and relied upon the authorities referred to in the judgment of the trial Judge as also on Pedapudi Vissanna Vs. Pedapudi Vuswabrahmam(6) and some observations in M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. Vs. Vishwambharlal Ruiya(7). 10. The first and the principal question emerging for determination is : whether an application for making an award the rule of the court and praying for a judgment and decree on its basis is maintainable without causing the filing of the award under the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act? There is some conflict of judicial opinion on this point; the absence of exhaustiveness of the Act providing materials for the said conflict. For a proper determination of the question it will be useful and convenient to refer to sec. 14 to 17 and 30 of the Act and Art. 138 of the Limitation Act as they, in our opinion, disclose a proper scheme for securing an enforcement of an award or getting it set aside or remitted for reconsideration and that under this scheme all proceedings, whether by way of enforcing the award or for getting it set aside or remitted should commence with the filing of the award under sec. 14 of the Act. Sec. 14, the commencing section in connection with proceedings in court consequent on an award, purports to regulate the procedure after the miking of the award. Sub-sec. (1) enjoins upon the arbitrators or umpire to sign the award and give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Sub-sec. (2) requires that at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party the arbitrators or the umpire shall cause the award or a signed copy thereof together with certain specified documents to be filed in court. This sub-section also contemplates a move by a party to secure the help of court for securing the filing of the award if an award in not filed at his request and provides for a direction by the court to the arbitrators or umpire to cause the filing of the award. Reference may also be made at this stage to Art. 178 of the Limitation Act as amended by the Arbitration Act providing limitation for the applications for the filing in court of an award. Reference may also be made at this stage to Art. 178 of the Limitation Act as amended by the Arbitration Act providing limitation for the applications for the filing in court of an award. These two provisions taken together provide the machinery for securing the filing of the award in court. Lastly, the sub-section also requires the court to give notice of the filing of the award to the parties. The schema and the provisions of sec. 14, namely,(1) creating an obligation on the part of the arbitrator or umpire to file the award,(2) recognition of a right of a party to secure the help of court in getting an award filed and the prescription of a period of limitation in this behalf, and (3) requirement that the court shall given notice of the filing of the award to the parties; appear to suggest that the filing of the award has been intended to bring it within the jurisdiction of the court for appropriate action contemplated on the subsequent sections of the Act and that this. (i. e. filing of an award) should be the commencement of all proceedings in court and no steps either for enforcing the award or for getting it set aside or remitted can be contemplated without the filing of the award. This suggestion is not negatived by the subsequent provisions but stands re-enforced by them. Sec. 15 enumerates the grounds on which the court may modify or correct an award. Sec. 16 then provides the grounds on which the court may remit it for reconsideration. Sec. 30 specifies the ground on which the court may set aside the award. Art. 158 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period of limitation for applications for purposes of sec. 16 and 30, reads as follows — Description Period of limitation. Time from which period begins to run 158. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for reconsideration. Thirty days The date of service of notice of filing of the award. 11. It is clear from the language of the article that three things are necessary for starting of the period of limitation, namely, (1) The award must be filed (evidently under sec. 14). (2) It must be filed in court. (3) Notice of the filing of the award must be given to the parties. 11. It is clear from the language of the article that three things are necessary for starting of the period of limitation, namely, (1) The award must be filed (evidently under sec. 14). (2) It must be filed in court. (3) Notice of the filing of the award must be given to the parties. We may now indicate two conclusions appearing to follow from the above review — (1) A move for setting aside the award or getting it remitted or for its correction and modification contemplates a prior filing of the award and the law fixes date of service of notice of filing of the award as the date on which the right accrues to a party to put in an application for these purposes. (2) In the light of the order of the various provisions of the term "the court" referred to in secs. 15, 16 and 30 which can pass appropriate orders should be understood with reference to the court as used in sec. 14 as the court where the award has been filed. The final conclusion to be arrived at is that an application for setting aside the award cannot be made unless the award is filed. There is abundant authority for the above proposition, namely, Ratanji Virpal & Co. Vs. Dhirajlal Manilal(8), Bengal Jute Mills Vs. Jewraj Heeralal(9), Janardhan Prasad Vs. Chandra Sekhar (10) and lastly, Firm Shriram Harachandas Khamgaon Vs. The President, the Cotton Seed Forward Delivery Managing Association Ltd. Khamgaon (11). In the last mentioned case after a reference to the earlier three cases it was observed that the law on the point was settled. If the filing of the award is necessary even for getting it set aside, there is all the greater need for the filing of the award for its enforcement by judgment and decree. 12. Next comes sec. 17, which provides for the pronouncement of a judgment in accordance with the award to be followed by a decree. An analysis of sec. 17 will show that the following conditions must be complied before a court can pronounce a judgment on the basis of an award— (1) A notice of the filing of the award must be given to the parties. An analysis of sec. 17 will show that the following conditions must be complied before a court can pronounce a judgment on the basis of an award— (1) A notice of the filing of the award must be given to the parties. (2) A period of 30 days prescribed under Art.158 of the Limitation Act must be allowed to expire after the date of the service of the notice of the filing of the award. These two conditions are deductible from the following words of the section. "the court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award ex parte has expired. (3) In case of an application having been made for setting aside an award the application must be disposed of and disallowed." The necessary implication of the position stated above is that a judgment and decree on the basis of an award is not permissible without the proper filing of the award under sec. 14 of the Act. In fact, the idea of an application accompanied by an award containing a mere prayer for judgment and decree on the basis of an award without causing the award to be filed under sec. 14 is foreign and repugnant to the language of sec. 17 because such an application does not contemplate the filing of an award and giving notice thereof to the parties. In such a case, there can be no commencement of the period of limitation for an application under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act to get the award set aside or remitted. It follows that a period of limitation, therefore, would never expire with the result that on giving proper effect to the language of sec. 17 a judgment and decree can never be passed on such an application. 13. On a consideration of the various provisions in conjunction we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that an application for judgment and decree in terms of the award without causing the filing of the award is not contemplated by sec. 17 and is unmaintainable. It is, however, necessary in all fairness to the trial Judge and the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent to notice and discuss the cases which have taken the contrary view. 14. The first case relied upon is Jaikishen Vs. Ramlal Gupta(1). 17 and is unmaintainable. It is, however, necessary in all fairness to the trial Judge and the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent to notice and discuss the cases which have taken the contrary view. 14. The first case relied upon is Jaikishen Vs. Ramlal Gupta(1). The facts in that case were "An award was made by the arbitrator in the presence of the parties to the application on 30th July, 1940. They were accordingly asked by the arbitrator to sign the award and did so. The award was then handed over to the petitioner in whose favour it was made while a copy of the same was given to the other party i. e. respondent. As the respondent did not carry out the terms of the award, the petitioner applied on 8th November, 1941 (i. e. after the expiry of 90 days), for making it a rule of the court. Since, the original award was filed by him along with his application the petitioner did not ask for an order for the filing of it but only asked for it to be made a rule of the court. The award having been obviously filed after 90 days, the trial court dismissed the application under Art.178 of the Limitation Act. On revision, Abdur Rehman J. found it difficult to treat the petitioner producing the award with the application as an agent of the arbitrator and filing the award as an agent. He observed, "It is impossible to suggest that when he made the application for the award to be made a rule of the court, he did so as an agent on behalf of the arbitrators or in any capacity Other than his individual one in which he was entitled to enforce the award and to have for that purpose a decree passed in accordance with the award. If he did not make that application as an agent, how could he be deemed to have attached the award to the application or filed the award in court as an agent of the arbitrators." In his judgment, the application of the petitioner could not be taken as one for filing the award. He thus over-ruled the applicability of Art.178 of the Limitation Act in the facts of that case. In answer to an argument that if that application was not under sec. He thus over-ruled the applicability of Art.178 of the Limitation Act in the facts of that case. In answer to an argument that if that application was not under sec. 14 of the Act, it could not be competent at all and was liable to be dismissed as not being provided by the Act, the learned Judge observed. "But, the Arbitration Act is not in my opinion exhaustive in the sense that an application like this could be thrown out as incompetent in the absence of a clear provision in the Act. Moreover, I cannot forget that the petitioner had asked for the award to be made a rule of the Court or in other words for a judgment and a decree to be passed in accordance with the award and this is distinctly provided in Sec.17. Arbitration Act". With great respect, we are unable to agree with the above observations of the learned Judge. In the earlier part of the judgment we have discussed the scheme disclosed by the relevant provisions of law and have recorded a conclusion that sec. 17 does not contemplate a judgment or a decree on the basis of an award without a proper filing of the award under sec. 14 of the Act, and we do not feel persuaded to modify our conclusion. 15. The other case referred to in the judgment of the trial Judge, namely, Radha Kishen Vs. Madho Krishna(2) has merely followed the case Jai Kishen Vs. Ramlal Gupta(1) cited earlier and does not at all advance the respondents case. 16. The third case relied upon by the lower court is Gangaram Vs. Radha Kishan (3). That case originally came before Harnam Singh J. before whom it was argued that the Act does not empower a party to the arbitration to file an award and that R. 10 made under sec. 44 of the Act in force in the Punjab State permitting the filing of the award by a party, being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act was ultra vires and that in any case the application was barred by limitation. The learned Judge referred the case to a Division Bench and indicated the following two questions— (1) Whether the rules framed by the High Court under sec. 44 of the Act are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act? The learned Judge referred the case to a Division Bench and indicated the following two questions— (1) Whether the rules framed by the High Court under sec. 44 of the Act are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act? (2) Whether Art. 178 of the Limitation Act provides period of limitation for applications made by the parties to the reference? The case was then heard by the same Judge and Kapoor J. Harnam Singh J. after referring to the right of a party to obtain possession of the award under sec. 38 of the Act and the judgment in John B. Paes Vs. Soomar S/o Umer (12) felt no doubt that the party must have a right to file the award in court. In this view of the matter, he held that R. 10 as intra vires and further expressed the view that in a case falling within sec. 14(2) of the Act the arbitrator is called upon to file the award while in a case falling within R. 10 the award may be filed by any of the parties to the arbitration in the manner prescribed in R. 3. Kapoor J. while concurring that the appeal should be dismissed does not appear to have gone to the extent of holding that a party can also file an award. He, however, held an application for the enforcement of the award maintainable and made the following observations in this connection— "The applications for enforcement of the awards are not confined to sec.14 alone but such applications are possible even outside that section, because sec. 14 deals with filing of the awards by an arbitrator or an umpire and this section does not cover an application made by a party for the enforcement of the award." Both the Judges relied upon Jai Kishen Vs. Ramlal Gupta(1) and Radha Kishen Vs. Madho Krishna(2) and Kapoor J. further sought support from the observations in M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. Vs. Vishwambharlal Ruiya(7). Now, so far as the filing of the award by a party is concerned, the point stands concluded by the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kumbha Mawji Vs. Ramlal Gupta(1) and Radha Kishen Vs. Madho Krishna(2) and Kapoor J. further sought support from the observations in M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. Vs. Vishwambharlal Ruiya(7). Now, so far as the filing of the award by a party is concerned, the point stands concluded by the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kumbha Mawji Vs. Dominion of India (5)— "A party cannot file an award without the authority of the arbitrators or the umpire autho rising the party to file the award." The Supreme Court also held that where the awards were handed over to the party, it cannot be assumed that the mere handing over of the awards necessarily implies the authority of the umpire to file the same into court on his behalf. That authority has to be specifically alleged and proved. In the absence of such authority, the filing of the awards by the party cannot be the filing by the umpire. 17. In the face of this authoritative decision we find it difficult to agree with the proposition that a party can also file an award. In this connection I may also observe that Lobo J. who decided the case John B. Paes Vs. Soomar s/o Umer (12) and the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court seem to have given undue importance to sec. 38 of the Act. From a mere fact that a party can obtain an award from the arbitrator or the umpire it is hardly fair to necessarily conclude that he can circumvent the provisions of sec. 14 and file the award himself so as to permit further proceedings in accordance with the other sections of the Act. It is possible to conceive of various purposes other than the filing of it in court for which the party may obtain the original award and we find it difficult to hold merely on a consideration of sec. 38 that a party can file an award. 18. As regards the maintainability of an application merely for the enforcement of the award, the learned Judges relied upon the cases noticed earlier and also on the inexhaustiveness of the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act. In the view which we have taken of the provisions of sec. 14 and the subsequent sections, we do not feel persuaded |to follow the view taken in Gangaram Vs. Radha Kishan (3) case. 14 of the Act. In the view which we have taken of the provisions of sec. 14 and the subsequent sections, we do not feel persuaded |to follow the view taken in Gangaram Vs. Radha Kishan (3) case. Referring to M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. Vs. Vishwambharlal Ruiya (7) relied upon by Kapoor J. in Gangaram Vs. Radha Kishan (4), the precise question for determination in that case was whether an application for a declaration as to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement was barred or not, Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J. upholding the maintainablity of such an application under sec. 32 of the Arbitration Act observed: "When the Legislature enacted sec. 32 and barred all suits with regard to the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement, the object of the Legislature was that all questions with regard to these matters should be dealt with under the Arbitration Act, and not by substantive suits; and it is open to a party to make any application with regard to which a suit is barred under sec. 32. Sec. 33 is merely one instance of such an application. The Legis lature cannot conceivably deal with all possible applications that may arise with regard to which suits are barred under sec.32. The right to make such applications is implicit in the very terms of sec.32 itself." The general observations made in this case cannot be of any help in the present case. According to the scheme of the Act, as noticed above, the proper procedure for enforcing the award is to take appropriate steps to get the award filed under sec. 14 for further action in accordance with the provisions of secs.15 to 17 and 30. This procedure appears to have been approved of by Chagla J. as he then was in an earlier Bombay case Ratanji Virpal & Co. Vs. Dhirajlal Manilal(8) referred to above wherein it was held that an award cannot be set aside without getting it filed. The above procedure cannot be circumvented with the help of the above general observations with an argument that as a suit for enforcement of the award is barred a party can present an application for the enforcement of the award under a plea of bar of a suit and dispense with the requirement of law as to the filing of the award. It cannot be said that the Act makes no provision whatsoever for securing the enforcement of an award so as to recognise an implicit right of an application on a plea of a bar of a suit. Indeed, it would be illogical to maintain that a party by omitting to adhere to procedure for filing the award can secure as if an independent right of seeking the enforcement of the award. 19. In the last case relied upon by Mr. Chandmal, namely, Puppalla Ramulu Vs. Nagidi Appalaswami and others(13) the facts were as follows:— 20. The petitioner and respondent referred their dispute to arbitration and an award was made on 4.3.1950, under which the respondent had to give the petitioner 14 bags of paddy. The award was delivered by the arbitrator to the petitioner. After an unsuccessful suit the petitioner applied on 21.12.51 for passing a decree in terms of an award. The respondent pleaded bar of limitation under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act and the trial Court accepting the plea of limitation dismissed the application. On a revision by the petitioner, a preliminary objection was raised that as the order was appealable the revision was incompetent. The learned Judge first proceeded to determine whether the application was under sec. 14(2) or under sec. 17 and observed in this connection: — "Under sec.14 (2) if the arbitrators do not file the award the party can obtain an order of the Court directing the arbitrator to file the award. Can it be extended to a case where the award is already in the Court, no doubt, in connection with some other proceeding? In my opinion that section can apply to a case where the help of the Court is sought for getting the award into Court by calling upon the arbitrators to do it." With these observations, the application was treat as one under sec. 17. The learned Judge further held that the order dismissing the application was not appealable and at the same time expressed the opinion that the order would not be appealable even if the application was as one under sec. 14. The precise question whether an application for decree in terms of the award without a prior filing of the award is not maintainable was not raised and determined by the Judge. The observations were primarily made to show that the order was not appealable. 14. The precise question whether an application for decree in terms of the award without a prior filing of the award is not maintainable was not raised and determined by the Judge. The observations were primarily made to show that the order was not appealable. There is also an observation in the judgment to the following effect — "Setting aside an award would arise only after the award is filed in court." The observation accords with the process of reasoning which lead us to the conclusion as to the underlying scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act and should be taken to indicate that the learned Judge was not pronouncing any definite opinion on the question which is before this Court. 21. Further, in determining whether the petitioners application before the Civil Judge was barred, the learned Judge no doubt observed that Art. 178 was not attracted but also held that as no notice containing the particulars referred to in sec. 14 was served on parties after the signing of the award, Art.178 did not debar the petitioner from obtaining relief claimed by him. We are clearly of the opinion that in the background of the facts of the case the learned counsel for the respondent cannot derive any assistance from the general observation made in connection with the elucidation of some other point and this case also need not affect our conclusion. 22. We now take up the cases relied upon by Mr. Jindal in support of his contention. 23. The first case is Kumbha Mawji Vs. Dominion of India (5). In that case, the umpire made two awards on or about 20.7.1949 in favour of the appellant making certain directions. The umpire was said to have made over each of the two awards in original to each of the parties. On 10th August, 1949, the respondent (before the Supreme Court) filed an application under sec. 14(2), Arbitration Act, before the court of Subordinate Judge, Gauhati, in Assam, praying that the umpire may be directed to file both the awards in court so that the petitioner may get an opportunity for filing objections thereto. On this application, notice was issued to the umpire to file the awards into that court before 24th August, 1949. The umpire sent a letter dated 18th August, 1949 to the Subordinate Judge submitting therewith the two awards. On this application, notice was issued to the umpire to file the awards into that court before 24th August, 1949. The umpire sent a letter dated 18th August, 1949 to the Subordinate Judge submitting therewith the two awards. The Subordinate Judge passed an order directing the respondent to file his copy of the award in his possession on 3.9.49 which the respondent did on 3.9.49. Meanwhile, on 17th August, 1949, i. e. a week after the respondent made its first application in the Gauhati Court, the appellants solicitors submitted a letter to the Registrar of the High Court, Original Side, producing the original awards for the purposes of filing them and thus purported to have initiated proceedings under sec. 14(2) of the Act. The respondent raised objections to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court as also to the validity of the award. The High Court on the Original Side held that the award must be taken to have been filed earlier in the Calcutta High Court and not in Gauhati Court and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had exclusive jurisdiction. On an appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court disagreed with the trial Judge and held that there had teen no due filing of the award in the Calcutta High Court under sec. 14 inasmuch as the awards were not filed by the umpire nor was it shown that the filing of them was under his authority. On an appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the view of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court and made observations which have already been quoted above. Mr. Zindals argument is that the production of the original award in the High Court having been considered of no avail the Supreme Court should be deemed to have impliedly held that under the Arbitration Act an application can be made for the enforcement of the award under sec. 14 only and that there is no other method which is available to party for the purpose of getting a judgment and decree in accordance with the award. On the other hand, Mr. Chandmal contended that the question whether an application merely for the enforcement of the award is maintainable under sec. 17 or not, was not specifically raised and argued before the Supreme Court and should not be deemed to have been impliedly decided. On the other hand, Mr. Chandmal contended that the question whether an application merely for the enforcement of the award is maintainable under sec. 17 or not, was not specifically raised and argued before the Supreme Court and should not be deemed to have been impliedly decided. We do not propose to express any final opinion on this controversy joined by the learned Advocates for the parties and need only observe that the decision of the Supreme Court is entirely consistent with and in a way helpful to the case set up by Mr. Zindal. Leaving the matter at this stage, we must observe that the other case Amod Kumar Verma Vs. Hari Prasad Burman(4) fully supports the contention of Mr. Zindal and the view which we have taken on a consideration of the scheme of the Act. The learned Judges have carefully examined the scheme of the Act and have come to the conclusion that the provisions of sec. 17 can be applied only in proceedings started in an application under sec. 14 only, and with great respect we agree with chief conclusion as also with the reasons therefor. The learned Judges in that case had referred to some difficulties which may arise on account of contingencies like the death of the arbitrator or the umpire before the filing of the award but observed that the arguments on the ground of those difficulties are arguments for proper legislation and cannot justify a court interpreting sec. 14 to mean that award can be filed by a party also. We may in this connection refer to Panchanan Dey Vs. Union of India(14) which has suggested a solution for a difficulty by enabling the court to get the award filed under sec. 151 of the Civil P. C. in such contingencies. Whether such a solution is permissible or not, on a proper consideration of the scheme and the various provisions of the Act and the examination of the case-law, we feel inclined to come to the conclusion that the proper procedure for the enforcement of the award is to commence appropriate proceedings for causing the award filed in court and then to take further steps and that a mere application for the enforcement of the award without getting it filed is not maintainable. Some case-law was cited at the Bar as to the effect of an award which is not made rule of the court on account of its bearing on the point before us but we do not consider it necessary to notice them as the necessary conclusion on the point before us could properly be and was actually arrived on the consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act and case law on the point itself. 24. In this view of the law, the respondents application merely for judgment and decree without getting the award filed under sec. 14 was clearly unmaintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The appellants appeal must succeed on this point alone and it is wholly unnecessary to consider the alternative contention canvassed by Mr. Jindal. 25. In the result, we accept the appeal and dismiss the respondents application for the enforcement of the award. In the circumstances of the case, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs.