Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the plaintiff-mortgagee who sued to enforce the mortgage evidenced by Ext. Al dated 18-8-1943. The suit claim is a sum of Rs. 2119/- made up of the principal mortgage amount of Rs. 2000/-and interest accrued thereon Rs. 119. The mortgage was for a term of 10 years. Contemporaneously with the mortgage there was a lease back of even date. The mortgage deed provided for interest on the mortgage amount at the rate of 90 parahs of paddy annually as the mortgagor was to retain possession of the mortgaged property with him; and the lease deed, as is seen from Ext. B1 judgment produced by the defence, provided for a rent of 90 parahs of paddy per annum to be paid to the mortgagee. 2. The defendant contended that the plaintiff-mortgagee having instituted two suits O.S. Nos. 605/1953 and 270/954 for arrears of rent covering a period after the expiry of the term when the mortgage money had also become due the present suit is barred by 0.2 R.2 CPC. 3. The Munsiff repelling the contention decreed the suit but the Subordinate Judge, on appeal, accepting the contention dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal. 4. Speaking for the Judicial Committee his Lordship Sir Madhavan Nair in Mohammed Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian (AIR. 1949 PC. 78) observed: "The correct test in cases falling under 0.2, R.2, is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit." and explained the expression'cause of action' as meaning "every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment." Ext. B1 is the consolidated judgment in the aforesaid two suits for rent urged as bar to the present suit. It refers to a lease deed dated 18-8-1943 executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff undertaking to pay a rent of 90 parahs of paddy per annum as the basis of those two suits for arrears of rent. Counsel for the respondent-defendant laid great stress on an observation in that judgment that the rent claimed there was interest on the mortgage amount. It is pertinent to note sub-section 9 (a) (i) of S. 9A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938: "... Counsel for the respondent-defendant laid great stress on an observation in that judgment that the rent claimed there was interest on the mortgage amount. It is pertinent to note sub-section 9 (a) (i) of S. 9A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938: "... where the mortgaged property or, as the case may be, the portion thereof in the possession of the mortgagee has been leased back to the mortgagor by the mortgagee, the rent due to the mortgagee under the lease ... shall be deemed to be the interest on the mortgage debt or the portion thereof attributable to the portion of the property aforesaid and the provisions of S.8 or 9 read with S.12, or S.13, as the case may be, shall apply to the entire debt." Admittedly the aforesaid two suits for rent were instituted after this provision came into force and the defendant in the rent suits claimed the benefits thereof. The defendant being an agriculturist as defined in the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, the rent had to be deemed to be interest on the mortgage amount and that is exactly what finds expression in Ext. B1. The circumstances clearly indicate that the observation can only be for purposes of Agriculturists' Relief Act and cannot be extended as a bar under O.2 R.2 CPC. to the present suit. As the cause of action in the suits, the judgment whereof is Ext. B1, was the lease referred to in that judgment and the cause of action in present suit is the mortgage which is an independent transaction, there cannot be any bar under 0.2 R.2 to the maintainability of this suit. Counsel for the respondent-defendant relied on the rulings in Diwan Chand v. Ralla Ram (AIR. 1926 Lah. 559) and Lakshmi Das, Gopichand v. Ghulam Nabi (AIR. 1935 Peshawar 84) where a mortgage and a lease-back were held to constitute one transaction and therefore a suit for rent under the lease-back was held to bar a subsequent suit for the mortgage money. But a mortgage and a lease back of even date have been regarded as two transactions in 24 Allahabad 521 (P.C.), AIR. 1935 P.C.172, AIR. 1928 Madras 543 F.B., 1958 Punjab 140,1959 Jammu and Kashmir 103,1940 Mad. 946,1958 KLT.1139, and in 1958 KLT. 946 the last two being decisions of Division Benches of this Court. But a mortgage and a lease back of even date have been regarded as two transactions in 24 Allahabad 521 (P.C.), AIR. 1935 P.C.172, AIR. 1928 Madras 543 F.B., 1958 Punjab 140,1959 Jammu and Kashmir 103,1940 Mad. 946,1958 KLT.1139, and in 1958 KLT. 946 the last two being decisions of Division Benches of this Court. Relying on 40 I.A. 31, Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was), with the concurrence of Wadsworth, J., observed in Abdul Kadir v. Subramonia Pattar (AIR. 1940 Madras. 946): "... though the mortgage and the lease back can and must in a case of this kind, be taken to form part of the same transaction, effect must be given to each according to its terms and the court cannot, by reading the two together, spell out a transaction totally different in character and incidents." Normally, the parties must be held to have intended what they did. If they intended only one transaction between them there is no meaning or significance in their executing a mortgage deed and a contemporaneous lease deed which in the general law of property denote two different transactions. I am aware that in certain Debt Relief Acts a possessory mortgage and a lease-back are directed to be counted together as a simple mortgage; but that can only be for purposes of those Acts and cannot be extended to cases under 0.2 R.2 CPC. as well. If the mortgage and lease-back be regarded as two transactions it cannot be contended that a suit on the basis of one would bar another suit on the basis of the other under 0.2 R.2 CPC. 5. In the result, the second appeal is allowed and in reversal of the decree of the lower appellate court that of the trial court is restored. But, in view of the dubious terms of Ext. Al which stipulates interest in identical terms as rent in the contemporaneous lease deed, the parties shall bear their respective costs throughout. 6. No leave. Allowed.