Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit for mortgage money instituted on March 11, 1957. Though the suit was decreed, the Munsiff disallowed costs to the plaintiff and directed him to pay the defendant's costs on the ground that the suit has been instituted within the period of moratorium provided in S.3 of the Act III of 1956. The plaintiff took the matter in appeal & the District Judge accepted the Munsiff. Hence this Second Appeal. 2. S.3 of the Travancore-Cochin Act III of 1956 provides: (1) No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted ... against any agriculturist in any civil . , . court before the expiry of six months from the commencement of this Act ... (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I), where a creditor files a suit for recovery of a debt during the period specified in sub-section (1) ... the court shall in decreeing the suit direct the plaintiff to bear his own costs and to pay the costs of the defendant who is an agriculturist..." The question then is whether the suit has been filed within the period of moratorium mentioned in the section. It is conceded that the Act came into force on September 11,1956; and that by virtue of S.3 of the Travancore-Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act VII of 1125, the Act has come into force from the first moment of the 11th day of September, 1956. 3. S.8 of the aforesaid Act VII of 1125 reads: "In any Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word 'from', and for the purpose of including the last in a series of clays or any other period of time to use the word 'to' " Obviously the section refers to calculation of time in terms of a series of days or any other period of time such as a week, month, or year, & provides that if the period to be reckoned is mentioned as commencing from a day, week, month or year the first day, week, month or year is to be excluded from computation. But the period of moratorium prescribed in S.3 of Act III of 1956 is six months from the commencement of the Act. But the period of moratorium prescribed in S.3 of Act III of 1956 is six months from the commencement of the Act. It is not to be reckoned from a day, but from an event, namely the commencement of the Act, indicating thereby that the period of moratorium synchronises with the first six months of the Act being in force, To such a provision, S.8 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act provides no guidance. 4. If the construction put upon by the defendant be accepted to exclude the first day of the period from reckoning because of the usage of the word 'from', the 11th day of September 1956 will not be a day of moratorium and all creditors would have been free to institute suits against their agriculturist-debtors that day. Obviously, that construction would therefore lead to an absurdity. S.3 is plain that the moratorium starts from the very commencement of the Act and therefore the six months' period referred to therein must be co-extensive with the first six months of the Act remaining in force. It then follows that the period of moratorium starts from the first moment of the 11th day of September 1956 and that therefore it expired on the 10th day of March 1957. The interpretation put on the provision by the courts below is therefore incorrect. Apart from the provision in S.3 of Act III of 1956, no reason is given by the courts below to deviate from the rule in S.35 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Second Appeal succeeds. 5. In the result, this appeal is allowed with costs here and in the courts below. Allowed.