Judgment :- 1. The judgment-debtor in O.S. No. 26 of 1953 filed C.M.P. No. 3465 of 1960 for setting aside the Court sale under 0.21 R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of irregularity and fraud in the publication and conduct of the sale and resultant substantial injury by reason of such irregularity and fraud. The lower court dismissed the application and hence this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal by the judgment-debtor. 2. For setting aside the court sale either fraud or material irregularity or both either in the publication or conduct or both of the sale and substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud have both to be established. In this case the property having an extent of 90 cents situated about three furlongs east to the Mahatma Gandhi College in Trivandrum was sold for Rs. 5,505-91 nP. on 30th July 1960. In the proceeding for setting aside the court sale a Commissioner was appointed, who has been examined as Dw. 2. He has filed Exts. D1 to D3, being sale deeds of neighbouring properties, and on the basis of the prices paid under those documents, he has fixed the price of the property in dispute at Rs. 170/- per cent, whereas the price fetched at the court sale was only Rs. 61/- per cent. In the sale proclamation the value of the property stated under 0.21 R.66 (2) (e) was Rs. 2000/- as stated by the decree-holder and Rs. 30,000/-as stated by the judgment-debtor. The property, as I have already indicated, was sold for Rs. 5,505/-. 3. Basing on these facts Mr. T.N. Subramonia Iyer, the learned advocate of the appellant, contends that substantial injury has resulted as a consequence of the gross under-valuation of the property in the sale proclamation. It may be mentioned that no other irregularity or fraud has been substantiated. It is settled law that, if as a result of gross under valuation the property proclaimed was sold at a grossly inadequate price, the substantial injury resulting from such low price is the result of the material irregularity of fixing the upset price at a grossly low figure (vide Ismail Sheriff Sahib v. Sankara Panicker,1960 KLJ. 833 and Sri Raja Bommadevara Naganna Naidu Bahadur Zamindar Gara v. Sri Raja Bommadevara Venkatrayulu Naidu Bahadur Zamindar Gara, AIR. 1945 P.C.178). 833 and Sri Raja Bommadevara Naganna Naidu Bahadur Zamindar Gara v. Sri Raja Bommadevara Venkatrayulu Naidu Bahadur Zamindar Gara, AIR. 1945 P.C.178). In the Privy Council decision referred to above Sir Madhavan Nair observed that in order to set aside a sale under 0.21 R.90 it should be proved (1) that there was material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale and (2) that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. His Lordship further held that mere irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale would not entitle the court to set it aside, unless upon the facts proved the court was satisfied that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. Sir Madhavan Nair observed further that the burden of proof of substantial injury might be discharged not only by direct evidence connecting the material irregularity or fraud with the substantial injury, but also by circumstantial evidence, that is evidence from which a reasonable inference might be drawn that the substantial injury was the result of the material irregularity or fraud. Therefore, if the upset price is grossly low in comparison with the value of the property, it can be safely presumed that the low price fetched at the sale is as a consequence of the grossly low upset price. 4. But in this case the contention on the side of the respondent is that there was no material irregularity, because R.66 (2) was strictly complied with. R.66 (2) (e) is to the effect that the proclamation shall state the value of the property as stated (i) by the decree-holder and (ii) by the judgment-debtor, and clause (f) of the same sub-rule lays down that the proclamation should also contain every other thing which the court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property. In this case both the values given by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor were given in the proclamation; so that sub-clause (e) of R.66 (2) was strictly complied with. But the contention of Mr. In this case both the values given by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor were given in the proclamation; so that sub-clause (e) of R.66 (2) was strictly complied with. But the contention of Mr. Subramorua Iyer is that when there is such a striking disparity between the values given by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, the court should, under sub-clause (f), make some independent enquiry and fix an upset price, so that an intending purchaser might be able to judge of the nature and value of the property and if the court fails to do that, it is material irregularity in the publication of the sale, which is a sufficient ground for setting aside the sale, if substantial injury has also resulted by reason of this material irregularity. In support of this contention he has drawn my attention to a decision of Mack, J. in Arunachalathammal v. T. Karagasabapathi Pillai, (AIR. 1955 Mad. 720). The learned judge observed in that decision that in cases where there was so wide a divergence between the decree-holder's valuation and the judgment-debtor's valuation, it would be desirable for the Court to have the property valued by an Amin and to have such valuation inserted in the proclamation. Ramaswami Gounder, J., of the same High Court observed in another case in Kuppammal v. Devendra Iyer, (1957 KLT. 783) that there was nothing in O.21 R.66 (2) (e) which compelled the executing court to make any enquiry as regards the valuation of the properties to be sold and give such value in the proclamation of sale and when the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor differed as regards the valuation of the property to be sold, the court had only to mention both the figures in the sale proclamation without fixing any upset price. In yet another case of the Madras High Court in R. Srinivasan v. The Andhra Bank Ltd. (AIR. 1949 Mad. 398) Govinda Menon, J. observed that by the enactment of the new clause (e) it should be deemed that the residuary clause (f) was intended to cover matters other than the market value and clause (f) could not be reasonably construed as including within its ambit any statement about the Court's view regarding the market value.. The learned judge further observed that that did not, however, prevent the court, if it thought necessary, from including the market value also as decided by it. 5. The learned judge further observed that that did not, however, prevent the court, if it thought necessary, from including the market value also as decided by it. 5. One mode of looking at the question is that when a few particulars are mentioned specifically in clauses (a) to (e) of O.21 R.66 (2) and when clause (f) is enacted only as a residuary provision to include every other thing which the court considers material, the legislature has intended to include in the residuary clause only particulars other than those contained in clauses (a) to (e). But at the same time the residuary clause is intended to confer a discretion in the court to include every other thing, which is not already included, so as to enable the purchaser to judge of the nature and value of the property. Therefore, it is but reasonable to construe this provision as to mean that the court's discretion is not confined to particulars other than those contained in clauses (a) to (e). The discretion may relate to everything, which is not already included in the proclamation including the market value, to give the intending purchasers an idea regarding the nature and value of the property. I am therefore of the opinion that if there is great disparity between the values given by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, the court would do well to make some independent enquiry and itself fix a valuation so as to enable the intending purchasers to judge of the nature and value of the property. In my opinion the court would do well to pay a little more attention at this stage of the proceedings. Mr. Subramorua Iyer invites my attention to a similar observation by Derbyshire C.J. in Kangal Chandra Mondal v. Sir Bejoy Chand Mahatab (42 C.W.N. 661 at 663). 6. At any rate, I am glad to find that the learned advocates on both sides quite fairly consent to have an agreed order passed in this case. On the basis of their agreement, I direct the judgment-debtor-appellant to deposit on or before 15th July 1962 the sale amount with 4 per cent interest per annum from the date of sale to the date of deposit. If any amounts had already been paid by the judgment-debtor, such amounts should also be given credit to. On the basis of their agreement, I direct the judgment-debtor-appellant to deposit on or before 15th July 1962 the sale amount with 4 per cent interest per annum from the date of sale to the date of deposit. If any amounts had already been paid by the judgment-debtor, such amounts should also be given credit to. On such deposit the sale will be set aside and if the deposit is not made on or before 15th July 1962, the sale will stand. The appellant will also deposit the value of the stamp papers purchased by the respondent and used for the sale sannad along with the sale amount. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in both the courts.