JUDGMENT A. P. Srivastava, J. - Three questions have been referred to us in this case for answers. 2. The appellants were landlords and one Chiranji Lal was the tenant of the shops in dispute. The appellants obtained permission under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) from the District Magistrate to file a suit for ejectment against Chiranji Lal. The permission was obtained on the ground that the shops were in a dilapidated condition and needed to be reconstructed. After the permission was granted a suit was actually filed but failed because the notice of ejectment issued under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was held to be defective. During the Pendency of the suit Chiranji Lal died and his son and widow were brought upon the record as heirs. These heirs of Chiranji Lal continued in occupation of the shop even after the suit had failed on the ground of defective notice and rent was realised from them by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then without obtaining a fresh permission under Sec. 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act filed another suit for the ejectment of the son and widow of Chiranji Lal from the shops. Before filing the suit another notice terminating the tenancy was served upon them as required by the Transfer of Property Act. 3. This suit was contested by the heirs of Chiranji Lal and one of the main grounds raised was that the suit was not maintainable because a fresh permission had not been obtained under Sec. 3 of the Act. It was contended that the permission which had been obtained earlier had been granted against Chiranji Lal personally and could not be availed of for maintaining a suit against his heirs, particularly when the hairs themselves had been recognised as tenants by the plaintiffs and rent had been realised from them. 4. The trial court accepted this contention and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs went up in appeal to the Civil Judge who agreed with the trial court on this point and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs then came to this Court in second appeal and urged that the view taken by the lower appellate court about the necessity of a second permission was erroneous. As Mr. The plaintiffs went up in appeal to the Civil Judge who agreed with the trial court on this point and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs then came to this Court in second appeal and urged that the view taken by the lower appellate court about the necessity of a second permission was erroneous. As Mr. Justice Gupta before whom this second appeal came up for disposal was of opinion that the questions raised were not free from difficulty and were of general importance he referred them to a Division Bench for consideration and that is how the case has come before us. The three questions referred to us are :- 1. Whether a suit can be filed for eviction of the tenants who are heirs of the original tenant, after the death of the original tenant, on the basis of a permission obtained against the original tenant during the lifetime of the original tenant? 2. Whether the ground on which the permission had been granted is relevant for the purpose of answering the first question? In case the answer to the second question is in the affirmative: 3. Whether the permission against the original tenant having been granted on the ground that the property forming the subject matter of the tenancy was fit to be reconstructed, a suit for ejectment of the heirs is maintainable on the basis of such a permission? 5. Out of the three questions referred the first is the most important and therefore it may be taken up first. For a proper answer to this question it is necessary to bear in mind the purpose of the Act, and particularly of Sec. 3 of it. As the preamble of the Act shows it was enacted due to shortage of accommodation in the State, and because it is considered expedient to provide in the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. Under the general law a landlord has a right to determine the tenancy of his tenant whenever he likes, subject of course to the terms of the lease and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Under the general law a landlord has a right to determine the tenancy of his tenant whenever he likes, subject of course to the terms of the lease and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. If the tenancy is validly terminated the landlord has also a right under the general law to sue the tenant for ejectment and to resume possession if the suit succeeds. As, however, it was necessary to control the letting and to prevent eviction of tenants because there was shortage of accommodation the legislature put certain restrictions on this general right of the landlord. One of the restrictions so imposed was that the general right to sue the tenant for ejectment could be exercised only in the limited contingencies mentioned in the various clauses of Sec. 3. The legislature however, realised that the necessity for filing a suit for ejectment may arise is cases not covered by the various clauses of the section also. For that contingency it provided that if the case was not covered by any of the clauses the suit for ejectment could be filed with the permission of the District Magistrate or an officer exercising powers of the District Magistrate under the Act. If, therefore, any of the various contingencies mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) of Section 3 existed or if the landlord succeeded in obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate the bar to his exercising the right of filing a suit for ejectment ceased to operate and the suit could be filed by him. The legislature did not provide in what cases the District Magistrate could grant the permission. The matter was left entirely to his discretion. But if he was persuaded to grant the permission the bar to the filing of the suit having been remove a suit for ejectment could be maintained. The purpose of obtaining the permission and its grant, therefore, was only to remove the restriction which the Act had placed on the right of the landlord to exercise his right to ejected the tenant after terminating his tenancy. The object of granting the permission is to enable the landlord a get back possession of the accommodation after forcing the tenant to leave it. The object of granting the permission is to enable the landlord a get back possession of the accommodation after forcing the tenant to leave it. As the section relates to a restriction placed on a general right it has to be interpreted strictly and as far as possible no technicalities should be allowed to defeat the purpose for which the provision is enacted. 6-7. When a landlord seeks the permission of the District Magistrate to file in the civil court a suit for the eviction of his tenant his obvious object is to take effective steps for evicting the tenant so that he may get back possession of the accommodation. Normally, therefore, if permission is once obtained it should ensure till the object for which the permission had been obtained is achieved. That is why in the case of Pahlad Das v. Ganga Saran, A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad 774 = 1957 A.L.J. 804 a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member observed :- "The obvious purpose of the permission was to enable the plaintiff to evict the defendant from the premises. As long as that purpose was not fulfilled the permission could not obviously exhaust itself. It is not shown that the permission was granted to file a single suit or that it had been specified in it that a second suit could not be filed on its basis. The permission could not in the circumstances exhaust itself simply because the first suit filed on its basis was dismissed on some technical ground. The learned Single Judge was in our opinion quite justified in his view that the permission obtained could be availed of for filing the second suit for ejectment." In that case after permission had been obtained a suit for ejectment was filed, but it failed because of a defect in the notice of ejectment and a fresh suit had therefore to be filed. It was held that it could be filed without obtaining a fresh permission, to be filed. It was held that it could be filed without obtaining a fresh permission. 8. There are other cases also which show that the permission obtained under Sec. 3 is not to be interpreted in a narrow technical sense. Thus in Moti Lal v. Basant Lal, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 175 there were two brothers who were joint landlords of an accommodation. It was held that it could be filed without obtaining a fresh permission. 8. There are other cases also which show that the permission obtained under Sec. 3 is not to be interpreted in a narrow technical sense. Thus in Moti Lal v. Basant Lal, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 175 there were two brothers who were joint landlords of an accommodation. Permission to sue the tenant for ejectment was obtained by one of the brothers in his own name only. When he filed the suit it was contested inter alia on the ground that permission having been granted to only one of the landlords the suit was not maintainable. The contention was, however, rejected and it was said :- "The only hurdle in the way of the owners of the shop in bringing the suit was the permission of the District Magistrate. Once that permission was obtained, the hurdle was removed and both could bring the suit. It does not matter if the permission was obtained by both or either of them. Once a permission was granted by the District Magistrate it took away the bar imposed by Sec. 3 and it did not matter whether the District Magistrate granted permission to one or the two joint owners. Permission to sue having been obtained under Sec. 3 it will automatically ensure not only to the benefit of the person who obtained it but also to the benefit of "others who were interested in filing the suit." 9. This view was approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Janardan Swarup v. Devi Prasad, A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 33 = 1958 A.L.J. 573. In that case there were several joint landlords and the accommodation was in the occupation of several persons as joint tenants. Permission had been granted under Sec. 3 of the Act in favour of only one of the landlords and only against one of the several tenants. The suit for ejectment filed on the basis of the permission was resisted on the ground that the permission was not sufficient to enable all the landlords to maintain a suit against all the tenants. The suit for ejectment filed on the basis of the permission was resisted on the ground that the permission was not sufficient to enable all the landlords to maintain a suit against all the tenants. Dealing with this objection Roy J. who was speaking for the Division Bench observed :- "In regard to the permission aforesaid it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the lower appellate Court's view that this permission was defective because it was in favour of only one of the landlords namely, Lala Janardan Swarup and against only one of the tenants, namely, Lala Debi Prasad was not based upon a correct appreciation of matter. In Moti Lal v. Basant Lal, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 175 a learned Judge of this Court held that where permission to sue for ejectment has been obtained under Sec. 3, it will automatically ensure not only to the benefit of the person who obtained it but also to the benefit of the others who were interested in filing the suit. It was further held that where it is manifest that all the plaintiffs landlords who were interested in the matter brought the suit after serving a notice on the tenants to vacate the premises in suit it will be deemed that the plaintiff who obtained the permission acted as agent on behalf of the other plaintiffs. We are in accord with that view. We are further of opinion that where an order of the nature covered by the present suit has been obtained by one of the plaintiffs who will be deemed to have acted as agent on behalf of the other plaintiffs for the ejectment of "the tenant" and the order specifies only one such person as tenant the order will be deemed to cover the entire body of tenants and not simply one out of them whose name was specified, not by the District Magistrate but by the Rent Control Officer." 10. While considering the validity or otherwise of a permission granted under Sec. 3. therefore, no technical importance is to be attached to the fact that it was given in favour of a particular person by naive or it was granted to file a suit against a particular person named in the order granting the permission. While considering the validity or otherwise of a permission granted under Sec. 3. therefore, no technical importance is to be attached to the fact that it was given in favour of a particular person by naive or it was granted to file a suit against a particular person named in the order granting the permission. Normally if a permission is granted keeping in view the purpose for which it is given it will enable all the landlords to eject all the tenants by an effective suit for ejectment and will hold good till that' object is achieved. 11. In the present case the permission was obtained against Chiranji Lal. A suit was else filed against him. It was during the pendency of that suit that Chiranji Lal died and his heirs including his son and widow were brought on record in place. They continued to press the defence which Chiranji Lal had himself raised about the defect in the notice of ejectment. That plea was sustained and the suit was dismissed. The result was that these heirs continued to be tenants. The tenancy is, unless there is a contract to the contrary, heritable under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. On the death of Chiranji Lal the tenancy had passed on to his heirs and they continued to be tenants. If they were the tenants, before the tenancy was legally determined the landlord was entitled to realise rent from them. The second suit for ejectment which was filed after effectively determining the tenancy was in a way in continuation of the former suit and permission having been obtained once the second suit could not be defeated only on the ground that a fresh permission had not been obtained. If this is to be permitted some suits for ejectment can never succeed and the permission granted for filing the suit will practically be illusory. For instance if after obtaining permission under Sec. 3 the suit is filed and either the plaintiff or the defendant dies the suit will become ineffective and a fresh permission will have to be obtained in order to file a second suit. Some one of the parties may die during the pendency of the second suit or during the pendency of the appeal filed in connection with that suit. Some one of the parties may die during the pendency of the second suit or during the pendency of the appeal filed in connection with that suit. That permission will in that case again become ineffective and a fresh permission will have to he obtained. That could never have been the intention of the legislature. 12. We are therefore of opinion that unless there a e exceptional circumstances to indicate otherwise if a permission is granted by the District Magistrate to a landlord or one of several landlords it should be treated as effective till the tenant of the accommodation is actually ejected. The permission does not come to an end because a suit for ejectment fails on any technical ground. The permission obtained in the present case against Chiranji Lal was therefore effective against his heirs also and on the basis of that permission the first suit having failed on a technical ground the second suit was maintainable. 13. Our attention has been drawn to the decision in Sajjan Singh v. Smt. Jamuna Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 410 In that case Smt. Jamuna Bala Devi was the owner of an accommodation which was in the occupation of Sajjan Singh as tenant. The lady obtained permission of the Rent Control Officer under Sec. 3 of the Act to file a suit for ejectment of Sajjan Singh. The permission was granted on the ground that the lady needed the house for her own use. After obtaining the permission before she could file a suit the lady partitioned her properties between her four sons and the accommodation in question fell to the lot of her son Sirohat Kumar Ganguli. He then filed a suit for the ejectment of the tenant taking advantage of the permission obtained by his mother. Two defences were raised. One was that the permission having been granted to Smt. Jamuna Bala Devi her son could not file a suit on that basis. The other was that permission having been granted on the ground of personal need of Smt. Jamuna Bala Devi that ground could net be availed of by the son and it was therefore necessary for him to obtain a fresh permission. Both the grounds were rejected by the courts below but were accepted in second appeal by a learned single Judge. Both the grounds were rejected by the courts below but were accepted in second appeal by a learned single Judge. The main considerations which appear to have weighed with the learned Judge were that (1) in view of the scheme of Sec. 3 the permission granted to the landlord under the section confers on him a personal right which is not transferable to his successor-in-interest and (2) an interpretation making the benefits of the permission granted in favour of a particular landlord on the basis of his personal needs available to his successor-in-interest would encourage evasion of the solitary safeguard of Sec. 3 and defeat its object. 14. With the utmost respect we are unable to find anything in Sec. 3 to justify the conclusion that the permission granted under that section confers a personal right on any person. The person who applies for such permission does so in his capacity as a landlord and not in any other capacity. The permission is granted to him in the same capacity as landlord in order to enable him to obtain possession of the accommodation by the eviction of the tenant occupying it. There is therefore no question of conferring any personal right on any one. If permission is obtained by a landlord as a landlord there appears no reason why it should come to an end on his death and it should not ensure for the benefit of the person who succeeds him as a landlord. Similarly if a permission is granted to enable the landlord to evict the tenant from the accommodation it should not come to an end with the death of the tenant but should be effective for filing and maintaining a suit against whoever succeeds to the tenancy rights on the death of the former tenant till the accommodation is really vacated. 15. Sec. 3 does not require the District Magistrate to give any reasons while granting the permission. The order passed by him is a purely administrative order. The ground which appeals to the District Magistrate and leads him to the grant of the permission may or may not be mentioned in the order. In case those grounds are not mentioned they will not be known to any one and particularly to the Court dealing with the ejectment suit filed on the basis of the permission. The ground which appeals to the District Magistrate and leads him to the grant of the permission may or may not be mentioned in the order. In case those grounds are not mentioned they will not be known to any one and particularly to the Court dealing with the ejectment suit filed on the basis of the permission. No one can compel the District Magistrate to state the grounds, nor is there any provision in the Act empowering the District Magistrate to interfere, if the permission is obtained on one ground but is sought to be utilised on another ground. A permission cannot also be granted conditionally or in respect of a part of the accommodation nor is it open to the District Magistrate to withdraw the permission once he has granted for the reason that the ground on which it was granted no longer exists. The ground on which the permission is granted thus becomes quite immaterial. The District Magistrate can either refuse to grant the per mission sought or grant it. Whatever may weigh with him for exercising the discretion one way or the other becomes irrelevant after that discretion has been exercised. Once the permission is granted the suit for eviction of the tenant can be maintained by the landlord. If on the other hand, it is refused the bar continues and he will not be able to file the suit for ejectment of the tenant though he has legally terminated the tenancy. No question of misusing the permission can, therefore, arise. In any case we find no provision in the Act under which the landlord can be penalised in any way for not sticking to the particular ground on which the permission to eject his tenant was obtained by him. For instance if the landlord persuades the District Magistrate to grant him permission on the ground that the building needs reconstruction, after he succeeds on the basis of the permission to eject the tenant we do not think any action can be taken against him if he does not reconstruct the accommodation and only makes the necessary repairs in it. There is no provision under which in such a case the decree for ejectment can he nullified. There is no provision under which in such a case the decree for ejectment can he nullified. Similarly if the permission is obtained on the basis of the personal need of the landlord and that personal need ceases to exist after the tenant is ejected can the District Magistrate insist that the landlord must occupy the accommodation himself and refuse to allot it even if the landlord wishes to let it out? 16. Thus both the considerations which weighed so much with the learned Single Judge in the case of Sajjan Singh v. Smt. fantasia Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 33 = 1958 A.L.J. 573 do not really justify the view he has taken. With all due respect, therefore, we are unable to share that view. Our answer to the first question therefore is in the affirmative. A suit can in our opinion he filed for the eviction of a tenant who is an heir of the original tenant, after-the death of the original tenant on the basis of a permission obtained against the original tenant during the lifetime of the original tenant. 17. In view of what we have stated above the answer to the second question must be in the negative. The third question does not therefore arise. 18. Let the record of the case be sent back to the learned Judge who made the reference with the above answers.