JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. This appellant is admittedly the daughter of one Ittiri by his wife Kunji. She was born in the year 1062 and her father Ittiri died in 1068 and two years later his wife Kunji also died. Ittiri had a brother Ittaman. His wife was Kurumba and Kurumba had four sons and two daughters. The 1st and 2nd defendants are two of the sons. Defendants 3 and 4 are the children of another deceased son of Ittaman, Ayyappakkutty. Defendants 5 and 6 are the children of the 2nd defendant and the fourth son of Kurumba who was also called Ittiri. He was dead at the time of the suit. The 7th defendant is the daughter of Ittaman, the other daughter having died before suit. 2. The appellant claimed that some of the plaint properties were acquired jointly in the names of Ittiri and Ittaman during the life-time of the former and from the income from those properties, the other plaint items were acquired. According to her, she was the only daughter of Ittiri and since Ittiri had no sons, she was entitled to a half share in the plaint properties. This claim was opposed by defendants 1 to 6, who filed a joint written statement. It is their contention that Kurumba was the common wife of Ittiri and Ittaman, that Kurumba was married by Ittiri and Ittaman and that after four children were born to them, Ittiri married Kunji. It was, therefore, contended that the sons of Kurumba must be treated as the children of Ittiri also and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any share, the sons having excluded the daughter. They further contended that in any view of the matter, the properties were being enjoyed by them and their predecessors in interest after the death of Ittiri in 1068, as if they alone were entitled to those properties, and that to the knowledge of the plaintiff and that they had been exclusively taking the usufructs therefrom and had also been treating the properties as their family properties and dealing with them as such with the result that there had been ouster and that the plaintiff's claim, if any, was barred by limitation and adverse possession. 3. 3. The court below found that Kurumba was the common wife of Ittiri and Ittaman and also that there had been ouster of the plaintiff and consequently dismissed the suit. 4. The first point to be considered in this appeal is whether Kurumba was the common wife of Ittiri and Ittaman. There is no documentary evidence produced in the case to indicate that Kurumba was the common wife of the two. On the other hand, whatever documentary evidence there is, shows that the children of Kurumba have never been described in any document as those of Ittiri. Ext. D1 is the partition deed dated 18-1-1958. In that document, the 3rd and 4th defendants have been described as the children of Ayyappakkutty and the 1st defendant who had a common wife, Malu. Similarly defendants 5 and 6 have all been described as the children of two fathers. At the time of the partition deed Ayyappakkutty was not alive. He died in 1122. This shows that it is not uncommon to describe an individual as the child of two fathers and that even when one of them is dead. Such is the description adopted in two partition deeds, Exts. D56 and P7, in two other families of the same community. However, in a number of documents, Ayyappakkutty is described only as the son of Ittaman. These documents range over a long period dating from 1095 onwards. Some of those documents are Exts. D3, D5, D6, D12, D14, D16, D21, D24 and D25. A lawyer's notice was issued on behalf of the plaintiff, which is Ext. P. 10 in the case, wherein, it was alleged that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share in the properties. The reply to the above notice also sent by a lawyer is Ext. P. 1. There is no specific statement in Ext. P. 1 that the plaintiff was not entitled to a share because her father had a common wife with his brother and that there were sons to that wife. This case is first set up in the written statement; but the case set up in the written statement had also to be given up to some extent at the time of evidence. In the written statement, it was alleged that Ittiri married Kunji after four children were born to Kurumba. It was said that the 2nd defendant was also one of such children. In the written statement, it was alleged that Ittiri married Kunji after four children were born to Kurumba. It was said that the 2nd defendant was also one of such children. But when the 1st defendant was examined as D. W. 1, he admitted that what was stated in the written statement was not correct and that the 2nd defendant was born only after the death of Ittiri. The witnesses examined on the side of the defence have also given inconsistent versions regarding the number of children that Kurumba had by her husbands Ittiri and Ittaman. Plaintiff has adduced evidence as P. W. 1 and her witnesses have supported her case. P. Ws. 2, 3 and 5 are such witnesses. All of them are over 70 years old and must have known the circumstances pertaining to this family and the relationship inter se of the members of this family. Of course, this oral evidence is more or less on the basis of what they heard, though it cannot be said that they did not know the state of affairs relating to the relationship inter se of the members of this family, being neighbours. One of them is a relation of the parties. But there is more or less an equal amount of oral evidence on the side of the defence, who have supported the defence version. In view of these conflicting versions, it appears to us that exclusive reliance cannot be placed on the oral evidence in this case. Whatever documentary evidence there is, indicates that the position is as contended by the plaintiff. The court below has relied only on two aspects for negativing the claim of the plaintiff. The first is that Ayyappakkutty is older than the plaintiff and that therefore Kurumba must have been married first. This reasoning does not appeal to us. The plaintiff has given evidence that before she was born two other children were born to Ittiri and from what she has deposed it appears they were born before Ayyappakkutty was born. The second reasoning given by the learned Subordinate Judge is that it was Ayyappakkutty who performed the religious ceremonies when Ittiri and thereafter Kunji died. From this it is inferred that Ayyappakkutty should have been the son of Ittiri. We are unable to accept this reasoning either. The second reasoning given by the learned Subordinate Judge is that it was Ayyappakkutty who performed the religious ceremonies when Ittiri and thereafter Kunji died. From this it is inferred that Ayyappakkutty should have been the son of Ittiri. We are unable to accept this reasoning either. Admittedly Ittiri had no sons by his wife Kunji and therefore there is nothing unusual or strange in Ittiri's brother's son performing the ceremonies. We therefore find that the plaintiff has established the case pleaded by her that she was the sole child of Ittiri. 5. We have next to consider which all of the plaint items belonged to Ittiri and Ittaman in common. There is no evidence in the case that the properties acquired before the death of Ittiri in 1068 were sufficient to leave surplus income to provide for fresh acquisitions. The 1st defendant has given evidence that such income was not even sufficient to maintain the members of the family. The properties that were in existence at the time of the death of Ittiri in 1068 are a portion of item No. 1 bearing S. No. 1336/3, items 2 to 6, a portion of item No. 9 bearing S. No. 1557/7 and items 10 and 11. These properties were acquired by Ittiri. From the nature of the evidence in the case, it is not possible to conclude that the plaintiff has any right to any other item of the plaint properties which were all acquired by Ittaman and his descendants after the death of Ittiri. The plaintiff has claimed only a half share out of the plaint items. Plaintiff can claim such half share only from the above items and that if her claim is not barred by adverse possession and limitation. 6. We have found that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the items mentioned in paragraph 6 above. This means that she is a coowner of those properties with Ittaman and with his descendants, after his death. She will lose her right to these properties only if there was ouster. Long and exclusive enjoyment of the properties by one or some of the coowners will not amount to ouster. Ouster may, however, in a proper case, be presumed where one coowner has been in sole enjoyment of the property for a long time. She will lose her right to these properties only if there was ouster. Long and exclusive enjoyment of the properties by one or some of the coowners will not amount to ouster. Ouster may, however, in a proper case, be presumed where one coowner has been in sole enjoyment of the property for a long time. In Culley v Doed John Taylerson ( (1840) 9 L.J.Q.B. 288) it was laid down that where the claimant, tenant in-common, had not been participating in the rents and profits for a considerable length of time, and when other circumstances had concurred, the Judge would direct the jury to take into consideration whether they would presume that there had been an ouster. This decision has been approved by the Privy Council in Varada Pillai v Jeevarathnammal (A. I. R. 1919 P. C. 44). In this case, it is not possible to say that there had been no participation by the plaintiff in the profits of the property. She has deposed that she had been given small amounts on various occasions and that she used to go back to her family house for her confinements and during those times all her needs were met by Ittaman and his descendants. The plaintiff was given monetary assistance occasionally is admitted by the defence also. Their case is that such assistance was out of bounty and generosity. It is unnecessary that there should be a full sharing of the profits and in the circumstances of this case, we are unable to conclude that there had been a complete non-participation by the plaintiff of the profits of the property. Various documents have been placed before us, and these have been relied on by the court below as well, for the position that Ittaman and his descendants were dealing with the properties as if they alone were entitled to them. But apart from Exts. D7 and D8, all the other documents relied on, viz., Exts. D45 to D51, related to properties other than those mentioned in paragraph 6 above. We have already held that the plaintiff has failed to establish her title to properties other than those mentioned in paragraph 6 above. Dealings with properties over which the plaintiff had no title cannot defeat her right to the other properties which we have found belonged to her in common with the others. Ittaman executed Ext. We have already held that the plaintiff has failed to establish her title to properties other than those mentioned in paragraph 6 above. Dealings with properties over which the plaintiff had no title cannot defeat her right to the other properties which we have found belonged to her in common with the others. Ittaman executed Ext. D7 mortgage for a portion of plaint item No. 1 and other items and took back those properties on lease from the mortgagee. In the mortgage document, Ext. D7, it is mentioned that a portion of the property mortgaged was acquired by Ittiri and the other properties were acquired by Ittaman. We are not able to spell out from the statements in that document that there had been a denial of the title of the plaintiff. Much less are we able to say that the denial, if any, arising by implication, was to the knowledge of the plaintiff. No question about this document was even put to the plaintiff when she was examined. In the circumstances, we have to conclude that there had been no ouster as contended by defendants 1 to 6. 7. In the light of the conclusions reached above, we declare that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in S. No. 1386/3 of item No. 1, items 2 to 6, S. No. 1557/7 of item No. 9, and items 10 and 11 of the plaint. We pass a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for half share in these items. From the evidence in the case, it is clear that buildings have been erected in item No. 1. We make it clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to any of those buildings. In partitioning S. No. 1386/3, which is a portion of item No. 1, division must be made in such a way that the buildings in that property are not allotted to the plaintiff. If this is not possible, the plaintiff's half share in S. No. 1386/3 (the property alone without the buildings thereon) must be valued and property of equal value allotted to her from items 2 to 6 or 10 and 11 in addition to her half share in those items. We direct the parties to suffer their costs here and in the court below.