JUDGMENT This is an appeal filed against the order of the Munsiff-Magistrate of Pattambi acquitting the accused who had been prosecuted for an offence ofdefamation under section 500, Indian Penal Code. The case of the prosecution is that in the issue of the Malayalam daily ‘Deshabhimani’ dated 12th August, 1961, the accused published a false imputation against the appellant with intent to defame him and harm his reputation. Exhibit P-1 is the offending publication in the paper. The original has been proved by P.W.3 the printer and publisher of the paper and P.W. 4 a teacher in the school in which the accused is employed has proved that it is in the handwriting of the accused. The accused when questioned has admitted that it was he who had written the article and got it published. His case is that the publication does not refer to the appellant, that it was against the appellant's son who was the Adhikari during the relevant period and that every word of what is stated is true. He sought to prove this by the evidence of D.W. 1 the amsom Menon. The learned Magistrate found that the publication did not refer to the appellant and acquitted the accused. Aggrieved with the order, this appeal has been filed by obtaining Special Leave under section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code. What is stated in Exhibit P-1 is that on 4th August, 1961, some mufti Constables came to make enquiries and the Adhikari who is an important Jenmi has given the names of some teachers and officials who had filed petitions before the Land Tribunal, as being Communists or Communist sympathisers. It is admitted that the appellant even though he is the permanent Adhikari of the amsom has been on leave for 7 or 8 months prior to 4th August, 1961, on which date the Police came for enquiries, and the appellant's son was the acting Adhikari all these months. It is also conceded by P.W.1 that his son is also a Jenmi having a number of tenants and they had also filed petitions before the Land Tribunal. The description could, therefore, well fit in with the appellant's son and the accused has proved through D.W.1 that it was the appellant's son who was questioned by the Police on 4th August, 1961. The description could, therefore, well fit in with the appellant's son and the accused has proved through D.W.1 that it was the appellant's son who was questioned by the Police on 4th August, 1961. It is unnecessary to decide whether the case of the accused sought to be proved through D.W.1 is true or not. If the words complained of contain no reflection on a particular individual or individuals, but may equally apply to others belonging to the same class an action for defamation will not lie. The defamatory matter to be actionable must be such that it contains an imputation concerning some particular person or persons whose identity can be established. It is unnecessary that the person whose conduct is called in question should be described by name. It is sufficient if on the evidence it can be shown that the imputation was directed towards a particular person or persons who can be identified. In this case the imputation complained of was directed against the Adhikari and it is impossible in my opinion, upon the facts disclosed to ascertain with any degree of certitude who that Adhikari is, whether it is the appellant or whether it is his son. Authority for this position may be had in the decision in Government Advocate, Bihar and Orissa v. Gopabandhu Das1. The Head-note reads: “Where the accused published in the paper of which he was the publisher and printer an account of an outrage on a woman alleged to have been perpetrated by two Constables within the jurisdiction of the Begunia Thana, in which four Constables were stationed, held, that in the absence of proof that it was intended to charge any particular and identifiable Constables with the alleged offence, the accused could not be convicted under section 500 of the Penal Code.” In the course of the judgment the learned Chief Justice has referred to two English cases. In Sir John Bourn's case2 where a party in a cause said to three men who had just given evidence against him “one of you three is a perjurer”, it was held that no action lay. In James v. Rutlech3 it was said that if the defendant said to a master “one of thy servants hath robbed me”, in the absence of special circumstances no one could sue. for it is not apparent who is the person slandered. In James v. Rutlech3 it was said that if the defendant said to a master “one of thy servants hath robbed me”, in the absence of special circumstances no one could sue. for it is not apparent who is the person slandered. To the same effect are the decisions in Ankaraju Subbaraya v. Batuk Prasad4 and Pratap Chandra Gupta v. Emperor5. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in these cases and I hold that the appellant cannot maintain a prosecution for defamation. The order of acquittal is, therefore, confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. M.C.M.-----Appeal dismissed.