Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the balance of consideration reserved under a sale deed executed by her. The suit was decreed in terms of the plaint by the trial court, but in appeal was dismissed as barred by Art.111 of the Indian Limitation Act so far as the personal remedy was concerned. The plaintiff has therefore preferred this Second Appeal and it raises the only question whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief against the person of the defendant or not. 2. It was first contended on behalf of the defendant, that the terms of the reservation in the sale deed exclude the defendant's personal liability altogether. The recital is simply, that a sum of Rs. 750/- is reserved as a first charge on the property sold, to be paid by the defendant on a registered receipt to be executed by the plaintiff. There is in this, an undertaking by the defendant to pay, which in itself imports a personal liability. The specification of a charge on the property sold is only cumulative and does not, in the absence of express language or of necessary intendment, exclude such liability. I therefore repel this contention and hold that the terms of the reservation do not exonerate the defendant from personal liability. 3. The next question is whether Art.111 or Art.116 of the Indian Limitation Act applies for the enforcement of the personal remedy against the defendant, the suit having been instituted more than three years, but within six years of the date of the sale deed. Art.111 prescribes a period of three years for a suit by a vendor for personal payment of unpaid purchase money and Art.116 prescribes a period of six year for a suit for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered. At the first blush, it struck me, that of these two Articles, the former is the specific Article in relation to a suit to enforce personal payment of unpaid purchase money. But having regard to the course of judicial decisions I am satisfied, that the latter which is restricted to contracts in writing registered; must be held to be the specific Article. The Privy Council considered Art.116 as against Art.110 which relates to suits for arrears of rent in Tricomdas Coovrji Bhoja v. Sri Gopinath Jiu Thakaur, AIR. But having regard to the course of judicial decisions I am satisfied, that the latter which is restricted to contracts in writing registered; must be held to be the specific Article. The Privy Council considered Art.116 as against Art.110 which relates to suits for arrears of rent in Tricomdas Coovrji Bhoja v. Sri Gopinath Jiu Thakaur, AIR. 1916 P. C. 182, in which Lord Sumner speaking for the court said: "However arguable the construction of Act XV of 1877 may have been when the matter was one of first impression, it certainly cannot be said that the construction, for which the appellant argues, was even clearly right. On the contrary, their Lordships accept the interpretation so often and so long put upon the statute by the Courts in India, and think that the decisions cannot now be disturbed." The argument that the term'compensation' is used in the Indian Contract Act in a very wide sense and that the omission from Art.116 of the words which find a place in Art.115 "and not herein specially provided for" is critical, was accepted and Art.116 was held to be a special provision "especially in view of the distinction long established by these Acts" (the Indian statutes on the law of limitation as enacted from time to time, which were surveyed in the judgment) "in favour of registered instruments". By parity of reasoning this may be said of Art.116 in relation to Art.111 also. In Ram Raghubir Lal v. United Refineries (Burma) Ltd., AIR. 1933 P. C. 143, which arose out of a suit to enforce payment of purchase money which was to be paid three months after the registration of the sale deed, the Privy Council applied Art.116 having regard to the earlier decision, observing however, that it was unnecessary "to consider the applicability of Art.111 ... in a case where (as here) the purchase money was not payable until some date after the conveyance of the property". Ram Ragubir Lal's case cited above was an appeal from the decision of the Rangoon High Court in Ram Ragubir. Lal v. United Refineries (Burma) Ltd., AIR. in a case where (as here) the purchase money was not payable until some date after the conveyance of the property". Ram Ragubir Lal's case cited above was an appeal from the decision of the Rangoon High Court in Ram Ragubir. Lal v. United Refineries (Burma) Ltd., AIR. 1931 Rangoon 139, where the scope of Art.116 in relation to a suit for unpaid purchase money was stated in these terms: "It is now well settled law that Art.116 applies, not merely to a suit for compensation for breach of contract in the narrower sense of the word compensation, but also to a suit for money payable under the terms of the contract, and that it is applicable in all cases in which the contract is in writing and registered, notwithstanding that there may be an article directly applicable to the class of contract in question. For example, although Art.66 provides three years as the term of limitation for a suit on a bond, yet Art.116 is applicable if the bond is registered." Though the decision of the appeal from this case by the Privy Council cannot he regarded as laying down that Art.111 governs a suit like the present in which no time limit is set for the payment of unpaid purchase money, the principle enunciated by the Rangoon Court is in complete accord with the interpretation of Art.116 by Lord Sumner in the earlier case. In Shankarrao Madhaorao Deshmukh v. Bhulangrao Tukaram Deshmukh, AIR 1937 Nagpur 246, it was found for a fact in spite of the recital in the sale deed, that a part of the consideration remained unpaid. The deed was interpreted as meaning that the promise to pay was the consideration the receipt of which was acknowledged and on that footing Art.116 was held to apply, distinguishing the Madras case in Avuthala v. Dayumma, ILR 24 Madras 233, as one where the sale deed recited that the money had been paid and not merely that the consideration had been received. The distinction is somewhat nice, but Art.116 was held to apply as for breach of contract in writing registered. The distinction is somewhat nice, but Art.116 was held to apply as for breach of contract in writing registered. It is unnecessary to deal with the point elaborately, as the course of decisions has been surveyed and the law summarised thus by Rustomji on Indian Limitation Act, 6th Edition, page 606: "The meaning given to this Art. (116) by a great number of decisions seems, in the result, to be that all suits for money lent and upon bonds, pronotes, agreements etc., for which a limitation of three years is prescribed and all suits on other contracts which are specially provided for in the Act, would be governed by Art.116 where the contract is registered." This agrees with the observations, of the Rangoon High Court in Ram Ragubir Lal v. United Refineries (Burma) Ltd. extracted above. The learned counsel for the defendant relied on Ramparikha Pandey v. Mt. Ramihari Kuer, AIR 1937 Patna 44, as having decided against the applicability of Art.116; but that was a case in which the sale deed recited the payment of the price in full, and no contract in writing to pay could be spelled. On the weight of decided cases, I hold that Art.116 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to the enforcement of the personal remedy against the defendant. The result is, that the decree of the Subordinate Judge disallowing such remedy is hereby vacated and that of the Munsiff is restored. The Second Appeal is allowed with costs here and in the lower court. Leave to appeal asked for. Leave granted.