Judgment :- 1. This appeal, I hope, will mark the end of a fairly protracted litigation between the decree-holder, on the one hand, and the second defendant- appellant before me, on the other. Two interesting points have been raised before me "by counsel for the appellant. The points are, one, that the second decree passed in this case on 25-3-1119 should be ignored so far as the appellant is concerned and two, that the trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside the first decree under R.13 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure after it had become inexecutable due to the bar of limitation. 2. From the decree, it is seen that the same is for money charged on certain properties which belonged to the first defendant. He was obliged to pay the amount in accordance with the provisions in a partition deed that took place between him and the original plaintiff. Defendants 2 to 6 were impleaded in the suit as subsequent encumbrancers. A decree was passed on 7-2-1111 against the plaint items. This decree, applying the six years' rule, would have got barred on 6-2-1117. Thereafter, on 22-12-1117, the third defendant, who had remained exparte, applied under Order IX R.13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have the exparte decree against him set aside. This application was accepted by the court and the decree in so far as it was against the third defendant's interest in the plaint properties was vacated on 22-12-1118. The contentions of the third defendant, however, were ultimately rejected, and a second decree on practically the same terms as those of the first was passed on 25-3-1119. The only alteration made was that item No. 3, to which the third defendant laid claim, will be sold last in execution. 3. The execution application out of which these proceedings commenced was filed on 25-2-1125. This application had a chequered career and up to the present time seven orders have been passed on it. On a former occasion, the matter was argued elaborately before the High Court and the decision of the High Court is reported in Ulahannan Mariam v. Varkey Kuruvilla (1956 KLT. 375) wherein it was held that there was no bar by limitation for the executability of the decree. On a former occasion, the matter was argued elaborately before the High Court and the decision of the High Court is reported in Ulahannan Mariam v. Varkey Kuruvilla (1956 KLT. 375) wherein it was held that there was no bar by limitation for the executability of the decree. However, it was also observed that "Whether the original decree was barred on 22-12-1117 when the application for restoration was filed by the 3rd defendant and if so what is the legal effect of the second decree as regards the second defendant has not been considered by the lower courts. So here I will deal only with the question as to what is the effect of a second decree ... leaving aside the consequences of such a decree being after the first decree had become barred." Again, towards the end of the judgment it was observed: "But as pointed out in the beginning the lower courts have not considered whether the second decree was passed after the original had become barred and if so what are the legal consequences arising from that fact. Hence this point is left to be decided by the executing court according to law." And this point has been decided by the learned Munsiff in favour of the appellant and by the lower appellate court against him, 4. The first point raised by counsel for the appellant was elaborated by pointing out that there is no attempt to execute the decree dated 7-2-111, and there being no decree as against the appellant and defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6 on 25-3-1119-at any rate, if there is any decree, that having been passed without notice to them-the decree dated 25-3-1119 cannot affect their interests and that decree cannot be executed against them. I do not think that it is open to the appellant to raise this point as he is concluded in this regard by the judgment of the High Court reported in Ulahannan Marian v. Varkey Kuruvilla (1956 KLT. 375). Counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish the facts of the Privy Council case in Ashfaq Hussain v. Gauri Sahai (ILR. XXXIII Allahabad 254 P. C) relied on by the High Court when it decided the case on the former occasion. This point also should have been taken on the earlier occasion and I do not think the appellant should be allowed to raise it now. XXXIII Allahabad 254 P. C) relied on by the High Court when it decided the case on the former occasion. This point also should have been taken on the earlier occasion and I do not think the appellant should be allowed to raise it now. The ruling relied on by counsel for the appellant in Govinda Pillai v. Lukkose Muthalali (1955 KLT. 160) for the contention that the second decree dated 25-3-1119 is a nullity was cited before the High Court on the former occasion and it was held that that case had no application. The High Court relied on the Privy Council case in which the following passage occurs: "This decree, which was dated the 16th November, 1904, was the second step in granting to the plaintiff the relief to which he was entitled. It supplemented and completed the decree granted on the 25th August, 1900 and for the first time gave to the plaintiff that which would alone justify him in applying for the joint execution to which he was entitled. and came to the conclusion that the decreeholder obtained a complete decree in the case after the first was set aside only on 25-3-1119 and that he was entitled to execute the same. The only question that was left open was the enquiry regarding the legal consequences arising from the fact that the second decree was passed after the original had become barred. This leads to the second point raised before me. 5. No ruling was cited before me by counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that the court in exercising its powers under Order IX R.13 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to set aside the decree after it had become barred by limitation. It is admitted that there is no such statutory restriction. The argument, however, was, that permitting of such re-opening has the effect of reviving a decree that had become dead and amounted to a circumvention of the law of limitation as embodied in the Indian Limitation Act. If the court has no jurisdiction to avoid that law directly, it is contended, the court has no right to do so indirectly. It appears to me there is no circumvention of any law either directly or indirectly in exercising the court's powers under R.13 of Order IX. If the court has no jurisdiction to avoid that law directly, it is contended, the court has no right to do so indirectly. It appears to me there is no circumvention of any law either directly or indirectly in exercising the court's powers under R.13 of Order IX. The two enactments, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Limitation Act, have to be read together. I am unable to give overriding effect to the provisions of one or the other. The two have to co-exist and at times the exercise of power under one of the statutes may have its impact on the other. The provisions in the Indian Limitation Act themselves clearly indicate this. Column 3 of Art. 182, which is the Article governing the period of limitation for execution of decrees, itself provides, that time from which the period would begin to "run will vary according to the exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is provided that the period begins to run from the date of the decree, the date of the final decree or order of the appellate court, or where there has been a review of the judgment the date of the decision passed on the review or where the decree has been amended, from the date of the amendment. No finality has, therefore, been given for any decree with reference to the original date on which it was passed. It is wrong to proceed on the basis that a decree in a given case had become incapable of execution at any particular time. The executability of the decree in a case must necessarily depend on the exercise of powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure by way of amendment of decree, review of the same and orders passed in appeal. That being so, I see no reason why the time from which the period has to be computed cannot also get altered by a decree being set aside in exercise of powers under Order IX R.13. The Privy Council decision in Ashfaq Hussain v. Gauri Sahai (ILR. XXXIII Allahabad 264 P. C) has laid down that the first decree became incomplete when it was set aside in part and became complete and executable in its entirety only when the second decree was passed. The Privy Council decision in Ashfaq Hussain v. Gauri Sahai (ILR. XXXIII Allahabad 264 P. C) has laid down that the first decree became incomplete when it was set aside in part and became complete and executable in its entirety only when the second decree was passed. The second decree, it was, therefore, said, was the decree to be reckoned for the purpose of Art.182 of the Limitation Act. The assumption made that the decree in this case had become incapable of execution for ever at the time the application under Order IX R.13 was moved seems to me to be not warranted. Whether the decree in the case is incapable of execution or not has to be determined with reference to the outcome of the application under R.13 of Order IX. 6. It may be that in certain cases the decree holder may collude with an obliging defendant and commit a fraud on the other defendants behind their back. The courts have ample powers to give redress against such fraud. In the earlier stages of this case, there was a suggestion that the third defendant's application to vacate the decree was engineered by the decree-holder and the reopening and the passing of a fresh decree were the result of collusion and fraud. This case was not proved and does not appear to have been pressed in the latter stages of this prolonged litigation. There was no such point argued when the case came up before the High Court on the last occasion and no such case was urged before the courts below after remand by the High Court. No grounds have been taken in the appeal memorandum in this appeal or in the one before the lower appellate court on this point. I must proceed, therefore, on the basis that there has be en no fraud or collusion in this case. 7. I do not think that the exercise of power under Order IX R.13 is in any trammelled, limited or restricted by the provisions of the, Indian Limitation Act. I am unable, therefore, to accept the contention of counsel for the appellant that the order reopening the decree under Order IX R.13 is one passed without jurisdiction. I dismiss this appeal, but make no order as to costs. Dismissed.