Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal by the first defendant arises out of a suit for partition of the plaintiff's share in the suit properties. Ittichiri Amma the common ancestress held the properties on kanam from Poomulli Mana. On her death they devolved on her tavazhi which consisted at the time of her two sons, Kesava Menon and Sekharan Nair. The plaintiff and defendants 3 to 8 are the children and the second defendant the widow, of Sekharan Nair who died in November, 1938. Kesava Menon died in February, 1950, having made a disposition of his properties including the suit properties by will Ext. B1, in favour of the first defendant his niece, who belongs to another tavazhi. The suit was contested by her on the ground, that the tavazhi of Kesava Menon and Sekharan Nair was undivided, that on the latter's death, Kesava Menon as the last surviving member was competent to make the disposition and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any right. The first court dismissed the suit, while in appeal the District Judge allowed partition. 2. In the year 1929, there was a suit between Kesava Menon and Sekharan Nair with respect to some properties including those in this suit. It was compromised under a petition Ext. A-1. By Para.2 of Ext. A-1 Sekharan Nair gave up his contentions with regard to some of the properties claimed by Kesava Menon to belong to him and by Para.3, which is more pertinent, they declared and agreed, that though the paramba and house were acquired & made (the word used being DminbXv for both paramba and house) with Kesava Menon's separate funds, the house and paramba, as also 61/2 paras of paddy lands which are all in this suit, were acquired on kanom by Ittichiri Amma and belong equally to Kesava Menon and Sekharan Nair. The plaintiff's case was founded on Ext. A-1 and was that Kesava Menon and Sekharan Nair became divided in interest, each taking a moiety of the properties absolutely, Sekharan Nair's half share having devolved on his heirs including the plaintiff. No further particulars about the litigation of 1929 are available than can be gleaned from Ext. A-1. However, there was no dispute that on the death of Ittichiri Amma, the suit properties including the paramba devolved or her tavazhi. No further particulars about the litigation of 1929 are available than can be gleaned from Ext. A-1. However, there was no dispute that on the death of Ittichiri Amma, the suit properties including the paramba devolved or her tavazhi. With respect to the building Kesava Menon seems to have advanced a special right, but to have given it up conceding Sekharan Nair's right thereto along with the paramba and 61/2 paras of paddy lands. The question to determine is whether the words, that both of them are equally entitled to such properties are sufficient to import division and bring about, a divided status. Antecedent jointness being undisputed, a mere declaration or an assertion of equal right in one member along with the other will not necessarily spell a division in interest. It is consistent with joint family status that the members thereof should possess equal rights over joint family properties. 3. The District Judge differing from the Munsiff seemed to think, that the word kaambn in Para.3 of Ext. A-1 meant, that each was given a half share and that this was sufficient to bring about a divided status. I do not think that the above word can necessarily lend itself to this construction. More than this, to bring about division by defining shares, an intention to divide must be manifest. "No act done by any member can operate as a partition unless it has been done with the intention to put an end to his joint status and acquire a new status, that is the status of a separate owner." (Mulla's Hindu Law, 1952 edition page 427 para 326). Even construing Ext. A-1 as the District Judge has done, that it has the effect of defining the share of each member of the tavazhi, as held by the Privy Council in Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala, AIR. 1925 PC. 49: "The mere fact that the shares of the coparceners have been ascertained does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference that the family had separated. There may be reasons other than a contemplated immediate separation for ascertaining what the shares of the coparceners on a separation would be." It has thus to be made out that the defining of the shares was with an intention to divide. This certainly cannot be inferred from the statement in Para.3 of Ext. Al. 4. There may be reasons other than a contemplated immediate separation for ascertaining what the shares of the coparceners on a separation would be." It has thus to be made out that the defining of the shares was with an intention to divide. This certainly cannot be inferred from the statement in Para.3 of Ext. Al. 4. Nangeli Amma v. Krishnan Nambeesan and others 1958 KLT. 516 relied on is distinguishable. In that case there was a disposition of property by will, by which the legatees were to enjoy the property equally kamhImiambn this word was construed to confer equal and separate rights. That was a case of a grant of property and there was no question as in the present, of a preexisting joint right, and moreover the disposition related no future enjoyment. In Para.3 of Ext. A-1, nothing was said about enjoyment of the properties. For the above reasons, I agree with the Munsiff in holding, that by Ext. A-1 no division in status between Sekharan Nair and Kesava Menon could be inferred. 5. No distinction is also possible with respect to the house and paramba which were conceded to belong to Kesava Menon though the word employed in Ext. A-1 and adverted to above is not apt in relation to the paramba. Whatever be the concession made, Kesava Menon had agreed to treat them as similar to the paddy lands, that is, in other words to throw them into the hotch pot. The word kaambn equally, must bear the same meaning with respect to the house, and paramba, as with respect to the paddy lands. In fact, for all that is known, the paramba was acquired on kanom by Ittichiri Amma. The contention that a half share in the house and paramba belonged to Sekharan Nair cannot be sustained. 6. It may be mentioned at this stage, that pursuant to the direction in the will, the first defendant paid Rs. 600/- to the second defendant and this was accepted by her. This amounted to acceptance by her of the will, but the plaintiff and others did not agree to this and refused to be bound by the will. 7. The result is, that the decree of the District Judge allowing partition is set aside and the decree of the first court is restored. This amounted to acceptance by her of the will, but the plaintiff and others did not agree to this and refused to be bound by the will. 7. The result is, that the decree of the District Judge allowing partition is set aside and the decree of the first court is restored. The first defendant will have her costs from the plaintiff in this court as well as in the lower appellate court. Allowed.