ORDER :- This revision petition is directed against the order of Subordinate Judge (II), allowing certain amendments to the plaint in T. S. No. 34 of 1959. 2. I find from the records that the petition for amendment has not even been numbered in the lower Court and that the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge merely mentions "amendment matter". This is wrong. An interlocutory application filed in a suit has got to be numbered as soon as it is taken on file. 3. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit against the petitioners as defendants stating that they were his tenants from 15-5-1958 of a plot of land and the shop building thereon, that the defendants did not pay the rent and put up certain constructions of permanent character without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, that thereby they forfeited the lease-hold right and that on various occasions, the plaintiff asked the defendants to vacate the suit shop, but they refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed for the eviction of the defendants and he also prayed for a sum of Rs. 900/- by way of damages for use and occupation of the land and shop. 4. The defendants filed a written statement contending, inter alia, that there was no valid notice to quit and as such the plaintiff had no cause of action to pray for their ejectment. With regard to the prayer for damages for use and occupation, the defendants claimed a set-off for certain amounts spent by them, with the details of which we are not concerned for the present. The plaintiff filed a reply statement regarding the plea of set-off. Issues were framed in the suit, one of the issues being whether the suit was not maintainable for want of a notice to quit. 5. The suit thereafter underwent many adjournments. About 9 months after the framing of issues, the plaintiff applied for the amendment of the plaint. We are not concerned with all the details of the amendment application, but only with those portions of it which were allowed by the lower Court. 5. The suit thereafter underwent many adjournments. About 9 months after the framing of issues, the plaintiff applied for the amendment of the plaint. We are not concerned with all the details of the amendment application, but only with those portions of it which were allowed by the lower Court. They related to a new averment which the plaintiff sought to make stating that he had terminated whatever interest the defendants were allowed to have in the properties in suit by a notice dated 29-8-1958 and that the cause of action arose on 15-9-1958, the grace time allowed to the defendants for surrendering possession. Another amendment was in the relief portion in which the plaintiff prayed for further mesne profits accuring pendente lite and up to the recovery of possession. The said amendments were allowed by the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge stated in his order with regard to the notice that it could be reasonably believed that the omission in the original plaint was due to inadvertence and hence the amendment was permissible. With regard to the claim for further mesne profits he stated that it was only an incidental prayer and so could be allowed. 6. It was argued in revision that the amendments should not have been allowed. It was pointed out that before a suit for eviction was filed by a landlord against the tenant a notice to quit had to be given and the cause of action for the suit would arise if the tenant failed to vacate on the termination of the date fixed for vacating the land and that no such cause of action was shown in the original plaint and so the plaint ought to have been rejected under O. 7 R. 11 C. P. C. on the ground that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. My attention was drawn to the words "shall be rejected" in O. 7 R. 11 C. P. C. and it was argued that it was a mandatory provision. My attention was drawn to the words "shall be rejected" in O. 7 R. 11 C. P. C. and it was argued that it was a mandatory provision. It was also pointed out that O. 6 R. 17 relating to the amendment of pleadings used the words "may allow" thereby making it a discretion of Court and it was urged that where there was a mandatory provision and a discretionary provision in the Code, the mandatory provision would override the discretionary provision and so an amendment of a plaint which had to be rejected cannot be allowed by the Court in order to give an opportunity to the party to avoid the rejection of the plaint. Thus, in the present case, the plaint ought to have been rejected by the Court under O. 7 R. 11 C. P. C. for want of disclosure of cause of action and the Court should not therefore have allowed an amendment subsequently after the defendants had filed their written statement pointing out the want of cause of action. My attention was also drawn to two decisions Sailesh Nath Bisi v. J. Chaudhuri, 50 Cal WN 540 and Gaganmal Ramchand v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, AIR 1950 Bom 345 . The first decision supported the contention of the petitioners, while the second decision was against them. In fact, the second decision has considered the first decision and expressly dissented from it. 7. I find myself unable to agree with the petitioners arguments. The plaint in the present case was not rejected by the Court under O. 7 R. 11 C. P. C. In fact, the Court could not reject the whole plaint for want of cause of action, as there was a prayer in the plaint for damages for use and occupation which, in any case, did not require a notice to quit. There is no provision in the C. P. C. for partial rejection of the plaint under O. 7 R. 11 C. P. C., though O. 6 Rule 16 gives a Court the power to strike out pleadings which may be unnecessary or scandalous or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit. But Order 6 Rule 16 will not apply to the present plaint. Thus, this plaint cannot have been rejected under Order 7 Rule 11. But Order 6 Rule 16 will not apply to the present plaint. Thus, this plaint cannot have been rejected under Order 7 Rule 11. Further, a reading of the plaint paragraph 4, shows that the plaintiff had on various occasions asked the defendants to vacate the suit shop and the defendants had refused to do so. Evidently, the lower Court thought that this was sufficient averment of the notice to quit as required to be alleged under O. 6 R. 11 C. P. C. When defendants pointed out in their written statements that no notice to quit had been given, the Court framed an issue in the case whether the suit was not maintainable for want of notice to quit. Thus, it was a question, which had to be decided in the course of the trial of the suit. It was at that stage that the plaintiff came forward with the application for amendment alleging the written notice to quit. The Court was satisfied that it was due to inadvertence that no specific allegation was made in the plaint about the written notice to quit. 8. If we read O. 6 R. 17 C. P. C., we find that a Court has been given ample powers for amendment of the pleadings in such manner as may be just. It also provides that all such amendments "shall be made" as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. One question in controversy between the parties as seen in issue 3 in the suit is whether notice to quit has been given. Thus, this was an amendment which the Court had every power to allow for the purpose of determining a matter in controversy between the parties. It is pertinent to note that the words used are "shall be made". Thus, though allowing an amendment is a matter of discretion of the Court, an amendment which is necessary for the purpose mentioned above has to be made by the Court. In the present case, if the Court had disallowed this particular amendment, it would have been held by this Court that the Court has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. I see no reason therefore to interfere with the amendment regarding the notice to quit. 9. In the present case, if the Court had disallowed this particular amendment, it would have been held by this Court that the Court has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. I see no reason therefore to interfere with the amendment regarding the notice to quit. 9. With regard to the other amendment relating to the further mesne profit, it is certainly incidental to the prayer for ejectment and it will be only avoiding multiplicity of suits to have the matter decided in the present suit itself. Hence, the lower Court was justified in granting the said amendment. 10. On the question whether O. 6, R. 17 is controlled by the provision in Order 7 Rule 11 C. P. C., I certainly agree with the Division Bench decision AIR 1950 Bom 345 and I am unable to agree with the single Judges decision of the Calcutta High Court in 50 Cal WN 540. Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. provides in particular that amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings. The proceedings start with the presentation of the plaint in Court. Thus, an amendment of the plaint can be allowed before admitting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 9, before returning the plaint under Order 7 Rule 10 or before rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C. P. C. Any amendment can be allowed which the Court considers just. If the Court is satisfied that the failure to make an averment about the notice to quit was due to inadvertence, the Court certainly could allow the amendment of the plaint instead of rejecting it under Order 7 Rule 11. Thus, it is clear that the power of the Court to allow an amendment is not controlled by the duty of the Court to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C. P. C. 11. The revision petition therefore fails and it is accordingly dismissed with the costs of the respondent.