Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.- This is an appeal by the defendant in O S No 26 of 1954 on the file of the District Court, Nagapattinam, against the decree and the judgment therein. The appellant’s father Sivasubramania Pillai, who was possessed of substantial properties, died in the year 1924 leaving behind him two widows Thaiyalai Achi and Karpagathachi (the respondent), and a daughter Nagaratnam (appellant) born through the former. Sivasubramania Pillai’s mother was also alive at the time of his death. About three years after his death, his mother and his two widows went on a pilgrimage to Banares. The expenses incurred during the trip created friction between the widows. Thaiyalai Achi who was in possession of the properties accused her co-widow of extravagance. The other could not perhaps tolerate the criticism and as a consequence misunderstandings arose. The respondent, the junior widow, thereupon approached D.W. 1, Manickam Pillai, a trusted friend of her deceased husband, for effecting a division of the properties left by her husband. It is the appellant’s case, and this is spoken to by Manickam Pillai whose evidence on this has not been the subject of any cross-examination, that Thaiyalai Achi was agreeable to effect a partition if she were allowed to take what was allotted to her absolutely ; so that in the event of her death, her daughter might obtain the same. The respondent in her evidence has, however, denied that Thaiyalai Achi made any such stipulation. We shall have to advert to this matter later. Manickam Pillai and two others brought about a settlement between the widows as a result of which a partition arrangement came into existence. Admittedly the arrangement was oral. In pursuance of it lots were cast in regard to the items of properties that were to be divided. Two lists of properties were prepared in accordance with the result of such casting of lots, and they were signed by both the widows ; each was given the list recording what fell to her share. Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit B-45 are respectively the lists of properties that fell to the share of Karpagathachi and Thaiyalai Achi. Two lists of properties were prepared in accordance with the result of such casting of lots, and they were signed by both the widows ; each was given the list recording what fell to her share. Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit B-45 are respectively the lists of properties that fell to the share of Karpagathachi and Thaiyalai Achi. The terms of the agreement recorded therein are identical and it will be useful at this stage to set out the relevant portion of Exhibit B-45 as a typical one: “Partition deed entered into on 14th July, 1927 between us two persons, namely (1) Thaiyalai Achi and (2) Karpagathachi, wives of R. Sivasubramania Pillai residing at Karuppur Manthai vattam, Mayuram taluk...(properties listed and set out)-----In accordance with the chit cast, Thaiyalai Achi, wife of Sivasubramania Pillai residing at Karuppur shall take ( ) the nanja, house and ground, cattle shed, cattle, pathway for men, cattle and cart and shed where dried dung cakes are stored mentioned in the list and she shall pay the Government kist for the aforesaid properties from the current fasli 1337 and enjoy them. (Sd. in Tamil) Thaiyalai Achi (Sd. in Tamil) Karpagathachi.” Thaiyalai Achi and Karpagathachi took possession of the properties that respectively fell to their share and began enjoying the same. Patta was not, however, transferred ; not much significance can be attached to such omission as the partition itself has been admitted. It is clear from the evidence of Manickam Pillai consistent, as it is with probability that legal advice Was taken at the time of partition; the widows must have been made aware that their estate could not enure beyond the lifetime of the survivor of the two. This is also clear from the three wills subsequently executed by Thaiyalai Achi (Exhibits B-1, B-2 and A-5), who besides what she obtained at the partition, had other properties of her own. She describes herself therein as the absolute owner of the latter set of properties ; there is no such description regarding the former. Thaiyalai Achi died on 26th August, 1954. Karpagathachi then instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration of her title and for recovery of possession of the properties covered by Exhibit B-45, from the appellant. Thaiyalai Achi died on 26th August, 1954. Karpagathachi then instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration of her title and for recovery of possession of the properties covered by Exhibit B-45, from the appellant. The suit was resisted by the appellant, on the ground that under the partition, Thaiyalai Achi had obtained an interest in the properties which would enure for the life-time of Karpagathachi and that interest, an estate pur outer vie, would devolve on her own heir, the appellant, for the duration of the life of the other widow. The learned District Judge appears to have been under a misapprehension that a partition between two Hindu women who inherited a joint estate by which each relinquished her right of survivorship to the other in the event of the latter dying earlier, could only exist where they purported to divide the property conferring absolute power on each other. He held that there being no proof of any absolute estate having been given under the partition, the widows could not be held to have divided the properties so as to preclude the surviving widow from obtaining what fell to the share of the other on the latter’s death. The suit was, therefore, decreed. Thaiyalai Achi’s daughter, the defendant, has appealed. As Thaiyalai Achi died before the Hindu Succession Act came into operation, the controversy has to be decided on the law as it existed prior to the enactment. The rules which govern the case of a partition between co-widows are well settled and but for the fact that Mr. Kuppuswami Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the respondent disputed the correctness of the decided cases which recognised a power in joint family heirs to give up at partition the right of survivorship inter se it would have been unnecessary to restate them. The law on the point can be stated thus. Where a sonless Hindu dies leaving a plurality of widows, the latter succeeded to his estate as joint heirs with a right of survivorship inter se. Although the widows represent the estate completely in the sense, that no other person has any present interest therein along with them, they would only have a limited right to the property- an estate which is compendiously known as a “ woman’s estate” under the Hindu law. Although the widows represent the estate completely in the sense, that no other person has any present interest therein along with them, they would only have a limited right to the property- an estate which is compendiously known as a “ woman’s estate” under the Hindu law. Broadly stated such an estate can be said to consist of two parts, (1) a right to enjoy the usufruct till the last surviving widow dies, (2) a power in the widows to alienate their husband’s property for necessity or benefit of the estate. As the right of the widows is limited, succession to the estate of the last male holder will take place after the death of the last survivor among them. But till then no reversioner has got any interest in the property left by the last male holder. Therefore, the duration or period of the widows’ estate will be till the last of them dies. So far as the reversioner is concerned, the estate can be represented only by all the widows acting together, and no alienation of the estate even for necessity would bind him unless all the widows act jointly. But in regard to the enjoyment of the usufruct, there is and can be no such limitation. The widows having an absolute right in regard to income from the property, can obtain partition and separate possession of portions of the properties, each being entitled to an equal share therein. The right that a widow obtains at such a partition cannot ordinarily be more than what she had already, namely, a right to enjoy the property for her own life. Therefore partition between the widows does not per se put an end to survivorship among each other which is inherent in the nature of their joint estate. This is unlike the case of coparceners in a joint Hindu family amongst whom after division there is no question of survivorship. The right of a co-widow to obtain partition of an equal share is capable of being enforced in Court. An enforced partition can only obtain for each widow the right to enjoy during her own life with the result that after the death of the one the other or others will take the property by survivorship. The right of a co-widow to obtain partition of an equal share is capable of being enforced in Court. An enforced partition can only obtain for each widow the right to enjoy during her own life with the result that after the death of the one the other or others will take the property by survivorship. But where partition between co-widows is by a consensual act, the interest taken by each widow can by agreement between the parties be something more than a mere interest for life of the taker. That is because of the power each widow has in the disposal of her own life interest. In other words, two widows can divide the properties by agreement in one of two ways: (1) A mere partition under which each would take an interest in the share allotted to her for her own life. This will be the case where partition is for mere convenience of enjoyment. (2) Each of the two widows can convey her subsisting interest in the properties allotted to the other ; her co-widow will then not merely have a right to enjoy the properties for her own life but by virtue of the conveyance by the other, have a further right to the same property till the lifetime of the latter, i.e. an interest (pur auter vie) for the duration of the other’s life. The principle underlying this is the power of widow to alienate the right to the income from the property that falls to her share for the duration of her own life. In Ramakkal v. Ramaswami Naicker1, the learned Judges observed: “We have no doubt that widow can alienate for her life any estate which comes to her as such and that she can, therefore, enter into such a deed as will preclude her from recovering during her life property which she has alienated to the full extent of such alienation provided it dees not extend beyond herlife interest.” Therefore if there is an appropriate agreement between the co-widows at partition, each can take not merely what she is entitled to for her life, but something more i.e., for the lifetime of her surviving co-widow by virtue of the conveyance or release made by the other widow. Mr. Mr. T.S. Kuppuswami Iyer has contended that such an arrangement between the co-widows would amount to nothing more than a release or conveyance of a possible right of survivorship and as such invalid, being in the nature of a transfer of spes successions. We are unable to see how such an agreement can be invalid. What each widow possesses is her right to enjoy for her own life and if she parts with that right in favour of her co-widow, as indeed she can do in favour of a stranger, it can only be a transfer of a subsisting right and not of a mere spes. The validity of a relinquishment by a widow of her interest in the properties allotted in favour of her co-widow at their partition has been recognised in Sudalai Ammal v. Gomathi Ammal1, Subbammal v. Lakshmana Iyer2, Ammani Ammal v. Periasami Gounder3. Reliance is placed on behalf of the respondent on the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Smt. Indira Balkrishna4, as supporting the contention that the widows had no power of transferring to each other her life interest in the property for the reason that the Supreme Court in stating the law on the subject does not refer to the right of a co-widow to surrender her right of survivorship. That was a case where there was no partition between these co-widows. The question that arose for consideration was whether the income received by them could be assessed as if it was received by an association of persons. That question was answered in the negative. The Supreme Court had in that connection to examine the nature of possession which the co-widows had in their husband’s property. The question before us, namely, the validity of an arrangement between co-widows relinquishing inter se their right of survivorship did neither arise nor was considered in that case. We are unable to agree that the uniform line of decisions recognising a power in a co-widow to give up at partition her right of survivorship require even a fresh consideration. Once it is held that the widows can relinquish the right of survivorship which one has in favour of the other, the question for determination in each case will be: “What are the terms of the partition. Once it is held that the widows can relinquish the right of survivorship which one has in favour of the other, the question for determination in each case will be: “What are the terms of the partition. Has it been made purely with a view to convenient enjoyment of the properties so that each widow gets only an interest for her own life, leaving intact the right of the other to take by survivorship, or whether such a right has been excluded by agreement between the parties.” In the case before us the respondent has no doubt stated in the plaint that the partition was effected with a view to enjoy and manage the lands more conveniently. But paragraph III (10) however states: “ It is stated in the reply notice that the arrangement of partition was oral. That statement is not altogether correct. It is evidenced by karai Edu (list of properties) allotted to each signed by both the parties.” The reference is evidently to Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit B-45. The lists include property allotted to Sivasubramania Pillai’s mother for her maintenance. The partition can therefore be taken to be complete The circumstance that two lists were separately drawn up, that they were signed by both of them and delivered over to the respective sharers would seem to indicate that some kind of title was intended to be transferred and that the arrangement was not one for mere convenient enjoyment of their husbands properties. Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit B-45 state that the respective sharers should obtain and enjoy the property, miner the familiar words of conveyance This expression coupled with the lact that the documents have been signed by both the widows (suggesting a conveyance) would show that they intended by the partition to vest the property in the respective sharer for the duration of the joint estate of the widows, i.e., till the lifetime of the survivor of them. Let us consider the other evidence in the case. On 15th September, 1928, Thaiyalai Achi executed, a Will Exhibit B-1, substantially bequeathing her properties to her daughter. The Will refers to her own properties as absolutely belonging to her. The properties obtained by her on partition with her co-widow were also disposed of under the Will in favour of her daughter to be enjoyed by the latter absolutely. On 15th September, 1928, Thaiyalai Achi executed, a Will Exhibit B-1, substantially bequeathing her properties to her daughter. The Will refers to her own properties as absolutely belonging to her. The properties obtained by her on partition with her co-widow were also disposed of under the Will in favour of her daughter to be enjoyed by the latter absolutely. In describing the properties obtained on partition the testatrix does not say (as noticed earlier) that she was absolutely entitled to the same. But nevertheless she states that the legatee is to enjoy both sets of properties absolutely. The ladies were living near Mayuram where legal advice was available. Presumably the difference in language employed with regard to the stridhanam and the half share of the husband’s estate disposed of under the Will was the result of legal advice. Be that as it may, the testatrix did to the knowledge of her co-widow dispose of the latter set of properties as well under her Will. Although the mere fact of Thaiyalai Achi making a testamentary disposition may not be decisive of the extent of her title and indeed if the terms of the partition were clear would not even be a relevant circumstance, it will be some evidence in the circumstances of this case, to show that almost immediately after partition she thought she had a disposing power over the property. There was no secrecy about the Will. It was registered. The two other Wills which followed it were also similarly registered. It is significant that during all the time there was no protest to such a testamentary disposition by the respondent, although she admits she had knowledge of the Will. Manickam Pillai as D.W. I has spoken, as stated already, to the fact that Thaiyalai Achi stipulated at the time of the partition that her share of properties should devolve on her daughter after her lifetime. The learned District Judge has discredited that evidence by reason of the interest of the witness in the appellant and his demonstrably false denial of his having anything to do with the properties of the appellant. But we do not think that his evidence can be rejected for that reason as we are of opinion that it finds corroboration in Thaiyalai Achi’s impression that she could make testamentary disposition over the properties that fell to her share. But we do not think that his evidence can be rejected for that reason as we are of opinion that it finds corroboration in Thaiyalai Achi’s impression that she could make testamentary disposition over the properties that fell to her share. Apart from the evidence of Manickam Pillai, P.W. 2, one of the attestors to Exhibits A-1 and B-45, who has been examined on the side of the respondent, first denied that there was any talk at the time of attestation that the widow should take absolutely her share but later stated in the course of his chief examination itself that it was agreed that each should enjoy absolutely. There is nothing in this evidence to show that such absolute enjoyment was to be with respect to income alone. Again, on 12th November, 1951 the two widows conveyed a property which was the subject-matter of the partition among themselves to a third party stating that after the death of their husband they were in enjoyment of it absolutely. There were similar recitals in the sale deed executed by them, Exhibit B-44. The circumstance that the sale deed had been executed by both of them is of no significance as so far as the alienee was concerned it was necessary they should both join to convey a valid title. There is yet another transaction which throws some light on the question. Under Exhibit B-5, Thaiyalai Achi is alone purported to convey an item of property in favour of a stranger conferring absolute title. The appellant’s explanation that she got one half of the price obtained for the land is too thin to be believed. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred us to joint alienations made by the widows jointly even after partition as indicating a subsisting interest of one widow in the share allotted to the other. We are unable to draw any such inference. It is well settled that one of the several Co-widows cannot alienate the properties without the consent of the other so as to bind the reversioner. The joint execution of sale deeds cannot help us in the determination of the question before us. It must be remembered that under the law as it stood at the time of the arrangement, the appellant whom the widows must have expected to survive them, would take the entire property on the death of both the widows. The joint execution of sale deeds cannot help us in the determination of the question before us. It must be remembered that under the law as it stood at the time of the arrangement, the appellant whom the widows must have expected to survive them, would take the entire property on the death of both the widows. Thaiyalai Achi who was in possession of the entire property did not perhaps want that during the interval between her death and that of the junior widow (who was younger than her by about 20 years) her only daughter should be deprived of even her own share, for the duration of Karpagathachi’s life. The case of the appellant that there was an agreement between the widows that the share given to Thaiyalai Achi should go to her daughter on her death and not revert in her co-widow appears therefore to be highly probable. In discussing the evidence above we have proceeded on the footing that Exhibits A-1 and B-45 do not embody all the terms of the arrangement between the parties or even if they do, there is an ambiguity which would warrant us to look into the surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct of the parties to ascertain their intention. Even if we exclude such evidence and restrict ourselves to the terms used in Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit B-45, our conclusion will be the same. As stated earlier the circumstance that both the widows signed the list of properties allotted to each coupled with the clause would imply a conveyance by them in favour of one of them with respect to the properties allotted to her and would be capable of conveying an interest in the property which both the widows had in them, namely, an interest for the duration of the joint widow’s estate just like any other alienation jointly executed by them in favour of a stranger. The learned District Judge appears to have thought that as the documents themselves do not confer an absolute estate on the widows it cannot be said that either of the two widows relinquished her right of survivorship in case the other was to predecease her. 5 We are unable to follow this reasoning. The learned District Judge appears to have thought that as the documents themselves do not confer an absolute estate on the widows it cannot be said that either of the two widows relinquished her right of survivorship in case the other was to predecease her. 5 We are unable to follow this reasoning. When the two widows inherited the properties of their husband, they had only a limited interest in them and they cannot by their own act give each an absolute interest therein, although each would relinquish her interest in the properties allotted to the other for the duration of her life. It would be inappropriate use of the language if the widow who intended to and did so relinquish her rights, were to say that the other widow would be entitled to enjoy the properties absolutely for that would amount to a grant of more than what she herself had. It is no doubt true that in several of the cases that have come before the Courts, the widows while entering into a partition arrangement gave each other an absolute estate and that was construed as meaning that each had given up her right of survivorship. That does not mean that where they have not described it as an absolute estate they cannot be held to have given up their right of survivorship, inter se, even if the words employed are capable of such an interpretation. The question in each case is one of intention to be gathered from the words used in the light of surrounding circumstances. In our opinion, on the terms of Exhibits A-1 and B-45 the two widows in the present case must be held to have intended to convey a right of survivorship which each had in the other’s estate. Mr. Ramaswami Iyengar who first argued for the respondent realised that the terms of Exhibits A-1 and B-45 would import a grant to each widow of an interest in the property allotted to her for the duration of the other widow’s life and attempted to get Exhibits A-1 and B-45 excluded from evidence. Learned counsel contended that the documents being unregistered would be inadmissible in evidence. But Mr. Learned counsel contended that the documents being unregistered would be inadmissible in evidence. But Mr. T. S. Kuppuswami Iyer who followed him qualified that contention by stating that while the documents would be admissible in evidence to show the character of their possession they could not be relied on so as to enable the appellant to prove that the respondent had parted with her life interest. Neither of the two aspects of the argument was put forward before the lower Court. We, therefore, intimated to the learned counsel that we were not prepared to allow such a contention to be raised for the first time before us. At the same time we considered it better to express our opinion on the merits of the contention and in that view and for that purpose allowed learned counsel to argue the point. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that the two documents on their terms created a right in praesenti in favour of the parties to the documents and that therefore they would not be admissible in the absence of registration. It was also contended relying on the decision in Ramayamma v. Achamma1 that it would not be open to the Court in such a case to look into other evidence as to the terms of the partition arrangement. It will be noticed that the terms of Exhibit A-1 have been admitted by the respondent, herself in her plaint. The relevant paragraph extracted from the plaint would show that the document had been incorporated thereto by reference. There being thus an admission in the pleadings the question of admissibility of the two documents is of no importance. It must also be noticed that Exhibit B-45 was admitted by consent by both the parties. Even otherwise we cannot accept either of the two contentions. The partition was admittedly oral and Exhibits A-1 and B-45 form only a subsequent and imperfect memoranda of the same, the title having been already transferred under the oral arrangement. It cannot be said on the evidence that all the terms of the arrangement are contained in the two documents. Perhaps if the contentions now raised before us had been put before the lower Court it would have been possible for the appellant to show that all the terms of the partition arrangement had not been reduced to writing under Exhibits A-1 and B-45. Mr. Perhaps if the contentions now raised before us had been put before the lower Court it would have been possible for the appellant to show that all the terms of the partition arrangement had not been reduced to writing under Exhibits A-1 and B-45. Mr. Kuppuswami Iyer then contended that while a partition between two co-widows can be effected orally, a relinquishment of the right of each widow to take by survivorship the properties allotted to the other widow in the case of the latter predeceasing her, could only be made by a duly registered document. No principle or authority is relied on to support the contention. Relinquishment of the right in such a case can be oral ; such a relinquishment among co-widows will only be a term in the partition arrangement between them, and if partition itself can be made orally, there can be no objection to the arrangement including the relinquishment of right of survivorship inter se between them being oral. That question is covered by authority. Vide Latchumanammal v. Gangammal1 , Sundarasiva Row v. Viyamma2 and Minakshi v. Subramania3 where it was recognised that an oral partition between co-widows can include an arrangement by which each relinquished her right of survivorship. We are of the opinion that the appellant has proved that the partition arrangement entered into between her mother and the respondent was one where each of the two sharers gave their life interest in the properties allotted to the other and that therefore the respondent would not be entitled to recover possession of the properties allotted to her co-widow at the partition and that the same would devolve on the appellant as her stridhanam heir or as her legatee. The appeal will therefore be allowed with costs here and in the Court below. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.