JUDGMENT Mukerji, J. - This appeal was referred to a Bench by Mr. Justice Bishambhar Dayal for, in his view, the point that was raised for determination of this case presented some difficulty. 2. The suit out of which this appeal arose was one for pre-emption filed by the respondent Jaya Datt Pant in respect of a sale which had been made by Prem Ballabh on July 7, 1952, of a certain quantity of proprietary land in Phantkhata 47 measuring 12 Nalis to the defendants for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 1,500. The plaintiff claimed pre-emption on the ground that he had a right of pre-emption and that he as a relation, related to the vendor within the third degree, claimed pre-emption of the land. The plaintiff alleged that the real consideration was much less than the ostensible consideration. The defence to the suit, in main, was that the pre-emptor-plaintiff though related to the vendor within the third degree could not claim pre-emption inasmuch as, firstly, that the land which was sold and was to be pre-empted was non-ancestral property, and secondly, that the pre-emptor-plaintiff was a non-resident. 3. The trial court tried the several issues that were raised but all of them are not relevant for our purposes, for all we need notice in this case is that issue which related to the plaintiff's right of pre-emption in respect of the vended property. The Trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding that he had no right of pre-emption in respect of the land. There was an appeal against the decision of the learned Munsif and the appellate Judge reversed the learned Munsif on the question of the plaintiff's right in regard to pre-emption. The learend Judge found that the plaintiffs, even though he was a non-resident co-sharer and even if the land was non-ancestral land, had the right of pre-emption. A second appeal was preferred to this Court against the decision of the learned District Judge of Kumaon and that second appeal, as we pointed out at the commencement of this judgment, came up first before Mr. Justice Bishambhar Dayal who referred it to a Bench and that is how the appeal now is before us for disposal. 4. The crucial question which calls for determination in this case is, as has already been indicated earlier, whether there was a right of pre-emption in the plaintiff. Justice Bishambhar Dayal who referred it to a Bench and that is how the appeal now is before us for disposal. 4. The crucial question which calls for determination in this case is, as has already been indicated earlier, whether there was a right of pre-emption in the plaintiff. Before we go on to consider the question we should like to state the admitted facts for those facts will be necessary for making our ultimate decision. The admitted facts are: 1. that there was a right of pre-emption in respect of sales in the area in which the vended property lay in the district of Kumaon; 2. that there were two types of property in respect of which a right of pre-emption could be exercised, whether successfully or not and those kinds of property were (a) ancestral property, and (b) non-ancestral property; 3. that resident co-sharers had a preference over non-resident co-sharers. What, however, was not admitted under this category was whether a resident co-sharer could have preference over a non-resident co-sharer who was related to the vendor within the third degree. The other admitted facts were:- (a) that the property in dispute was non-ancestral property, and (b) that the plaintiff-preemptor was a co-sharer related to the vendor within the third degree but a non-resident co-sharer. 5. The parties in this case produced no evidence at all in regard to the custom on which they relied; even the Wajibularz, or a similar record of rights, also was not produced. The plaintiff appears to have relied for the success of his case solely on what was recorded in regard to the custom of pre-emption obtaining in Kumaun in "A Manual of the Land Tenures of the Kumaun Division" by V. A. Stowell, and on two decisions which have been recorded, again, by Stowell in his bock "Kumaun Rulings for Civil Courts." Incidentally reliance was also placed on what was recorded in the District Gazetteer of Almora. 6. The question which we are now to determine is whether a non-resident co-sharer related within the third degree to the vendor has a preferential right thereby entitling him to preempt a sale in favour of resident co-sharer who was not related to the vendor in respect of non-ancestral property. 6. The question which we are now to determine is whether a non-resident co-sharer related within the third degree to the vendor has a preferential right thereby entitling him to preempt a sale in favour of resident co-sharer who was not related to the vendor in respect of non-ancestral property. Stowell in his `Manual of the Land Tenures of the Kumaun Division (Hill Tracts)' 1954 edition, at page 46 makes this record; "A near relative who is not a co-sharer in the village has no right of pre-emption at all............" "A non-resident co-sharer also has no right of pre-emption, see the Garhwal village memorandum and Gajadhar Jayal v. Jora and others of Kandi, Malla Dhangu, second appeal No. 10 of 1902 by Mr. Hamblin, Commissioner......" "A near relative cannot, as such, claim pre-emption in non-ancestral land Bali v. Amlanand, by Sri Henry Ramsay, 18th September, 1873, quoted by Mr. Pauw." Mr. Stowell also appears to have laid down, as his own view, that the first requisite to pre-emption was that the person who claimed pre-emption should not only be a co-sharer but a resident co-sharer of the village, but this view or opinion of Mr. Stowell does not give any material on which that opinion could be substantiated. The view or record of Mr. Stowell's finding in regard to a non-resident co-sharer's right of pre-emption, which we have just quoted above, was based on what was the custom in respect of Garhwal and not in respect of Kumaun. It has nowhere been found by Mr. Stowell, nor have we been shown any other authoritative record of views or mate-rial on which it could be said, that customs obtaining in Garhwal were similar to customs obtaining in Kumaun or were identical. Customs in large parts of India have a local origin and it is common knowledge that there are, even though they may be slight, variations in similar customs from local area to local area. This general trend in the customary law is more in evidence in hill areas than possibly in the plains, for the obvious reason that in the hills communities have less opportunities of social contacts because of difficulties of movement and transport. 7. This general trend in the customary law is more in evidence in hill areas than possibly in the plains, for the obvious reason that in the hills communities have less opportunities of social contacts because of difficulties of movement and transport. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants naturally relied strongly on what was stated in Stowell's book "A Manual of the Land Tenures of the Kumaun Division" about a non-resident near relative having no preferential right of pre-emption in respect of non-ancestral land. As we said, this record of the alleged custom in Stowell's book was, in our opinion, not supported by any decisions or any other material. Indeed, Stowell does not seem to have considered the import of at least two judicial decisions collected by him in his book `Kumaun Rulings for Civil Courts' where it was held that a co-sharer, who was related to the vendor within the third degree, even though he was a non-resident of the village, had a preferential right of pre-emption even in respect of non-ancestral land over a mere co-sharer who was a resident of the village. These two decisions are to be found at pages 75 and 77 of Stowell's Kumaun Rulings for Civil Courts. The first decision is in Lachi Nesi, son of Joge Negi v. Joga, son of Lal Singh and Gusain, son of Joga Negi, Sp. C.A. No. 80 of 1912. The decision was by Mr. J.S. Campbell, the then Commissioner of Kumaun, who for all judicial purposes then acted as the High Court for Kumaun. In that case Mr. Campbell held that a non-resident co-sharer, who was related to the vendor within the third degree, was entitled to pre-emption against a purchaser who was a resident co-sharer of the village but was not related to the vendor. Mr. Campbell expressed the view in that case that it was considered more important to keep the family intact by the custom of pre-emption rather than to keep undesirable outsiders out of the village community and, therefore, the relation of the vendor had a preference over a non-relation even though the non-relation was a resident of the village and the relation was not so resident. Mr. Campbell in the above decision observed that if one insisted that no one but a resident co-sharer could claim pre-emption then it would, in Mr. Mr. Campbell in the above decision observed that if one insisted that no one but a resident co-sharer could claim pre-emption then it would, in Mr. Campbell's opinion, be contrary to the custom which prevailed and would entail great hardship in many cases. Mr. Campbell pointed out in this decision that this question in Garhwal was somewhat different, owing to, what he calls, a reference to the `resident' co-sharer having crept into the memorandum of village customs at Mr. Pauw's settlement. This would explain why it would not be proper for us, or for the matter of that for anybody, to rely on the Garhwal custom for determining what the custom should be or would be or is in Kumaun. Mr. Campbell further pointed out that Mr. Hamblings' ruling in Gajadhar Jayal v. Jora the decision on which Stowell relied for recording his observation - to the effect that a non-resident co-sharer has no right of pre-emption was entirely based upon the Garhwal memorandum of village custom. That being so, that case would provide no authority for customs prevailing in Kumaun. 8. The next decision was in Narain Datt Joshi v. Bhola Datt Ganga Datt and Purnanand Joshis, S.C.A. No. 37 of 1913. This decision too was given by Mr. Campbell and he held, again, that the vendor's brother, who was also a co-sharer in the village but was non-resident, was entitled to pre-emption against a purchaser who was a resident co-sharer even in respect of non-ancestral land. 9. As we have noticed, neither of these two cases was shown to us to have been either dissented from or their authority in any way shaken by casting any doubts by any subsequent decision either by the Commissioner of Kumaun or by this Court. 10. Reliance was placed by Mr. Gopi Krishna Sahai on the decision of Prajapati Naithani v. (1) Kirpal Singh (2) Diwan Singh, (3) Tej Ram Naithani, S.C.A. Nos 37 and 79 of 1913 which came up to this Court on a reference made under R. 17 of the Kumaun Rules. The reference came up before Sir Henry Richards, C.J., and Tudball, J., and while dealing with the reference the learned Judges expressed the view that the burden lay on the pl`aintiff who sought pre-emption on the basis of an alleged custom to prove the existence of the custom and to bring himself within it. The reference came up before Sir Henry Richards, C.J., and Tudball, J., and while dealing with the reference the learned Judges expressed the view that the burden lay on the pl`aintiff who sought pre-emption on the basis of an alleged custom to prove the existence of the custom and to bring himself within it. No one could take any exception to the principle which-was enunciated and on that principle their lordships answered the reference by saying that the court should have framed certain issues upon the two questions, namely, whether the custom of pre-emption extended to ancestral land, and secondly whether the plaintiff, being non-resident, had a right against a resident vendee. The case was, therefore, again tried on the two issues, findings were thereafter recorded on those two issues and decision ultimately given on those findings. This case, therefore, was no authority for the proposition, because what was decided in that particular case was the custom as it obtained in a particular locality from where the case came. It did not concern itself with a general custom obtaining in the whole of Kumaun If it were possible for us, so late in the day, to take the line that was taken by Sri Henry Richards, C.J. and Tudball, J. in Prajapati Naithani's case, S.C.A. No. 79 of 1913, namely, to say that because the plaintiff in the case before us has not led any evidence to show that the custom of pre-emption as he set up obtained he must fail, then we could have taken that line, but we are of the opinion that it is too late in the day for us to take that view, particularly when this Court has in Ballu Thekedar v. Thakur Dan Singh, 1950 ALJ 234 held that where a series of decisions has been based on the recognition of a custom it is not necessary to prove the existence of that custom strictly by adducing evidence in support of it in every case. We are, therefore, of the view that even though the plaintiff in the instant case has not adduced direct evidence to prove the custom on which he relied, yet on the admitted position, that there was a custom of pre-emption prevalent in every part of Kumaun and that the custom on which he relied had been judicially noticed and upheld, the plaintiff should be held to have discharged the burden that lay on him to prove the custom in this case. 11. We should like to record the fact that there is now an Act called the Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (U.P. Act XVII of 1960) whereby the law of pre-emption is abolished in the same way as it has been abolished by Section 336 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but then we were not shown as to whether or not this Act has been applied to the area where the disputed property lay, for we find that the relevant portion of the Act did not come into force immediately on the passing of the Act but was to come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification published in the official Gazette, appoint; further, that the State Government could appoint different dates for coming into force of different parts of the Act to areas which fell within the ambit of the Act. Therefore, no one could seek any benefit out of the provisions of this Act. 12. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the view taken by the lower appellate court in this case was right and that this appeal should, therefore, fail. 13. We accordingly dismiss this appeal, but under the circumstances of this case we make no order as to the costs thereof.