JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is by the plaintiff against the decree, dated, 23•101959, passed by Shri S. S. Pancholy, Additional District Judge, Barwani, in Civil Regular Appeal No. 24 of 1956, affirming the decree, dated, 1-10-1956 passed by Shri V.Y. Munshi, Civil Judge, Class I, Barwani, in Civil Suit No. 142 of 1952. 2. The appellant is the widow of one, Nathulal, who was a Nagar Seth of Barwani. He died in the year 1930, leaving behind his mother, Mst. Mainabai and widow, Mst. Radhabai. He did not leave behind any issues. 3. Mst. Radhabai adopted one Kundanmal as a son to her deceassed husband. Before the actual ceremony of adoption, she entered into a registered agreement, dated, 14-3-1933 with Kundanmal's natural father, Motilal about some arrangements with the family property, which was under the management of Court of Wards, as the proposed adopted boy, Kundanmal was a minor at that time. The agreement provided that with effect from the date of the adoption, the adopted boy will become the owner of all property as an heir of the deceased Nathulal subject to the following conditions:- (i) That Kundanmal being aged 12 years at that time, the property would be under the management of the Court of Wards till Kundanmal attained the age of majority, namely, 21 years. Till then the Court of Wards would supply funds for the maintenance of the adoptive mother, her mother-in-law and the adopted boy. (ii) After Kundanmal became a major and got possession of all the properly from the Court of Wards, be would enjoy all the moveable property and be in charge of the business firm of the family, as also a Ginning Factory situated at Rajghat road. The said property would be the joint property of the adopted boy, the adoptive mother and Mst. mainabai. In case the mother-in law Maina bai or the adoptive mother Radhabai did not consider it suitable to stay jointly with the adopted boy Kundanmal, they would be entitled to reside in the western portion of the family house locating the Kirana shop or in any other family house. mainabai. In case the mother-in law Maina bai or the adoptive mother Radhabai did not consider it suitable to stay jointly with the adopted boy Kundanmal, they would be entitled to reside in the western portion of the family house locating the Kirana shop or in any other family house. (iii) That leaving the above mentioned property, which was to be the joint property of all the three family members, the adoptive mother, Radhabai was to become an absolute owner of the rest of the family property, which she was entitled to alienate, as also to appropriate the usufruct of the same for her own expenses of maintenance including pilgrimage. (iv) Out of the houses, which were under the management of the Court of Wards and which were under mortgages, the adoptive mother, Radhabai would be entitled to rent of those houses; but if the mortgagors (other strangers) redeemed the mortgages and the income from rent was stopped, Radbabai would be entitled to all the mortgage amount. (v) The adoptive mother, Radhabai was to remain in possession of all the gold and silver ornaments in absolute right. (vi) That the adopted boy, Kundanmal, after becoming a major, was liable to pay Rs. 30/- per month as maintenance to Mst. Mainabai. Out of that amount, Rs. 20/- were to be paid from the income of the business firm and the Ginning Factory and the maintenance was to be a charge on the Ginning Factory. The balance of Rs. 10/- was to be paid by the adoptive mother, Radhabai, to her mother-in-law out of the income from the houses, which she had reserved for herself. (vii) After the death of the adoptive mother, the adopted boy would be the owner of all the property allotted to her by the agreement that may exist at the time of her death. (viii) If the adoptive mother was to die before her mother-in• law, Mainabai, the adopted boy, Kundanmal was to become owner of all the property, but he was liable to pay Rs. 30/- per month as maintenance to his grand mother, Mainabai out of the entire property and the same was to be a charge on the entire property. The gold and silver ornaments in possession of Mainabai would be with her during her life time; and after her death, Kundanmal was to become the owner thereof. 30/- per month as maintenance to his grand mother, Mainabai out of the entire property and the same was to be a charge on the entire property. The gold and silver ornaments in possession of Mainabai would be with her during her life time; and after her death, Kundanmal was to become the owner thereof. These were all the essential terms of the ante adoption agreement, dated, 14-3-1933. The question for consideration arises as to how far this ante adoption agreement was valid 4. The said ante adoption agreement was given effect to by the Court of Wards, as is clear by the Darbar Order, dated, 28-10-1941 (Ex. P-2). The order was passed by the Dewan, who was the President of the State Council of Barwani State. By the said order, the houses as per list enclosed were directed to be mutated in the name of Radhabai. Similarly, the agricultural lands, as per the list enclosed were also directed to be mutated in her name. Similarly, non-agricultural property in the Municipal area was directed to be mutated in the name of Radhabai. The mutation was to be effected in her name subject to the condition that after her death, the properties were to be mutated in the name of her adopted son, Kundanmal. Similarly, Radhabai was to appropriate the usufruct of the two houses mortgaged with the family. This would show that the Darbar gave effect to the ante adoption agreement, dated, 14-3-1933 (Ex. P-1) The list (Ex. P-3) attached to the Darbar Order (Ex, P-2) showed about 23 houses., which were to be mutated in the name of Radhabai. The income from the said houses at that time was stated to be about Rs. 52/- per month from the, rent recovered from the tenants. 5. On an earlier occasion, two creditors of Kundanmal, namely, Raoji bhai and Balmukund filed Civil Suits against him, namely, Civil Suit No. 32 of 1945 and Civil Suit No. 16 of 1945. After obtaining decrees, the creditors attached two houses and an open plot of land, which had been in possession of Mst. Radhabai in pursuance of the ante adoption - agreement, dated, 14-3-1933. Radhabai had filed objections under Order 21, rule 58 Civil Procedure Code in execution of those decrees. After obtaining decrees, the creditors attached two houses and an open plot of land, which had been in possession of Mst. Radhabai in pursuance of the ante adoption - agreement, dated, 14-3-1933. Radhabai had filed objections under Order 21, rule 58 Civil Procedure Code in execution of those decrees. As the objections were decided against her, she filed a declaratory suit under Order 21, rule 63 Civil Procedure Code against the decree-holders, Raojibhai and Balmukund in the Court of the District Judge, Barwani, who by judgment, dated, 30-31948 decreed her claim. 6. Against that decree, there was ail appeal, namely, Civil First Appeal No. 45 of 1948 in the Madhya Bharat High Court, which was decided by a Division Bench consisting of P.K. Kaul, C.J. and V.M. Mehta, J. vide judgment, dated, 26-9-1951. The learned Judges held that the ante adoption agreement was a device whereby the adoptive mother shared property with the adopted boy. According to the learned Judges, the agreement being void was incapable of ratification and, therefore, the same could not be given effect to. In that view of the case, the appeal was allowed and Radhabai's claim for a declaration was dismissed. 7. Subsequently, the other creditors of Kundanmal namely, the present respondents 1 to 4 obtained a decree against him and in execution of the same attached four houses in possession of Mst. Radbabal, which bad been allotted to her by the ante adoption agreement, dated. 14-3-1933. The objection was decided against her by the executing Court. Hence she filed the present declaratory suit under Order 21, rule 63, The learned Judges of the Courts below negatived her contentions and dismissed her suit. Hence the present second appeal. In the present appeal, we are concerned with two questions only, namely, (i) whether the ante adoption agreement was valid and to what extent and (ii) what was the effect of the previous decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court, dated, 26-9-1951 (Ex.D-1). 8. Taking up the second question first as to what was the effect of the previous decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court (Ex. D-l), it is to be remembered that the earlier decision was between another set of creditors of Kundanmal in an objection petition filed by the present appellant. The present respondents 1 to 4 were not parties to that decision. D-l), it is to be remembered that the earlier decision was between another set of creditors of Kundanmal in an objection petition filed by the present appellant. The present respondents 1 to 4 were not parties to that decision. As the objection under Order 21, rule 58 bad been decided agai115t the objector-Radhabai, she had filed a declatory suit under Order 21, rule 63,. Civil Procedure Code. Although the suit was decreed by the trial Court, that decree was reversed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court. From the judgment on record, there is nothing to indicate that the creditors in that suit had defended the suit in a representative capacity. Consequently, it was a litigation inter parties and cannot bind the objector or the judgment-debtor of that case in the present litigation. There can be no doubt that it cannot operate as res judicata under any of the provisions of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is necessary to consider the legal effect of that decision, as the Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court had expressed the opinion that the ante adoption agreement, dated, 14-3-1933 (Ex. P-l) was void in itself. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that this opinion expressed by the Division Bench, apart from being not binding on this Court, cannot even be relied upon as a judicial precedent, while the learned counsel for the respondents urged that even though the decision may not operate as res judicata, it has evidentiary value as a judicial precedent. 9. In this connection, it is to be noted that their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mst. Munni Bibi and another Vs. Tirloki Nath and Others LR 58 IA 158 have indicated the conditions for the application of the principle of res judicata as between co-defendants. Firstly, the test to be applied is whether there was conflict of interest between the co-defendants, and secondly whether it was necessary for the Court to resolve the conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief asked for, and thirdly whether it was necessary to decide that question between the co-defendants. Further, Their Lordships have laid down that the principle of res judicata may be applicable even though the party against whom it is sought to invoke may not have appeared in the earlier suit. Further, Their Lordships have laid down that the principle of res judicata may be applicable even though the party against whom it is sought to invoke may not have appeared in the earlier suit. The test will be whether the party is bound by the decision in the earlier suit. This view has, later on, been reiterated by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chandu Lal Agarwalla and another Vs. Khalitur Rahaman and others AIR 1950 PC 17. It does not appear from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court (Ex. D-1) that there was any conflict or any issues framed as between the co-defendants, namely; the present appellant and the adopted boy, Kundanmal. All the issues were framed upon the contention of the creditors that the ante adoption agreement was void and, therefore, property in possession of Radhabai was liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree against the adopted son, Kundanmal. Although there might be some inherent conflict of interest between the co-defendants, it is necessary that the same should have been brought to the notice of the parties and should have been specifically decided, as laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the two cases mentioned above. Therefore, I am of opinion that the Division Bench decision (Ex. D-1) cannot operate as res judicata between co-defendants. 10. It is further pertinent to note that the scope of a suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code is necessarily declaratory and the question is about the title of the judgment-debtor or the objector in respect of property sought to be attached and sold. The decision of a declaratory suit on an earlier occassion between one set of creditors of the judgment-debtor and the objector can certainly not operate as res judicata, as the parties in a later suit by another set of creditors are different, unless ii is found that the earlier suit had been contested by the creditors in a representative capacity to which case Order 1, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code might be applicable. The judgment in the previous litigation would. The judgment in the previous litigation would. necessarily be a judgment in personam, unless it is obtained in a representative capacity, otherwise it 'cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, as laid down by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ahmad Ali Khan Bahadur (died) and another Vs. Banguluru Veeralla and others AIR 1959 AP 280 . It is clear that the earlier suit in the present case had not been defended by the creditors, Raojibhai and Balmukund in a representative capacity. Therefore; the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court (Ex.D-l) can in no sense operate as res judicata in the present litigation, nor can the defendants inter se be precluded from raising their respective contentions regarding the title to the property sought to be attached and sold by the present respondents. 11. However, the learned counsel for the respondents, inviting attention to the Supreme Court case of Sahu Madho Das and others Vs. Mukand Ram and another AIR 1955 SC 481 , urged that although the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court (Ex. D-I] may not operate as res judicata, yet that decision bas to be considered as a judicial precedent, because the very document, namely, the ante adoption agreement, dated, 14-3-1933 (Ex. P-l) was the subject matter of interpretation by the Division Bench and the same document is now relied on by the present appellant in support of her title to the attached property. 12. It is true that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that where a will was the subject of construction by the Privy Council on an earlier occasion, the decision though not operating as res judicata between the parties to the subsequent litigation, may still be cited as a judicial precedent, wherein the opinion expressed by the Privy Council on the earlier occasion could not be lightly ignored. So far as the decisions of the Federal Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court are concerned, they would have greater value as judicial precedents in as much as even the obiter observations made by Their Lordships would be binding on all subordinate Courts. So far as the decisions of the Federal Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court are concerned, they would have greater value as judicial precedents in as much as even the obiter observations made by Their Lordships would be binding on all subordinate Courts. But so far as the High Court decisions are concerned, the legal efficacy of judicial precedent will be much less, unless it is found that the earlier decision is binding on the Bench of the High Court in a subsequent case. If the earlier decision be a Full Bench decision, it win certainly bind a Division Bench or a Single Bench as judicial precedent. Similarly, if the earlier decision be by a Division Bench, it will bind a Single Bench of the High Court in a subsequent case. However, the position will be altogether different where the earlier decision is not binding on the subsequent Bench for any reasons whatsoever. It is indisputable that the present Madhya Pradesh High Court is only bound by the decisions of the Nagpur High Court, and not any of the regional Courts, such as, the Madhya Bharat High Court, the Vindhya Pradesh Judicial Commissioner's Court, or the Bhopal Judicial Commissioner's Court, although such decisions may be entitled to due weight and respect as an expression of opinion by any other High Court. This is the position arising on account of the provisions of sections 49 to 69 of the States Reorganisation Act (Act No. 37 of 1956), according to which the Nagpur High Court becomes the predecessor of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Therefore I am of opinion that although the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court (Ex. D-I) is entitled to all respect as an expression of opinion on an earlier occasion, it cannot be cited as a judicial precedent for the simple reason that the expression of opinion is not legally binding on a Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. If a conflict arises, this Court will have to consider the question on its own merits giving due weight to the expression of opinion of the Madhya Bharat High Court. Therefore. I am of opinion that the said decision cannot be cited as a judicial precedent, although it is entitled to all respect and due weight. The question whether an ante adoption agreement is void or voidable has to be examined on its own merits. Therefore. I am of opinion that the said decision cannot be cited as a judicial precedent, although it is entitled to all respect and due weight. The question whether an ante adoption agreement is void or voidable has to be examined on its own merits. 13. Coming to the first question whether the ante adoption agreement was valid and to what extent, I have already indicated that the question has to be decided on its own merits giving due respect and weight to the Division Bench decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court (Ex.D-l). The learned author, Sir D. F. Mulla in his commentary on the 'Principles of Hindu Law' (12th edition), section 500, page 664 observes as follows; "(1) Where the adopted son was a major at the time of the adoption, he may be in agreement with the adoptive father or the adopting widow made before the adoption, consent to a limitation of his rights in the property of his adoptive father. (2) Where the adopted son is a minor, the question arises whether it is competent to his natural father to enter into an agreement with the adoptive father or the adopting widow limiting his son's rights in the property of the adoptive father. This question came up before the Judicial Committee in Krishnamurthi Vs. Krishnamurthi LR 54 IA 248 where it was held that having regard to a consensus of judicial decisions excepting that in Jagannadha Vs. Papamma (1893) 16 Mad 400, an arrangement made on the adoption of a minor whereby the widow of the adoptive father is to enjoy his property during her lifetime, or for a less period, that arrangement being consented to by the Datural father before the adoption, is to be regarded as valid by custom. 'As soon, however, as the arrangements go beyond that, i.e. either give the widow property absolutely or give the property to strangers they think no custom as 10 this has been proved to exist and that such arrangements are against the radical view of Hindu law.' An agreement or consent by the natural father is not effectual in law or by custom to validate any other disposition taking effect after the adoption and curtailing the rights of the adopted son in property in which he acquires a present and an immediate interest by virtue of the adoption. The High Court of Madras, however, has held that an agreement between the adopting mother and the natural father whereby a portion of her husband's estate is settled upon her for her absolute use and enjoyment with powers of alienation is valid and binding on the adopted son, If the agreement is fair, reasonable and beneficial to him. (3) Though an agreement going beyond that sanctioned by custom does not bind the minor, it is not void, and it may be ratified by the adopted son on attaining majority, in which case he will be held bound by it." For the third proposition, the learned author relies on the Privy Council case of Ramasami Vs. Vencatramaiyan LR 6 IA 195. 14. The learned author, Mayne on 'Hindu Law and Usage' (l1th edition), paragraph 203 page 260 observes as follows :- "The Bengal under the Dayabhaga law, where a father bas the absolute power of disposing of his property, be may couple with his authority to the widow to adopt, a direction that the estate of the widow shah not be interfered with or divested during her life, or indeed any other condition derogating from the interest which would otherwise be taken by the adopted son. In provinces governed by the Mitakshara law, where a son obtains by birth by a vested interest in his father's ancestral property, a person who has once made a complete and unconditional adoption could not derogate from its operation either by deed during his life time or by will, unless the property is impartible. But no coparcenary is however constituted between the adopter and the adopted son in respect of the former's self-acquired property. Where a man made a disposition of part of his property which was valid when made, and as part of the same transaction took a boy in adoption, the father of the will, and assenting to them, and knowing that the testator would not have made the adoption without such assent, it was held that the will was valid against the adopted son. It has been held in Bombay that it the parent of the boy, when giving him in adoption, expressly agrees with the widow that she shall remain in possession of the property during her life time, and she only accepts the boy on those terms, the agreement will bind him, as being made by his natural guardian, and within the powers given to such guardian by law. But if the stipulations of the contem poraneous agreement are unreasonable, for instance, if they in vest the widow with powers to be exercised not for her own benefit but for her daughter or brother, they are invalid. In one case, Lord Macnaghton said that it was difficult 'to understand how an agreement by a natural father could prejudice or affect the rights of his son, which could only arise when his parental control and authority determined and that if conditions were attached to the adoption, the analogy, such as it is, presented by the doctrines of Courts of Equity in this country relating to the execution of powers of appointment would rather suggest that, even in that case, the adoption would have been valid and the conditions void'. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that an ante-adoption agreement when it formed part of the negotiations preceding the adoption, and was embodied in the deed of adoption, came within the powers of the father acting as guardian of his son in giving him in adoption, and would bind the son if 'the agreement in regard to the property was in itself a fair and reasonable one, and one Which, taken as part of the contract for the adoption, was for the minor's benefit, as being a condition on which alone the adoption would be made." 15. The earliest case on the point is the Privy Council case of Ramai samiayan and others Vs. Venkataramaiyan alias Chidambaraiyan LR 6IA 196 where the natural father of a boy entered into an agreement with the adoptive mother that the boy would inherit only a third of the property of his adoptive father. Their Lordships laid down that the agreement was not void but was at least capable of ratification when the adopted son attained majority. 16. It is to be noted that the phrase 'void' has been used in the sense that the agreement is not enforceable as against the adopted boy. Their Lordships laid down that the agreement was not void but was at least capable of ratification when the adopted son attained majority. 16. It is to be noted that the phrase 'void' has been used in the sense that the agreement is not enforceable as against the adopted boy. All the same, their Lordships have definitely laid down that the agreement is capable of ratification by the adopted son after he attains majority, which means that it is unenforceable during his minority, but capable of ratification after attaining majority. It is only in this sense that the phrase 'void' has been used, which only indicates that it is voidable at the instance of the adopted son. The learned counsel for the respondents laid great stress on the use of the word 'void', but I am unable to understand it in the light suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents. 17. This Privy Council case was followed by Batten, A.J.C. in Korat Vs. Pancham 6 MPLC 57=12 NLR 29, where in the learned Judge held that where at the time of adopting a son an agreement was entered into between the natural father of the adopted boy and the adoptive father that there will be no partition of the ancestral property during his life time, the agreement was binding on the adopted son as being reasonable condition which only limited the son's enjoyment of the property during the life time of his adoptive father, and therefore, such a condition was valid. 18. The question was further considered by Their. Lordships of the Privy Council in Krishnamurthi Ayyar Vs. Krishnamunhi Ayyar and another LR 54 IA 243, wherein Their Lordships laid down that where an ante-adoption agreement was made by the natural father with the person proposing to adopt the boy, agreement would be valid to the extent of the custom sanctioned, but if an agreement were to be made by the natural father subsequent to the adoption, he would not be able to limit the rights of the adopted son; as consequent upon the adoption, the adopted son's right to property begins which cannot be curtailed by any subsequent agreement. Their Lordships further laid down that as soon as the arrangement go behind a reasonable custom, that is, they either give the widow property absolutely or give the property to strangers, no custom to that effect can be proved to exist and such arrangement would be against the radical view of the Hindu law. Their Lordships also laid down that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that all arrangements, consented to by a natural father, and of benefit to the boy with truncated rights would be valid. There are two limitations laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council; one is that it should be an agreement in accordance with the custom sanctioned and secondly it should not be a device whereby the adopted boy and the person adopting enter into a device to share property and moreover, no property should be disbursed to strangers. Only under such circumstances an ante-adoption agreement would be valid. 19. It is, therefore, to be seen if the present agreement falls within the rules laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the two cases mentioned above. These two Privy Council cases have been applied by the Indian High Courts under different circumstances. It may be interesting to note the different eventualities. 20. In Vyasacharyabin Narayanacharya Vs. Venkubai Kom Ramgacharya and another ILR 37 Bom 251, a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had to consider whether an agreement between the natural father and the adopting widow giving property to the adopting widow's daughter was valid. The agreement was repudiated by the adoptive boy after attaining majority. The learned Judges held that the agreement was not binding on the adopted son and the settlement was not enforceable. That was perfectly correct having in view the rule laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramasami Vs. Vencatramaiyan LR 6IA 196, as it was an arrangement giving part of the property to a stranger, namely, the sister of the adopted boy. This case was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant and in my opinion, it dots not very much assist the appellant in any manner. 21. The question was also considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Visalakshi Ammal Vs. This case was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant and in my opinion, it dots not very much assist the appellant in any manner. 21. The question was also considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Visalakshi Ammal Vs. Sivaramien and another ILR 27 Mad 577 where the natural father of the adopted boy entered into an agreement with the adopting widow with certain properties mentioned in schedule 2 were to be enjoyed by the adoptive mother as limited estate during her life time and after her death, the adopted boy was to get them. Differences arose and during the minority of the adopted boy a suit was filed on his behalf for possession of the properties mentioned in schedule 2. The learned Judges held that the agreement was binding on the adopted son, as it was within the scope of a reasonable custom. 22. The case of Banarasi Das and others Vs. Sumat Prasad and others AIR 1936 All 641 was a case of an agreement between the natural guardian of the adopted boy and the adoptive mother, whereby the latter was to enjoy the family property in limited right during her life time. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench upheld the agreement on the ground that it was within the rule laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Krishnamurthi Ayyar Vs. Krishnamurthi Ayyar and another (supra) LR 54 IA 248 and sanctioned by custom. 23. The case of T. Raju Vs. Nagammal and another ILR 52 Madras 128 was a case of an ante adoption agreement between the natural father of the adopted boy and the adoptive mother, whereby the latter had been given some portion of the family property in absolute right. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench upheld the agreement on the premises that it was fair and reasonable and within the rule laid down by custom. The learned Judges also discussed and explained the Privy Council case of Krishnamurthi Ayyar Vs. Krishnamurthi Ayyar and another (supra) 54 IA 248. 24. The case of Anant Nilkanth and another Vs. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench upheld the agreement on the premises that it was fair and reasonable and within the rule laid down by custom. The learned Judges also discussed and explained the Privy Council case of Krishnamurthi Ayyar Vs. Krishnamurthi Ayyar and another (supra) 54 IA 248. 24. The case of Anant Nilkanth and another Vs. Lala Rupnarayan and others 32 MPLC 129=ILR 1945 Nag 693 decided by Bose, J. (as he then was) and J. Sen, J. was not a case of an ante-adoption agreement, but was a case of an agreement between the limited owner and the reversioners, whereby she had surrendered her life interest in favour of the next reversioner subject to a provision for her maintenance and residence during her life time. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench held that such an agreement was reasonable and, therefore, enforceable, as it was not a device for dividing the estate with the reversioner, or a cloak for reserving a substantial portion of an estate for the benefit of the limited owner so as to render invalid a relinquishment of her life interest in her husband's entire property. 25. The case of Pachigolla Venkatarao and others Vs. Palepu Venka\eswararao and others AIR 1956 AP 1 decided by a Division Bench was a case of an agreement between the adoptive father and the natural father of the adopted boy curtailing the adopted son's right of disposition of property. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench held that such an agreement was invalid. Naturally, an agreement which curtails the rights of the adopted son to dispose of the property after it vests in him may be rendered invalid, as his right to whatever property or interest he gets is absolute. Such .a custom may be held not established. 26. The case of Makkapati Purnananda Sastri Vs. Chintalapati Purnanandam and others AIR 1961 AP 435 was a case of an ante-adoption agreement between the adoptive mother and the natural father of the adopted son, whereby a portion of the estate was absolutely given to the adopting mother for her maintenance. The learned Judges of the Division Bench upheld the agreement on the ground that it was reasonable and sanctioned by custom. 27. The case of Punjabrao Deorao Vs. Sheshrao Slo Baburao and ethers AIR 1962 Bom 175 decided by a Division Bench of Tambe and Raju, JJ. The learned Judges of the Division Bench upheld the agreement on the ground that it was reasonable and sanctioned by custom. 27. The case of Punjabrao Deorao Vs. Sheshrao Slo Baburao and ethers AIR 1962 Bom 175 decided by a Division Bench of Tambe and Raju, JJ. was a case of an ante-adoption agreement between the adoptive mother and the adopted son that the latter would be an exclusive owner of 1/3rd of the family property, while the remaining property would belong to the adoptive mother The learned Judges upheld the agreement observing that it was for the adopted boy to prove that the agreement was unfair, unreasonable and not beneficial to him; and in the absence of any such proof, the agreement was valid. 28. It is, therefore, pertinent to note that the tests laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramsami Vs. Vencatramaiyan (supra) and Krishnamurthi Ayyar Vs. Krishnamurthi Ayyar and another (supra). have been applied by the Indian High Courts to different circumstances with varied permutations and combinations. So far as the tests laid down by Their Lordships are concerned, they have to be applied to the facts of each particular case. There can be no hard and fast rule in that behalf. But the real tests would be whether an ante-adoption agreement is reasonable, as sanctioned by custom and whether it is not a device on the part of the adoptive mother or the father to share property with strangers. It is true that in some of the cases decided by the different High Courts mentioned above, it might be argued that the rule laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council has been exceeded. But, I am of the opinion that the real test would still be the one laid down by Their Lordships on which the reasonableness of the agreement has to be judged, It has been held that an agreement whereby the adoptive mother enjoys all the family property during her life time in limited right would be valid, as being sanctioned by custom. Similarly, in some cases it has been held that the adoptive mother being entitled to a right of maintenance and residence, the agreement, if it provides for certain property in absolute right in recognition of her right of maintenance and residence, would be valid. Similarly, in some cases it has been held that the adoptive mother being entitled to a right of maintenance and residence, the agreement, if it provides for certain property in absolute right in recognition of her right of maintenance and residence, would be valid. There can be no general proposition that £In agreement giving certain property in absolute right would be rendered invalid in all circumstances. 29. To conclude, I am of the opinion that an ante adoption agreement might be upheld only on the ground of a reasonable custom; and secondly that it is not a device to share property either with the adopted son or with any stranger. These are the essential tests which ought to be applied to every case, although the validity of an ante-adoption agreement might depend on the particular facts of each case, having in view the circumstances, as also the terms of the agreement. The question will not be whether the property is given in limited right or absolute right to the adoptive mother, nor will the question be as to in what shares the property is to be enjoyed by the adoptive mother and the adopted son. But, the sum and substance of all the circumstances and the terms of the agreement have to be considered together to decide whether the agreement is fair and reasonable, and not a device for sharing the property either between the adoptive mother and the adopted son, or with strangers. 30 The terms of the agreement in the present case have already been reproduced earlier. They indicate that during the life time of the adoptive mother, she was to enjoy certain portion of the family property in absolute right and that after her death the same was to go to the adopted son. Merely because certain house about 23 in numbers are mentioned, it cannot be stated that this was a device by the adoptive mother to get the lion's share of the family property. Those houses appear to be small and fetching an income of about Rs. 52 - per month. As regards the ornaments, the adoptive mother would be able to retain them as her Stridhan. On the whole, applying the tests laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council, I am unable to subscribe to the view that the agreement in the present case was invalid. 52 - per month. As regards the ornaments, the adoptive mother would be able to retain them as her Stridhan. On the whole, applying the tests laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council, I am unable to subscribe to the view that the agreement in the present case was invalid. The same has to be upheld as a reasonable one within the scope of the custom established. Moreover, the fact that some of the family property might be given to an adoptive mother in absolute right would be neither here nor there. Before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 that might have been a relevant consideration. But, although the agreement might have been prior to the said Act, as the case comes up for decision after the said enactment, even an agreement giving certain property to the adoptive mother in absolute right has, in my opinion to be upheld, provided the two tests laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council are fulfilled. 31 moreover, the ante adoption agreement was given effect to by the Court of Wards, as is clear by the Darba, order dated, 28-1 0-1941 (Ex. P-2). Moreover the adopted son, after he attained majority, can be said to have ratified the same, as he acted on it for a number of years. He never repudiated the agreement after he attained majority some time in the year 1941. I have already indicated earlier that the agreement is not void at its inception, but would only be unenforceable and would be voidable at the instance of the adopted son, as clearly laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council. Therefore, with due respect I am unable to subscribe to the view of the learned judges of the Madhya Bharat High Court in the case decided on an earlier occasion that such an agreement is to be considered as void. For this reason also, the, said decision cannot be considered to be a judicial precedent, as it is clearly contrary to the dictum laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council. 32 As a result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. For this reason also, the, said decision cannot be considered to be a judicial precedent, as it is clearly contrary to the dictum laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council. 32 As a result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree passed by the Courts below is set aside and the appellant's suit for declaration that the property in her possession is not liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree in favour of respondents 1 to 4 is granted. Consequently this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. Counsel's fee in this Court according to schedule or certificate, whichever be less. Leave for filing Letters Patent appeal is refused.