Judgement NAIK, J. :- The non-applicant (accused), Bundelkhand Transport Company, was convicted by the Magistrate First Class, Chhatarpur, under Sec. 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for committing breaches of Rules 111 and 147-A of the Central provinces and Berar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), framed under the Act, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25/- or, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five days on each count. On revision, the Sessions Judge, Chhatarpur, has reported the case to this Court under Sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recommending that the conviction and sentences of the non-applicant (accused) be set aside, inter alia, on the ground that even if it had been established that there was no first-aid box containing all the prescribed articles and no speedometer in working order when the vehicle was checked, there could be no culpable breach of the Rules because the contents of the first-aid box could be removed and the speedometer could get out of order in the course of the journey without the owner of the vehicle coming to know of it; and consequently unless it were proved that the vehicle had no first-aid box and a speedometer in working order when it started on its journey, the owner could not be liable for any breach of the said Rules. In the opinion of the learned Sessions, Judge, unless there was carelessness, negligence or mens rea on the part of the owner, a conviction under Sec. 112 of the Act was not permissible. 2. In my opinion, the reference is misconceived. 3. Under Rule 111 of the Rules, 'every motor vehicle ..............shall be fitted with an instrument (hereinafter referred to as a 'speedometer') so constructed and in such 3 position as at all times readily to indicate to the driver of the vehicle the speed at which the vehicle is travelling'. Similarly, under R. 147-A of the Rules, 'every pub-lie service vehicle shall carry a First Aid Box No. 3 containing the articles specified in the Rule'. Similarly, under R. 147-A of the Rules, 'every pub-lie service vehicle shall carry a First Aid Box No. 3 containing the articles specified in the Rule'. Rule 96 then provides : "No person shall use and no person shall cause or allow to be used or to be in any public place any motor vehicle which does not comply with the rules contained in this Chapter, or with any order thereunder made by competent authority. Nothing in this rule shall apply to a motor vehicle which has been damaged in an accident while at the place of the accident or to a vehicle so damaged or otherwise defective while being removed to the nearest reasonable place of repair or disposal." 4. It is common ground that at the time the vehicle was checked its speedometer was not functioning and it did not contain a first-aid box No. 3 complete in all respects as required by the Rules. There was thus o breach of Rules 111 and 147-A ibid. The question then is whether the non-applicant, which is the owner of the vehicle, can be held liable for the breach. 5. A crime usually consists in an 'actus reus', viz., a whole situation forbidden by Saw, and a mens rea, viz., a criminal intent. Sometimes, as in statutory offences, certain situations are absolutely prohibited, and it is then said that for such situations mens rea or the requisite criminal intent is not required. But, even so, there must be proved to exist the 'situation forbidden by law' or actus reus. 6. Again, in criminal law the general common law rule is that there is no vicarious liability unless created by the statute except in the case of common law public nuisance, because the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se has not generally been imported into It. Whenever the statute creates vicarious liability by express terms viz., by saying that whoever by himself, or through his agent or servant, does any act shall be liable etc., there is no difficulty and the principal is liable. But, sometimes words are used which are somewhat ambiguous and then we have to determine what would best subserve the object of the legislation for which it was enacted. 7. In Mousell Bros. But, sometimes words are used which are somewhat ambiguous and then we have to determine what would best subserve the object of the legislation for which it was enacted. 7. In Mousell Bros. v. London and North Western Rly., 1917-2 KB 836 at p. 845, Atkin, J. said : "I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed. If authority for this is necessary it will be found in the judgement of Bowen L.J. in Reg v. Tyler, 1891-2 QB 588 at p. 592." 8. Under Rules 111 and 147-A of the Rules, the prohibition regarding a defective speedometer and a first-aid box containing the prescribed articles is so absolute that it appears that the Legislature intended us to dispense with that requirement of mens rea; but even so, the actus reus must still be established by the prosecution, in order to bring the accused within the letter of the Rules. This is furnished by R. 96 of the Rules, which provides that no person shall use and no person shall cause or allow to be used or to be in any public place any motor vehicle etc. As this requirement has still to be satisfied, we shall therefore have to consider whether the non-applicant owner had done any of these things. 9. As for the expressions 'cause' and 'allow' are concerned, there can be no doubt that they, like the words 'permit' and 'suffer' import a requirement of knowledge. As this requirement has still to be satisfied, we shall therefore have to consider whether the non-applicant owner had done any of these things. 9. As for the expressions 'cause' and 'allow' are concerned, there can be no doubt that they, like the words 'permit' and 'suffer' import a requirement of knowledge. How can a man suffer a thing to be done when he does not know 'of it' said Lord Coleridge, C.J. in Somerset v. Hart, 1884-12 QBD 360 at p. 362; and this is now the accepted view : (see Lomas v. Peek, 1947-2 All ER 574 and Ferguson v. Weaving, 1951-1 KB 814 at p. 820). And as pointed out by Prof. Glanville Williams, where Knowledge is required by implication from the statute, the knowledge means personal knowledge and the knowledge of a servant is not imputed to the master except in certain 'licencee' cases. There being no proof of knowledge, the non-applicant owner could not be held guilty of the breaches in question under the aforesaid expressions. 10. We are, however, yet left with the word 'use'. I have asked myself the question "whether the non-applicant owner could be said to have 'used the defective motor vehicle' within the meaning of the said rules, and I am of opinion that on the preponderance of judicial authority, it must be held that he had so used it. 11. When words denoting 'legal transactions, such as, 'use', 'sell', 'carry', etc. are used, they have a double content - one connoting the physical act of 'user', 'sale' or 'carriage', and the other of legal relationship. In interpreting criminal statutes, Courts have to read such words in both senses, so that net is thrown over both the servant who physically uses, sells or carries, and the master who legally uses, sells or carries, and the master becomes vicariously liable for criminal liability without proof of mens rea or even knowledge. 12. In interpreting criminal statutes, Courts have to read such words in both senses, so that net is thrown over both the servant who physically uses, sells or carries, and the master who legally uses, sells or carries, and the master becomes vicariously liable for criminal liability without proof of mens rea or even knowledge. 12. In Griffiths v. Studebakers, Ltd., 1924-1 KB 102, a motor-car belonging to the defendants, who were holders of a limited trade licence in respect of it, was driven, on a public road, by one of their employees, contrary to the express orders of the defendants, with more than two passengers in it, in breach of the Road Vehicles (Trade Licences) Regulations, 1922, it was held that the defendants were responsible in law for breach of the Regulations, notwithstanding that they had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the breach, on the ground that they were 'using' the car in contravention of the Regulations. Lord Hewart, C.J., dealing with the contention that the employers could not be held guilty of breach of the Regulations when they had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the breach, and especially when the car was not being physically used by them when the breach occurred, said (at p. 106) : ".............it would defeat the scheme of this legislation if it were open to an employer, whether a company, a firm, or an individual, to say that although the car was being used under the limited licence in contravention of the conditions upon which it was granted : 'My hand was not the hand that drove the car'." 13. The question was again considered in James and Sons Ltd. v. Smee and Green v. Burnett, 1955-1 QB 73 at p. 86 both of which were disposed by a common judgement. In the case of James and Sons Ltd., 1955-1 QB 78 the defendants owned a motor-lorry and a trailer. In order that the braking system should be in proper order when the lorry was drawing the trailer, a brake cable on the lorry had to be connected to a brake cable on the trailer, so that the trailer's brakes could be operated by a lever in the cabin of the lorry. In order that the braking system should be in proper order when the lorry was drawing the trailer, a brake cable on the lorry had to be connected to a brake cable on the trailer, so that the trailer's brakes could be operated by a lever in the cabin of the lorry. When, on 10-11-1953, the police stopped and checked the lorry and the trailer, they found that the cables were not connected due to the negligence of the driver and his assistant, both servants of the defendants, so that the 'braking system of the trailer was not in working order. The defendants were charged with 'permitting to be used' on a road a trailer, the braking system of which had not been maintained in good and efficient working order, in contravention of regulations 75 and 101 of the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations, 1951; and as 'permitting' imported a state of mind and as there was no evidence that the defendants by any responsible officer permitted in any such sense the user by their driver in contravention of the Regulations, the defendants were acquitted. Parker, J., speaking for the majority of the Court (at p. 90) said : "..........while the driver of a vehicle on the road uses that vehicle within the meaning of regulation 101, so also, if he be a servant, does his master whether that master be a private individual or a limited company, provided always that the servant is driving on his master's business. It cannot be said that only the servant uses and that the master merely causes or permits such use. In common parlance a master is using his vehicle if it is being used by his servant on his business, and there is still room for the application' of the words 'causes or permits' since he may request or permit a friend to use the vehicle." ** ** ** ** ** ** ** "The defendants were, however, charged with permitting the use, in contravention of regulation 75, which in our opinion, at once imports a state of mind. The difference in this respect was pointed out as long ago as 1894 by Collins, J. in Somerest v. Wade, 1894-1 QB 574 at p. 577, where he pointed out the difference between an absolute prohibition against a licensee selling to a drunken person and a prohibition against permitting drunkenness. The difference in this respect was pointed out as long ago as 1894 by Collins, J. in Somerest v. Wade, 1894-1 QB 574 at p. 577, where he pointed out the difference between an absolute prohibition against a licensee selling to a drunken person and a prohibition against permitting drunkenness. In the latter case he must be shown to have known that the customer was drink before he, can be convicted : cf. also 1951-1 KB 814. Knowledge, moreover, in this connection includes the state of mind of a man who shuts his eyes to the obvious or allows his servant to do something in the circumstances where a contravention is likely, not caring whether a contravention takes place or not : cf. Goldsmith v. Deakin, (1933) 50 TLR 73, Prosser v. Richings, (1936) 52 TLR 677 and Churchill v. Norris, 1938-158 LT 255. In the present case there is no evidence that the defendants by any responsible officer permitted in any such sense the user by driver in contravention of the regulation." In the sister case of Green v. Burnett, (1955) 1 QB 78, the owners and the driver were charged with unlawful user of a motor-van on which a certain part of the braking system was not maintained in good and efficient working order and properly adjusted contrary to regulations 75 and 101 aforesaid. They were both convicted for using the motor-van in its defective condition. Lord Goddard, C.J. based ins decision on the ground that the Regulations laid down art absolute prohibition against user in contravention thereof and that, accordingly, the offence against both the respondents was clearly proved. 14. The word 'used' was again interpreted in a similar fashion in Quality Dairies (York) Ltd. v. Pedley, 1952-1 KB 275. In that case York Producers Ltd., a sub-contractor of the defendants milk distributors 'used' a vessel which was not in a state of thorough cleanliness before use as required by regulation 26 of the Milk and Dairies Regulations, 1949. It was held that the distributors were responsible as for 'using' themselves. Parker, J., delivering the judgement of the Court, said : "It was contended.........before us that although they were distributors within the regulations, and although they sold the milk to the hospital, they were not personally using the bottle in question, and therefore cannot be held guilty of an offence against the regulation. Parker, J., delivering the judgement of the Court, said : "It was contended.........before us that although they were distributors within the regulations, and although they sold the milk to the hospital, they were not personally using the bottle in question, and therefore cannot be held guilty of an offence against the regulation. This, however, begs the question, since it can, in our opinion, properly be said that the use of the bottle by York Producers Ltd. was use by the defendants." 15. The conviction of the non-applicant under Section 112 of the Act for contravention of Rules 111 and 147-A of the Rules was thus proper. 16. The reference is, therefore, rejected.