Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed beyond 90 days and the Civil Miscellaneous Petition, which accompanies the revision petition, is for excusing the delay in filing the revision. My learned brother Madhavan Nair, J. issued notice on both the C.R.P. and the C.M.P. for excusing delay on 18th September 1961. Both the main case and the C.M.P. for condoning delay come up for final disposal before me. 2. The learned advocate of, the respondent seriously opposes the petition for excusing the delay. It is well settled that there is no statutory period of limitation for filing a revision under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is also no right of revision conferred on any party, whereby he may request the High Court, as of right, to revise an order passed by a Subordinate Court against him. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 is purely a matter of discretion and the High Court may call for the record of any case decided by a Subordinate court and if the High Court is satisfied that the subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the High Court may revise the order and make any other order as it thinks fit. Strictly speaking the High Court has the power to exercise this jurisdiction at any time without reference to any prescribed period of limitation and that suo motu. That being the case, if a matter comes to the knowledge of the High Court and if it is also found that the subordinate court has acted either without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may revise the said order. In the present case notice having been issued in the Civil Revision Petition itself and the matter in the Civil Revision Petition itself having been brought up before the High Court, which the High Court has the power to hear and dispose of suo mote, there is no point in going into the merits or demerits of the petition for excusing delay and dismiss the revision petition on the ground of delay, if really there is a case for interference in revision in the main case itself. Therefore, I do not seriously consider the objections raised by the respondent to the petition for excusing the delay and I allow that petition. 3. Then comes the Civil Revision Petition itself. The agriculturist debtor in a petition for relief under Act XXXI of 1958 is the petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition, his petition having been dismissed by both the lower courts. The petitioner's case is that he executed a mortgage over the plaint property in favour of the respondent on 22nd March 1954 and took back the same on lease. His further case is that though the recital of consideration in the mortgage deed is Rs. 500/-, a sum of Rs. 400/- alone was paid; and he further alleges that on 25th February 1956 he paid an amount of Rs. 100/- towards the mortgage money. Both these latter contentions have been found against by both the lower courts and therefore, it has to be held that the mortgage amount is Rs. 500/-. 4. The next question is whether S.11 of Act XXXI of 1958 applies to the case. According to the petitioner he took back the property on the same day as the mortgage. But it appears from the evidence that the original of Ext. D1, which is a copy of the lease back, was executed on 25th March 1955, that is more than an year after the mortgage. Then arises the question whether S.11 applies to a case, where the mortgage and lease back are not on the same day. There is nothing in S.11 to indicate that the mortgage and lease back should be on the same day or they must constitute the same transaction to attract the provisions of the section. S.11 (6) provides that sub-sections 2 to 5 of S.11 shall not apply to mortgages, where the property mortgaged has been leased back to the mortgagor by the mortgagee and to such mortgages Cls. (a) and (b) of sub-section (6) shall apply. This provision, I mean sub-section (6) of Sec. 11, does not say that the lease back must be on the same day as the mortgage. (a) and (b) of sub-section (6) shall apply. This provision, I mean sub-section (6) of Sec. 11, does not say that the lease back must be on the same day as the mortgage. If, by virtue of a lease back, the mortgagor is in possession of the property mortgaged, whether the lease back is on the same day as the mortgage or on a subsequent date thereto, and if the mortgage is subsisting, to such mortgages clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (6) shall apply. Under clauses (a) and (b) of this sub-section the mortgage shall be deemed to be a simple mortgage from the date of the lease back and the provisions of the Act shall apply to the debt covered by the mortgage and the interest payable on the mortgage amount after the commencement of the Act shall be 5 per cent per annum. At this stage it is interesting and instructive to note the wording of S.11 (6.) (a), which clearly indicates that the legislature had in mind not only a lease back of the same day as the mortgage, but a lease back of a subsequent date as well. For, sub-section (6) (a) reads that the mortgage shall be deemed to be a simple mortgage "from the date of the lease back", which evidently means that prior to that date the mortgage may not be deemed to be a simple mortgage. This contemplates a case like the present one, wherein the lease back was on a date subsequent to the date of the mortgage and therefore S.11 (6) applies to this case. 5. The next question (and that is the ground on which the lower courts dismissed the petition) is whether the petitioner should have deposited the 1st instalment within the period of six months from the commencement of Act XXXI of 1958. This question has no relevancy now, because by Act II of 1961 S.4 of Act XXXI of 1958 has been completely amended and recast. Sub-section 5 of this amended S.4 clearly says that the debtor shall not forfeit the benefits conferred by this section if any instalment of any debt is not paid on the due date, the creditor having been in his turn given only the right to recover such instalment as provided for in S.10 of the Act. Therefore, on both the grounds the petitioner is entitled to succeed. 6. Therefore, on both the grounds the petitioner is entitled to succeed. 6. The learned advocate of the respondent has raised two other grounds, regarding the maintainability of the petitioner's appeal to the lower appellate court and regarding the deposit of the subsequent instalments. I am inclined to think that those objections have no relevancy in this Civil Revision Petition. 7. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore allowed, the order of the lower court is set aside and the petitioner's application for relief under Act XXXI of 1958 is allowed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs in the Civil Revision Petition. Allowed.