This is an appeal under S. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act against an order of the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act to determine the amount; of compensation which a workman is entitled to get on account of accidents. The res­pondent Baruni Kurmi was admittedly working in the Lalbag T. E. an Out-garden of Dalu T. E. and is a workman within the meaning of the Work­men's Compensation Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') Respondent's case is that on the 19vn January, 1959 while she was carrying a load of sun-grass over a high tilla she accidentally fell down and broke her right-knee resulting in per­manent total disablement. (2) Section 2(1) (g) of the Act defines 'partial disablement as-• "where the disablement is of a temporary nature, such disablement as reduces the earning capacity of a workman in any employment in which he was engaged at the time of the acci­dent resulting in the disablements, and where the disablement is of a permanent nature, such dis­ablement as reduces his earning capacity in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at that time : provide^ that every injury specified in Schedule I shall be deemed to result in per­manent partial disablement". Total disablement' has been defined under Sec­tion 2 (1) (1) of the Act as follows.- " 'total disablement' means, such disable­ment, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement: provided that permanent total disablement shall be deem­ed to result from the permanent total loss of ('he sight of both eyes or from any combination of injuries specified in Schedule I where the ag­gregate percentage of the loss of earning capacity, as specified in that Schedule against those in­juries, amounts to one hundred per cent". (3) The contention of the appellant is that there is no evidence to prove the fact that the respondent has been permanently disabled due to the accident in the course of her employment. The respondent examined herself. She has stated that on 19-1-1959 while she was working in -he garden carrying sun-grass on her head she acci­dentally fell down and broke her right knee. She was treated in the garden hospital, but the in­jury is still there and she has become unable to do any work due to the injury. The respondent examined herself. She has stated that on 19-1-1959 while she was working in -he garden carrying sun-grass on her head she acci­dentally fell down and broke her right knee. She was treated in the garden hospital, but the in­jury is still there and she has become unable to do any work due to the injury. In her cross-examination she has admitted that she was treated in the hospital- About 6 or 7 days after she was dis­charged from hospital she went to work in the garden. She was asked to clear the nursery. After that she did not go to work any more. She received her wages for that day. She did not report to the Manager or Sardar that she was absent from work due -o her injury. She also did not go to the doctor for further treatment. The Sardar has been examined on her behalf. He states that after her release from hospital the respondent went to work in the garden for one day only under him. She was asked to clear jungle in the nursery. Generally people clear the nursery in a sitting potion. She was however unable to do it sitting. She did some work that day after winch she went away home. In his cross-examination no doubt he stated that he did not visit her house and that she also did not send any information. The appellant has pro­duced the Manager of the T. E- He has stated that she was discharged from, the hospital on the recommendation of the Chief Medical Officer on 7-6-1959. During her stay in hospital she was given compensation. After discharge she attend­ed work for one day only and received full wages. She did not report to him about her inability to work after that day. The Company has further examined the As­sistant Medical Officer of the Dalu T. E. .He has stated that after the injury was received by for on the 19th January 1959 she was taken lo the hospital. The injury was a fracture of the right knee- She was admitted into (the- indoor hospital and was treated- On the 23rd January 1959 she was transferred; to Lalbag Central Hospital for better treatment. He states 'hat she was operat­ed again on 31st January 1959 by Dr. Misra and was discharged on the 16th February 1959 when she came to Dalu Hospital. He states 'hat she was operat­ed again on 31st January 1959 by Dr. Misra and was discharged on the 16th February 1959 when she came to Dalu Hospital. She complained of the stiffness to him. Then he treated her. On 7th June 1959 she was discharged after she was fully recovered. Except for a little stiffness of the knee she had no other complaint. There was no par­tial or total disablement. In cross examination however, he has stated that no X'ray plate was sent from Lalbag and he could not affirm that X'ray was taken in this case. In his opinion the respondent has not become disabled permanently due to the injury. This is the state of the evidence on the record. It is very difficult1 on this state of evidence to say that the finding of the Commissioner is based on no evidence. It can also not be said that the in­ference drawn by the Commissioner is so un­reasonable and perverse that his decision can be regarded as against law. (4) Mr. Dam for the appellant has very strenuously contended that the conduct of the respondent after she joined duty after she was treated in the hospital fully shows, that she was never disabled. If she in fact was not able to work after she worked for a day in the garden, one would have expected in the normal course that she would go to the hospital for further treatment or report to the Manager that she was unable to work on account of the permanent: dis­ablement. She kept quiet for a long time till in 1960 the Union was approached and the applica­tion for compensation was filed. I do not think that any such inference can be drawn from that fact. If she had been thoroughly treated in the two hospitals and then worked for a day in the garden and found that she was unable to work, normally one would not expect from her that she will again go to the hospital and try for any further treatment. Her failure therefore to go to the hospital after she had worked for a day in the garden and found that she was no fit to work, cannot be said to be consistent with the Theory that she was never disabled on account of the injury received by her. Her failure therefore to go to the hospital after she had worked for a day in the garden and found that she was no fit to work, cannot be said to be consistent with the Theory that she was never disabled on account of the injury received by her. She was also not in a position to produce any other evidence of her disability, except her own statement and the state­ment of the Sardar under whom she worked for a day after her discharge from the hospital. It is contended that the conduct of the Sar­dar is such, that no reliance can be placed on his evidence. I do not think that the assessment of Evidence is a question which can be examined by this court in appeal. But apart from that, on the face of it, I see nothing to disbelieve his state­ment. The Doctor's evidence is only his opinion. It is not a case where the doctor examined her at the time of making the application so that his opinion being the opinion of an expert would have carried much weight as to whether she was on the date of the application disabled totally or not. The doctor has. given his opinion Based on his examination at the time when she was dis­charged from the hospital in June 1959 and he seems to be of the opinion that she was comple­tely cured- In this state of the affair I cannot say that the evidence of the doctor can be con­clusive of the fact that on the date when she made the claim she failed to prove that she was permanently disabled. (5) Much reliance is placed on the medical report about her condition on the 16th February 1959. This report reads as follows: "Wound healed by first intention. Recovery uneventful. She has got some swelling of the knee joint and limitation of movements. Advised rest and gradual active exercise of the knee". Even this report shows that on the 16th February 1959 she had some swelling of the knee joint and limitation of movements and she was advised rest. Thereafter only one medical report was given about her condition at the Dalu hospital dated 7th June 1959. The report shows that the patient has been discharged who left for her house at Laliagh Outgarden. Thereafter only one medical report was given about her condition at the Dalu hospital dated 7th June 1959. The report shows that the patient has been discharged who left for her house at Laliagh Outgarden. There is a note attached to the history given in this report which reads as follows: "On 7-6-59 the patient has been discharged from Daloo Hospital as she is fit for light work". These two report's also show that on the date when she was discharged, she was not completely cured and was fit. It is true that these reports do not in so many words say that she was permanently disabled but they do not exclude the possibility of her permanent disablement. It can­not therefore, be said that there is no evidence (or the Commissioner to come to the conclusion that she has been completely disabled. The Com­missioner examined her himself. It is true that in the absence of any other evidence the examina­tion by the Commissioner himself in court about the condition of the injury cannot be conclusive. But that can certainly be relied upon in support "f the other evidence on the record and the circumstances of the case. It is also true that the opinion of the Commissioner On examina­tion was opposed to the definite opinion of the medical man, the medical opinion has got to be preferred, but as I have already pointed out, the medical opinion only relates to the time when the respondent was actually discharged from the hospital and not to the time of the application made, for compensation. When she was discharg­ed from the hospital obviously the wound caused by the operation must have healed up and ap­parently there was nothing else which the doctors could do and she had to fie discharged. Whether she still was suffering and was disabled will be a matter which can be evident only after she had been discharged from the hospital. It can­not, therefore, be said that there is any conclu­sive evidence on any medical report which can necessarily go against the opinion formed by the Commissioner by his own examination supported by the evidence produced before him. (6) Reliance has been placed on the case of Panchanan Ghose v. Bhaggu Bari, AIR .1950 Cal 261. It can­not, therefore, be said that there is any conclu­sive evidence on any medical report which can necessarily go against the opinion formed by the Commissioner by his own examination supported by the evidence produced before him. (6) Reliance has been placed on the case of Panchanan Ghose v. Bhaggu Bari, AIR .1950 Cal 261. That was a case where the finding of the High Court was that from the evidence on the record it was not established that the petitioner was a workman at all, and there was no evidence to take the alleged disability to be permanent. It. was further observed in that case that- "A finding as to incapacity or the extent of incapacity cannot be founded upon mere medical certificates which are the worst form of hearsay evidence. They merely record what somebody who is not a witness has written. Similarly, it is not proper for the Commissioner to base such finding upon his own observation of the injured workman". The doctor has been examined in the present case in court and it is not a case where the Commis­sioner has relied upon the medical certificate. As to the other observation relied upon I do not think that it applies to the facts of the present case. As I have already indicated the decision in that case mainly rested upon the findings that the applicant has failed to prove that he was a work" man but apart from that the court had relied only upon his own observation before him. In the present case there was an evidence of the Sardat and the applicant herself and if this evidence is believed coupled with the observation of the Com­missioner during the course of the inquiry, it can­not be said that there was no evidence besides the opinion of the Commissioner himself held on per­sonal examination during the inquiry. (7) The next .case relied .upon is Steel Pro­ducts Ltd. v. Amelda, AIR 195.1 Cal 145. In my judgment the case has no Bearing on the facts of the present case. There a person who was a fitter had an attack of cerebral thrombosis with progressive cerebral oedema and died. A claim for compensation was made for his death and the only question was whether the Commissioner without any evidence to connect the disease with the work he was doing at the time had awarded compensation. There a person who was a fitter had an attack of cerebral thrombosis with progressive cerebral oedema and died. A claim for compensation was made for his death and the only question was whether the Commissioner without any evidence to connect the disease with the work he was doing at the time had awarded compensation. It was held °n appeal by the Calcutta High Court that on the mere fact that the man died of the thrombosis and cerebral Oedema without connecting the death to the employment no compensation could be awarded. No objection can be taken to this broad proposi­tion of law. In the present case if the evidence is accepted that she was disabled, there can .be no ground to hold that the disability was due to anything else except the accident or fall in the course of her employment. (8) The next case relied On. is Laxmibai Atma-ram v. .Chairman and Trustees, Bombay Port Trust, AIR 1954 J3om .180. That was a case where the order of the .Commissioner was upset. it was held that the Judge Co doubt has to ap­proach every problem that comes before him with compassion and humanity but ultimately when he comes to a decision he has got to decide according to law even though he may find the law harsh and cruel. In this case there was the medical evidence to the effect that the heart attack was due to the strain of work but the Com­missioner had rejected that medical opinion and had based his decision on other circumstances. The High Court on appeal held that in view of the direct medical evidence to .the effect that the heart attack was due to the strain of the heart nerves as a result of the work, the evidence of the doctor could not be ignored. Each case W'U thus depend upon its own facts and the circumstances. In the result, therefore, in my opinion St cannot be said that the Commissioner has com­mitted any error of law. His findings are based on evidence and the inference drawn by the Com­missioner is neither unreasonable nor perverse. In the circumstances the appeal fails but the par­ties will bear their own costs of this appeal. EF/H/V.B.B. Appeal dismissed.