ORDER Shivdayal J. - l. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The challenge is against an order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, granting a regular casual contract carriage permit to the Chhattisgarh Motor Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Raipur, (respondent 3), in respect of one vehicle for the area of Raipur, Durg and Bastar districts. 2. The petitioner's grievance is two fold:- (1) No notice was given to the petitioner of the application made by the third respondent. The grant of the permit to respondent 3 is prejudicial to the petitioner's right and it has no other remedy but to invoke the powers of this Court under Article 226. (2) The permit is of an unheard nature and has been granted in utter disregard of the law. 3. The impugned permit was granted in these circumstances. On November 21, 1961, an application under section 49 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter called the Act), was made to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, for grant of a regular casual contract carriage permit in respect of one Vehicle for the area of Raipur, Durg and Bastar districts. This application was not notified to anybody. On December 4, 1961, Mr. S.K. Ghosh, Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, put up a note to the Commissioner, Raipur District. The commissioner affixed his signature on the following day. This is all that was done. 4. No return has been filed either by the Regional Transport Authority or the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority. A return has been filed by respondent 3 in which these facts are not disputed. 5. It is a preliminary objection raised for the third respondent that as no appeal or revision was filed by the petitioner, the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. Section 64 (f) of the Act is a provision relied on by the respondent 3. It runs thus: "Any person being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached there o.........may.........appeal... ......" Under this clause it cannot be enough that a person provides transport facilities. It is further necessary that he should have opposed the grant of the permit in favour of the respondent. ......" Under this clause it cannot be enough that a person provides transport facilities. It is further necessary that he should have opposed the grant of the permit in favour of the respondent. The expression "having opposed the grant of a permit" is a prerequisite which must be fulfilled and in the absence of which there is no right of appeal. It is a condition precedent to filing an appeal under section 64 (f), of the Act that, he appellant must have opposed the grant of a permit and this must be established factually. In the present case the impugned order was passed behind the back of the petitioner and without any notice to him. He could not, therefore, file a representation or oppose the grant of the permit sought. He had no right of appeal therefore. 6. Under the new section 64-A the State Transport Authority has been vested with powers of revision in cases in which no appeal lies, but the proviso debars the State Transport Authority from entertaining any application from a person aggrieved by an order of the Regional Transport Authority, if it is not made within 30 days from the date of the order. No power is given to the revisional authority to extend the prescribed time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been made applicable to a revision under this section. The petitioner has stated that he became aware of the impugned order in April 1962. This is not controverted in the return, except a bald allegation that the petitioner came to know about the grant of the permit the very next day. It is not stated who gave the petitioner that information and how he got it. It was, therefore, not possible for the petitioner to file a revision under section 64-A within 30 days of the impugned order. No revision can be entertained under section 64-A after the expiry of 30 days from the date of the impugned order. The State Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain any application after the expiry of the prescribed time. 7. Another preliminary objection raised by Shri R.K. Pandey is that the petitioner has no locus standi. It is argued that no person can be aggrieved by a permit granted under section 50 of the Act unless and until he comes within one of the categories enumerated in the section. 7. Another preliminary objection raised by Shri R.K. Pandey is that the petitioner has no locus standi. It is argued that no person can be aggrieved by a permit granted under section 50 of the Act unless and until he comes within one of the categories enumerated in the section. As to this preliminary objection, suffice to say that in paragraph 4 of the return filed by respondent 3. it is stated that the petition of was granted three contract carriage permits which have already been renewed upto March 31, 1964. That being so, the petitioner is a person "already holding contract carriage permits" within the meaning of section 50 of the Act. 8. It is then contended by the learned counsel that the contract carriage permits which the petitioner holds are not in respect of the same route or area for which respondent 3 has been granted a permit under the impugned order. It is true that the permit granted to respondent 3 is in respect of the area of Raipur, Durg and Bastar districts and the petitioner has no contract carriage permit for all these three districts, but his permits are only for Raipur region. In our view, it is sufficient to bring a person within section 50 of the Act if he holds a contract carriage permit "in the region" although it may not be for the entire area for which the permit is applied for under section 49. 9. Having thus disposed of all the preliminary objections we would advert to the main grounds urged in the petition. In considering an application made under section 49 of the Act the Regional Transport Authority is bound to ;- (1) have regard to the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest; and (2) take into consideration any representations ;- (a) which may then be made, or (b) which may previously have been made by persons or authorities enumerated in the section. We have pointed out at the outset all that was done in granting the permit to the respondent 3. No notice was given to any boy of the application for grant of the permit which was made under section 49 of the Act. This is conceded by respondent 3. We have pointed out at the outset all that was done in granting the permit to the respondent 3. No notice was given to any boy of the application for grant of the permit which was made under section 49 of the Act. This is conceded by respondent 3. It appears that respondent 3 just entered the office of the Regional Transport Authority; the Secretary just jotted down certain remarks with the concluding recommendation "if the R.T.A. considers proper the permit will be granted for area as applied for"; and the Commissioner, Raipur; (R.T.A.) just put a signature "C. L. Gupta, 5 12." without writing any other word. This order can by no means be legitimately supported. Shri R.K. Pandey found himself in unsurmountable difficulty because he could not possibly argue that the Regional Transport Authority complied with the imperative requirements of section 50 appointed out above. Even the report or comments or recommendation, by whatever name the Secretary's note may be called, is completely divorced from the considerations which the law enjoins to be present in the mind of the Authority while considering such an application. 10. It is argued for respondent 3 that in the absence of any provision requiring a notice to be given or the application being published for general information, the order of the Regional Transport Authority cannot be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution merely for went of notice. Now, on a careful perusal of section 50 of the Act it is clear that the Regional Transport Authority must also take into consideration "any representations" made by the persons and authorities named in that section. It is true that the procedure prescribed for the publication of an application for stage carriage permit under section 57 (3) of the Act is not applicable to an application for a contract carriage permit made under section 50. But the wording of clause (6) of section 57 makes it abundantly clear that a representation can be made by persons or authorities referred to in section 50 to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted in any region or any area is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or the area. Whenever such a representation is made, the Regional Transport Authority may take any such steps as it considers appropriate for its hearing in the presence of persons likely to be effected thereby. The combined effect of sections 50 and 57 (6) of the Act is that representations can be made and such representations must be considered. It, therefore, cannot be doubted that these provisions necessarily contemplate a notice to be given to the persons and authorities named in section 50. It is implicit in the language of section 50 read with section 57 (6) of the Act that before an application under section 49 can be allowed notice must be given to (1) all persons already holding contract carriage permits in the regions, (2) all local authorities in the region and (3) the police authority in the region. In the absence of any particular procedure or method by which such notice should be given, it is open to the Regional Transport Authority to adopt any ordinary or rational method of giving a notice. That would be sufficient. But it cannot be said that as there is no procedure prescribed, no notice need at all be given even to the holders of contract carriage permits in that region. It is patent enough that such persons may legitimately be expected to make representations as there is a likelihood of their being adversely affected. See Bejoy Krishna Vs. R.T.A. Calcutta, 61 CWN 590. We think that this view alone accords with the cardinal rule of natural justice that no order should be passed to the prejudice of a person without giving him an opportunity of being heard. 11. The entire proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority presents an unusual and extraordinary appearance. A regular casual contract carriage permit has been granted for the entire Commissioner's division like a blank cheque book to be used irrestrictively at the pleasure of the grantee in utter disregard of all can ns of the law and the mandatory provisions of section 50 and to the complete prejudice of others who hold contract carriage permits. Inspite of notice of this petition being given to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, and its Secretary also, neither of them has either put in appearance or instructed the Government Advocate or even filed a return. Inspite of notice of this petition being given to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, and its Secretary also, neither of them has either put in appearance or instructed the Government Advocate or even filed a return. This Court will, therefore, not be unjustified in assuming that the action on the part of the Regional Transport Authority and its Secretary was deliberately high handed. 12. This petition is allowed. The order of the Regional Transport Authority dated December 5, 1961, and the permit granted in pursuance thereof are quashed. The petitioner shall get his costs from the contesting respondent (respondent 3), Counsel's fee Rs. 250.