JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - Is a defendant's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing the plaintiff respondent's suit for a declaration of his title as bhumidhar in possession of certain plots of land. The plaintiff Mahendra Nath, a minor, alleged in his plaint that he was the khudkasht-holder of the land, having inherited it from his ancestor who had been in possession since 1943, that the defendant Lalta Pandey had managed to obtain in collusion with the Patwari a fictitious entry in the Khasra of 1356F. describing him as khudkasht holder; that the defendant was taking advantage of the plaintiff's minority and interfering with his possession, hence the suit. The defendants Latta Pande and Sant Sahai Pande, who are brothers resisted the suit and claimed that the land was settled with them by the ancestor of the plaintiff ten years before the suit and they had been in their possession ever since. They claimed that they were tenants and not khudkasht holders and alleged that any entry recording them as khudkasht holders was false and probably obtained by the plaintiff in collusion with the Patwari; that in any case they were in possession of the plots in 1356F, and 1359F, and had acquired adhivasi rights. Both the courts below disbelieved the defendant's story that the land had been settled with them by the ancestors of the plaintiff or that they had ever been in possession, and rejected their evidence of settlement as "highly inconsistent and unreliable." They also held that the defendants had not been in possession either in 1356F, or 1359F, and had acquired no adhivasi rights on the basis of possession. It was, however, argued before the appellate judge (hut not before the trial court) that the defendants should be deemed to have become adhivasis because of the entry in the record of 1356F, in their favour. He rejected this,plea on the ground that the entry described the defendants as khudkashtholders whereas their own case was that they were tenants, and held that they could not rely on an entry which was inconsistent with the defendant's own case and manifestly incorrect. One of the defendants has now come to this Court in second appeal. 2. Mr. He rejected this,plea on the ground that the entry described the defendants as khudkashtholders whereas their own case was that they were tenants, and held that they could not rely on an entry which was inconsistent with the defendant's own case and manifestly incorrect. One of the defendants has now come to this Court in second appeal. 2. Mr. K. B. L. Gaur, learned counsel for the appellant who argued this appeal with great tenacity, contended that the appellate court erred in holding that the entry in 1356F, did not confer any rights of adhivasi on the defendants. This was the only point urged in support of this appeal. Mr. Gaur conceded that in second appeal he must accept the findings of the court below that they were not the tenants of the land and had never been in possession and that the entries in the revenue papers of 1356F, were incorrect, but contended that these findings did not affect the defendant's claim to be regarded as adhivasis. It was not at all necessary under Cl. (b) that an adhivasi must have been in occupation of the land in 1356F., for it merely required the existence of an entry recording him as an occupant. The Court cannot inquire whether the person in fact occupied the land, for the entry itself, right or wrong, conferred a title on the person in whose favour it is made. Lastly, counsel argued that it was not necessary under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 that the word `occupant' (qabiz) must actually be used, for the entry can be express or implied. If a person is recorded as tenant or sub-tenant and so on, the Court can infer from the words of the entry and the surrounding circumstances that it means an occupant. Mr. Gaur contended that after the court had held that the appellants were wrongly recorded as khudkasht holders it was bound to reject the words "khudkasht holders" and hold that the defendants were virtually recorded as occupants of the land in their own right. Mr. Jagdish Swarup for the respondent contended that the entry describing the defendants as khudkasht holders is not an entry recording them as occupants as required under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act and they never became adhivasis. 3. Mr. Jagdish Swarup for the respondent contended that the entry describing the defendants as khudkasht holders is not an entry recording them as occupants as required under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act and they never became adhivasis. 3. The only question in this appeal is whether on the facts found by the lower appellate court the defendants can claim to be the adhivasis of the land under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 on the basis of the entries in the revenue papers. Counsel's argument makes it necessary for me to interpret the meaning of the phrase "recorded as an occupant" in the light of the purpose and principle underlying Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 and its relation to the general scheme of the Act. 4. Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 provides in effect that a person who was recorded as occupant of any land (other than certain specified categories of land) in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. prepared under Sec. 28 and respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 shall, unless he has become a bhumidhar under Sec. 18 or Asami under Sec. 21, be called adhivasi of the land and be entitled to take or retain possession of it. 5. This Sec. created a class of tillers called adhivasis (the word Adhivasi means occupant) and conferred on them a right to the land which they had been cultivating before the abolition of zamindari. Its object apparently was to protect the rights of persons who had been tilling the land but could not for reasons beyond their control, show any ostensible right or title. 6. To claim the status and rights of an adhivasi under Cl. (b) a person has to prove that in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, he was recorded as "an occupant." The qualifying words in this clause are not "who was an occupant" but "who was recorded as an occupant." The existence of an entry in his favour in the khasra or khatauni makes him an adhivasi and he is entitled to retain possession of the land or regain it if he had already been evicted, after 30-6-1948. 7. The provisions of Cl. 7. The provisions of Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act are unusual as they appear to confer a valuable property right on a person on the basis of mere existence of an entry recording him as an occupant regardless of its incorrectness and the person adversely affected by it is deprived of the opportunity to prove that he was never in occupation of the land at all. If the clause is interpreted literally, the effect may be that any person with a clear title to the land and in actual cultivation can be deprived of his property simply because some one else may have been incorrectly recorded as its occupant by the patwari in the khasra - not even the khatauni - of single year, 1356F. 8. The purpose of this clause and the principle underlying it do not appear to have been discussed uptil now though the meaning of the phrase "recorded as an occupant" has been considered in several decisions of this Court some of which are not easily reconciled with one another. In Kamta Pandey v. Banarsi Chaubey, S.A. No. 364 of 1952 (an unpublished decision) B. Dayal, J. held that a person can claim the benefit of Cl. (b) only if he was actually recorded as an occupant but not if he is recorded only as a tenant or sub-tenant etc. and the court is asked to infer that he was also in occupation. In Bhagwan Das v. Board of Revenue, W.P. No. 1950 (another unpublished decision) V. Bhargava and B. D. Gupta, JJ. held that an entry in 1356F, recording a person as a cotenant could not lead to the conclusion that he is recorded as an occupant. In Swami Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1960 A.L.J. 241 a Full Bench of this Court held that the word "occupant" in Sec. 20 means a person who occupies or has the actual user on his own behalf but he need not have any interest in the land and may be a trespasser provided he claims an exclusive right to occupy the land on his own behalf. In Jagdish Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1956 A.L.J. 347 it was held that persons belonging to the class of licensees, marfaldars, or sajhis cannot claim the benefit of adhivasis even if they are re-corded as in occupation as these persons are in possession of land as agents of some one else. In Bhagwali v. Board of Revenue, 1959 A.L.J. 479 R. Dayal and Srivastava, JJ. held that an entry recording a person as a mortgagee does not confer on him the benefits of an adhivasi as a mortgagee is in possession not on his own behalf but that of the mortgagor. In Futta v. Board of Revenue, 1956 A.L.J. 351 Agarwala and Chaturvedi, JJ. held that the entry in the record of rights envisaged in Sec. 20 should have been made by the Patwari in the ordinary, course of his business. It would follow front this that an entry which is fraudulent or forged by the Patwari is ineffective. But in Hukum Singh v. Board of Revenue, W.P. No. 508 of 1956 (another unpublished decision) Desai and Beg, JJ. held that the question whether an entry is fictitious or genuine is irrelevant and not a matter into which the Court can inquire. In Lala Nanak Chand v. The Board of Revenue, 1955 A.L.J. 408 Agarwala and Chaturvedi, JJ. (who earlier decided Futta v. Board of Revenue, 1956 A.L.J. 351 held that it was not necessary that an entry recording a person as an occupant should be correct and that the person should have been in actual possession. In Pershudi v. Kunwar Sen, 1955 A.L.J. 882 Roy, J. held that the decision in Lala Nanak Chand's cases, 1955 A.L.J. 408 could not be construed as laying down a general principle of law that in all cases the entry of a person's name as an occupant in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, should be the determining factor irrespective of how that entry came about. 9. The Supreme Court had to consider the meaning of the word "occupant" in Cl. (b) in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills v. Khalil-ur-Rahman, 1961 A.L.J. 27. Their Lordships observed that the word `occupant' must be given its ordinary mean-ring which is a person in occupation, and so long as a person has been in occupation in his own right he will be entitled to the rights conferred under :Sec. 20(b). (b) in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills v. Khalil-ur-Rahman, 1961 A.L.J. 27. Their Lordships observed that the word `occupant' must be given its ordinary mean-ring which is a person in occupation, and so long as a person has been in occupation in his own right he will be entitled to the rights conferred under :Sec. 20(b). The Court further held that the entry in 1356F. is not conclusive as regards the status of the occupant and the court can enquire whether his status is correctly recorded. Their Lordships rejected the argument, based on the principle enunciated in Lala Nanak Chand v. The Board of Revenue, 1955 A.L.J. 408, that the Court cannot examine the correctness of the entry, and made an observation which in effect put a question mark across the correctness of the view taken in Lala Nanak Chand's cases, 1955 A.L.J. 408 (and in other decisions) that "it was not necessary that the person recorded as occupant should also have been in occupation," though their lordships left the question unanswered. 10. The learned Judges who decided Lala Nanak Chand v. The Board of Revenue, 1955 A.L.J. 408 observed that an interpretation of Cl. (b) according to which a person incorrectly recorded as an occupant becomes entitled to the land appeared startling because it conferred "unjust advantages on persons who had wrongly got their names recorded in 1356F. as occupants," but they suggested that possibly the Legislature in its wisdom thought that to avoid future litigation and uncertainty of tenure it would be better if the record were deemed to be correct unless the correction had been ordered to be made before the date of vesting. The learned Judges observed, "The courts of law are not concerned with the wisdom of the legislature" and "they have to administer the law as they find it." 11. With respect, I think that though the Court cannot interfere with any law on the ground that it does not agree with its policy, it may have to ascertain the purpose and policy of law - as for example, where the language is obscure or the literal meaning would lead to manifest injustice and alternative meanings are possible - so that the Court's interpretation of it will sub-serve and not frustrate that policy or purpose. The Court will not lightly impute unwisdom to the legislature which is composed of elected representatives of the nation who arc presumed to know its problems as well as the Judges, and should search for a rational and equitable principle behind a law which at first sight appears unjust. The meaning and scope of an unusual provision like Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act should be interpreted after ascertaining the entire scheme of the Act, the purpose which the provision was intended to achieve, and the social evil it was meant to remove. 12. I do not think ,that the sanctity attached to the entry in the khasra and khatauni of 1356F. was due to a desire to avoid future litigation. No such sanctity was conferred on entries evidence in together categories of rights and even in the case of adhivasi rights based on cultivatory possession in 1359F., the existence of a mere entry recording a person as in cultivatory possession was not considered sufficient and proof of actual possession plus cultivation was required. It cannot be that the legislature was worried over the prospect of litigation over one class of rights but indifferent to litigation over all other rights. 13. I think that clause (b) of Sec. 20 was enacted to solve a specific problem and is founded on a rational and just principle. It is well known fact, of which the court can take the judicial notice, that before the abolition of the zamindari system in this State a very large number of persons were cultivating land under informal arrangements with the zamindars but could show no patta or lease or other documentary evidence of title. In Oudh there was a wide-spread practice among land owners not to execute any patta or agreement conferring right or title on the cultivator with the result that though he was tilling the land under an informal arrangement with the landlord, he could establish no right and be recorded in the revenue records merely as "occupant" (qabiz). If all these persons had been put to the proof of their title as sirdars, they could only set up oral arrangements or agreements which would be difficult to prove against the word of the powerful land owners. If all these persons had been put to the proof of their title as sirdars, they could only set up oral arrangements or agreements which would be difficult to prove against the word of the powerful land owners. But they were all tillers of the soil and entitled to protection in view of the declared policy of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and apparently Cl. (b) was included primarily for their benefit. It was, therefore, thought fit to make the entry in the khasra or khatauni serve as proof of the fact that the person in whose favour it was made was in occupation of the land as a tiller in his own right. It must have been realised that the advantage of such a provision might go to some trespassers and others who were in illegal possession of the land, but individual cases of abuse are inevitable in a incise devised for the protection of large class of persons. 14. Thus interpreted, Cl. (b) is in accordance with the general scheme of the Act which confers rights on all kinds of person who were the actual tillers of the soil on the date when zamindari was abolished. In fact, it is an essential part of that scheme. Sec. 10 protects the right of tenants of sir, Sec. 12 of the kadars, Sec. 14 of mortgagees in personal cultivation of the land, Sec. 16 of occupants of land in which no superior rights existed. Sec. 18 of intermediaries who held the land as sir, khudkasht or groves and of fixed-rate-tenant, rent-free-grantees, occupancy tenants, hereditary tenants, and certain other class of holders, Sec. 19 of land and certain other classes of tenants, such as holdings on special terms in Oudh. Thus the Act contains detailed provisions for protection of the rights of the tillers of the soil who were cultivating it under some title which was recognised and entered in the revenue records. But a large number of tillers, due to circumstances beyond their control, could show no title and claim no benefits under these provisions. For their benefit Cl. (b) provided that a person who was recorded as an "occupant" in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, should be an adhivasi and entitled to retain or regain possession. It may be described as a charter of rights for tillers without title. For their benefit Cl. (b) provided that a person who was recorded as an "occupant" in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, should be an adhivasi and entitled to retain or regain possession. It may be described as a charter of rights for tillers without title. The entries in the year 1356F., which corresponded to 1948-49 A.D., were selected presumably because in that year the Committee appointed by the U.P. Legislature published its report containing a detailed scheme for the abolition of zamindari and protection of the rights of all tillers including those who could furnish no proof of title except an entry in the revenue papers describing them as occupants (qabiz). To eliminate fraudulent claims based on manipulated records, the entries already made by the patwari in the ordinary course in the Fasli year immediately before the publication of the report alone were accepted as proof of occupation. 15. But the legal foundation of an adhivasis rights under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 is his occupation of the land as its tiller and not the entry in the record of 1356F, which is merely evidence of occupation in fact, the only evidence which the State will recognise. The practical result may be the same in most cases, but the point is of juristic importance. An entry by a patwari cannot operate as a grant by the state nor confer any rights of property, but if it was made in the ordinary course of his duties it can be recognised under the law as conclusive proof of the facts recorded therein. But if the entry itself is treated as a grant or source of property rights, this will introduce an unusual concept in law and jurisprudence and can lead to strange results. In case of conflict between the entry in the khatauni and the khasra; there will be two conflicting titles; but no such implication can arise if the entries are regarded as proof of occupation, for where entries are in conflict the Court can determine on evidence which is correct. The various decisions of this Court in which it was held that a person can become an adhivasi only if he was in occupation in his own right imply that an adhivasi's title is founded on his occupation, and the entry in 1356F, serves as proof of his occupation. The various decisions of this Court in which it was held that a person can become an adhivasi only if he was in occupation in his own right imply that an adhivasi's title is founded on his occupation, and the entry in 1356F, serves as proof of his occupation. This is also made clear by the languages of Sec. 21 which prescribes the circumstances under which a person in occupation will be deemed to be an asami and not adhivasi. In Cl. (b) a person claiming to be an adhivasi on the basis of an entry in 1356F, is described as a person "referred to in sub-Sec. (1) of Cl. (b) of Sec. 20 who on the date immediately proceeding the date of vesting occupied or held land as occupant." He is not referred to as a person "who is recorded as an occupant" but as a person "who occupied or held land - as an occupant." Further down the clause makes a distinction between cases where ''the land was - occupied" prior to 9th April 1946 and those where it was occupied after that date. Thus it is clear that the foundation of the right of an adhivasi under Sec. 20(b) is his occupation of the land - a fact to be proved by the entry in 1356F., no other manner of proof being permitted. 16. I shall now consider the nature and the language of the entry required under Cl. (b). It requires that the person should have been "recorded as an occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F, prepared under Secs. 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act." Mr. Gaur argued that it is not necessary that the word `occupant' (qabiz) should be used in the entry, and any word is sufficient from which the Court can infer that the person was in occupation - as for example, tenant, sub-tenant and so on. I cannot agree. This clause was not included for the protection of tenants and others whose rights are fully safeguarded under other Sections of the Act but of persons who had been tilling the land in their own right but could not show any better evidence of their title than an entry describing them as occupants. The word `occupant' has been advisedly used and does not mean a tenant or sub-tenant who may be in possession. The word `occupant' has been advisedly used and does not mean a tenant or sub-tenant who may be in possession. It means a person in occupation which is not the same thing as a person in possession. An owner may be in possession but not in occupation. Upper Ganges Sugar v. Khalil-ur-Rahman, 1961 A.L.J. 27. Moreover, a person is recorded as "an occupant" in the Khatauni or the Khasra only under circumstances which are prescribed in the rules made under Sec. 234 of the Land Revenue Act according to which the khasra and kliatauni must be maintained. These rules are contained in the Land Records Manual published by the U.P. Government. 17. In my view, before a person can claim to be an adhivasi under Cl. (b) he must show that he is recorded as "an occupant" (qabiz) in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F, prepared under Secs. 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. Cl. (b) therefore requires proof of two facts - first there must be an entry in either the Khasra or Khatauni recording the person as "occupant" (qabiz); and secondly, the entry must have been made in a Khasra or Khatauni prepared under Secs. 28 and 33 respectively of the Land Revenue Act - in other words, in the ordinary course of his duties by the patwari in charge. If either of these two conditions is not established, the person cannot claim the rights of an adhivasi 18. Secs. 28 and 33 of the Land Revenue Act furnish a clue to the circumstances in which an entry recording a person as an "occupant" should be made in the Khasra or Khatauni in accordance with the rules. Khasra is a field book and Khatauni a record of rights. Sec. 28 requires that the Collector shall maintain a map and field-book of each village in accordance with rules made under Sec. 234 and Sec. 32 likewise enjoins that there must be record of rights for each village in accordance with these rules. Sec. 33 requires the Collector to maintain this record of rights which must be amended annually or at such longer intervals as the State Government may prescribe. The rules under Sec. 234 are contained in the Land-Record Manual. The entries in the Khasra are to be made in accordance with form P-3 attached to R. 6. Sec. 33 requires the Collector to maintain this record of rights which must be amended annually or at such longer intervals as the State Government may prescribe. The rules under Sec. 234 are contained in the Land-Record Manual. The entries in the Khasra are to be made in accordance with form P-3 attached to R. 6. And the succeeding rules contained detailed instructions how these entries could he made. Entries describing different classes of tenants are provided for under different rules. R. 73 provides for entries for grove-holders, 76 for owners in cultivation (khudkasht holders), 77 for tenants and sir and khudkasht, 78 for thekedars" and mortgagee's cultivation, 79 for usufructuary mortgagees, and 87 for tenants of various kinds and sub-tenants. In addition, there are specific provisions for entering persons as occupants of land who cannot be entered under any of these categories. For instance, R. 85 provides that where a tenant left the neighbourhood without leaving in charge of his folding any person responsible for the payment of his rent and without giving a written notice to landholder of such arrangement, the Patwari will show the tenant's name in Col. 5 of the Khasra with the addition of "ferar" in red ink, and the name of the actual cultivatory will be shown in the remarks column with the word "qabiz." Again Cl. (e) of R. 87 provides that in Col. 6 of the Khasra will be entered occupiers of land without the consent of the person whose name is entered in Col. 5 of the Khasra in Agra Col. 20 and in Oudh Col. 12 of the Khatauni. 19. There are similar provisions in the rules relating to the entries in the Khatauni which is a record of rights. These entries are to be made in accordance with the form P-11 which is amended to R. 121. R. 124 divides the arrangement of land in the Khatauni into 20 classes such as Sir of the landlords, khudkasht, and so on. Category 10-A provides for the recording of occupiers of land without title when there is no one already recorded in Col. 5 of the khasra, and category 20 for "occupiers of land without the consent of the person if anyone recorded in Col. Category 10-A provides for the recording of occupiers of land without title when there is no one already recorded in Col. 5 of the khasra, and category 20 for "occupiers of land without the consent of the person if anyone recorded in Col. 5 of the Khasra." As regards Oudh there is a similar classification of categories under R. 124-A and categories 5-A and 12 in this rule are identical with the categories 10-A and 20 relating to Agra and provide for the recording of "occupiers of land" without consent (5-A) or without title (12). 20. Thus the rules made under Sec. 234 of the Land Revenue Act prescribe the circumstances and conditions under which certain persons can be recorded as "occupants" of the land and these entries must be distinguished from others which record persons as tenants, sub-tenants and so on but cannot be the basis of adhivasi rights under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20. As explained above the rights of tenants and others are protected under other sections of the Act, not under this clause. The entry which has been made the basis of the right under Cl. (b) is regarded as sufficient proof of occupation and no other manner of proof is required or permitted for the requisition of this very valuable right which may seriously affect the rights of ether persons. For this reason this clause has to be strictly interpreted and I would hold that the words "recorded as an occupant" exclude all entries in which a person is not actually recorded as an "occupant" (qabiz) but as a tenant and so on and the Court is asked to infer that he was in occupation. This was also the view taken in Kamla Pandey v. Banarsi Chaube, S.A. No. 364 of 1952 Cl. (b) does not recognise an implied entry - that is, one which does not describe a person as an occupant but which may imply that he was one. 21. I shall now consider, in the light of the principles enunciated above, whether the entries relied on by the defendants confer adhivasi rights on them under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20. The original records were not produced before the courts below which permitted the defendants to produce certified copies. This was not a correct procedure, in my opinion. 21. I shall now consider, in the light of the principles enunciated above, whether the entries relied on by the defendants confer adhivasi rights on them under Cl. (b) of Sec. 20. The original records were not produced before the courts below which permitted the defendants to produce certified copies. This was not a correct procedure, in my opinion. Under Cl (b) the entry in the khasra or khatauni is presumed to be conclusive proof of the facts stated therein but where one party pleads that the entries are forged or fictitious, the Court should insist on the production of the original record. 22. The certified copy of the Khasra produced by the defendants contains extracts of entries made in the seven fasli years 1352 to 1359. The material year is 1356F. In the extract of that year, in Col. No. 3 headed "name of cultivator the following entry occurs; "Ram Sahai and Lalita Pande (the defendants) badastur, Ziman 2". Counsel for the appellant admitted----and it is common ground - that Ziman 2 refers to Category No. 2 of Rule 124 - namely, khudkasht holders. He also admitted that the word badastur means `as before' or `as in the previous year.' Therefore, this entry, assuming that it is genuine, records the defendants as "khudkasht holders as in previous years." Such an entry cannot confer any adhivasi rights on the defendants. In the first place, the entry does not record the defendants as occupants but as khudkasht holders. I have already explained that the rights of an adhivasi under Cl. (b) can be claimed only if the claimant is actually recorded as an "occupant" in accordance with the rules; he cannot produce an entry recording him as tenant or khudkashtholder and ask the court to infer that he was an occupant. Secondly, a khudkasht-holder cannot be an adhivasi in view of the bar of Explanation IV to Sec. 20. Thirdly, the words `as before' destroy the effect of the entry, for in the previous year, 1355F., the plaintiff's ancestor and not any of the defendants is recorded as a khudkasht-holder. Thus the entry does not even make sense and was rightly rejected as fictitious by the courts below. Thirdly, the words `as before' destroy the effect of the entry, for in the previous year, 1355F., the plaintiff's ancestor and not any of the defendants is recorded as a khudkasht-holder. Thus the entry does not even make sense and was rightly rejected as fictitious by the courts below. It is not unlikely that the Patwari, colluding with the defendants, entered their name in the year 1356F, but bungled his job and used words which make the entry ineffective for the purpose of Cl. (b) of Sec. 20. I would, therefore, hold that there is no entry in the khasra of 1356F. recording the defendants as occupants. 23. The defendants also filed an extract from the khatauni of 1359F. in which they are recorded as in possession for seven years. This entry is completely ineffective for the purpose of conferring adhivasi rights under Cl. (b). A person cannot claim to be an adhivasi on the basis of an entry in 1359F. describing as "an occupant for seven years," for no statutory sanctity attaches to the record of any year except 1356F. 24. Mr. Cour contended that after the lower court had discarded the words `khudkasht holder' in the entry as an incorrect description of the defendant's status as an occupant, it was bound to accept the rest of the entry as virtually recording the defendant as an `occupant.' There are two short answers to this argument. First, the Court below did not reject merely the word khudkasht-holder but the entire entry as farzi and collusive. Secondly if the words `Ziman 2' are discarded, there is nothing else in the entry which could be recorded as describing the defendants as occupants even by implication. Under this entry they are either khudkasht-holders or nothing. Learned counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Co. v. Khalil-ur-Rahmani, 1961 A.L.J. 27 in which the Court rejected the description of the Company as thekedar in the entry as incorrect and held that it was in occupation of its own right. That judgment, as I understand it, laid down the principle that where a person is recorded as an occupant in the entry of 1356F, but his status is incorrectly described the Court may itself determine his status. That judgment, as I understand it, laid down the principle that where a person is recorded as an occupant in the entry of 1356F, but his status is incorrectly described the Court may itself determine his status. In that case the Supreme Court inquired into the status of the appellant Company and found that the respondent's own case was that the Company was in occupation as a trespasser. It does not follow that the Court is bound to hold in every case, regardless of evidence or the relevant circumstances, that the person must have been in occupation in his own right. The question becomes one of evidence. In the present case the Courts below found that the defendants had nothing to do with the land and were never in occupation in any capacity. 25. There is another reason why the defendant is not entitled to claim the rights of an adhivasi on the basis of this entry. In his written statement he alleged that the entry was fictitious and interpolated by the patvari in collusion with the plaintiffs. A person who pleads that a particular entry is forged or fictitious cannot subsequently claim any rights on the basis of that very entry. 26. Mr. Gaur in the final stages of his argument, asked for permission to amend the defendant's written statement and pleaded that the entry of 1356F is genuine. I am not inclined to grant this oral prayer which, if allowed, will enable the defendants to turn a somersault and put up a case which completely contradicts their original case. 27. Moreover, if the defendants plead that the entry recording them as khudkaste-holders it genuine, this will be fatal to their claim as adhivasis. A khudkasht-holder is an intermediary, but Explanation IV to Sec. 20 provides in effect that an intermediary cannot be an adhivasi. 28. The appeal is dismissed with costs.