MODI, J.—This is a civil regular second appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit for declaration and possession which has been dismissed by both courts below for reasons presently to be mentioned. But before I deal with the case on the merits, I feel bound to point out that this is a typical case where rules of procedure have been allowed to over-ride the dictates of justice and for no valid reason whatsoever. 2. This litigation was started on the nth April, 1947. The dispute is about a certain piece of land measuring 15 yards by 11 yards situate in the town of Bari in Mohalla Sarai which was shown as A in a rough sketch incorporated under paragraph one of the plaint. The plaintiffs put their case in this way. It was alleged that they were the owners in possession of plot B and that there was another plot A to the south of it; but as appears from the proceedings which took place subsequent to the filing of the plaint, the plot A which is in dispute is to the north of the plot B and a good deal of confusion seems to have been caused in this case because of this apparent but unfortunate mistake. The case of the plaintiffs further was that both these plots belonged to one Chena. In Smt. 1907, Chena is alleged to have granted a usufructuary mortgage of it for a sum of Rs. 65/- to one Sadasukh, and the latters son Kalla it is said transferred his mortgagee rights to the grandfather of the plaintiffs on Kati Vadi 5 Smt. 1957, as a result of which they came in possession of this plot, that is, plot B. As regards the plot A, the case of the plaintiffs was that they were also in occupation of this plot which lay adjacent to the other plot B and that they had later purchased it from the heirs and successors of Chena, the original owner, by a document dated the 28th November, 1945. The plaintiffs grievance was that the contesting defendant Ramprasad on a representation that this land belonged to the Town Council of Bari obtained a sale of it from the latter. The date of the sale is not mentioned in the plaint; but it appears from the allegations made therein that it must have taken place some time before 1941. The plaintiffs grievance was that the contesting defendant Ramprasad on a representation that this land belonged to the Town Council of Bari obtained a sale of it from the latter. The date of the sale is not mentioned in the plaint; but it appears from the allegations made therein that it must have taken place some time before 1941. The plaintiffs raised an objection before the Town Council but they were directed to have their rights decided in a competent court of law. Consequently, the plaintiffs instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for a declaration that the Town Council of Bari had no right to sell the land in question, and, therefore, the sale made by it in favour of the defendant Ramprasad was void and inoperative against the plaintiffs. It may be pointed out at this place that the plaintiffs did not make any prayer for possession in the plaint as was originally filed, but by an amendment thereof they included this prayer also and this amended plaint was filed, in court on the 27th January, 1954. The plaintiffs besides impleading Ramprasad as a defendant also impleaded the Secretary of the Town Council Bari as a party defendant. It is unfortunate that the case made no progress whatever until the beginning of 1954. The Secretary,Town Council, Bari, did not file any written statement and the suit was contested by the other defendant Ramprasad only. I shall hereinafter refer to Ramprasad as the only defendant in the case for facility of reference. 3. The defence of Ramprasad was that the plaintiffs had no right or title to the land in dispute and that it belonged to the Town Council. He seems to have admitted, however, that the plot B had been under mortgage with the plaintiffs and that the defendant had filed a suit for pre-emption with respect to the sale which had been obtained in respect of that plot by the plaintiffs and that suit was pending. The defendant also contended that the plaintiffs had not described the boundaries of the plot in dispute in their plaint and that it did not really disclose any cause of action. There is no doubt that the plaint in this case was a rather or as was sought to be made out in the application for amendment that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. There is no doubt that the plaint in this case was a rather or as was sought to be made out in the application for amendment that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. At this place I should like to take the opportunity of mentioning that I have gone into the plaint rather carefully, and as I have already adverted to above it was rather crudely drafted inasmuch as the boundaries of the plot which was the subject-matter of the suit were not mentioned at all therein and further that the disputed plot was wrongly mentioned as being in the south of the plot B while it was actually in the north of that plot: but all that notwithstanding it cannot be premised with any justification that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action particularly having regard to the circumstance that these defects which existed in the original plaint were clearly and definitely sought to be remedied by the application for amendment. The court of first instance however pointed out certain inconsistencies in the application for amendment and the so-called consequential amendment and the document of sale of mortgagee rights; but it seems to have completely forgotten that these discrepancies, if any, related to the plot B which, be it noted, is not the subject matter of dispute between the parties. The dispute between the parties relates to the plot A, and so far as the measurements of this plot are concerned, they have been consistently given by the plaintiffs as 15 yards east-west by 11 yards north-south. Then again, as regards the rather stupid error which was made in the plaint while describing the plot A which was the plot in dispute to the south of the other plot B (about which there is no dispute) this was also made patently clear by the plantiffs that the disputed plot A was really to the north of the plot B and not to its south. Reference may be made in this connection to the two applications, both made on the 22nd of February, 1955, one of which was the application giving further and better particulars of the subject-matter of the plaint and the other was the application for seeking amendment of the plaint. Reference may be made in this connection to the two applications, both made on the 22nd of February, 1955, one of which was the application giving further and better particulars of the subject-matter of the plaint and the other was the application for seeking amendment of the plaint. I am entirely unable to understand how in these circumstances the trial court came to the conclusion to which it did that the plaintiffs suit was incapable of being tried out on the merits or made the subject-matter of a decree one way or the other. The entire approach of that court, therefore, to the case seems to me to have been of a rather perfunctory character engendered by inadequate appreciation of the real facts of the case. It may also be pointed out at this place that the trial court was wrong when it observed in its order under appeal that the plaintiffs had neither filed a proper application for amendment of the plaint nor an application giving further and better particulars of their claim. It was no part of its duty at that stage to see whether the plaintiffs claim was well or ill founded because a conclusion as to that could only be reached after the case should have been tried out on the merits and each party should have had an opportunity of establishing its case by proper evidence such as it thought fit to adduce. 7. The question in these circumstances is whether the trial court had acted rightly in throwing out the plaintiffs suit in a rather summary and arbitrary manner which it thought fit to adopt. I have no hesitation in answering this question in the negative and should like to point out in unequivocal terms that the case has not had a fair deal as it should have had. I would also take the opportunity of drawing the attention of the courts below to the salutary provision contained in O. IV, r. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure which allows the court at any stage of the proceedings to permit either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, 2nd it further lays down that all such amendments should be allowed as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. The principle underlying this provision could not perhaps be better brought out than the forceful language of Bowen L. J. in Cropper Vs. Smith(6) which is this : — "...it is a well established principle that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes they made in the conduct of their cases......I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct; If it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or of grace......It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right. Can it be said in the present case that the kind of amendments which the plaintiffs wanted to make in their plaint were fraudulent or dishonest or that the allowance of them would have occasioned any injustice to the other party which could not be compensated by an appropriate order of costs if necessary. To this question, in my opinion, there can be only one answer and that is that the amendments asked for should have been allowed and the trial court committed a grave error in the exercise of its discretion in refusing them. Having regard to all the circumstances to which 1 have made detailed reference above and to prevent the further wastage of time,I would allow the amendments which the plaintiffs sought to make by their application for amendment of the plaint presented in the trial court on the 22nd February, 1955. The course which the case should take should be perfectly clear to the trial court. The defendant shall be given an opportunity to file his written statement to the amended plaint and thereafter issues shall be framed and the case shall proceed to trial without any loss of time. The course which the case should take should be perfectly clear to the trial court. The defendant shall be given an opportunity to file his written statement to the amended plaint and thereafter issues shall be framed and the case shall proceed to trial without any loss of time. It is indeed greatly to be regretted that a simple case like, the present should have been allowed to drag for very nearly fifteen years without anything substantial having been done to decide it on the merits. 8. Before I conclude I wish to deal briefly with the situation which would have arisen if I had held in agreement with the view of the trial court that the plaintiffs had failed to furnish the further and better particulars of the statement of their claim or had failed to move a proper application for amendment of the plaint. Would the trial court be justified in dismissing the suit in a situation like this under sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ? Now there can be no two opinions that speaking as a rule, it is the duty of the courts to adjudicate a case on the merits, that is, as respects the rights of the parties to an action as the result of a trial at which all the parties thereto have had a fair opportunity to substantiate their case. In other words, the dismissal of a suit should normally follow upon a trial and not before. Exceptional situations, however, do arise such as where a plaintiff absents himself at the hearing or he dies and his legal representatives are not brought on the record or the plaint discloses no cause of action whatever. In such and similar cases, the suit has to be either dismissed or the plaint has to be rejected as the case may be. But even here the Code of Civil Procedure has thought fit to make provisions which would give relief where such relief is called for. Thus where a suit has been dismissed for default of the plaintiffs appearance on the date fixed for the hearing thereof, the plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity to have his suit restored where he is able to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance such as illness or failure of communications and so on and so forth. See O. IX, r. 9 C. P. C. Similarly where a plaint discloses no cause of action, the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Court shall reject the plaint (See O. VII, r. 11) but not that the suit be dismissed and in such a case it would be open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit disclosing a proper cause of action if he chooses to do so. 9. The principle underlying all these provisions is that substantial advancement of the interests of justice by an adjudication of the contending claims of the parties on their respective merits. Judged by this fundamental test, should a court take the extreme step of dismissing a plaintiffs claim because he fails to file further and better particulars or fails to amend his plaint. No. is my answer to this question so long as the plaint discloses a cause of action which can be tried and adjudicated upon one way or the other on the allegations made therein. If the suit Can possibly proceed to trial on such allegations as have been made in the plaint, then the proper course for the court should be to proceed to try it, raise appropriate issues therein and allow evidence to be led and to pass a decree in the suit on the merits such as may be called for. To dismiss a suit under the provisions of sec. 151 C. P. C. or under any other provision under such circumstances should smack of being something in the nature of a punishment, and such a procedure, I submit, should not be lightly resorted to and would be justified in an extreme and a flagrant or contumacious case where the plaint as I have said discloses no cause of action or where the conduct of a party amounts to a clear abuse of the court. 10. Putting the whole matter from yet another angle, in so far as a case raises a question of discretion, such discretion must be exercised according to judicial principles and not in a fanciful or capricious or arbitrary manner. 10. Putting the whole matter from yet another angle, in so far as a case raises a question of discretion, such discretion must be exercised according to judicial principles and not in a fanciful or capricious or arbitrary manner. It is on this principle that maintain that the court should be always willing to allow the amendment of a pleading where there has been a clerical error or a bonafide, or an inadvertent mis-description of the property which is the subject-matter of the suit or where there has been a mistake of fact. The allowance of such Amendments tends to avoid multiplicity of suits and advance the interests of substantial justice which, after all is said and done, is the supreme object of all administration of justice. Even where such opportunity is afforded but not availed of, a further question arises whether the court should dismiss the suit. I feel disposed to answer this question by the same rest which I have indicated above namely whether it is reasonably possible to try the suit as it stands. A slight inconsistency here or there in the allegations made in the plaint, by itself, should hardly be a sufficient reason and should not be made an excuse for throwing out the plaintiffs suit and might well be left to be straightened out at the trial of the case. The point I wish to emphasize is that snap judgments serve no useful purpose and must be deprecated. This is, however, not to say that in a proper case the court has not the power and the discretion to dismiss the suit for flagrantly disobeying the orders of the court. Such power it doubtless has but it should be remembered that it has to be exercised rarely and after utmost caution and not as an expedient if I may call a spade a spade to get rid of an old case, on a possible pretext, off the courts file as is sometimes unfortunately done. 11. Such power it doubtless has but it should be remembered that it has to be exercised rarely and after utmost caution and not as an expedient if I may call a spade a spade to get rid of an old case, on a possible pretext, off the courts file as is sometimes unfortunately done. 11. Having thus indicated the correct principles which should apply in a matter like this, I would for reasons set out above at length hold that in the present case the plaintiffs had filed not only the application giving further and better particulars of die property claimed by them but they had also filed an application for being allowed to amend their plaint and with these applications having been filed, I am definitely of the opinion that there should be no vagueness or incompleteness about the subject matter of the plaint and that the court of first instance had acted rather arbitrarily in rejecting these applications and the action taken by it cannot be defended on any sound judicial principle, and I further desire to say that if it had allowed these applications as it should have, all this time would not have been needlessly thrown away. 12. In the result, I would allow this appeal, set aside the orders of the courts below and send the case back to the trial court for being proceeded with according to law in the light of the observations made above. This case shall receive high priority and shall be finally disposed of with all possible expedition. As to costs, I think that as much of the trouble has arisen in this case due to the crude drafting of the plaint and a good deal of the complications that have arisen are the director indirect outcome thereof, the parties shall bear their own costs of the appeal here and in the first appellate court ; but further costs shall abide the result.