JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - This is a special appeal by one Sharafat Ullah Khan under Ch. VIII, R. 5 of Rules of Court against an order of a learned single Judge dismissing his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The facts leading to the petition may now be briefly summarised. 2. One Sri Wasi Ullah Khan had been elected the President of the Municipal Board of Tilhar in the district of Shahjahanpur. As a result of an election petition the election of Wasi Ullah Khan was declared void with the result that a casual vacancy in the office of the President took place. The appellant was the Senior Vice-President of the Municipal Board at that time, and began to act as the President of the Board in that casual vacancy. A bye-election for the office of the President was held and, on the 8th of October 1960, the appellant was declared elected. Thereafter, on the 13th of October 1961, a notice of a motion of non-confidence in the appellant, accompanied with a copy of the motion, which had been signed by 12 of the members of the Board, was presented to the District Magistrate Shahjahanpur by six of the signatories to the motion of non-confidence. The District Magistrate thereupon convened a meeting of the Board to be held on the 15th of November 1961 for consideration of the aforesaid motion. Before the aforesaid meeting could take place the appellant filed the petition giving rise to this appeal and an interim order was passed by this Court whereby, though the holding of the meeting on the 15th of November 1961 was not prohibited, it was ordered that in case the non-confidence motion succeeded at the meeting the same shall neither be given effect to nor communicated to the petitioner by the Civil Judicial Officer who may preside at the meeting. 3. 3. The case set forward by the appellant in his petition was that, after he had been declared elected as President on the 8th of October 1960, he submitted a written resignation in respect of the office of Senior Vice-President which he held at the time, and that this resignation was accepted by the Board on the 29th of October 1960 whereafter, on the same day, he took oath of the office of the President as required by the rule framed by the local Government in exercise of its powers under Section 296 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, hereinafter referred as the "Act." The legality of the motion of non-confidence was challenged, in the main, on two grounds. The first was founded on the assertion that the appellant must be deemed to have assumed office of the President on the 29th of October 1960 on which date he took oath of office as President, and that the notice of the motion of non-confidence having been received by the District Magistrate on the 13th of October 1961, i.e. within 12 months of the 29th of October 1960, was in violation of Cl (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. The second ground was that the notice of the motion of non-confidence having been delivered to the District Magistrate by six of the signatories, there was no proper presentation inasmuch as Cl. (2) of Sec. 87-A of the Act required delivery of such notice by two only of the signatories. The prayer in the petition was for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the notices of the non-confidence motion as also the entire proceedings for consideration thereof in pursuance of the same. Another ground which was raised in the petition and urged before the learned single Judge and related to publication of the notice of non-confidence in terms of Cl. (3) of Sec. 87-A of the Act was decided by the learned single Judge against the appellant, but the decision of the learned single Judge on that ground has not been challenged before us in the course of the hearing of this appeal. (3) of Sec. 87-A of the Act was decided by the learned single Judge against the appellant, but the decision of the learned single Judge on that ground has not been challenged before us in the course of the hearing of this appeal. The petition to this court was contested and, so far as the facts set forward in the petition were concerned, the assertions therein that the appellant submitted his resignation from the office of Senior Vice-President and that it was accepted by the Board on the 29th of October 1960 whereafter, on the same date, the appellant took oath of the office of President, were denied. On the view that writ proceedings were not a proper forum for going into controversial questions of fact the learned single Judge, without entering into any discussion about the merits, and in our opinion rightly, proceeded, however, to decide the petition assuming in favour of the appellant that the aforesaid allegations were correct. On the first question the learned single Judge relied on the provisions contained in Section 46 of the Act and took the view that the appellant must be deemed to have assumed office within the meaning of that expression in Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act on the 8th of October 1960 on which date the appellant had been declared elected to the office of the President. He consequently found that the notice of the motion of non-confidence was delivered to the District Magistrate beyond a period of 12 months from the assumption of the office of President by the appellant and that, therefore, there was no violation of any prohibition contained in Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. On the second question the learned single Judge took the view that there was no material on the record to show the number of members who "delivered" the notice of non-confidence to the District Magistrate on the 13th of October 1961, that all that appeared from the material on the record was that at the time of the delivery of the aforesaid notice six of the signatories were present, and that, therefore, it could not be said with any certainty that a breach of Cl. (2) of Sec. 87-A of the Act requiring delivery of the notice by two of the signatories had been committed. In the result the learned single Judge dismissed the petition. (2) of Sec. 87-A of the Act requiring delivery of the notice by two of the signatories had been committed. In the result the learned single Judge dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal. We have heard learned counsel at considerable length and we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the learned single Judge. We now proceed to give our reasons. 4. In support of the first ground, involving the contention that the receipt of the motion of non-confidence by the District Magistrate took place within 12 months of the assumption of office of the President by the appellant, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant on a rule framed by the local Government in exercise of its powers under Section 296 of the Act. The said rule runs as follows: "The Chairman/President of Municipal Board shall before taking his seat for the first time as Chairman/President, make and subscribe before the members of the Board an oath or, at his option, an affirmation and similarly the Chairman/President shall administer the oath, or at their option an affirmation to the members, in the form set out below : Form of Oath or Affirmation. I .... having been elected/co-opted as a Member/Chairman/President of the Municipal Board of . . . do make oath and say/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of my office. Member Chairman President" 5. It has been urged that, on the assertion accepted by the learned single Judge that the appellant took oath of office as President on 29th of October 1960, he cannot be deemed until the 29th of October 1960, to have assumed office of President within the meaning of that expression in Cl. (14) (of Sec. 87-A of the Act) which runs as follows: "No notice of a motion of non-confidence under this section shall be received within 12 months of the assumption of office by a President." In the next place reliance was placed on Cl. (3) of Section 54 of the Act which runs as follows: "(3) Any Vice-President wishing to resign may intimate in writing his intention to do so to the President and on his resignation being accepted by the Board he shall be deemed to have vacated his office." 6. (3) of Section 54 of the Act which runs as follows: "(3) Any Vice-President wishing to resign may intimate in writing his intention to do so to the President and on his resignation being accepted by the Board he shall be deemed to have vacated his office." 6. The argument of learned counsel was that though, as Vice-President of the Board, the appellant was authorised by Section 55 of the Act to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the President, the appellant nevertheless continued to be the Vice-President of the Board until his resignation from the office of the Vice-President was accepted by the Board on the 29th of October 1960, and that the appellant cannot be deemed to have held the office of the President until that date. The argument is obviously founded on the hypothesis that the same person cannot, at the same time, hold both the offices. 7. The first question that arises for determination is whether the taking of oath of office as President is necessary as a condition precedent before the appellant could be deemed to have assumed office of the President within the meaning of that expression in Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. So far as the rule framed by the local Government under Section 296 is concerned, what it requires is that the President shall, before taking his seat for the first time as President make and subscribe before the members of the Board an oath or affirmation in the form given in the concluding portion of the rule. The argument on behalf of the appellant has been that there can be no assumption of office until the President has taken oath of office as laid down in the rule. Turning to the provisions of the statute itself, we find that Section 46 of the Act runs as follows: "The term of office of a President elected in a casual vacancy shall commence from the declaration of his election under the Act and shall be the remainder of the term of the Board." Be it noted that the aforesaid provision relates specially to the case of a President elected in a casual vacancy, as in the present case, and that no such parallel provision is to be found in the Act in respect of a President elected at the time of the constitution of the Board. 8. 8. The language of the statute as found in Section 46 of the Act seems to us to be perfectly clear. It is provided therein that "the term of the office of President . . . shall commence from the declaration of his election ..." There is no controversy that the election of the appellant was declared on the 8th of October, 1960. If we were to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant, the result would be that, even though the law declares that the term of office of the appellant as President of the Board commenced on the 8th of October, 1960, he will be treated as not having assumed office until a much later date. It will be anomalous to hold that the term of office of any person can begin before he assumes that office. In our opinion, the result that follows from the provisions contained in Section 46 of the Act is that, as soon as the result of an election for the office of President in a casual vacancy is declared, the office of the President must automatically be deemed to have been filled in by the person in whose favour the result is declared, and that such automatic filling in of the office by virtue of a declaration contained in the statute itself must be treated as equivalent to assumption of office by that person. All that the rule framed by the local Government enjoins is that, before taking his seat for the first time as President, he shall take oath as prescribed therein. We construe this expression "taking his seat" as referring to the duty of the President to preside at meetings of the Board, and not to any other of the various duties and powers laid down in the Act. It is to be noticed that the principal duties of a President are first enumerated in Section 50 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and they do not include the duty of presiding at meetings of the Board. The function of presiding at meetings of the Board is laid down in the Act as an additional duty which also has to be performed by the President under Section 51 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The function of presiding at meetings of the Board is laid down in the Act as an additional duty which also has to be performed by the President under Section 51 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The use of the expression "taking his seat" in the rule framed by the local Government must be held to have been used with the specific object of requiring the President to take oath before presiding at meetings of the Board while not standing in the way of his discharging other duties of his office. If we were to construe this expression as covering all the duties and powers of the President, the declaration of law contained in Section 46 of the Act shall be rendered nugatory inasmuch as, even though his term of office as President shall be deemed to have begun, he shall be powerless to perform any function of the President. In our opinion, in the case of a President elected in a casual vacancy, the assumption by such a person of his office as President must, in view of Section 46 of the Act, be deemed to have commenced as soon as the fact that he has been elected President is declared. 9. We have given reasons for our view that all that the rule requiring taking of oath appears to prohibit is the taking of his seat by the President, and that there appears to be no inconsistency between that rule and the provisions of Section 46 of the Act. We would, however, like to add that, if we were of the view that there was inconsistency between the two, we would have struck down the rule as ultra vires to the extent of its inconsistency with the specific provisions contained in Section 46 of the Act. The power of the State Government to make rules is circumscribed by the provisions of Section 296 of the Act itself inasmuch as it is laid down therein that the rules which the State Government makes shall be consistent with the Act. Therefore, to the extent to which any rule may be inconsistent with the provisions contained in the Act itself, the former has to be ignored as unauthorised and void. 10. So far as the argument founded on Cl. (3) of Section 54 of the Act is concerned, there appears to be no difficulty. Therefore, to the extent to which any rule may be inconsistent with the provisions contained in the Act itself, the former has to be ignored as unauthorised and void. 10. So far as the argument founded on Cl. (3) of Section 54 of the Act is concerned, there appears to be no difficulty. It is no doubt true that, under the aforesaid clause, any Vice-President wishing to resign has to intimate his intention in writing to the President, and it is after acceptance of his resignation by the Board that the Vice-President is to be deemed to have vacated his office. In the first instance, it appears that the provision contained in the aforesaid clause is an enabling provision to be resorted to by a Vice-President "wishing to resign." In the case of a Vice-President who seeks to be elected as President in a casual vacancy in the office of the President, his wish to resign from the office of the Vice-President seems to be implicit in the fact that he seeks election to the office of the President, though such a wish is only tentative until such time as he is declared elected as President. After the result of the bye-election has been declared what follows from the provisions contained in Section 46 of the Act is that the term of office as President, of the person declared elected, commences automatically. By virtue of this provision there remains, in our opinion, no necessity for a Vice-President who has been elected President in a casual vacancy to resort to the procedure provided in sub-Cl. (3) of Section 54 of the Act. The office of the Vice-President must, in such a case, be deemed automatically to have fallen vacant the moment the result of the election has been declared. Even on the view that it is necessary for such a Vice-President to take recourse to the method laid down in Cl. (3) of Section 54 of the Act to enable him to absolve himself of the responsibilities of the office of Vice-President, there appears no difficulty in holding that, until his resignation is accepted by the Board, such a person occupies both the offices, viz., that of the President of the Board, as also of the Vice-President of the Board. (3) of Section 54 of the Act to enable him to absolve himself of the responsibilities of the office of Vice-President, there appears no difficulty in holding that, until his resignation is accepted by the Board, such a person occupies both the offices, viz., that of the President of the Board, as also of the Vice-President of the Board. Reference in this connection may be made to the provisions contained in Sec. 43-A of the Act which runs as follows: - "No person shall be at the same time the President or Vice-President both of a Municipal Board and any other local authority: Provided that if a person is elected to any such or similar office of more than one local authority, he shall, at his option continue to hold the office in one local authority and resign from others within a prescribed period." The aforesaid provision makes it clear that, even though the Legislature specifically thought of providing against the same person holding the office of the President or the Vice-President of a Municipal Board simultaneous with such an office in any other local authority, the Legislature did not lay down that the same person cannot be a President as well as a Vice-President of the same Municipal Board. Even in this section, the provision for resigning from other offices within a prescribed period envisages that the same person will hold more than one office for a short limited period. Learned counsel has not pointed out any provision of the law under which the holding of these two offices by the same person is prohibited. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that, assuming that the letter of resignation by the appellant of his office as Vice-President of the Board was accepted by the Board on the 29th of October, 1960, the appellant must, nevertheless, be deemed to have assumed office as president on the 8th of October, 1960, on which date the result of the election was declared in his favour, irrespective of the position whether he ceased to be Vice-President on the 8th of October, 1960, or on the 29th of October, 1960. 11. Our conclusion is amply supported by numerous decisions bearing on the subject. 11. Our conclusion is amply supported by numerous decisions bearing on the subject. The first case which appears to have some bearing on the point is the decision of a Bench of this Court in Shiv Dayal v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 Allahabad 664 : 1953 ALJ 405. The question raised in that case was whether the date upon which a Chairman assumes office was one of fact or whether it depended upon the issue of notification by the Government. It was observed that there was no provision in the Act laying down the necessity of a notification, and the view taken by the learned Judges was that the date upon which a Chairman assumes office was one of fact. Gurtu, J. observed that a person who had been elected was entitled to enter upon his office immediately, and that it may be that he himself postpones entering upon his office in which case naturally it would be the date on which he starts performing his duties on which he can be said to have assumed office. Instances were cited in paras. 4, 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by Iftakhar Husain respondent No. 14 to show that, soon after the 8th of October 1960, the appellant signed various official papers as President of the Municipal Board. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellant it was asserted in para. 5 thereof that the contents of paras. 4, 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit of Iftakhar Husain were irrelevant and, in a supplementary rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellant also, the facts asserted by Iftakhar Husain in paras. 4, 5 and 6 were not denied, and all that was said was that the designation `President' was to be found below his signatures in the case of those documents as a matter of routine. The position which thus emerges from the material before the learned single Judge disclosed that the appellant did not postpone entering upon his office as President until the 29th of October 1960 but started to perform his duty as President as early as the 10th of October 1960 on which date he signed as President on an official report mentioned in para. 4 of the counter-affidavit of Iftakhar Husain respondent No. 14. 4 of the counter-affidavit of Iftakhar Husain respondent No. 14. It is thus deal that, even on the principle upon which the case of Shiv Dayal was decided the appellant must be deemed to have assumed office as President well beyond the period of twelve months contemplated by Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. 12. The decision of a Bench of this Court in Ganesh Prasad v. The District Magistrate, 1956 ALJR 58 has a direct hearing on the present case. In the aforesaid case a similar question arose with reference to the power of a member to sign a notice of an intention to make a motion of non-confidence before that member had taken the oath of his office as member. The contention raised was that such a member had no right to sign such a notice. It was held that the member must be deemed to have become the member of the Board as soon as he was declared elected even though he was not entitled to have his seat for the first time as member until he had taken the oath prescribed under the rule in question. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case was followed by Hon. Desai, J. in Narain Deo Singh v. Sri B.C. Jain and others, Writ Petition No. 3733 of 1956. D/d. 23.12.1958. The facts giving rise to the writ petition bear striking similarity with the facts of the present case. The petitioner in that case was declared elected on the 19th of October 1957 and his election was published in the Gazette of 9th of November 1957 whereafter he took the oath of office on the 29th of November 1957. The notice of an intention to make a motion of non-confidence was delivered to the District Magistrate on the 24th of November 1958 which was within a year of the date on which he took the oath of his office though beyond one year from the date on which he had been declared elected. The contention raised was that the District Magistrate received the notice in contravention of Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. The question which the learned Judge considered was whether the petitioner must be deemed to have assumed office as Chairman on the 28th of November 1957 on which date the petitioner took the oath of his office. The contention raised was that the District Magistrate received the notice in contravention of Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. The question which the learned Judge considered was whether the petitioner must be deemed to have assumed office as Chairman on the 28th of November 1957 on which date the petitioner took the oath of his office. Reference was made to the rule framed by the State Government in exercise of its power under Section 296 of the Act. The learned Judge relied on various provisions of the Act for arriving at the conclusion that there is no justification for the contention that unless the President takes the oath of his office he cannot function as President. The learned Judge's view was that all that the President was prohibited from doing until he took the oath of his office was presiding over a meeting which was only one of his powers and duties. The learned Judge held that the President must be deemed to have assumed office as President as soon as he is declared elected under Section 46 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has not cited any authority having a direct bearing on the question at issue in support of the contention raised by him on behalf of the appellant. We are in agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the appellant must be deemed to have assumed office as President on the date on which he was declared elected and that, therefore, the receipt of the notice of the motion of non-confidence by the District Magistrate on the 13th of October 1961 was not in violation of Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. 13. We now turn to the second ground urged on behalf of the appellant that there was no proper presentation of the notice of the motion of non-confidence inasmuch as the same had been delivered to the District Magistrate by six of the signatories instead of two as provided in Sec. 87-A of the Act. Stress was laid by learned counsel on the expression `only' occurring in Cl. (1) of Sec. 87-A, and it was urged that delivery of the notice by more than two of the signatories was in direct contravention of what learned counsel described as a mandatory provision of the law. Stress was laid by learned counsel on the expression `only' occurring in Cl. (1) of Sec. 87-A, and it was urged that delivery of the notice by more than two of the signatories was in direct contravention of what learned counsel described as a mandatory provision of the law. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on the observations of Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in the decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 SC 233 at 248 to the following effect: "But when the law prescribes that the intention should be expressed in a particular manner, it can be taken into account only if it is so expressed. An intention not duly expressed is, in a Court of law, in the same position as an intention not expressed at all." The learned Judge made the aforesaid observation whilst considering the powers of a Returning Officer under the Representation of the People Act and the rules framed thereunder. The question was whether the acceptance by the Returning Officer of a vote which he had no power to accept by reason of a rule under which the Returning Officer had automatically to reject certain class of votes for not being in conformity with the rules was to be treated as valid, and whether such a vote could be taken into account on the ground that the elector giving that vote for a particular candidate. It is in this connection that the learned Judge observed what has been cited above. We are of the view that the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court has no bearing on the question at issue in the Present case. Learned counsel for the appellant has not pointed out any provision of law laying down, or even indicating, that if notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the President is delivered by more than two of the members signing the notice, the District Magistrate shall refuse to receive such a notice or that such a notice shall not be deemed valid. 14. The question for consideration is: what is the real nature of the provision requiring two of the signatories to deliver the notice to the District Magistrate. 14. The question for consideration is: what is the real nature of the provision requiring two of the signatories to deliver the notice to the District Magistrate. The fact that such a notice has to be signed by not less than half of the total number of the members of the Board necessarily involves a considerable number of persons being signatories to such a notice. Normally, the law requires that, if more persons than one sign a petition or motion, the further action of presenting it should also be done by of them but, in this case, delivery of such notice to the District Magistrate by all the members signing it appears to have been considered unnecessary and the law, therefore, required its delivery by any two of such members. We construe this provision merely as one enabling two of the signatories to deliver to the District Magistrate the notice which has been signed by numerous persons. The provision that such a notice shall be delivered by two of the members does not, to our mind, mean that if more than two members are present at the time of the delivery of the notice to the District Magistrate, the delivery shall be rendered illegal or ineffective. The requirements of delivery to the District Magistrate by two members, if construed in a literal sense, would mean that, at the time the notice is handed to the District Magistrate by two members, if construed in a literal sense, would mean that, at the time the notice is handed to the District Magistrate, two members must be holding it together in their hand. We are not prepared to place such an absured construction. In our opinion, the manual act of delivery is meant by the statue to be performed by any one of two members who must both be present before the District Magistrate at the time the notice is delivered to the District Magistrate by either of them. We see no reason to hold that, if some more of the members who have signed the notice is delivered by one of them, the delivery of the notice to the District Magistrate should be deemed illegal. We see no reason to hold that, if some more of the members who have signed the notice is delivered by one of them, the delivery of the notice to the District Magistrate should be deemed illegal. In our opinion the requirement that any two of the members signing the notice must deliver it together to the District Magistrate must be read as meaning that the delivery must be by at least two of the members signing the notice. 15. The provisions of Sec. 87-A of the Act have come up for consideration in various cases and there is ample authority on the question whether a breach of the provisions contained therein is fatal. In Tara Chand Modi v. The District Magistrate, Meerut and others, Sp. A. No. 313 of 1956. d/d. 22.1.1957, the contention raised was that all directions contained in the various clauses of Sec. 87-A of the Act were mandatory and must be complied with strictly. The learned Judges relied on the well known principle that enactments in form mandatory might in substance be directory and that the use of word `shall' did not necessarily conclude the matter. Reliance was placed on the observations of Lord Campbell in Liverpool Burough Bank v. Turner, 1861 (30) LJ Ch. 379 to the following effect: "There is no universal rule to aid in determining whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statue to be considered". Even though the requirement of Cl. (3) of Sec. 87-A of the Act that notice of the meeting convened by the District Magistrate should be sent to every member at his place of residence was not found to have been complied with inasmuch as the notices were not sent by the residential address of the members, it was held that the fact that the notices had actually been served upon the members constituted sufficient compliance. After due consideration, the contention that every single direction contained in Sec. 87-A was mandatory in the sense that even the slightest departure from literal compliance with it entailed nullification of the motion of non-confidence was rejected, and it was observed that all the directions contained in Sec.-A could not be put on the same footing and that a substantial, though no literal, compliance with them would be enough. Another principle laid down was that unless justification for this Court to interfere in exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. In Chokhey Lal v. District Magistrate of Meerut and others, Sp. A. No. 17 of 1957, D/d. 25.1.1957, the substance of the purpose behind the procedure laid down in Sec. 87-A of the Act was taken into account and it was held that, in the absence of prejudice, this Court was not bound to interfere merely because there had been some departure from strict compliance in accordance with the language of the statute. In our opinion the requirement that the notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the President should be presented together to the District Magistrate by any two of the members signing the notice relates to the performance of a purely ministerial act by at least two of the signatories as on behalf of all the signatories to such a notice. Even if we were inclined to accept Mr. Kunzru's contention that the procedure provided by the statute envisages delivery by not more than two persons our opinion is that such procedure relates merely to the manner of performance of a purely ministerial act and that, in the absence of any prejudice, non-compliance with the same cannot invalidate the proceedings that follow. There is no assertion in the appellant's affidavit in support of the petition giving rise to this appeal that the notice of non-confidence in the appellant was `delivered' by more than two of the signatories to that notice. All that is averred is that the notice was `presented' by six of the members. We cannot construe this averment to mean that the manual act of delivery of the notice was performed by all the six members holding that notice together at the time of its delivery to the District Magistrate. All that is averred is that the notice was `presented' by six of the members. We cannot construe this averment to mean that the manual act of delivery of the notice was performed by all the six members holding that notice together at the time of its delivery to the District Magistrate. All that the averment seems to imply is that six of the members were present at the time the notice was delivered to the District Magistrate. We do not see any reason to hold that there was any contravention of any provision contained in Sec. 87-A of the Act in this case. Adverting to the argument of learned counsel for the appellant on the use of the word `shall' in Cl. (1) of Sec. 87-A, as observed by the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath, A.I.R. 1955 SC 233 it is well established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory, and that the use of the word `shall' does not conclude the matter. Relying on the rules laid down in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, 1880 (5) AC 214 it was observed that the question as to whether a statutory requirement had to be construed as mandatory or directory depended on an ascertainment of the true intention of the Legislature which was the determining factor. It is clear to us beyond doubt that the word 'shall' occurring in Cl. (1) of Sec. 87-A of the Act did not make every detail of procedure laid down in the aforesaid section equivalent to mandatory requirements of the law. In respect of various matters provided for in Sec. 87-A of the Act this Court has, on numerous occasions, held that the procedure laid down was not mandatory in the sense that, even though there had been substantial compliance, non-observance thereof in the strict language of the law rendered the proceedings illegal or ineffective. 17. No prejudice has been suggested, as none can obviously be suggested, by reason merely of the fact that at the time of the delivery of the notice to the District Magistrate more than two members were present. Therefore, apart from our view that there has been no contravention of any requirement of Cl. 17. No prejudice has been suggested, as none can obviously be suggested, by reason merely of the fact that at the time of the delivery of the notice to the District Magistrate more than two members were present. Therefore, apart from our view that there has been no contravention of any requirement of Cl. (2) of Sec. 87-A of the Act, in the absence of any prejudice there appears no good ground to issue any writ in the exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. We are in full agreement with the learned single Judge in his view that there was no substance in any of the grounds argued before us. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order shall stand discharged