MEHROTRA, C. J. : The facts leading up to the present petition are that on receipt of information to the effects that huge qualities of betelnuts ha3 been illicitly? imported into India from Pakistan, the Preventive Officer of Silehar Divisional and Circle Office coo-ducted a search at the godown situate at the eastern side of the Manager's Bungalow of the' petitioner Prayagdas Tushnial's Chandypore Tea Estate on the 3rd April 1980. The search warrant was issued by the District Magistrate, Cachar to that effect. On search the officer recovered 28,006 Ibs. (net weight) of Tatti betelnuts and 114' old gunny bags. The Manager of the Chandipur Tea Estate was thereafter interrogated and he said that the betelnuts in question belonged to his brother Shri Prayag Das Tushnial. Sri Prayag Das Tushnial was then interrogated and he ad­mitted that the betelnuts belonged to him. His case is that he purchased huge quantity, of betel-nuts from different local markets during the period from 26th October 1959 to 31st December 1959 and that he converted a portion thereof into tatti form alter dehusking. A copy of his account book was taken by the Customs Officers. In 'that account book he has rationed twenty-seven persons from whom he had different dates purchased betelnuts. There after the officer conducted certain inquiries and tried to contact some of the persons mentioned in the account book of the petitioner and he lame to the conclusion after recording the evidence of some of those people as well as of others list the petitioner has been importing betelnuts from Pakistan. After the preliminary inquiry was held by the officer concerned, the Collector of Central excise and Land Customs found reasonable grounds for proceeding against the petitioner for the confiscation of the goods and for imposing lie penalty as provided under section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act. A notice was issued to the petitioner to show -cause as to why the goods re­covered from the Tea Estate should not be confis­cated and penalty imposed on him for the offence Id smuggling illicit goods from Pakistan. The petitioner filed about thirty-three affidavits before the Collector of Customs of the persons who ad­mitted that they had sold betelnuts to the peti­tioner. The petitioner filed about thirty-three affidavits before the Collector of Customs of the persons who ad­mitted that they had sold betelnuts to the peti­tioner. The Collector of Land Customs after giv­ing reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to date his case discarded the affidavits filed by the petitioner and relying upon the statement recor­ded by the inquiring officer before the, issue of notice to the petitioner to show cause on the 16th June 1960, held that the goods were of illicit origin, they have been imported into India from Pakistan without the proper licence and thus they were liable to be confiscated. The goods were taken by the petitioner on deposit of a security of Rs. 40,947-40 N. P. That amount was confiscated. Further the Collector of Land Customs found that the petitioner was guilty of aiding, instigating and entering into conspiracy for the illegal importation of the seized betelnuts to India from Pakistan. On that finding he imposed a personal penalty of Rs. 25.000/- on the petitioner. It is this order of the Collector of Land Customs which has been challenged by means of the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the aforesaid order. (2) The main contention raised by the petitioner is that the principles of natural justice have been violated in the present case and thus the order of the Collector of Land Customs is liable to be set aside. It cannot be doubted that the Collector of Land Customs when making an in­quiry after giving a show cause notice to the peti­tioner about the confiscation and imposition of penalty against a person from whose possession certain goods have been seized, has to act judi­cially and the order passed by him is not an administrative order. The order thus is amenable I to a writ of certiorari by this court. (3) The above proposition of the petitioner cannot be doubted now. It has been settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various decisions that the Collector in adjudicating acts in his quasi-judicial capacity and cot in his adminis­trative capacity. The order thus is amenable I to a writ of certiorari by this court. (3) The above proposition of the petitioner cannot be doubted now. It has been settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various decisions that the Collector in adjudicating acts in his quasi-judicial capacity and cot in his adminis­trative capacity. In the cage of F. N. Roy y Collector of Customs, Calcutta (S) AIR 1957 SO 646 and Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail; Amritsar, AIR 1958 S.C 119 it has been held (that in the matter of confiscation and penalty under the Sea .Customs Act the Collector acts judicially. Even the terms of section 182 of the Sea Customs Act warrant that inference. After the show cause notice has been given to the person form whose possession goods have been seized, the Collect or has to adjudicate. The concept of adjudication necessarily implies determination based on the principles of natural justice. One of the principles' of natural justice is that a person cannot be convicted on the evidence taken behind his pre­sence, In the present case it is not doubted that the Collector of Land Customs has relied upon some statements alleged to have been made by some witnesses before the inquiring officer. According to the Collector of Land Customs the statement of witnesses could be relied upon as they were made before independent persons. If those witnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner and he had been given an opportunity to crass examine those witnesses, he might have succeeded in convincing the Collector of Customs that their statements cannot be relied upon. It is the Collec­tor of Land Customs who has to form his opinion after giving an opportunity to the petitioner as to whether the goods are liable to be confiscated and whether any penalty can be imposed under sec­tion 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and the Collec­tor could not form any opinion without the witnes­ses being examined before him and without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to cross examine those witnesses. It is true that thy Collec­tor is not a court when adjudicating about the confiscation of the goods and imposition of the penalty and he is not bound by the rules of evi­dence- But nonetheless he is to act judicially and the fundamental principles of natural justice and criminal jurisprudence have go to be observed in such an inquiry. It is in the nature of a criminal trial though not an actual trial for an offence. The burden is on the department to show that the goods are liable to be confiscated as they have been smuggled into this country without a proper import license and further that the petitioner is concerned in the offence of smuggling. (4) It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (he case of Amba Lal v. Union of India, AIR J961 SC 264 that - "A customs officer is not a judicial tribunal and a proceeding before him is not a prosecution. But the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Land Customs Act are penal in charac­ter. The appropriate customs authority is em­powered to make an inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a person under the said Acts, summon and examine witnesses, de­cide whether an offence is committed, make an order of confiscation of the goods in respect of which the offence Is committed aid impose penal1 y on the person concerned. To such a situation, though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Evidence AQS may not apply ex­cept in so far as they are statutorily made appli­cable, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and of natural justice must necessarily apply- If so, the burden of proof is on the cus­toms authorities and they have to bring home the guilt to the person alleged to have committed a particular offence under the said Acts by adducing satisfactory evidence”. (5) It is contended by Mr. Goswami who appears for the Department, that the principles of natural justice vary according to the circumstances of each case and there is no hard and fast definition of the expression 'principles of natural justice'. Unless there is some procedure laid down regulating the inquiry under the Act, it cannot be said that the principles of natural jus­tice have been violated. Unless there is some procedure laid down regulating the inquiry under the Act, it cannot be said that the principles of natural jus­tice have been violated. Every case will have to be examined on its own circumstances before it can be said that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. If there are certain rules of procedure laid down in the Act itself, the violation of those provisions will entitle this court to set aside the order on the ground that the rules have not been observed. But the fact that %e Collector has to adjudicate upon the question necessarily imposes a duty on him to act judicially and in so doing he has to observe certain funda­mental principles of natural justice. It cannot be said that because it is difficult for the Department to prove the fact that these goods have been im­ported illegally as the border is very wide, the Collector is entitled to confiscate the goods on mere, suspicion. There must be some evidence on the record to justify such an inference and ad­mittedly there is no evidence before, the Collector except the alleged statement of these witnesses recorded by the inquiring officer. The violation of the principles of natural justice lies in accepting those alleged statements as part of the evi­dence in this case. It is in our opinion a gross violation of the principles of natural justice to allow certain alleged statements made by witnes­ses behind the back of the person concerned to prejudice the mind of the inquiring officer with­out giving an opportunity to the person concerned to cross examine those witnesses. (6) The notice which is issued is also in terms to show cause why the goods should not be confis­cated. The show cause notice itself shows that an/ opportunity is to be given to the person concerned net only to produce evidence but to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the Department. (6) The notice which is issued is also in terms to show cause why the goods should not be confis­cated. The show cause notice itself shows that an/ opportunity is to be given to the person concerned net only to produce evidence but to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the Department. The following observation made by the Collector in his order will also show that he held the peti­tioner guilty and ordered confiscation of the goods only relying upon the alleged statements of those witnesses: ''The direct contradiction of these statements or signing in blank paper or of the statements having not read to them is not acceptable inas­much as if the original statements are seen, it would be found 'that the original statements have been endorsed as having been given voluntarily in1 presence of independent witnesses''. (7) It is not necessary to refer to some of the authorities cited at the bar. Mr. Ghose has how­ever, drawn our attention to the case of Union of India v. T. R. Varma, (S) AIR 1957 SC 882 and Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, AIR 1959 S.C 1111 These are no doubt cases under Arti­cle 311 of the Constitution. But the fundamental principle is the same. These cases broadly lay down as to what are the principles of natural justice without of course giving any exhaustive definition of the expression. The same principle has been applied to an inquiry under section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act by the Mysore High Court in the case of Nagar Mohan Rao v. Collec­tor of the Central Excise AIR 1961 Mys 203. Bu' apart from these authorities the broad principle in our opinion is that this court under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with an order of a quasi-judicial tribunal if in making an inquiry its violates certain fundamental principles of natural jus­tice and in our opinion in the present case the Collector of Land Customs violated the principles of natural justice, in making the inquiry. The order in our opinion, should thus be quashed. (8) Another argument was made by Mr. j Ghose which cannot be said to be without substance. His contention is that admittedly the goods when examined by some trade organisation was found to be of mixed character. Some of them were of foreign origin and some of Indian origin. The order in our opinion, should thus be quashed. (8) Another argument was made by Mr. j Ghose which cannot be said to be without substance. His contention is that admittedly the goods when examined by some trade organisation was found to be of mixed character. Some of them were of foreign origin and some of Indian origin. Under those circumstances the confiscation of the entire goods could not be ordered and it was very difficult to separate the portion which was of illicit origin from the goods of Indian origin. The order of confiscation on that ground also must fail. We need not go into the question as to whether it can be said that there was any evidence to hold that the petitioner was concerned in the smuggling of the goods. As we have held that the entire inquiry is vitiated as the Collector did not observe the principles of natural justice, it is not necessary to go into this question. In 'he result therefore, I allow this petition and quash the order of the Collector of Central Excise and Land Cus­toms dated the 13th June 1961- The petitioner is entitled to his cost which we assess at Rs. 100/- (9) S. K. DUTTA, J. : I agree. EF/M/V.B.B. Petition allowed