ORDER Dixit, C.J. This is an application under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing a decision of the Board of Revenue which affirmed a decision of the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain, conferring on the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 pakka tenancy rights u/s 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act (No. 13 of 1951-hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act). The Tehsildar and Collector of Shajapur had rejected the said opponents' application u/s 38 claiming pahki tenancy rights on payment of the money as provided in that section. The Commissioner had set aside these orders of the Tehsildar and the Collector. 2, In their application u/s 33 of the Abolition Act, the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 alleged that the petitioner was a Pukhta-Mauruai tenant of certain lands and they were sub-tenants of the petitioner in respect of that land for years and held the land in that capacity on 2nd October 1951 and continued so to hold the land even thereafter; and that, therefore, they were entitled to the pakka tenancy rights u/s 38. The petitioner contested the claim inter alia on the grounds that the said opponents were not sub-tenants; that by an agreement dated the 1st Jane 1948 (annexure B to the petition) entered into between the said opponents and the petitioner, the opponents were allowed to cultivate the land concerned for one year only, namely, Samvat-2005, on the condition that the petitioner would supply the bullocks and seeds and bear all expenses of cultivation and pay the rent and the opponents, who would be entitled to receive one-third share of the crop for their labour, would vacate the land at the end of the year Samvat-2005, and that in any ease even as subtenants the opponents could not get any pakka tenancy rights as the petitioner being an idol was suffering from a disability within the meaning of section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (No. 66 of 1950) rendering it incapable of cultivating the land personally and, therefore, under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 38 of the Abolition Act the opponents could only remain as sub-tenants. The Tehsildar and the Collector of Shajapur rejected the opponents' application taking the view that the petitioner being an idol could not be regarded as a person holding the land for agricultural purposes and, therefore, a 'tenant' as defined in the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, and that consequently the opponents were not sub-tenants of the petitioner. In second appeal the Commissioner held that the opponents' names were entered in the revenue papers as sub-tenants but after the conclusion of the agreement dated the 1st June 1948 they entered into the possession of the land as 'Bataidars' and since then, that is since Samvat-2004, they were holding the land in that right. The learned Commissioner concluded that the opponents were sub-tenants. He further held that the petitioner, though an idol, was not a person suffering from a disability within the meaning of section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, and, therefore, the petitioner could not get the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 38 of the Abolition Act. On this view, the Commissioner made an order conferring pakka tenancy rights on the opponents oh payment of the necessary amount under sub-section (2) of section 38. The petitioner then preferred a revision petition before the Board of Revenue. At the hearing before the Board, the petitioner sought to contest the finding of the Commissioner about the status of the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 contending that it raised a question of law as it was based on the construction put by the Commissioner on the agreement dated the 1st June 1948. The Board of Revenue did not accept this contention and refused to disturb the finding of the Commissioner treating it as a finding of fact. The Board observed - ...the finding that the non-applicants were sub-tenants was based on evidence available and not merely on the basis of Exh. D-1. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that any question of law is involved in this case for coming to the conclusion that the non-applicants were sub-tenants of the relevant time. If the facts were in strict accordance with the recital in Exh. D-1. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that any question of law is involved in this case for coming to the conclusion that the non-applicants were sub-tenants of the relevant time. If the facts were in strict accordance with the recital in Exh. D.1 the question would be open to argument that those facts did not warrant the inference that the non-applicants were sub-tenants and any inference drawn to the contrary raised a question of law open to revision. But since this is not the case and since the finding of the learned Additional Commissioner was that on the relevant date the facts were not in accordance with the recital in Exh. D-1 but that the non-applicants were actually the sub-tenants of the applicant, the first point urged on behalf of the applicant has to be rejected. The Board further held that the petitioner could not claim the benefit of section 74 of the Tenancy Act as it was not suffering from any physical infirmity of the kind referred to in Election 74 (I) of that Act to which a living person was liable to be subject. Accordingly the Board of Revenue confirmed the Commissioner's decision, Before us, Shri Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the finding, which the Commissioner gave, was that the opponents Nos. 2 to 4 held the land as Bataidars under the agreement dated the 1st June 1948; that while upholding this finding the Board of Revenue was not justified in reading it as a finding given on the evidence on record that the opponents were actually, and not merely by virtue of the Explanation to section 73 of the Tenancy Act, sub-tenants of the petitioner; and that even if it be taken that the Commissioner reached the conclusion on the evidence on record that the opponents were actually sub-tenants and it was this finding which was affirmed by the Board of Revenue, yet the finding would be open to review in these proceedings as it was fundamental to the exercise of jurisdiction u/s 38 of the Abolition Act by the revenue authority, who could not be allowed to usurp the jurisdiction which it did not possess by giving a wrong finding of fact. It was argued that there was no evidence whatsoever to show that the opponents were actually the sub-tenants of the petitioner and that, if they were Bataidars as held by the Commissioner, then there was no obligation on them to pay any rent and they could not be regarded as sub-tenants; and further that as under the agreement the said opponents did not cultivate the land with their own bullocks, they could not be regarded as sub-tenants under the Explanation to section 73 of the Tenancy Act. Learned counsel proceeded to submit that for the purposes of the Abolition Act and the Tenancy Act an idol was dearly a person; that there was no reason to restrict section 74 (1) of the Tenancy Act to natural persons incapable of personally cultivating the land; and that if a juridical person was included in the word 'person' as used in section 74, then the expression, 'other physical infirmity' used in section 74 could not be limited to an infirmity ejusdem generis with blindness. It was said that an idol in its very nature was incapable of personally cultivating the land, and that, therefore, even if the opponents were sub-tenants they could not claim any pakka tenancy rights in view of the proviso to section 38 (2) of the Abolition Act. In our view, this petition must be granted. It is evident from the Commissioner's order that he held in unmistakable terms that the opponents entered into possession of the land in question as Bataidars under the agreement dated the 1st June 1948 and were holding the land in that right since Samvat 2004, His conclusion that the opponents were sub-tenants was based on the assumption that a Batai contract involved a relationship of tenancy or sub-tenancy. We do not find any adequate ground for holding that the Commissioner's conclusion was that the respondents were actually sub-tenants on the evidence that was led before him. It is, however, not necessary to consider whether the Board of Revenue's reading of the finding of the Commissioner about the status of the opponents, which the Board affirmed, was right or erroneous, for, whether the opponents are regarded as Bataidars or sub-tenants, in either ease they are not entitled to the pakka tenancy rights u/s 38 of the Abolition Act. If, as has been held by the Commissioner, the said opponents held the land as Bataidars since the year Samvat 2004, then they cannot clearly be regarded as sub-tenants. u/s 54 (xviii) of the Tenancy Act, a person can be said to be a tenant if he holds the land for agricultural purposes and if he is liable to pay rent or if he would be liable to pay rent for his holding but for a contract. A 'Bataidar' is clearly not a person under any obligation to pay rent. The words 'Batai' and 'Bataidar' have been derived from the word 'Bat' which means partition or a division or a share. 'Batai' thus denotes a division between a cultivator and a landlord or Government, and a 'Bataidar' is a cultivator who shares the crop or the produce with the proprietor. There is no question of payment of any rent by a Bataidar to a proprietor. 'Tenancy' implies creation of a subordinate right and does not involve the sharing of any produce; while a Bataidar cultivates the land for the benefit of the proprietor on certain conditions. Therefore, if the petitioners were Bataidars, then they could not be regarded as subtenants. The Explanation to section 73 of the Tenancy Act no doubt says that an agreement whereby a person undertakes to cultivate the holding with his own bullocks and on condition of payment of a portion of the total produce shall be deemed to be a sub-lease. But here under the agreement dated the 1st June 1948 the opponents cultivated the land not with their own bullocks but by the bullocks supplied by the petitioner. Therefore, after holding that under the agreement referred to above the opponents were Bataidars, the Commissioner erred in further holding that they were sub-tenants. If, on the other hand, the respondents are regarded as sub-tenants entitled to apply for pakka tenancy rights u/s 38 of the Abolition Act, then section 74 of the Tenancy Act and the proviso to section 38 (2) of the Abolition Act would stand in their way of getting those rights. If, on the other hand, the respondents are regarded as sub-tenants entitled to apply for pakka tenancy rights u/s 38 of the Abolition Act, then section 74 of the Tenancy Act and the proviso to section 38 (2) of the Abolition Act would stand in their way of getting those rights. The proviso to section 38 (2) of the Abolition Act runs as follows :- Provided that a sub-tenant or tenant or a sub-tenant shall remain a sub-tenant or tenant of a subtenant as before in case of disability mentioned in section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. He shall have no right to become a pakka tenant by depositing the amount under sub-section. Section 74 (1) of the Tenancy Act is in the following terms:- 74(1) A pakka tenant who is a widow, a minor, a lunatic and idiot or a person incapable of personally cultivating by reason of blindness or other physical infirmity or because he is in the Military, Naval, or Air Service of the Indian Dominion or the United States or is under detention or imprisonment, may sub-let the whole or any part of his holdings: It will be seen from these provisions that if the petitioner-idol is within the meaning of section 74 (1) a person incapable of personally cultivating the land by some physical infirmity, then there is no bar to the petitioner sub-letting the land and the opponents cannot by virtue of any sub-tenancy claim pakka tenancy rights u/s 38 of the Abolition Act. The Board of Revenue construed the words "other physical infirmity" as limited to an infirmity ejusdem generis with blindness and from that concluded that as an idol did not suffer from any infirmity of the kind to which a living person was liable to be subject, it could not be regarded as a person incapable of personally cultivating the land by some physical infirmity so as to attract section 74 (1) of the Tenancy Act. We are unable to agree with this reasoning. The question whether the word 'person' as used in section 74 (1) includes an artificial person must be decided with reference to the setting in which the word is placed, to the circumstances in which it has been used and to the context in which it stands. We are unable to agree with this reasoning. The question whether the word 'person' as used in section 74 (1) includes an artificial person must be decided with reference to the setting in which the word is placed, to the circumstances in which it has been used and to the context in which it stands. The subject-matter of the Tenancy Act and the Abolition Act must be considered in order to decide whether the word 'person' includes an artificial or juridical person. This method of construction of the word 'person' was adopted in B. A. Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Kameshwar Singh AIR 1938 Cal. 745, where it was held that the word 'person' in Order 33, rule 1, CPC and in Order 44, rule 1, CPC did not include a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. It is altogether a wrong method of construction of the word 'person' to determine its meaning with reference to the scope of the expression 'physical infirmity'. On the other hand, the meaning of the expression 'physical infirmity' is controlled by the meaning of the word 'person' as used in section 74 (1). Now, it cannot be denied that for the purposes of the Abolition Act and the Tenancy Act the word 'person', wherever it has been used, includes an artificial person. Section 2 (a) of the Abolition Act defines 'proprietor', "as respects of village, Mahal or land settled on Zamindari Byatem, a person owning whether in trust or for his own benefit such village, Mahal or land and include u/s 54 (xviii) 'tenant' "means a person who holds land for agricultural purposes.... In the definitions of 'sub-tenant' and 'pakka tenant', as given in section 54 of the Tenancy Act, also the word 'person' is involved. If for the purposes of the definitions of 'proprietor', 'pakka tenant', 'tenant' or 'sub-tenant' the word 'person' is taken to mean as not including a juridical person, such as the petitioner, then there can be no question of any land of the petitioner vesting in the State under the Abolition Act and of sections 37 and 38 of that Act coming into play at all. The foundation of the opponents' claim for the grant of pakka tenancy rights would then fall altogether. The foundation of the opponents' claim for the grant of pakka tenancy rights would then fall altogether. It is only if for the purposes of the Abolition Act the word 'person' is taken as including a juridical person that the petitioner can be regarded as a proprietor u/s 38 of the Abolition Act and it is only on that inclusion that the opponents can invoke the benefit of section 38. It follows, therefore, that for the purposes of the proviso to section 38 (2) and section 74 (1) the word 'person' must be read as including an artificial person. And if that is the meaning of the word 'person', then the expression 'other physical infirmity' cannot be read as limited to an infirmity relating or pertaining to the body of a natural person. It can only mean a material or substantive infirmity having an objective existence and which is distinct or different from that already mentioned. The principle of ejusdem generis cannot be applied here as the mention of one infirmity namely blindness does not constitute a genua. In Untd. Towns Etc. Co. v, A. G. Newfoundland A I R (1939) SC 423, the Privy Council has said that there must be more than one species mentioned to constitute a genus and the "mention of a single species - for example, water rates-does not constitute a genus". It was observed that there is no room for the application of the principle of ejmdem generis in the absence of any mention of a genus. That an idol suffers from a physical infirmity rendering it incapable of personally cultivating the land cannot be doubted. The expression 'to cultivate personally' has been defined in section 54 (xvii). Under that definition, personal cultivation is constituted when one cultivates land on one's own account (a) by one's own labour; or (b) by the labour of any member of one's family; or (c) by servant's hired labour under one's personal supervision. In the case of an idol, there cannot be in its very nature any cultivation by the idol itself by its own labour or by the labour of any member of the idol's family or by any servants or labourers working under the personal supervision of the idol. In the case of an idol, there cannot be in its very nature any cultivation by the idol itself by its own labour or by the labour of any member of the idol's family or by any servants or labourers working under the personal supervision of the idol. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Board of Revenue was wrong in holding that the words "other physical infirmity" must be construed as ejusdem generis with blindness and that the petitioner did not suffer from any disability within the meaning of section 74 (I) of the Tenancy Act. If, as we think, the petitioner can invoke the benefit of section 74 of the Tenancy Act, then under the proviso to section 38 (2) of the Abolition Act the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 cannot claim any pakka tenancy rights by virtue of any status of theirs as sub-tenants. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if the finding of the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue about the status of the opponents Nos. 1 to 4 was a finding of fact it was open to review in these proceedings as it was a finding fundamental to the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authority making an order u/s 38 of the Abolition Act. Suffice to say that the well-settled principle is that when the jurisdiction of a Court depends upon the existence of some collateral facts then the Court cannot by a wrong decision on them give itself jurisdiction which it could not otherwise possess. The decision as to the collateral facts is, however, not the main question which the Court has to decide. If, on the other hand, the Court is given jurisdiction to determine certain facts and those facts form a part of the very issue which it has to decide and the Act constituting the Court gives it power to come to a final decision on that matter, then the decision of the Court cannot be treated as one going to its jurisdiction. If in such a case the Court gives a wrong decision, it would merely be an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not in the assumption thereof (see Rex v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioner 21 QBD 319; Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian-General AIR 1962 SC 319; Parry and Co. If in such a case the Court gives a wrong decision, it would merely be an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not in the assumption thereof (see Rex v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioner 21 QBD 319; Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian-General AIR 1962 SC 319; Parry and Co. Ltd. Vs. Commercial Employees' Association, Madras, ; T.G. Baaaappa v. T. Nagappa AIR 1964 S C 410; Bari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque AIR 1965 SC 233. As we have said earlier, it is not necessary to decide whether in this case or in the case of Smt. Sonabai Vs. Board of Revenue and Others, , which was cited before us, the finding of the Revenue Authority as regards sub-tenancy was a finding on a collateral fact on which the existence of the Revenue Authority's jurisdiction depended or whether it was the main question which it had to decide. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed, the decisions of the Board of Revenue and the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain, are quashed and the order of the Tehsildar, Shajapur, as upheld by the Collector, Shajapur, dismissing the opponents Nos. 1 to 4's application u/s 38 of the Abolition Act is restored. The petitioner shall have costs throughout. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 100. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Final Result : Allowed