( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the defendant judgment-debtor Messrs. Thacker's Press and Directories Ltd. , from an order, dated September 7, 1961, of our learned brother, G. K. Mitter, J. , appointing, it is said, a receiver in execution. ( 2 ) THE answering respondent in this appeal is the Metropolitan Bank Ltd. , hereinafter referred to as the Bank. On September 6, 1957, the Bank instituted a suit against the appellant and one Murari Mohan Chatterji, the other and non-appearing respondent in this appeal, for recovery of Rs. 6 lakhs and odd. On March 14, 1958, the suit culminated in a consent decree against the appellant for Rs. 10 lakhs, payable by monthly instalments, spread over 20 (twenty) years, - Rs. 4375/- a month from January, 1959 to December, 1978, the last instalment being of the final and reduced amount of Rs. 2,500/ -. In the decree, there were provisions inter alia for rebate on punctual payment and for interest in case of defaults. The decree aforesaid also declared a charge on a lease-hold and certain publications and machineries, plants, etc. , all listed in the schedule to the terms of settlement, forming part of the decree itself. This was done on the footing of a deed of hypothecation, dated October 25, 1952, and a deed of mortgage, dated July 26, 1955, with this limitation that the deeds would not run beyond the properties, just referred to above. In other words, the charge was to be 'only on the properties as mentioned in the schedule, referred to above and annexed thereto' as the third clause in the relevant terms of settlement puts it. ( 3 ) THE appellant defaulted in paying instalments : not one, not two, but so many as twenty three, and from the very beginning, namely, from January, 1959, the first instalment having been payable by January 31, 1959, and the twenty-third by November, 1960. That led the Bank to levy execution on December 22, 1960, for twenty three monthly instalments of Rs. 4375/- each, coming up to Rs. 1,00,625/- in all, Clause 5 of the terms of settlement entitled the Bank to apply for execution for recovery of the aforesaid unpaid instalments. The mode of execution, sought for, was appointment of a receiver 'to sell the assets or sufficient part thereof', charged for payment of the decretal amount. 4375/- each, coming up to Rs. 1,00,625/- in all, Clause 5 of the terms of settlement entitled the Bank to apply for execution for recovery of the aforesaid unpaid instalments. The mode of execution, sought for, was appointment of a receiver 'to sell the assets or sufficient part thereof', charged for payment of the decretal amount. Clause 5 of the terms of settlement also entitled the Bank 'to get a receiver in execution' but of the charged lease-hold only, for letting it out, collecting rents, etc. ( 4 ) UPON the above application, G. K. Mitter, J. , passed the order, dated September 7, 1961, which is the subject matter of this appeal. That order provides inter alia, - (a) Mr. O. Ahmed is appointed, in execution of the decree, a receiver (without security) of the publications, machineries, plants, etc. , charged properties all and specified in the schedule to the order. (b) The appellant 'and all persons, claiming under it' do deliver up quiet possession thereof along with all concerned books, registers, etc. , to Mr. Ahmed, who do take possession thereof too. (c) Mr. Ahmed do have the power to bring and defend suits. (d) Mr. Ahmed do sell the two varieties of the charged properties; (1) publications and (2) machineries, plants, etc. , - of which alone he is appointed the receiver, - for repayment of the decretal dues so as to cover the claim of Rs. 1,00,625/- for the recovery of which the Bank came to Court in execution. ( 5 ) THE appellant challenges the propriety of this order and contends that it is contrary to law and should be set aside and the appointment of receiver should be recalled and the receiver should be discharged. The validity of this contention has to be carefully examined for deciding this appeal. ( 6 ) BEFORE, however, we proceed to the merits, we would dispose of two preliminary points, raised by the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the Respondent Bank, as pleas in bar against the appellant. The validity of this contention has to be carefully examined for deciding this appeal. ( 6 ) BEFORE, however, we proceed to the merits, we would dispose of two preliminary points, raised by the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the Respondent Bank, as pleas in bar against the appellant. These preliminary points are by way of demurrer, the first urging that the point under Section 51 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which alone the appellant's learned Counsel practically relies, is not open to him, the same not having been mooted or raised in the Court below and involving, as it does, not a pure question of law but, at the best, mixed questions of law and fact, and the second raising a point of res judicata, or, more accurately, waiver of the appeal. We may state at once that these preliminary objections do not appeal to us. If it be a case under Section 51 (d) of the Code and the law prescribes or requires certain facts to be proved before relief could be claimable or obtainable thereunder, it is open to the judgment-debtor to show, at any stage of the proceeding, be it appeal or otherwise, that necessary circumstances do not exist or necessary facts have not been proved to justify grant of relief under the section, particularly, when, as, in the instant case, there were not even any relevant allegation on the part of the decree-holder beyond a vague and general statement that 'it is just and convenient having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that a Receiver should be appointed in execution to sell the charged assets'. The other objection is even more unsubstantial. The fact that the judgment-debtor accepted some procedural details in the matter of the instant sale would not certainly conclude it in its challenge to the said sale in the pending appeal, filed for the purpose, either by way of res judicata or on any principle of waiver. The acceptance of the procedural details or the decision in that behalf in the relative or connected interlocutory proceeding must be read as subject to the result of this appeal, which was then pending, and cannot be considered otherwise. The preliminary objections are, accordingly, overruled. ( 7 ) WE turn now to the order, the propriety of which has been assailed before us. The preliminary objections are, accordingly, overruled. ( 7 ) WE turn now to the order, the propriety of which has been assailed before us. Its gist has already been set out above. Read as a whole and fairly too, the order does not mean that thereby the Court orders execution by appointing a receiver within the meaning of Section 51 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court orders instead execution by sale (without attachment) of the charged properties, certain publications, on the one hand, and plants, machineries etc. , on the other - though, undoubtedly, the sale is directed to be held by a receiver. In so doing, the Court presses into service its powers under Section 51 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and not Section 51 (d ). That this is so appears to be clear from the substance of the order under appeal, read in the light of the scheme of Section 51 of the Code. ( 8 ) THAT Section 51 contemplates five modes of execution: - (1) delivery of any property specifically decreed; (2) attachment and sale or sale without attachment of any property; (3) arrest and detention in prison of the judgment-debtor; (4) appointment of a receiver; and (5) such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require. ( 9 ) ON facts, obtaining here, the first and the third modes are ruled out; is ruled out, too, the first part of the second mode, namely, attachment and sale as the instant case is not, one strictly of attachment in execution. It may be that appointment of a receiver in execution is virtually, or, in substance, a form of attachment, - indirect attachment so to say; but, here, going by the pith of the order under appeal, there has been strictly speaking, no such appointment. In law, such an appointment is made strictly under Section 51 (d) of the Code, under which the accent is on the appointment of a receiver in execution, that is, on the appointment of a receiver as the mode of execution. In law, such an appointment is made strictly under Section 51 (d) of the Code, under which the accent is on the appointment of a receiver in execution, that is, on the appointment of a receiver as the mode of execution. A receiver is appointed so with a view to doing complete justice to both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, to secure to the decree-holder the best means of realizing his dues without unreasonable delay and undue hardship to the judgment-debtor, say, the receiver collects rents of the property, which is under execution, pays the decree-holder his dues in reasonable amounts or instalments out of the collections, so made, sustains, too, the judgment-debtor who does not forfeit his right to live by being a judgment-debtor, and, with the decretal dues liquidated, returns the property to the judgment-debtor, the owner thereof, within a reasonable time. That is the case of a receiver in execution, whom the executing Court appoints not to sell the property but to preserve it for the judgment-debtor after satisfying the dues of the decree-holder. Of course, this is but one illustration of how a receiver in execution, appointed under Section 51 (d), normally works and is intended to work. Other illustrations may be given, namely, to realise the decretal dues out of the rents, issues and profits of immovable properties, held by the judgment-debtor in lieu of maintenance (Vide (1) Rajendra Narain Singh v. Sundara Bibi, LR 52 IA 2620 or for maintenance and support of his dignity and status (Vide (2) Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Karnani Industrial Bank Limited, LR 58 IA 215), without power of alienation or to realise the maintenance, with which an immovable property is charged, for payment or satisfaction of the decree, when that is the best means, available for the purpose from the point of view of both the judgment-debtor and the judgment-creditor, or to collect the tolls from hats etc. , and they all point to the same conclusion and serve the same and, that is, of preserving the judgment-debtor's property, while, at the same time satisfying the decretal dues. The judgment-debtor with his property, laden with the decretal dues, should flourish rather than perish, the decree being honoured and satisfied at the same time. That is, normally, the object of appointing a receiver in execution. The judgment-debtor with his property, laden with the decretal dues, should flourish rather than perish, the decree being honoured and satisfied at the same time. That is, normally, the object of appointing a receiver in execution. In exceptional cases, no doubt, a receiver in execution under section 51 (d) of the Code may be vested with a power of sale but that would be a sale not under Section 51 (b), where the mode of execution is the sale, but by way of ancillary relief through appointment of receiver as the mode of execution, the stress in execution being an receiver. Mr. Ahmed, G. K. Mitter, J. , appoints, is not a receiver of this sort, that is, not a receiver in execution. No doubt, the word 'receiver' is there but there is no charm or magic in the said word. All he is appointed for, so far as the decretal amount of Rs. 1,99,625/- under execution is concerned, is to sell the charged properties - mark this underlying purpose - for its realisation : just the antithesis of what a receiver in execution is normally for. The account here is on sale - sale in execution - that is, on the judgment-debtor's losing the property to pay the decree-holder's dues, - negation of the very object of appointing a receiver in execution under Section 51 (d), namely, to preserve the corpus for the ultimate benefit of the judgment-debtor, while satisfying the decree-holder's dues out of the income, of course, within a reasonable time and without unreasonable harassment and harashness to or upon the judgment-debtor. The first part of the second mode [section 51 (b)] thus goes out and goes out, too, the fourth mode [section 51 (d)] leaving in the field, the second part of the second method [section 51 (b)] and the fifth one [section 51 (e)], which late provision normally contemplates the special cases, provided in the Code (vide e. g. , Order 21, rules 31 to 34) and applies, where the earlier mode are unavailing or unsuitable, which is not the case here. ( 10 ) EVEN conceding that the instant appointment is of a receiver in execution, taking that expression literally or, in its literal sense, the present case would still be to that extent, one of attachment or indirect attachment, as said above, but, even then, it would still be a case under Section 51 (b), though under its first part, that is, of attachment and sale, as the accent here is on sale as the mode of execution, and Section 51 (d) would remain irrelevant and inapplicable. ( 11 ) A few words more before we leave the Section (Sec. 51 ). ( 12 ) NORMALLY, as we have seen above, sale is not contemplated under Section 51 (d ). That, however, does not mean that a receiver in execution, appointed strictly under the aforesaid Section (Section 51 (d)], may not be authorised or entitled to sell. Such a sale, however, would not strictly, be a sale in execution under Section 51 (b) of the Code, where the accent is on sale as the mode of execution. It is important to bear this in mind and observe this distinction and determine in each case, where a sale of ordered or intended to be held by a receiver in an execution case, where the accent lies - on sale or on appointment of receiver - as the mode of execution; in other words, which of the two the substantive or primary object of the particular execution is and which ancillary. It is to be remembered also that if, in any such case, Section 51 (b) be prima facie inapplicable, that section will be excluded, leaving the filed to Section 51 (d ). ( 13 ) THE word 'receiver' in the order under appeal need create no trouble or difficulty. Though designating him 'receiver' G. K. Mitter, J. , does really appoint Mr. Ahmed as the person to conduct the sale. Far from coming on the edge of the law, an order as that fully accords with it. Under Order 21, Rule 65, of the Code, every sale in execution of a decree (as here) shall be conducted by an officer of the Court or by such other person as the Court may appoint in that behalf (See also Order 21, Rule 77 ). Mr. Ahmed answers to the description of such a person, nicely enough. Under Order 21, Rule 65, of the Code, every sale in execution of a decree (as here) shall be conducted by an officer of the Court or by such other person as the Court may appoint in that behalf (See also Order 21, Rule 77 ). Mr. Ahmed answers to the description of such a person, nicely enough. ( 14 ) VIEWED as above, the entire outlook is changed and Mr. Gouri Mitter's ingenious argument, seemingly cogent, plausible and attractive, concentrating on the impropriety of equitable execution on materials, which, according to him, condescend to little exact details and which do not show that legal execution is beyond the reach order the decree-holder here, cannot help the appellant. Indeed, it is time that we cease speaking in terms of legal and equitable executions. These borrowed phraseologies from the English law, strictly appertaining to a time, when law meant common law and maintained a sharp distinction with equity, is long out of date, the more so, under our system, where the modes of execution have been codified, although some of them have been left sufficiently elastic, so as to let in a large amount of discretion - judicial discretion - in the matter of their adoption and working out, and to that extent, admit application of equitable principles, unfettered by prescribed statutory or procedural details. ( 15 ) APPOINTING a receiver is one of the modes of execution Section 151 prescribes. So it is as much a legal mode as any other. An executing Court, considering whether or not appointment of a receiver is called for, will, doubtless, have Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code in mind and make the appointment only when it considers that it is just and convenient to do so. To that extent, it involves exercise of judicial discretion on equitable principles but thereby it does not cease to be a legal mode. The execution, or, the mode of execution is legal and statutory, that is, as prescribed in the Code, although, to the extent, the Code does not prescribe any details and leaves the matter to be worked out by the Court, equitable exercise of the jurisdiction of judicial discretion is called for and contemplated. ( 16 ) BY a parity of reasoning, become ineffective too the cases Mr. ( 16 ) BY a parity of reasoning, become ineffective too the cases Mr. Gouri Mitter cites, as they are all distinguishable and fundamentally different, turning, as they do, on the appointment of a receiver in execution under Section 51 (d) of the Code. (Raja) Promatha Nath malia v. H. V. Low and Co. , (3) AIR 1930 Cal 502 SC 34 CWN 238, [where what bulked large was a sale by a receiver - receiver in execution, the stress being on receiver as the mode of execution - of a colliery at Asansol outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court on its original side, thereby precluding, without the transfer of the decree, the application of Section 51 (b) of the Code (the very provision, which is available to us and which we invoke in the instant case) and so leaving the field open for Section 51 (d)], (4) Hemendra Nath Roy Choudhury and another v. Prokash Chandra Ghosh and others, 35 CWN 1066 SC AIR 1932 Cal 189 [which did not countenance the learned Subordinate Judge's view, that, Section 51 (d) having been there on the statute book, a decree-holder could get a receiver in execution for the mere asking - as of right and as a matter of course, - and laid down that such a mode of execution could be justified only under Order 40, Rule 1, namely, only when it was just and convenient to have a receiver, and emphasized, as we do, that such a course should be allowed only where it was more likely to benefit both the judgment-debtor and the judgment-creditor than a sale], (5) Kshitish Chandra Acharyya Choudhury and others v. Raja Janaki Nath Roy and others, AIR 1932 Cal 194, SC 35 CWN 1141 [where the same principle was reiterated by the same two learned Judges, Mukherji and Guha, JJ. who decided Hemendra Nath Roy Choudhury's case, supra], (6) Jawla Prosad Bhartia v. Hanumanbux Poddar and others, 40 CWN 1065 [where, nine properties proving unsaleable and the debts, intended to be paid out of the sale proceeds thereof, remaining unsatisfied, the appointment of a receiver in execution strictly so called was held to be justified]. In re. Sm. who decided Hemendra Nath Roy Choudhury's case, supra], (6) Jawla Prosad Bhartia v. Hanumanbux Poddar and others, 40 CWN 1065 [where, nine properties proving unsaleable and the debts, intended to be paid out of the sale proceeds thereof, remaining unsatisfied, the appointment of a receiver in execution strictly so called was held to be justified]. In re. Sm. Renula Bose in Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga v. Anath Nath Bose and others, (7) AIR 1938 Cal 93, SC 42 CWN 266, [where the same learned Judge (Panckridge, J.), as, in the case, just cited before, denied a co-mortgagor the relief of getting a receiver in execution, where such relief was claimed merely because of the delay of having the mortgaged properties outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of this Court on its Original Side sold - delay which she had contemplated, - and laid down that 'some actual difficulty in carrying out the same' must be there to attract this mode of execution by appointing a receiver, but taking into consideration the conduct of the defendants (judgment-debtors) who could - but did not - pay something towards their dues, just as is the case before us and such conduct meriting no sympathy, gave the decree-holder liberty to renew the application on appropriate grounds], (8) Satyapriya Banerjee v. Kundan Mull Babu, AIR 1939 Cal 428 SC 43 CWN 512, [where, other things apart, much was not thought of the suggestion for appointment of a receiver of the salary of the appellant qua an MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly), when the respondent decree-holder had other remedies, open to him, to get his dues], (9) Suresh Chandra Roy Choudhury v. Prakash Krishna Deb and others, 45 CWN 1104 (where Mcnair, J. , having found that in the circumstances of the case execution by appointment of Receiver was the best means of securing the rights of the judgment-creditor without causing undue hardship to the judgment-debtor, adopted that method of execution and appointed a receiver), (10) Pursattamdas Gujrati and others v. Lal Baijnath Prosad and others, AIR 1941 Cal 240 [where the same learned Judge (Mcnair J.) followed the same course when other mode of execution could be pursued only at considerable risk and with doubtful results], (4) Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd. Sikarpur v. Kumar Chandra Singh Dudhoria and others, AIR 1949 Cal 63, SC 52 CWN 736, [which sustained the appointment of a receiver in execution, not as a matter or right nor because legal execution was exhausted but on the principle that that was the best way out to meet the decretal dues of Rs. 17,994/10/- instead of putting the tenure, worth Rs. 4000/- or 5000/-, to sale], and (12) Dhakuria Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Sm. Surabala Devi and Ors. , AIR 1958 Cal 610 [where no order was made on an application for appointment of a receiver to enforce what is known in Company jurisprudence as 'balance order' or balance order on the 'contributories or contributions', because the ordinary method of execution by attachment and sale in situ, ensuring publicity, all its own, did not, in the circumstances of that case, deserve to be discarded in favour of the extraordinary method of execution by appointment of a receiver, sale by whom in Calcutta of district properties, as the learned Judge apprehended there, in the facts before him, was not likely to be attended with that publicity and interest a local sale would create]. ( 17 ) EVEN the barest synopses of the above cases - and those are all the cases, Mr. Gouri Mitter cites - go to show that they are all cases under Section 51 (d) of the Code and having little to do with the mode of execution by a sale under Section 51 (b) of the Code, as here, to be conducted by a person (here Mr. Ahmed), as the executing Court appoints in this behalf. On the other hand, the order under appeal provides, in a manner, for what the appellant seeks; not the extraordinary mode of execution by appointing a receiver under Section 51 (d) but the ordinary mode of execution by sale under Section 51 (b) though not through the usual agency, namely, by the Registrar. A Registrar's sale is what the appellant is after. As the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondent Bank, submits, it is not a case of appointment of a receiver simpliciter, it is a case of appointment of a receiver to sell under Section 51 (b) of the Code. Still better, it is appointment of a person (Vide Order 21, Rule 65 of the Code) to sell thereunder. As the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondent Bank, submits, it is not a case of appointment of a receiver simpliciter, it is a case of appointment of a receiver to sell under Section 51 (b) of the Code. Still better, it is appointment of a person (Vide Order 21, Rule 65 of the Code) to sell thereunder. ( 18 ) ON behalf of the appellant, reference has been made, in vain to the fifth clause in the terms of settlement, entitling the respondent decree-holder to get a receiver in execution of the charged lease-hold. The appointment under consideration is not that. It is the appointment of a person to sell the other two types of charges assets. ( 19 ) MR. Gupta, following Mr. Gouri Mitter, refers us to that part order the order under appeal, conferring on Mr. Ahmed the power to bring and defend suits. In the context of facts here, this is otiose and deserve to be ignored. When drafting an order of the type, which is before us, and with the very uttering of the word 'receiver', such a recital not very necessary though, in the context, as here, perhaps comes in as a matter of course and, as we shall presently see, it may have some justification, too, in the instant case. ( 20 ) THE executing Court, directing Mr. Ahmed to take possession of the charged assets, a direction Mr. Gupta makes a point of, does not connote that it has appointed a receiver in execution within the meaning of Section 51 (d) of the Code. It has done no more than appointing a person, designating him a receiver, to conduct the sale (without attachment strictly so-called) within the meaning of Section 51 (b) thereof. What is to be sold consists of movables, possession of which must be taken by one, who sells, before he sells. Were that not so, what if certain movables sold are missing, sale over? Immediate possession which has to be given to the purchaser on payment of the purchase money (Vide Rules 10 and 44 of Chapter XXVII of the Original Side Rules of this Court; vide also Order 21, Rules 77 and 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure) cannot be given and the sale will come to little as the learned Standing Counsel emphasizes. No Court can tolerate this or suffer such things happen. No Court can tolerate this or suffer such things happen. So the direction about possession is a necessary pre-requisite - nay, more truly, a part, an essential and integral part, - in the instant case, of the order or direction, under Section 51 (b) of the Code, for sale (without attachment strictly so-called ). Nothing more should be read into it. The Court takes possession as an aid to the ultimate purpose of the intended sale in execution, that is, by way of an ancillary step, and it takes possession through its nominee, call him receiver or by any other name, but he may well be a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, of the Code, holding the property in custodia legis, that is on behalf of the Court, and possessing and exercising, if necessary, the powers under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code until the sale is held and possession is made over to the purchaser. Indeed, what will the Court's nominee sell, unless he actually holds what he has to sell and what will he do, unless he has the above powers, if exercise of the same be necessary in the meantime? Power to bring and defend suits may well be justified in such a nominee from this point of view. ( 21 ) THE reserved price, not below which the sale shall be held, has been fixed. That the sale will be by public auction has been determined and that is quite in keeping and in conformity with Section 51 (b), read with Order 21, Rule 65, of the Code. Mr. Gouri Mitter does not address us on these points. What he does submit is that Mr. Ahmed should be called upon to furnish security and that the sale should be subject to confirmation by the Court. ( 22 ) ON the question of security, the learned Standing Counsel gives an undertaking on behalf of the decree-holder respondent that the sale proceeds minus the cost for holding the sale and the remuneration of Mr. Ahmed, already fixed by the order under appeal, shall be deposited in the decree-holder bank, which shall hold the amount subject to the orders of the executing Court, we accept this undertaking and, along with the security of Rs. 25,000/-, which we propose to direct Mr. Ahmed, already fixed by the order under appeal, shall be deposited in the decree-holder bank, which shall hold the amount subject to the orders of the executing Court, we accept this undertaking and, along with the security of Rs. 25,000/-, which we propose to direct Mr. Ahmed to furnish, we deem it to be reasonable and sufficient, in the circumstances of this case, for protection of the judgment-debtor's interest and for allaying its apprehensions in the matter. ( 23 ) WE would, accordingly, direct that Mr. Ahmed do act in the present matter in the light of and in accordance with the above undertaking and that he do furnish, within a fortnight after the reopening of this Court after the ensuing Puja holidays, security to the satisfaction of the Registrar, O. S. , for the amount of Rs. 25,000/ -. ( 24 ) ON the question of confirmation, let it be stated at the risk of repetition, that movables shall be sold. So, as soon as the purchase money is paid, the person, holding the sale (here Mr. Ahmed) shall grant a receipt for the same and the sale shall become absolute [vide Order 21, Rule 77 (2) of the Code; vide also Rule 10, Chapter XXVII of the Original Side Rules]. Thus, law itself provides for confirmation and, when that is so, no further direction appears to be called for or necessary in the matter. The statute and the Rules do not contemplate confirmation of such sales, except as above, and, for obvious reasons, and we do not feel any necessity for it and find none either, particularly in view of the undertaking and the order for security, hereinbefore mentioned, in addition to the provisions for reserved price and public auction, already made. ( 25 ) THE seed of this litigation was sown on October 25, 1952, when the deed of hypothecation was executed. That was followed by a deed of mortgage on July 26, 1955. The suit was instituted on September 6, 1957, for recovery of Rupees six lakhs and odd. That was followed on March 14, 1958, by a consent decree for Rs. 10 lakhs, providing for instalments on a generous scale, spread over 20 (twenty) years. The appellant has not been good enough to pay a single instalment. This is 1962, coming to and end. That was followed on March 14, 1958, by a consent decree for Rs. 10 lakhs, providing for instalments on a generous scale, spread over 20 (twenty) years. The appellant has not been good enough to pay a single instalment. This is 1962, coming to and end. The appellant is, therefore, one who has forfeited the sympathy of the Court. It is time that execution be speeded up. Let it not be said that a Court can only make a decree but cannot execute or enforce it. ( 26 ) IN the result, subject to the observations, made above, and the directions contained hereinbefore, about the deposit of the sale proceeds, and furnishing of security, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel. ( 27 ) LIBERTY to Mr. Ahmed to proceed with the printing of the catalogue according to the directions, already given by Court, in the mean time. Liberty to the parties to mention for further directions, if necessary, after the holidays. Appeal dismissed with costs.