Bhargava, J.—This is an application in revision by Udairam and Bahadur against their conviction under sec. 447 of the Indian Penal Code. They have been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 400/- each. 2. The dispute between the parties relates to Khasra No. 1233 situate in village Kohrana, District Alwar. It appears that Sheochand complainant had obtained a decree for recovery of possession of this and two other fields against Udairam. In execution of that decree a warrant for delivery of possession was issued by the Sub Divisional Officer, Behror. Before the warrant could be executed, Bahadur who is the brother of Udairam instituted a suit for declaration against Sheochand and in that suit obtained an ex-parte order of temporary injunction restraining the decree-holder from interfering with his possession over the said fields. The order of injunction was also issued from the court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Behror. The order regarding delivery of possession was to be executed through the Tehsildar, Behror. It appears that Udairam appeared before the Tehsildar and apprised him of the order of temporary injunction issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Behror against Sheochand on which the Tehsildar on 15th September, 1959 issued an order directing the Girdawar Qanugo not to deliver possession to Sheochand untill further orders. Shri Basant Visharad Girdawar Qanugo who was examined as a prosecution witness admits that he had received information that a temporary injunction had been issued against Sheochand restraining him from taking possession. However, on 20th September, 1959 the Girdawar Qanugo executed the warrant for delivery of possession and Sheochand was actually put in possession of Khasra No. 1233. Thereafter Udairam and Bahadur forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the field on 14th October, 1959. 3. A report of this incident was made to the police and after investigation a challan was submitted against Udairam and Bahadur u/sec. 447 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused denied the charge and also the fact of delivery of possession to Sheochand on 20th September, 1959. Bahadur stated that he was in possession of the field. 4. The learned Magistrate who tried the case after considering the evidence held that Sheochand was in possession of the field on 14th October, 1959 and was forcibly dispossessed by the accused on that date. He, therefore, convicted both the accused under sec. 447 of the Indian Penal Code. Bahadur stated that he was in possession of the field. 4. The learned Magistrate who tried the case after considering the evidence held that Sheochand was in possession of the field on 14th October, 1959 and was forcibly dispossessed by the accused on that date. He, therefore, convicted both the accused under sec. 447 of the Indian Penal Code. An appeal was preferred against this judgment, but the learned Sessions Judge, Alwar also rejected it. 5. The main contention which has been raised in this revision is that possession alleged to have been delivered to Sheochand on 20th September, 1959 was void in law as it was given after a temporary injunction had been issued against him restraining him from interfering with the possession of Bahadur. A good number of cases were cited before me in support of the proposition that when a stay order is passed by the executing itself or by some superior court staying the execution of the decree a sale held after the stay order is invalid. With the exception of one case i.e., Shri Mandar Das Vs. Atma Ram(l) the remaining cases are clearly distinguishable because in all those cases either the order was passed by the executing court itself directing its officer to stay further proceedings in execution of the decree or the orders were issued by the appellate court under Order 41, r. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure directing the lower court to stay the execution of the decree. There can be no doubt that when a superior court directs the stay of execution pending in the lower court the jurisdiction of the lower court to execute the decree is suspended and all proceedings taken after the stay order would be invalid. In the present case no such order was passed but a temporary injunction was issued against the decree holder not to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff in the other case. There is a clear distinction between a temporary injunction which is directed against a particular person and a stay order passed by an appellate court under order 41, r. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure directing the lower court not to proceed with the execution of the decree. Therefore, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no bearing on the facts of this case. Therefore, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no bearing on the facts of this case. In Shri Mandar Dass case(l) an injunction was issued to the executing court itself and since the executing court even after the receipt of that order did not comply with it and confirmed the sale it was held that it acted without jurisdiction. This case also is not applicable to the facts of the present case because here no injunction order was directed to the court executing the decree. However in a later case the Lahore High Court itself in Lal Chand Vs. Sohan Lal (2) disagreed with this decision. This case applies to the facts of the present case with appositeness. It was held in this case that :— "A temporary injunction under the provision of Rule 1, 0.39, is not a stay order issued by a court competent to stay execution proceedings under any provision of the Code authorising such an order. The effect Of non-complaince with an injunction issued under O. 39, Rule 1 is to make the offender liable to the punishment prescribed in 0.39, Rule 2(3) and a completed sale in contravention of an injunction under 0.39 Rule 1 is not a nullity as being without jurisdiction. A temporary injunction under 0.39,Rulel is not a mandatory direction to a court, as is a Stay order of the kind provided for by the Code, but is an order directed against a particular person which can be issued only in the circumstances described in Rule 1." With respect I agree with the view expressed above. The other decisions which may also be usefully referred to in this connection are : The Delhi and London Bank, Ltd. Vs. Ram Narain (3), Manohar Das Vs. Ram Autar Pande(4), Puzhakkal Edon Vs. Mahadeva Pattar(5), Beli Ram Vs. Ram Lal(6) and Hakim Singh Vs. Wasan Singh(7). 6. In the Delhi and London Banks case(3) it was held that : "The effect of a temporary injunction granted under Sec. 492(b) of the Civil Procedure Code is not to make a subsequent mortgage of the property in question illegal and void, within the meaning of Sec. 23 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). Wasan Singh(7). 6. In the Delhi and London Banks case(3) it was held that : "The effect of a temporary injunction granted under Sec. 492(b) of the Civil Procedure Code is not to make a subsequent mortgage of the property in question illegal and void, within the meaning of Sec. 23 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). Such a penalty must not be read into Sec. 493, which provides otherwise for the breach of an injunction granted under Sec. 492." This case was followed in Manohar Dass case(4) and it was held that : "An alienation made pending a temporary injunction under Sec. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not void either under Sec. 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, or any other law." These two cases were followed by Madras High Court in Puzhakkal Edons case (5) where in a suit by the members of a Tarwad to remove the Karnavan from office, the Court passed an injunction restraining the latter from contracting loans to manage the property. The Karnavan nevertheless borrowed money for the necessary purposes of the Tarwad while the injunction was in force. The Karnavan nevertheless borrowed money for the necessary purposes of the Tarwad while the injunction was in force. In a suit by the creditor for repayment of the loan it was held that : "The effect of the injunction was what was laid down in order ;XXXIX, Civil Procedure Code, and that both the Karnavan and the Tarwad were liable for the debt." In Beli Rams case(6) it was held that : "A temporary injunction restraining a party to a suit from making a transfer of certain property has not the effect of avoiding a sale of the property carried out in defiance of the restrain ing order where the transferee is a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of any fraud or collusion on the part of the vendor." In Hakim Singhs case(7) it was held that "It is clear law that an alienation effected in voilation of a prohibitor order is not void though the person who alienates it may be liable for action in contempt of court or damages." Order 39, Rule 2 lays down that in case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the court directs his release. It does not provide that breach of an injunction would render the delivery of possession as void. I am, therefore, of the view that the delivery of possession to Sheo Chand on 20th September, 1959 was not void on the ground that he was restrained by a temporary injunction not to take possession. The order of the Tehsildar dated 15th September, 1959 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel is of no avail to him because the Sub-divisional Officer did not direct his Officer i.e. the Girdawar Qanugo to stay delivery of possession. The Tehsildar obviously read something more than what the order of injunction issued by the Sub-divisional Officer, contained. He had only to carry out the directions given by the executing court and he acted without authority in asking the Girdawar Qanugo to stay delivery of possession. The Tehsildar obviously read something more than what the order of injunction issued by the Sub-divisional Officer, contained. He had only to carry out the directions given by the executing court and he acted without authority in asking the Girdawar Qanugo to stay delivery of possession. Although this order may have been communicated to the Girdawar Qanugo yet it will not render the delivery of possession invalid; 7. It was next urged that the trial Magistrate was not justified in passing an order for restoration of possession to the complainant because there was neither any evidence nor any finding that accused took possession by show of force or by criminal intimidation. There is no force in this contention either because there is evidence of the prosecution witnesses who say that the accused threat-ended to beat the complainant when he asked them not to take possession of the land. The order for restoration of possession is, therefore, quite justified in the circumstances of the case. 8. Lastly it was contended that the fine imposed on the petitioners is very excessive. This contention appears to be correct. Both Udai Ram and Bahadur are real brothers and a fine of Rs. 890/- on both of them appears to be excessive. I, therefore, reduce the fine to Rs. 100/- on each of them as that would meet the ends of justice in the circumstances of the case. 9. The revision is, therefore, partly allowed, conviction of the petitioners is maintained, but the fine imposed on them is reduced to Rs. 100/- each. The amount of fine in excess of Rs. 100/- will be refunded to them.