JUDGMENT S.D. Singh, J.-1. The following three questions have been referred to the Full Bench by our brother, Mithan Lal, J. (1) Whether in a suit instituted before the 28th May, 1956, that is prior to the enforcement of Act XVIII of 1956, and which was still pending on the date the said amendment came into force, the issue about sirdari right was or was not to be referred to the revenue court? (2) Whether the jurisdiction of the court for deciding sirdari issue is governed with reference to the date of the institution of suit or the date of decision? (3) Whether the jurisdiction of the court which decided the question of sirdari right and which jurisdiction had also been exercised by entertainment of the suit, could be taken away and the issue relating to sirdari right became referable to revenue court by amendment to Sec. 332-B in face.of the saving incorporated under Sec. 23(1) of Act XVIII of 1956? 2. The reference to Full Bench has been made in this second civil appeal 30 of 1959 and nine other connected appeal Nos. 65, 86, 185, 186, 255, 257, 418, 477 and 587 of 1959. All these appeals were heard together. 3. The points involved in the decision of the questions referred to the Full Bench relate to the interpretation of Section 332-B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, I of 1951, (to be referred to hereafter as the Act) and the amendments made in that section from time to time. A brief history of the legislation on the subject may be given before we come to the points under consideration. 4. When Act I of 1951 was enacted, Sec. 332 prescribed the procedure when a question relating to title was raised in a revenue Court in any suit or proceeding mentioned in column 3 of Schedule II of the Act. The expression "a question regarding the title of any party" was not defined as such, but obviously it included questions relating to the bhurnidhari, sirdari, adhivasi and assami rights, recognised under Section 18 to 21 of the Act, of either party to a litigation. Initially, therefore, jurisdiction to determine these questions vested only in the Civil Courts. 5. The Act was amended by Ordinance II of 1954 by which sub-sec. (5) was added to Section 332 and a new Sec. 332-A was added after Sec. 332. Initially, therefore, jurisdiction to determine these questions vested only in the Civil Courts. 5. The Act was amended by Ordinance II of 1954 by which sub-sec. (5) was added to Section 332 and a new Sec. 332-A was added after Sec. 332. Under sub-Cl. (5) of Section 332 a question relating to adhivasi or asami rights was not to be deemed to raise a question of title within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) of Section 332 and under Sec. 332-A provision was made for an issue relating to adhivasi or asami rights of any litigant raised in any suit in a civil court being submitted to the Collector for a decision thereon. This Ordinance came into force on 6th August, 1954, and amended the existing law to this extent that while decision of questions relating to bhumidhari and sirdari rights remained within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, jurisdiction for the decision of questions relating to sirdari and adhivasi rights was transferred to revenue Courts, whether such questions arose in civil or revenue Courts. The U.P. Ordinance II of 1954 was in due course replaced by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XX of 1954. The same amendment was made even by this Act along with a number of other amendments but with this difference that what was formerly provided in the form of sub-sec. (5) of Section 332 was now given the shape of Sec. 332-A and the old Sec. 332-A was numbered as 332-B. This Sec. 332-B itself provided that it would govern suits instituted after the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954, which meant, therefore, that suits instituted before 10th October, 1954 remained unaffected by it. 6. A minor amendment in the Act was made by para. 3 of Ordinance I of 1955, which was later replaced by U.P. Amending Act, VII of 1955, but the amendment made thereby in Sec. 322-B is not material for purposes of the decision of these appeals. The next material change was, however, made by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, which came into force with effect from 28th May, 1956. Under Section 19 of this Act Sec. 332-A and 322-B were both amended and the words "a sirdar, adhivasi or asami" were substituted for "an adhivasi or asami" in both the sections. The next material change was, however, made by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, which came into force with effect from 28th May, 1956. Under Section 19 of this Act Sec. 332-A and 322-B were both amended and the words "a sirdar, adhivasi or asami" were substituted for "an adhivasi or asami" in both the sections. The result, therefore was that under these amendments, jurisdiction of the civil Courts to decide question relating to sirdari rights was also taken away and transferred to the revenue Courts. Section 23 of the Amending Act is the saving clause which kept the jurisdiction of the Courts to continue to hear and decide cases already pending in respect of certain proceedings notwithstanding any amendment made in the Act intact. But we will come to this section later. 7. The next amendment was made under the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XXXVII of 1958, which came into force on 7th November, 1958. Under Section 79 of this Act Section 332, 332-A and 332-B of Act I of 1951, were deleted with the result that there is no provision since then for any issue being submitted by the revenue Courts to the Civil Courts or by the Civil Courts to the revenue Courts and both classes of Courts have now to decide all questions, to whatever right they may relate, which might arise in suits or proceeding instituted before them and within their cognizance. There is a saving clause in Section 87 of this Act also. 8. The suits giving rise to the different appeals, which are before us, were all instituted before Sec. 332-B was added in the Act. Questions relating to the sirdari rights of the plaintiffs or defendants were raised in the suits and since these questions were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Courts when these suits were instituted, no notice appears to have been taken by the trial Courts of the amendment made in the law and they heard and decided the issue relating to sirdari rights as if Sec. 332-B did not apply to these proceedings at all. The unsuccessful parties in each of these cases went up in appeal in due course, which were heard and decided either in favour or against them. The unsuccessful parties in each of these cases went up in appeal in due course, which were heard and decided either in favour or against them. It was only when second appeals were filed in this Court that the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Munsifs to hear and decide the issues relating to sirdari rights was raised. 9. There have been two single Bench decisions in the meantime, one reported in Ram Lochan Singh v. Lakshmi Shankar, 1959 RD 207 by B. Dayal, J., and other Raghuraj Narain v. Judicial Officer, 1959 ALJ 681 by Dhavan, J. 10. Interpreting Section 23 of the U.P. Amending Act, XVIII of 1956, B. Dayal, J. held that Section 23 provides that suits, which had already been filed and were pending, shall continue to be heard by the Court in which they were pending and that. therefore, the amended Sec. 332-B did not apply to pending suits and did not affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to hear and decide questions relating to sirdari rights in suits, which were instituted before 28th May, 1956. In other case Dhavan, J. also held that the Amending Act of 1956 did not affect the procedure in suits filed before that amendment became law and he also added that apart from this Sec. 332-B having been repealed by Act, XXXVII of 1958, the position today reverted to the one prevailing before the passing of the Amending Act of 1956. 11. This very question then came up for decision before a Division Bench in Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 SLJ 991. The decision of the Division Bench turned upon the interpretation of Section 23 of the U.P. Amending Act, XVIII of 1956, which may now he quoted with advantage: "23. (i) Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title,.obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority. (ii) An appeal, review or revision from any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall notwithstanding any amendment herein made, lie to the court or authority to which it would have lain if instituted or commenced before the said commencement." It is the second part of sub-sec. (1) of Section 23 which is relevant for purposes of the present discussion. It refers to "proceeding" and provides that any proceeding instituted or commenced before any Court or authority prior to the commencement of the Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment made in the Principal Act, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority. The word "proceeding" was held in Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991 not to include a "suit" and it was, therefore, held that this saving clause did not apply to suits pending in Civil Courts, with the result that the amended Sec. 332-B, in the view of Mukerji and Manchanda, JJ., applied to all suits pending on 28th May, 1956. In that case the issue relating to sirdari rights, in fact, had been submitted to the Collector for a finding and what was contended before the Division Bench was that the issue should not have been so referred. It was, however, held that the amended Sec. 332-B did apply to pending suits and that the issue relating to sirdari rights was rightly submitted to the Collector. It is the correctness of this decision which was doubted by our brother, Mahan Lal, J. when these appeals came up for hearing before him. 12. Three different views were placed before us: (i) The word `proceeding' in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act includes a suit, and all pending suits would, therefore, continue to be heard and decided as if no amendment were made in the Act. (ii) The word `proceeding' does not include a suit; and the saving clause consequently not being applicable to pending suits, they would be governed by the amended Sec. 332-B of the Act and the Civil Courts will have no jurisdiction to decide questions relating to sirdari rights. (iii) Even though the word `proceeding' does not include a suit and the amended provisions of the Act would apply in the hearing of the pending. suits. Secs. (iii) Even though the word `proceeding' does not include a suit and the amended provisions of the Act would apply in the hearing of the pending. suits. Secs. 332, 332-A and 332-B having been deleted now by the 1958 Act, it is no longer possible to remand the suits for the necessary issues being referred to the Collector for a finding. 13. A fourth line of argument was put forward by Sri Hyder Hussain, who appeared for the respondent in appeal No. 255. He agreed that the word `proceeding' did include a suit, but contended that the Munsi having decided not to refer the issue to the Collector for a finding. He exercised his jurisdiction inasmuch as he decided to hear the issue himself, and that under the first part of sub-sec. (i) of Section 23 any amendment in the Act shall not affect the validity of the jurisdiction so exercised. 14. Sri R. N. Shukla, who appeared for the appellants in three appeals and for the respondent in one, did not advance any argument in support of one view or the other. 15. The question whether the word `proceeding' includes a suit does not appear to have been considered in Ram Lochan Singh v. Lakshmi Shankar, 1959 RD 207 though the judgment proceeds on the assumption that the saving made in the second part of Sec. 23(i) refers even to suits, nor was this question considered as such in Raghuraj Narain v. Judicial Officer, 1959 A.L.J. 681. 16. It cannot be denied that at the time the suits were filed, Civil Courts had jurisdiction to decide the issues relating to sirdari rights. 16. It cannot be denied that at the time the suits were filed, Civil Courts had jurisdiction to decide the issues relating to sirdari rights. When it was said in the Full Bench case, Mahant Shanthanand Gir v. Mahant Basudevanand, AIR 1930 Allahabad 225 : 1930 ALJ 402 that "It is clear from the authorities that a jurisdiction existing in a Court can only be taken away by the use of precise and distinct words in a statute, or as some authorities have held, by the necessary implication of the words used." or in Galsworthy v. Durrant, 1860 (2) LT 788 that "According to the well established principle which regulates the construction of Acts of Parliament an existing jurisdiction cannot be taken away except by precise and distinct words." it was conceded that even an existing jurisdiction may be taken away by an Act of the Legislature, though it was necessary for it for the purpose to ex-press its intention in precise and distinct words, or by necessary implication, and the only question for consideration, therefore, is whether. such an intention can be gathered from the language of the 1956 Act. 17. The question whether the change introduced by the 1956 Act in this respect relates to substantive law or is a mere matter of procedure, does not really arise for decision in this case. If it relates to a mere matter of procedure, the amended law would take immediate effect and apply to even pending proceedings, vide unapt Gopal Sheoroy v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 915. If on the other hand, the amendment in question is regarded as effecting the substantive rights of the parties. It will not have retrospective effect unless the intention of the legislature in that respect is clearly expressed, and it appears to us that this is one of those cases in which such intention is so expressed. Sec. 332-B (1) begins with the words "If in any suit relating to land instituted after the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954, in a Civil Court." The section thus applies to all suits instituted after the commencement of the 1954 Act, i.e., instituted on or after the 10th October, 1954. Sec. 332-B (1) begins with the words "If in any suit relating to land instituted after the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954, in a Civil Court." The section thus applies to all suits instituted after the commencement of the 1954 Act, i.e., instituted on or after the 10th October, 1954. When questions relating to sirdari rights were also brought within the scope of this section by the 1956 Act, the words `instituted after the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954 applied equally to suits involving such rights, as they did to suits relating to adhioasi or asami rights. If nothing else was said in respect of such suits, the amended provision would apply even to suits relating to sirdari rights, even though amended provision affected substantive rights. The intention of the Legislature so far as Sec. 332-B is concerned is thus clearly expressed. The question, therefore, which really arises for decision, is whether an exception was made in case of such suits in the saving clause in Sec, 23(1) or if the amendment made in Sec. 332-B remains unaffected by the saving clause. 18. But even if the question as to whether the amendment relates to a matter of procedure or affects the substantive rights of the parties is regarded as arising in this appeal, we are of opinion that no substantive rights are affected by the amendment which concerns a pure question of procedure. The substantive right of the parties in the suit was to have the question relating to their sirdari rights determined. They also had a right to have this right determined according to the substantive law contained in the relevant provisions of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and connected legislation. They also had a right to go in appeal or appeals against the decision of the trial Court in accordance with the provisions therefor as they existed on the day the suits were filed. They also had a right to go in appeal or appeals against the decision of the trial Court in accordance with the provisions therefor as they existed on the day the suits were filed. So long as the law relating to the determination of sirdari rights remained the same, the question whether the issue relating to such rights was heard and decided by the Civil Court or the Revenue Court would be a matter of mere procedure, as it does not, in any way, affect their rights in the land or their rights to have the dispute in respect of such rights determined in accordance with the law applicable to them. The amendment made in respect of the forum for the determination of such questions does not even affect the right of appeal or the forum for such appeals. The decree that would be passed in the suit would still be a decree of a Civil Court, and the finding recorded by the Revenue Court, though it would be final for purposes of the trial Court, would be liable to be scrutinised in appeal on the Civil side. 19. We may also, in this connection, refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, A.I.R. 1962 SC 547, in which their Lordships have observed that in interpreting statutes affecting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, two principles should be kept in view: (1) Where the Legislature intends that the disputes contemplated should be tried not by ordinary Civil Courts, but by Special tribunals, the relevant words should receive not a narrow but a liberal construction. (2) If a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction, it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. 20. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the provisions of Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act as well as Sec. 87(1) should receive not a narrow, but a liberal construction. 20. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the provisions of Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act as well as Sec. 87(1) should receive not a narrow, but a liberal construction. We have also kept in view later observations of their Lordships in the same case, where they say: "While bearing this principle in mind, we must have regard to another important principle of construction and that is that if a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts, it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion." 21. As has been mentioned by us earlier, the legislature has not merely by necessary implication, but in express words, used in Sec. 332-B, indicated its intention of excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to hear and decide issues relating to sirdari rights. 22. There is, in our opinion, therefore, no effect on the substantive rights of the parties, and the amendment made relates to a mere question of procedure, which will consequently have immediate effect; and even if substantive rights of the parties are indirectly involved, the Legislature has made its intention to transfer jurisdiction clear in no uncertain language. 23. Coming to the question which is directly involved in the decision of this case, we agree that the word `proceeding,' standing by itself, would certainly be wide enough to cover all kinds of proceedings in courts, including suits. But the question is not what `proceedings' would mean in its widest sense or even its usual sense, but what it does in the context in which it has been used in Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act. In our view, therefore, cases in which the import of the word `proceedings' has been explained would not be of any material help in understanding its significance in Sec. 23(i) aforesaid. 24. It has been pointed out by Mukerji and Manchanda, JJ. in Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991 that while,the word `proceeding' alone is used in sub-sec. (1) of Section 23, the words `suit' and `proceeding' have both been referred to in sub-sec. (11). of the same section and that this indicated that the Legislature was distinguishing between a `proceeding' and a `suit' and we may say with respect that this is, in our opinion also, what the Legislature intended. 25. (1) of Section 23, the words `suit' and `proceeding' have both been referred to in sub-sec. (11). of the same section and that this indicated that the Legislature was distinguishing between a `proceeding' and a `suit' and we may say with respect that this is, in our opinion also, what the Legislature intended. 25. Sec. 331 of the Act refers to Three types of proceedings in sub-sec. (1), `suit', `application' and `proceedings'; and although Sch. II, as it originally stood in the Act, referred only to an application or a `suit' the Schedule as it was substituted for the original by Section 25 of the 1956 Act even refers to certain proceedings as `proceedings' as for example, in Serial No. 4. 26. It is certainly true that the Legislature has used the word `proceeding' in the heading of Col. 3 of Sch. II, as well as in sub-secs. (2) and (3) of Section 331 of the Act in a wider sense so as to include `suits', `applications' and `proceedings', but the very context or the occasion for the use of that expression at these places as also in some other sections of the Act, such as 334 (1), 341 and 344, would indicate that it was being used there in a generic sense. The heading of Col. 3 in Sch. II clearly indicates that the word `proceeding' therein was used to describe all types of cases which were being included in the Schedule, -viz.., `suits' `applications' and `proceedings' in the restricted sense. And a reference to sub-secs. (2) and (3) of Section 331 of the Act would show that the word `proceedings' is used in the sense in which it has been used in the heading of Col. 3 of Sch. II. The Legislature had to use the expression `proceeding' at these places, perhaps in the absence of any better expression, to cover all types of proceedings which were being provided for, but was using that expression in a different and restricted sense, when it used it in contradiction to `suit' or `application' in sub-sec. (1) of Section 331 of the Act, or in the different serial Nos. in Sch. II. 27. (1) of Section 331 of the Act, or in the different serial Nos. in Sch. II. 27. Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act refers to proceedings alone and not even to applications, and it may be argued that if the word `proceeding' does not include a suit, it would not include even an application, and if it does not include even an application, there would be proceeding which may be said to be a `proceeding' not arising out of a suit or an application. But if regard is had to the provisions of the Act as a whole, it would appear that while the word `proceeding' has been used by the Legislature as a term inter-changeable with `application', a clear distinction has been maintained between a `proceeding' or an `application' on the one hand and a `suit' on the other. Cl. (aa) was added in Sec. 240-B of the Act by the 1956 Act and it refers to "any proceeding under Sec. 232." But Sec. 232(1) provides for an adhivasi applying for possession and sub-sec, (2) of Section 232 clearly refers to the start of the proceeding by means of an application. Sec. 15 of the 1956 Act provides for review of certain dismissed applications for the purpose as "the application or the proceedings". The words `application' and `proceeding' have thus been used in an inter-changeable sense and merely because the word `proceeding' in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act would include an `application', it does not necessarily follow that it would include even a suit. On the other hand, a clear distinction has been maintained between `suits' and `proceedings' in the Act itself, and subsequent connected legislation. Sec. 6 (h) (1) of the Act makes a pointed reference both to `suits' as well as `proceedings' and so does Section 331 (I) or the now deleted Secs. 232(1) and Sec. 332(A)- 28. The Act was substantially amended in 1954 by the U.P. Land Reforms (amendment) Act, XX of 1954 and there was a saving clause even in that Act in Sec. 74. There the saving clause was intended to provide for certain suits and they have been referred to as such. No reference has been made to suits under sub-sec. The Act was substantially amended in 1954 by the U.P. Land Reforms (amendment) Act, XX of 1954 and there was a saving clause even in that Act in Sec. 74. There the saving clause was intended to provide for certain suits and they have been referred to as such. No reference has been made to suits under sub-sec. (1) of Section 23 of the 1954 Act, and while the saving clause in that sub-section provides only for proceedings, there is reference to a suit as well as a proceeding in sub-sec. (11) of the very same section. If the word `proceeding' was being used in a wider sense so as to include even a suit, it could have been used even in sub-sec. (11) in the same sense. When that was not done and specific reference made to suits in that sub-section, it is obvious that the Legislature was alive to the difference in the two types of proceedings. Although the word `proceeding' may in a proper context include even a suit, in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and connected legislation, it has been used, except when the context indicates otherwise, in a particular sense and intended to describe only those proceedings which are not suits. 29. The same provision had to be made when the Act was again amended in 1958. Sec. 87 of the U.P. Amendment Act, XXXVII of 1958, made the same provision for proceedings in sub-sec. (1) and for appeal, review or revision from any suit or proceeding in sub-sec. (2). It is obvious therefore, that the Legislature was using these terms in a particular sense throughout, and not casually in one sense at one place and in another at another place. We are of opinion, therefore, that Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991 was correctly decided and lays clown the correct law. The word `proceeding' in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act does not include a `suit'. 30. The reason why the saving clause in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act was not applied to pending suits is not far to seek. The word `proceeding' in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act does not include a `suit'. 30. The reason why the saving clause in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act was not applied to pending suits is not far to seek. Once the Legislature decided to transfer jurisdiction for the decision of question relating to sirdari rights exclusively to Revenue Courts, it was also considered desirable that these Courts should exercise this jurisdiction not merely in respect of suits which were to be filed subsequently, but even in respect of suits which were, pending on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act, as there was no sense or principle involved in retaining jurisdiction in respect of the pending suits in the Civil Courts. 31. Although Sec. 332-B would apply to all suits in which `a decree had not already been passed.' the passing of the decree dates back to the deliver of judgment in the suit, and the section would in fact, therefore, he. applicable to only those suits in which judgment had not already been delivered at the commencement of the 1956 Act. The preparation of the decree follows the judgment almost automatically and we do not see any scope for any argument based on the time actually taken for the preparation of the decree. And ample provision is made in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act in respect of cases in which an issue relating to sirdari rights may have already been decided as a preliminary issue or in which a preliminary decree involving a finding in respect of such rights may have been passed. The earlier part of Sec. 23(1) of the Act clearly provides: "Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised....." 32. All cases, therefore, in which a finding in respect of an issue relating to sirdari rights had already been recorded would be cases in which a right, title, obligation or liability has already been acquired, accrued or incurred, or in which jurisdiction has already been exercised. Cases in which only evidence on the sirdari issues, either wholly or in part, may have been recorded, may also be regarded as cases in which jurisdiction has already been exercised. Cases in which only evidence on the sirdari issues, either wholly or in part, may have been recorded, may also be regarded as cases in which jurisdiction has already been exercised. They will all, therefore, be saved under the earlier part of Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act. 33. It was contended that even those cases in which an issue about sirdari rights was framed before the commencement of 1956 Act would be cases in which jurisdiction was already exercised by the Civil Courts. It is difficult for us, however, to appreciate the force of this argument. Issues have to be framed by Civil Courts in all cases, whether or not an issue has to be referred to the Collector for a finding. Prior to the 1956 Act, issues relating to sirdari rights were heard and decided by the Civil Courts themselves, there being no provision for such issues being referred to the Collector. Civil Courts cannot, therefore, be said to have applied their minds in such cases to the question whether an issue was to be referred to the Collector at the time of framing the issues, as there was no occasion for them to do so, and there was, therefore, no question of the Civil Courts exercising any jurisdiction in this respect at that stage. 34. The mere fact that a suit was instituted in a Civil Court, does not necessarily lead to the inference that the court exercised jurisdiction in respect of it. By accepting the plaint the court merely took cognizance of the suit. The question of exercising jurisdiction in respect of it, it appears to us, arises stage by stage according to the progress of the suit to the extent it may be permissible under the law. Thus if the law provides that a certain issue in the suit shall be heard and decided by another court, or that the proceedings in the suit after certain stage shall be stayed or transferred to some other court, the court of institution will have no jurisdiction to decide the issue or to proceed with the case beyond the specified stage. It cannot, therefore, be said that in entertaining the suit, the Civil Court exercised jurisdiction within the meaning of the earlier part of Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act. 35. It cannot, therefore, be said that in entertaining the suit, the Civil Court exercised jurisdiction within the meaning of the earlier part of Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act. 35. The position therefore, is that all those suits, which were pending on 28th May 1956, when the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, came into force, were not saved under Cl. (1) of Section 23 of the afore said Act, unless they were covered by the earlier part of Cl. (1), and the amended Sec. 332-B did apply to them. It was necessary, therefore, for the Civil Courts to refer the issue relating to sirdari rights in all such cases to the Collector under that section. 36. On the assumption that the word `proceedings' does include a suit and that the saving clause in Section 23 (1) of the 1956 Act applied to all pending suits, it was urged by Sri K.S. Varma that the amendment made in Sec. 332-B would even then be applicable to pending suits as the section itself provided that it would apply to all suits instituted after the commencement of the 1954 Amending Act. That argument is, however, fallacious. If the word `proceeding' in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act does include a suit, the result would be that all pending suits would continue to be heard and decided by the Court or authority in which they were pending notwithstanding any amendment made in the Act and even the amendment made in Sec. 332-B, by which the section was made applicable to sirdari rights would not he applicable to such suits. But as we have said earlier, Sec. 23(1) of 1956 Act does not refer to suits, and Sec. 332-B would in terms of its own language, be applicable to all pending suits instituted after the commencement of the 1954 i.e., after 10th October, 1954. 37. The next question which arises for decision relates to the effect of the amendment made in the Act by the U.P. Amendment Act, XXXVII of 1958. As has been pointed out earlier, Sec. 332-B has been deleted with effect from 7th November, 1958. 37. The next question which arises for decision relates to the effect of the amendment made in the Act by the U.P. Amendment Act, XXXVII of 1958. As has been pointed out earlier, Sec. 332-B has been deleted with effect from 7th November, 1958. There is a saving clause even in this Act, which reads :- "87(1) Except as provided in Secs, 85 and 86, any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority." 38. The relevant part of this sub-sec. (1) of Section 87 is almost exactly the same as that of sub-sec. (1) of Section 23 of the 1956 Act and on the basis of the same reasoning it would also be applicable only to a `proceeding' and not a `suit', with the result that suits pending on 7th November, 1958. when this Amending Act, XXXVII of 1958, came into force will not be saved by Sec. 87(1) and will consequently be affected by the amendments made in the Act. 39. The suits out of which these appeals have arisen were all instituted before the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956. Since the word `proceeding' of that Act does not include a suit, the provisions of this 1956 Act have been held to be applicable to all pending suits and issues relating to sirdari rights should have consequently been submitted by the trial Courts to the Collector under Sec. 332-B of the Act for a finding. If the provisions of the Act had remained unaltered thereafter, it would have been necessary for these appeals being allowed and the trial Courts directed to submit these issues to the Collector in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 332-B which would have been applicable to these suits. 40. As has, however, been mentioned earlier, S. 332-B was deleted in 1958 by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XXXVII of 1958. 40. As has, however, been mentioned earlier, S. 332-B was deleted in 1958 by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XXXVII of 1958. Sec. 87(1) of this Act also uses the word `proceeding' and since the word `proceeding' has been held not to include a `suit', this Sec. 87(1) would also not be applicable to the pending suits, and there is no provision in the Act now for an issue being submitted to the Collector for a finding. If the present appeals are allowed on the ground that on the date the suits were decided by the Munsifs, they had no jurisdiction to decide questions relating to sirdari rights, and these suits are remanded for fresh hearing in accordance with law, would it be possible for the trial Courts to refer the issues to the Collector for a finding now under Sec. 332-B aforesaid? After the appeals are allowed and the suits are remanded to the trial Courts, the suits would be governed for their disposal by the law as it stands now. Since the word `proceeding' in Sec. 87(1) of the 1958 Act does not include a suit, the law applicable to them prior to this 1958 Act would no longer be available for their disposal and the trial Courts will have consequently to proceed with the suits in accordance with the present law, i.e., hear and decide the issues themselves. In that view, therefore, any remand of the suits for fresh disposal in accordance with the view indicated bar us earlier would be meaningless and result merely in unnecessary delay in the final disposal of the suits. We are, therefore, of opinion that although issues relating to sirdari rights should have been submitted in each one of the suits out of which these appeals have arisen to the Collector under Sec. 332-B of the Act, setting aside of the decrees passed by the lower Courts on that account would serve no useful purpose, in view of fact that Sec. 332-B has now itself been deleted from the Act. 41. Reference was also made at the Bar to Sanwal Singh v. Jwala, 1962 ALJ 384, which was decided by one of us. 41. Reference was also made at the Bar to Sanwal Singh v. Jwala, 1962 ALJ 384, which was decided by one of us. In that case the suit which was filed after the commencement of the 1956 Act, was pending at the time of the commencement of the 1958 Act and it was held that since Sec. 332-B was no longer part of the statute law when the case was decided, the issue relating to sirdari rights could not be referred to the Collector for a finding. 42. A question similar to the one arising in these appeals also came up for decision before one of us in second civil appeal no. 443 of 1959 (Lucknow Bench) decided on 14th March, 1962, and it was held: "The word "proceeding" in this sub-sec. (1) of Section 87 of 1958 Act will also not in view of the decision in Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991, include a suit and the saving clause would not, therefore, apply to the present suit. The question, therefore will be whether it would be desirable to set aside the decrees passed by the two Courts for re-hearing of the suit in accordance with law. The main purpose behind the remand of the case could be that the issue regarding the sirdari rights be referred to the revenue Court under Sec. 332-B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. But that section has already been deleted and in view of the decision in Ram Chandra v. Muneshwa, 1961 ALJ 991 the amended law of procedure would be applicable to the decision of the suit even after remand and in that view the Munsif would not be entitled to refer the issue for decision to the revenue Court. He would on the other hand, have jurisdiction to decide the question of sirdari rights in the suit himself. In that view, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by setting aside the decrees of the two Courts on this ground." 43. He would on the other hand, have jurisdiction to decide the question of sirdari rights in the suit himself. In that view, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by setting aside the decrees of the two Courts on this ground." 43. While advancing his argument in respect of the interpretation of Sec. 87(1) of the 1958 Act, it was con-tended by Sri K. S. Verma, with a view to avoid the consequences of that section and Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act being similarly interpreted, that the intention of the Legislature has been to limit the jurisdiction for the decision of questions relating to sirdari rights to revenue Courts and that, therefore, there is ambiguity in the language of Sec. 87(1) and the words "after making reference to the revenue Court" should be added at the end of that sub-section so as to make that intention clear and reliance was placed upon Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 1953 Edn., page 250, for the proposition that an omission which the context shows with reasonable certainty to have been unintended may be supplied, at least in enactments which are construed beneficially, as distinguished from strictly. Reference was also made to page 275 of the same book where it is said that where the alter. native lies between either supplying by implication words `which appear to have been accidentally omitted', or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is usual to supply the words. 44. In order to apply these principles, however it is necessary that there should be some ambiguity in the statute. If the language of the statute is clear, there would be no question of reading any additional words in it. In the same book, page 12, the learned author says:- "It is but a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or to be taken from a statute, unless there are similar adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and, in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do' Thompson v. Goold, 1910 AC 409. It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and, in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do' Thompson v. Goold, 1910 AC 409. We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself Vickers v. Evanso, 1910 AC 444. Words plainly should not be added by implication into a statute unless it is necessary to do so to give the language sense and meaning in its context." The necessity to add any words to Sec. 87(1) would thus arise only if there is any ambiguity in it and we are of opinion that there is none. The language used in both parts of sub-sec. (1) of Section 87 is plain and simple and there is, therefore, no question of adding any words to it. 45. The only other point which remains to be considered is the one relating to exercise of jurisdiction which is the subject-matter of the third question mentioned on the first page of the judgment. It was contended by Sri Hyder Husain, who appeared for the respondents in appeal no. 255 that the Civil Courts having exercised jurisdiction in respect of even the issue relating to sirdari rights inasmuch as they did not refer the issue to the Collector under Sec. 332-B, the amendment in that section would not affect the exercise of that jurisdiction under the first part of sub-sec. (1) of Section 23 of the 1956 Act. The third question which has been referred to us is, however, differently worded. It refers to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Civil Courts by the very fact that the suits were entertained by them and what we have been asked to decide in that question is whether in view of that circumstance the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide questions relating to sirdari rights could be taken away by the amendment of Sec. 332-B in face of the saving incorporated under Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act. 46. This argument has already been considered by us in the earlier part of this judgment while dealing with the question of interpretation of Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act. It appears to us that no question of exercise of jurisdiction arises in these cases. 46. This argument has already been considered by us in the earlier part of this judgment while dealing with the question of interpretation of Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act. It appears to us that no question of exercise of jurisdiction arises in these cases. If any jurisdiction was exercised by the Civil Courts by the different suits being entertained by them it was only to take cognisance of the suits. To that extent the jurisdiction remains in tact. Even after the amendment of Sec. 332B of the Act, the jurisdiction for the decision of the suits remained with the Civil Courts, though it had yet to be exercised. The amendment made under Sec. 332-B only required a particular issue about sirdari rights being referred to the Collector for a finding. No jurisdiction had been exercised by the Civil Courts till then regarding the decision of such issues. The amended law took immediate effect and was specifically applied even to pending suits, and was consequently applicable to them. 47. There was no exercise of jurisdiction even on the ground that the Civil Courts decided either expressly or impliedly that the issue re-hating to sirdari rights shall not be referred to the Collector under Sec. 332-B. We have already considered this contention earlier in this judgment. No such express or implied finding could have been recorded by the Civil Courts prior to the amendment of the Act in 1956 as till then the question of referring an issue relating to sirdari rights to the Collector could not arise. The Civil Courts could decide whether an issue in respect of such rights was to he referred to the Collector only after the Act was amended in 1956. Any such exercise of jurisdiction could be after the amendment of the Act and not prior to it, and the first part of sub-Sec. (1) of Section 23 of the 1956 Act could not be relied upon to save the exercise of a jurisdiction which was in fact never exercised, and for which there was no occasion even. 48. Our answers to the three questions referred to the Full Bench by Mahan Lal, J. are: - (1) In a suit instituted before the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, and which was still, pending at such commencement. 48. Our answers to the three questions referred to the Full Bench by Mahan Lal, J. are: - (1) In a suit instituted before the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, and which was still, pending at such commencement. It was necessary for the issue about the sirdari rights being referred to the Collector under Sec. 332-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, I of 1950. But if the issue was not submitted to the Collector under that section before 7th November 1958, i.e. before the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XXXVII of 1958, Sec. 332-B ceased to apply and it was no longer necessary or possible for the aforesaid issue being submitted to the Collector for a finding. (2) The jurisdiction of the Court for deciding sirdari issues is governed by the law applicable on the date of the decision of the suit and not by the one in force on the date of its institution. (3) There was no exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Courts relating to the decision of sirdari rights merely by the entertainment of such suits. Issues relating to sirdari rights, therefore, became referable to revenue Courts by amendment of Sec. 332-B of the Act, the saving clause incorporated under Sec. 23(1) of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, not being applicable to suits. N. U. Beg. J.- 49. I regret my inability to agree with the answers proposed to be given by my learned brothers to the questions referred to the Full Bench. The reference relates to the interpretation of Sec. 23(1) of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, (No. XVIII of 1956) hereinafter called "the 1956 Act". It came into force on the 28th May, 1956. It covers a batch of ten Second Civil Appeals, viz. Second Civil Appeals Nos. 30, 65, 86, 185, 186, 255, 257, 418, 477, and 587 of 1959. All the suits out of which the aforementioned Second Civil Appea Is arise were filed in Civil Courts prior to the 28th May, 1956, the date on which the 1956 Act came into force, and were pending on the said date. In all of them a question of title regarding sirdari right was raised and decided by the Civil Court without referring the same to the Revenue Court. In all of them a question of title regarding sirdari right was raised and decided by the Civil Court without referring the same to the Revenue Court. The matter was taken in appeal, and the parties unsuccessful therein filed the aforementioned Second Civil Appeals in their respective cases in the High Court. 50. These appeals came up for hearing before Mahan Lal, J. on the 14th March, 1962. Before the learned Judge. on behalf of the appellants, it was argued that the 1956 Act having come into force on the 28th May, 1956, and the present suit having been filed prior to the said date, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue relating to sirdari right; and same should have been referred to the revenue Court. Reliance by the learned Counsel for the appellants was placed on the Division Bench case of Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991. In this case it was held that in a suit which was instituted prior to the coming into force of the 1956 Act and which was pending on the said date, it was obligatory on the Civil Court to refer the question of sirdari right to the Revenue Court for decision. The two previous single Judge cases of this Court, namely Ram Lochan Singh v. Lakshmi Shanker, 1959 RD 207 and Raghuraj Narain v. Judicial Officer, 1959 ALJ 681, were over-ruled by the Division Bench. The view taken by the Division Bench in this case is that in Section 23 of the 1956 Act, the word "proceeding' does not include a suit, and further that the word "proceeding" in the said section applies only to stages of a case after the termination of the suit, and not to the various stages or steps in the progress of the suit itself. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the meaning of the word "proceeding" is a wide one, and the above view expressed by the Division Bench was, therefore, open to doubt. The matter, therefore, deserved reconsideration by a Full Bench. The learned single Judge accepted this submission and referred the matter for reconsideration to a larger Bench. He formulated the following three questions for consideration by the Full Bench:- (See page 1040) 51. The matter, therefore, deserved reconsideration by a Full Bench. The learned single Judge accepted this submission and referred the matter for reconsideration to a larger Bench. He formulated the following three questions for consideration by the Full Bench:- (See page 1040) 51. At the very outset it is necessary to give a brief historical retrospect of the relevant Statute law on the subject in order to enable one to appreciate the legal arguments that arise in this case. 52. The law relating to the tenancy rights prior to the abolition of zamindari in Uttar Pradesh was contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939). The policy underlying this Act was all questions of proprietary rights should be decided by the Civil Court, and all questions of tenancy rights should be decided by the Revenue Court. This would be borne out by a perusal of Secs. 286 and 288 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, (No. 1 of 1951) hereinafter called "the Principal Act" came into force on the 26th January, 1951. The notification required by Section 4 of the said Act was published on the 1st July, 1952. As a result of it all proprietary rights of intermediaries in the areas specified therein stood abolished and were replaced by four types of land tenures. The four types of land tenures which were the creation of the said Act were:- (1) Adhivasi right, (2) Asami right, (3) Sirdari right, and (4) Bhumidhari right. 53. It is important to note at this stage that the initial and the basic policy of this Act, when it was passed, clearly appears to be to make all questions of title justiciable by Civil Courts only. This would be borne out by Section 332 which provided the procedure for decision of questions of title. The main portion of Sec. 332(1) of the said Act as it stood after certain minor amendments effected by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, (No. XVI of 1953) ran as follows:- "332. Procedure when question of title is raised - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 331, if in any suit or proceedings mentioned in Col. 3 of Sch. Procedure when question of title is raised - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 331, if in any suit or proceedings mentioned in Col. 3 of Sch. II, a question is raised regarding the title of any party to the land which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding and such question is directly and substantially in issue, the court shall, unless the question has already been decided by a competent court, frame an issue on the question of the title, and submit the record to the competent Civil Court for the decision of that issue only" (Rest omitted). 54. Schedule II referred to in the above section related to suits, applications or proceedings which were cognizable by the Revenue Courts alone tinder Section 331 of the said Act. The result of the above provision in the Principal Act, therefore, was that all questions of title, whether relating to adhivasi, asami, sirdari or bhumidhari rights had to be referred to the Civil Court even when they arose in the Revenue Court. 55. By the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance 1954 (No. II of 1954) which came into force on the 6th August, 1954, the initial position as set forth above was modified, and the Revenue Courts were given the jurisdiction to decide questions of title relating to two types of tenures, namely adhivasi and asami. This amendment was incorporated in the Principal Act by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, (No. XX of 1954) hereinafter referred to as "the 1954 Act." This purpose was achieved by introducing two sections, namely Secs. 332-A and 332-B, in the Principal Act by Secs. 63 and 64 of the 1954 Act. Subsequently, a minor amendment was effected in the above section by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, (No. 1 of 1955) which came into force on the 22nd January, 1955. The said amendment was incorporated in the Principal Act by Secs. 2 and 3 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, (No. VII of 1955), which came into force on the 22nd March, 1955. The said amendment was incorporated in the Principal Act by Secs. 2 and 3 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, (No. VII of 1955), which came into force on the 22nd March, 1955. Sec. 332-A and the relevant portion of Sec. 332-B(1) of the 1954 Act, as amended thus, stood as follows:- "332-A. Adhivasi or asami right in land not a question of title - Where in any suit or proceeding relating to land under this Act or under any other law, for the time being in force, a question is raised whether a person is or on any particular date was an adhivasi or asami of any land it shall not be deemed to raise a question of title. "332-B. Procedure when plea of asami or adhivasi rights is raised in a Civil Court. - (1) If in any suit relating to land instituted after the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954, in a Civil Court, or if instituted before the said commencement a decree had not already been passed, the question arises or is raised whether any party to the suit is or on any material date was an adhivasi or asami of the land, and such question has not previously been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Civil Court shall frame an issue on the question and submit the record to the Collector or for the decision of that issue only." (Rest omitted). The effect of the introduction of Sec. 332-B, therefore, was that the question of adhivasi or asami right, when arising in any Civil Court, had to be referred to the Revenue Court in the following two cases:- (1) Where the suit was instituted after the commencement of the 1951 Act, and (2) Where the suit, though instituted prior to the commencement of the 1954 Act, was pending on the said date. 56. It may be noted at this stage that the change brought about by the 1954 Act so far as condition No. 2 is concerned, was bound to result in serious hardship in a number of cases. Under it, the issue was liable to be referred to the Revenue Court if the suit was pending on the date of the enforcement of the said Act. Under it, the issue was liable to be referred to the Revenue Court if the suit was pending on the date of the enforcement of the said Act. The result was that even if the parties had adduced all their evidence in the Civil Court on the issue of title, and after closing their cases, their Counsel had finished their arguments and the case was reserved only for delivery of judgment, the issue would have to be referred to the Revenue Court. Further, there may be a case in which the Court had framed a preliminary issue on the question of title, and after determining the same had proceeded, later on, to determine other issues, say the question of damages. Even in a case where the Court has passed a preliminary decree deciding the question of title, for example in a partition suit, it could be said that the issue was liable to be remitted to the Revenue Court because the suit remained pending till the final decree was passed. In the last two cases referred to above, the substantive rights of the parties already determined by the Civil Court would have to be re-determined by the Revenue Court. 57. The above provision, therefore, appears to be of a highly drastic and harsh nature. It might have the effect of unsettling the substantive rights already settled. It might also prove highly prejudicial to a party since the finding given by the Civil Court in his favour might be upset by the Revenue Court. The procedure prescribed was also likely to result in heavy financial loss, and, apart from entailing waste of public time of the Court. It was bound to cause serious inconvenience to both the parties in certain cases. The parties might have incurred huge expenses in engaging Counsel, paying their fees, adducing evidence and having the matter argued. The evidence already adduced by them might not be available to them in the Revenue Court. It might be lost or destroyed and the witnesses might die. The question might have been determined by the Court. All this would be Set at naught by the amendment. The whole question would have to be remitted for redetermination by the Revenue Court. The entire evidence would have to be summoned again in the Revenue Court. The counsel may have to be engaged again for the new Court. The question might have been determined by the Court. All this would be Set at naught by the amendment. The whole question would have to be remitted for redetermination by the Revenue Court. The entire evidence would have to be summoned again in the Revenue Court. The counsel may have to be engaged again for the new Court. The case would have to be argued again in another forum, and in the new decision given would be binding on the Civil Court. The decision of the Revenue Court might be contrary to the decision of the Civil Court. Apart from its damaging effect on the rights of the parties, it is to be noted that the said provision affects the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in suits already instituted and pending before them. It is not as if the procedure in the same Court was being altered. The amendment in question might have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction already exercised by the Civil Court in an important part of the subject matter, and vesting it in a different Court. The issue of title is usually the main issue involved in such cases, and the decision of the Court turns on it. The Code of Civil Procedure is made applicable to proceedings under the Principal Act, but the change in question is made not by amending the law relating to the procedure, but by amending the provisions of the Principal Act dealing with the substantive rights of the parties and the jurisdiction of the Court. 58. The question as to whether the amendment in question is purely of a procedural nature or of a mixed nature affecting both procedure as well as substantive rights becomes, however, immaterial in this case, and need not be gone into, in view of the interpretation placed by me in the saving clause contained in Section 23 of the 1956 Act. I have, however, pointed out the above features of the 1954 Act in order to indicate that the purpose and intention of the Legislature in inserting the said saving clause in the 1956 Act obviously appears to be to remedy the mischief and avoid the inconvenience and hardship that was bound to be caused by the actual operation of the provisions of the 1954 Act in certain cases. 59. 59. The next step in the development of law in this regard was taken by the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act. (No. XVIII of 1956) which came into force on the 28th May, 1956. By Section 19 of this Act, in Sec. 332-A and Sec. 332-B of the Principal Act for the words "an adhivasi or asami" the words "a sirdar, adhivasi or asami" were substituted. The 1956 Act, however while adding sirdari right in Sec. 332-B, also introduced a saving clause by Section 23 of the same Act. The interpretation of this section is the purpose for which this Full Bench has been constituted. Sec. 23 runs as follows: "23. Saving. - (i) Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already, acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised and any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority. (ii) An appeal, review or revision from any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, lie to the court or authority to which it would have laid if instituted or commenced before the said commencement." As already observed, it is possible that in 1956 the Legislature realised the drastic consequences that the amendment relating to the adhivasi and asami right by the 1954 Act might have had on the cases already pending in the Civil Courts, the dislocation of the already decided rights that it entailed, the waste of public time that it involved, and the serious inconvenience and financial loss that it had the effect of causing to the parties in certain cases. It, therefore, considered it desirable to put in a saving provision in the 1956 Act with a view to prevent the same unfortunate consequences ensuing, at any rate, in respect of the determination of the new sirdari right which was being freshly introduced into the same section. How far the Legislature succeeded in achieving this purpose will be discussed in the subsequent portion of the judgment. 60. How far the Legislature succeeded in achieving this purpose will be discussed in the subsequent portion of the judgment. 60. To complete the history of the development of the law in this regard it may he mentioned that in 1958 the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, (XXXVII of 1958), hereinafter referred to as "the 1958 Act" was passed. This Act came into force on the 27th November, 1958. By Section 79 of this Act Secs. 332-A and 332-B were deleted. The effect of this deletion was that the bar placed by the Acts of 1954 and 1956 on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to decide questions to title in respect of the Adhivasi, asami and sirdari rights stood completely removed. Once, therefore, a suit was cognizable by the Civil Court, it became possessed of full jurisdiction to decide all questions raised therein including the question of title. The entire procedure relating to the remittance of issues by the Civil Court to the revenue Court was thus swept away by the 1958 Act. It may also be noted that Section 87 of the 1958 Act provided a saving clause on lines exactly similar to Section 23 of the 1956 Act. 61. A close examination of the provisions of Section 23 of the 1956 Act may be made at this stage. An analysis of Section 23 shows that the amendment made by the 1956 Act would not affect three classes of cases. They are specified as follows:- (1) According to Section 23, the amendment made by the 1956 Act "shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred." (2) The amendment in question shall not affect "any jurisdiction already exercised." (3) The amendment shall not affect "any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority" prior to the commencement of the 1956 Act and such proceeding shall, notwithstanding any amendment made, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority. 62. The first exception relates to the rights or liabilities of the parties, the second to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the third to all proceedings in general. The application of all the three aforementioned exceptions carved out by Section 23 of this Act may now be determined with reference to the various stages of a pending suit. 63. 62. The first exception relates to the rights or liabilities of the parties, the second to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the third to all proceedings in general. The application of all the three aforementioned exceptions carved out by Section 23 of this Act may now be determined with reference to the various stages of a pending suit. 63. So far as exception no. 1 is concerned, it will obviously apply to pending cases in which a finding on the question of title has already been given in a preliminary issue or a preliminary decree. In all these cases as a consequence of something already done viz., the trial of the case at the instance of the parties and the order passed by the Court therein, a right or title has already been acquired by one part, and an obligation or liability has already been incurred by the other. The amendment made by the 1956 Act will not, therefore, affect such pending cases. The purpose of this exception appears to be in consonance with the intention of the Legislature to remedy the inconvenience and the prejudice resulting from the operation of the 1954 Act. This very purpose seems to permeate the entire body of Sec. 23(1). While, therefore, interpreting all the three parts of this saving clause, it would be helpful to bear in mind throughout the rule of interpretation underlying the same. The said rule is stated in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (10th Edn, at page 191 in the following words:- "In determining either the general object of the Legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. An argument drawn from an inconvenience, it has been said, is forcible in law, and no less but rather more, force is due to any drawn from an absurdity or injustice." At page 227 of the same hook it is slated as follows: "But a new procedure would be presumably inapplicable, where its application would prejudice rights established under the old, or would involve a breach of faith between the parties." In Jagdish Swamp's book on the Interpretation of Indian Statutes also at pp. 413-414, it is stated as follows:- "A new procedure would be presumably inapplicable, where its application would prejudice rights established under the old law. In Chhunna Lal v. Sriniwas, AIR 1946 Madras 262 the petitioner gave the requisite notice but before the date of hearing the rule as to notice was amended. The petitioner could not be compelled once more to give notices of some new date for hearing and incur all the consequent expenses, and the amended rule was accordingly held to be not retrospective. The validity or operation of any order validly passed or any act validly done by a judicial tribunal under the procedural law for the time being in force cannot be affected by any subsequent change in the said law Ram Singh v. Crown, 1950 E.P. 25 (32). So far as the second exception is concerned. this would obviously apply to cases covered by exception No. 1. A remittance of an issue relating to title in such cases would be tantamount to an ouster of the jurisdiction of the Court in a matter in which the said jurisdiction has already been exercised. Such cases would, therefore, be covered not only be exception No. 1 but also by exception No. 2. 64. In addition to the above cases, under exception No. 2 would also be covered cases in which the Court has already framed an issue on the question of sirdari right before the commencement of the 1956 Act. On the date of the framing of the issue, the Court fixes a date for taking further action towards the determination of the said issue by fixing a date for taking evidence or by taking other steps in that regard. Even if the Court has not passed an explicit order that it would try the issue itself, such an order would be necessarily implied in the proceedings. As the Act requiring the remittance of the issue of title was not in force on that date, the Court would not pass an order remitting the said issue to the revenue Court. Framing an issue on the question of title will, therefore, be the first step towards the determination of the question of title, and, where this step is taken by the Court, it must be held that the Court has already done an act exercising jurisdiction over this part of the proceedings. Framing an issue on the question of title will, therefore, be the first step towards the determination of the question of title, and, where this step is taken by the Court, it must be held that the Court has already done an act exercising jurisdiction over this part of the proceedings. The production of evidence and the hearing of arguments including the pronouncement of judgment on the question of title would be the subsequent stages of the part of the proceedings which started with the framing of the issue of title, and all of them would be directed towards the same end. All these stages would, therefore, be also covered by exception 2. 65. It may be argued that before this part is attracted, jurisdiction should be completely exercised. Mere framing of an issue is only a partial exercise of jurisdiction. This argument ignores the fact that the word used in connection with jurisdiction is "affect". The word "affect" appears to be a term of wide amplitude. In the Law Lexicon of British India by P. Ramanatha Aiyar the meaning of the word "affect" is stated as follows:- "Affect. To have an effect upon, to influence, but often used in the sense of acting injuriously upon "persons and things and sometimes in the sense of Vary.Bouv: Ame. Cyc; Davis v. Symonds, I Cox Eq. Cas. 402 (407), Tyler v. Wells, 2 Moo. App. 526, 538. The meaning of the two words "affect" and "effect" are also clarified as follows: - "Affect and effect are sometimes confused. To affect is to influence, concern, to effect is to accomplish or bring about." 66. Once, therefore, the Court has taken a single step forward in the sphere of jurisdiction relating to the determination of the question of title, any reversal of its position in this regard would affect its jurisdiction in the matter and attract the exemptive provision of exception No. 2. 67. It may also be noted that "jurisdiction" is a term of wide application. It may relate not only to the decision of a matter but also its cognizance and hearing. Further the term "Jurisdiction may relate to territorial jurisdiction or to pecuniary jurisdiction or to the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. 68. 67. It may also be noted that "jurisdiction" is a term of wide application. It may relate not only to the decision of a matter but also its cognizance and hearing. Further the term "Jurisdiction may relate to territorial jurisdiction or to pecuniary jurisdiction or to the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. 68. The meaning of the word "jurisdiction" has been expounded with some detail in a Full Bench case in Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1921 Calcutta 34. The following passage from the judgment of the said case is relevant in this connection: "In the order of reference to a Full Bench in the case of Sukhlal v. Taro Chand, 1905 (33) Cal. 68, it was stated that jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of Court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it; in other words, by jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. An examination of the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the term "jurisdiction", which has been stated to be `the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact;' the authority by which the Judicial Officer take cognizance of and decide causes the authority' to hear and decide a legal controversy `the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them: 'the power to hear, determine and pronounce judgment on the issues before the Court; `the power of authority which is conferred upon a Court by the Legislature to hear and determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments into the facts, to apply the law, to pronounce. the judgment and to carry it into execution." The learned Judges then went on to classify jurisdiction into three categories (1) territorial jurisdiction, (2) pecuniary jurisdiction and (3) jurisdiction over the subject matter. 69. In the present case the jurisdiction that would be affected would be the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. By framing the issue on the question of title the Court actually assumed jurisdiction over this part of the subject-matter of the suit. 69. In the present case the jurisdiction that would be affected would be the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. By framing the issue on the question of title the Court actually assumed jurisdiction over this part of the subject-matter of the suit. When the Court framed the issue on the question of title it possessed full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the entire subject-matter of the suit. An issue regarding sirdari rights is an issue of title and is, in fact, the most vital issue in the case. The subsequent deprivation of its power to try this issue would, therefore, result in affecting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court over the most important part of the subject matter of the suit. The Court had already embarked on this task on the date on which it had framed an issue. It had, therefore, already exercised jurisdiction over this part of the subject-matter of the suit at the time when it framed the issue. As a result of the 1956 Act, therefore the most important part of the jurisdiction of the Court was cut off. The court was thus disabled from trying the issue of title, and its jurisdiction must, therefore, be held to be affected in such cases. 70. It may also be noted in this connection that statutes affecting or ousting jurisdiction of Courts are to be strictly interpreted- The following observations made in the Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court in Mahant Shantha Nand Gir Chela and Mahant Gaya Nand Gir v. Mahant Basudevanand, 1858 (8) E.B. 801 are relevant in this regard:- "It is clear from the authorities that a jurisdiction existing in a Court can only be taken away by the use of precise and distinct words in a statute or as some authorities have held by the necessary implication of the words used. In the same way if the common law is to be altered, there must be equally precision in the words of the Act. In the case of Galsworthy v. Durrant, 1860 (2) LT 788, the then Master of the rolls said as follows : `According to the well established principle which regulates the construction of Acts of parliament, an existing jurisdiction cannot be taken away except by precise and distinct words.' After citing English cases on the point, later on it is observed: - "Lord Cambell in Southampton Bridge Co. v. Local Board of Southampton, 1858 (8) EB 801 said: `Inasmuch as the power of the Court Queens' Bench to change venue is a common law power, words should be very strong which are relied upon to take away such power.' Examples need not be multiplied. This rule for the construction of statutes has been explicit in English Law for centuries." 71. I am, therefore, of the opinion that exception No. 2. will also cover cases where the Court has exercised its jurisdiction by framing an issue on the question of title or by taking any further step towards the determination of the said issue thereafter, eg. recording evidence or hearing arguments etc., because the jurisdiction to fully hear that part of the case possessed by the Court at that stage, and already exercised by it, would be affected by the subsequent amendment. 72. The third exception made by Section 23 relates to proceedings already instituted prior to the commencement of the 1956 Act. The question that ,irises in this connection is whether the word "proceeding" used in this part of the section includes a suit or not. Having given my anxious and prolonged consideration to this part of the case, I have eventually come to the conclusion that the word "proceeding" used in Sec. 23(1) should be interpreted to include a suit. A reference to Thorondike Baranhart Comprehensive Desk Dictionary shows that the word proceeding is drived from the Latin words - "pro" meaning "forward" and "cedere" meaning "to move." It means "go on after having stopped; go forward" and also "begin and carry on an action at law." The word "proceeding" means "action in a case in a law Court." The meaning of the word "proceeding" given in Murrays' New English Dictionary at No. 1 is "The action of going onward, advance, onward movement or course." At No. 3 the meaning given is "The instituting or carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process, any act done by authority of a court of law, any step taken in a cause by either party." In Webster's New International Dictionary its meaning in law is given as follows: "Law (1) pl. the course of procedure in an action at law (2) Any step or act taken in conducting litigation." 73. the course of procedure in an action at law (2) Any step or act taken in conducting litigation." 73. In legal parlance the word "proceeding" is a term of widest amplitude it includes not only the stages which a case may undergo after the termination of the suit, e.g. an appeal or revision, or execution, but also the successive stag, es which mark the progress of the suit from its inception, during its trial and till its termination. The meaning of the word "proceeding" has been enunciated in the Law Lexicon of British India by P. Ramanatha Aiyar thus: "A proceeding in a civil action is an act necessary to be done in order to attain a given end. It is a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right. "In its general acceptation, `proceeding' means the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments and of executing. Ordinary proceedings intend the regular and usual mode of carrying on a suit by due course of common law. "In its general acceptation, `a proceeding' is an act which is done by the authority or direction of the Court, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to attain a given end: a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right; performance of an act, wholly distinct from any consideration of an abstract right; the form and manner of conducting judicial business before a Court or judicial Officer; regular or orderly progress in form of law including all possible steps in an action, from its commencement to the execution of judgment. See 26 M. 589 (F.B.) 11 W. R. 209; 146 I. C. 653; 1933 Rang. 292; 1 A. L. J. 428; 13 I. C. 175." The meaning of the word "proceeding" has been expounded in similar words in a Full Bench case of the Calcutta High Court in Deb Narain. Dutt v. Narendra Krishna, ILR 16 Cal. 267 F.B. 272 it is observed as follows: "The word `proceeding' is a very general one, it is not limited to proceedings connected with civil suits, but includes, I suppose proceedings other than civil proceedings, and civil proceedings other than suits. Dutt v. Narendra Krishna, ILR 16 Cal. 267 F.B. 272 it is observed as follows: "The word `proceeding' is a very general one, it is not limited to proceedings connected with civil suits, but includes, I suppose proceedings other than civil proceedings, and civil proceedings other than suits. When applied to suits, it may be used to mean the suit as a whole, or it may be used, and often is used, to express the separate steps taken in the course of a suit, the aggregate of which makes up the suit." In Rajesab Wallad Imamsab Bhagwan v. Harish Chandra Hannawar, 1954 (56) Bom. LR 638 it is observed that the word "proceeding" in Section 89 (2) (b) (ii) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, includes a suit, an appeal and also an execution proceedings. 74. In Ratanchand Srichand V. Hanmantra v. Shiv Bakas, 6 Bom. HCR 166 it is stated as follows:- "A suit is a judicial proceeding, and the word `proceedings' must be taken to include all the proceedings in the suit from the date of its institution to its final disposal and therefore to include proceedings in appeal." 75. In Satghuri v. Mujidan, ILR 15 Cal. 107 it was held that the word "proceeding" in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1868 includes a suit in its entirety. 76. In Pallipuravil Asan Kutti v. Maukkolakkal Koyaman Kutti, AIR 1937 Madras 342 the word `proceeding' with reference to Section 153, C.P.C. was interpreted to mean `any application to a Court of justice however made for aid in the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for damages, or for any remedial object.' 77. In Brijlal Suri v. The State of U.P., AIR 1958 Allahabad 621, which is a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, following a Full Bench case of the Punjab High Court, Chaturvedi. J. made the following observations:- "I respectfully agree with the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of Kapur Singh, A.I.R. 1957 Pun. 173 referred to above and hold that civil proceedings may be defined as a judicial process to enforce a civil right and include any remedy employed to vindicate that right. The word `proceeding' covers every steps in an action and is equivalent to an action." 78. 173 referred to above and hold that civil proceedings may be defined as a judicial process to enforce a civil right and include any remedy employed to vindicate that right. The word `proceeding' covers every steps in an action and is equivalent to an action." 78. In Saligram v. Kharag Jit, 1 ALJR 428, while interpreting the provisions of the N.W.P. Tenancy Act (II of 1901), it was held that the word "proceedings" used therein includes the whole proceedings from the filing of the plaint down to the final order in execution. 79. In Rudra Pratap v. Mirtunjay Pratap, AIR 1957 Allahabad 28 a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Desai and Roy, JJ. held that the words "Civil proceeding" are wide enough to cover any proceeding of a civil nature, whether it is being held by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction or in its revisional jurisdiction. 80. In Hansraj v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co., A.I.R. 1933 PC 63 : 1933 ALJ 175 it is observed as follows: "The word suit ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint." 81. In Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, A.I.R. 1950 SC 222 the meaning of the word "sue" is expounded as follows: "The expression `sue' means `the enforcement of a claim or a civil right means of legal proceeding.' When a right is in jeopardy fall within the expression `sue'. Any remedy that can be taken to vindicate the right is included within the expression." 82. The above rulings indicate that the term `proceeding' is a word such wider in scope than a suit. It may include not only a suit but also a large variety of other matters. The term "proceeding" may thus comprise the following matters: (1) The various stages of a suit from its institution to its termination, including the several steps taken towards its further progress at all the intermediate stages from its beginning to its end. (2) The suit in its entirety. (3) Steps taken after the termination of the suit, e.g. appeal, review or revision for having the decision made in the suit reopened and modified. (4) Steps taken independently of the suit to have the decision given in the suit enforced, e.g. execution proceedings. (2) The suit in its entirety. (3) Steps taken after the termination of the suit, e.g. appeal, review or revision for having the decision made in the suit reopened and modified. (4) Steps taken independently of the suit to have the decision given in the suit enforced, e.g. execution proceedings. (5) The above matters may relate to the civil or to the criminal side. The term "proceeding" is wide enough to cover both. 83. In view of the obviously wide import of the meaning of the term `proceedings' in its ordinary acceptation, it would not be correct to restrict it to proceedings other than suits, unless there are strong indications in support of such a construction. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hariprasad v. A. D. Divelkar, A.I.R. 1957 SC 121, "it is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended." The present case is a stranger one because in the present case neither the 1956 Act nor the Principal Act has anywhere defined the meaning of the term "proceeding" with a view to give it any artificial restricted or extraordinary connotation. 84. In the above situation, it would be legitimate to treat the term "proceeding" as inclusive of suit, unless the contrary intention follows from express words or by necessary implication. There is nothing express to the contrary in the present case. If the Legislature intended to exclude "suit" from the operation of Sec. 23(i), the easiest thing for it would have been to expressly add the words "except a suit" after the term "proceeding." 85. It is to be noted at this stage that the very fact that the Legislature has introduced a saving clause in the Act of 1956 in Section 23, itself makes it quite patent that the Legislature in-tended to exempt certain proceedings from the application of the Act. The only question is whether the Legislature intended to exempt all proceedings including suits or all proceedings excluding suits. It is further significant to note that the word "proceeding" is not qualified by any adjective restricting its application to any particular type of proceedings. The only question is whether the Legislature intended to exempt all proceedings including suits or all proceedings excluding suits. It is further significant to note that the word "proceeding" is not qualified by any adjective restricting its application to any particular type of proceedings. If it is used generally, there does not appear to be any reason why it should be interpreted to exclude suits, and include all other proceedings within its ambit. If applications are included within the category of exemptions, there does not appear to be any cogent ground for excluding suits. The result of accepting the contrary view would be that if the question of title regarding sirdari right were to come at the trial stage in a suit, it would have to be determined by a revenue Court. On the other hand, if the same question were to be raised at the stage of appeal in a case where the appellate court allows an amendment of pleadings in this regard and proceeds to determine the issue, or at the stage of execution or in other proceedings which are initiated by an application and are not suits, e.g. proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act or the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act or any other Act, it would be determined by the Civil Court. The result would be that there would be jurisdiction in two different Courts for determining the same issue depending on the question whether the matter arises in a suit or a proceeding other than a suit. Further, the same Court (i.e. the Civil Court) would be possessing the jurisdiction to try the issue if the matter arose before it in an application but not if it arose before it in a suit. The contrary interpretation, therefore, is likely to result in situations that are anomalous, conflicting and embarrassing. It is a well-known canon of construction that an interpretation that leads to such results should be avoided. 86. To hold otherwise may lead to various other anomalies. Sec. 332 provides for a reference of a question of title by the Revenue Court to the Civil Court. Sec. 332-A, as framed by the Act of 1954, provided that where in a "suit or proceeding" a question is raised as to whether a person is adhivasi or asami of any land, it shall not be deemed to raise a question of title. Sec. 332-A, as framed by the Act of 1954, provided that where in a "suit or proceeding" a question is raised as to whether a person is adhivasi or asami of any land, it shall not be deemed to raise a question of title. By Section 19 of the 1956 Act the word "sirdar" has been added to Sec. 332-A as well. If the interpretation accepted in Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991 is treated as correct, then the amendment made in Sec. 332-A cannot have retrospective effect. This would be the result of Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act. It would, therefore, follow that whereas in a suit instituted or pending in a Revenue Court, the question of sirdari will have to be referred to the Civil Court, even after the 28th May, 1956, because, that will continue to be a question of title, it will be correspondingly referable to the Revenue Court by the Civil Court under Sec. 332-B. This could not have been intended. The amendment when read in the light of Sec. 332-A indicates that the question of sirdari right continues to be a question of title in all suits instituted before the 28th May, 1956, and as such, is decidable exclusively by the civil and not by the Revenue Court. 87. Under Sec. 229-B and even independently of this section, a suit for declaration by a sirdar lay in the Civil Court before the 1956 Act. That right to decide the suit has not been taken away in any manner by the 1956 Act. It could not have been obviously intended that while the Civil Court should continue to decide the suit for declaration, the crux of the dispute i.e. whether the plaintiff is or is not a sirdar, should be. referred to the revenue Court in the same suit. That will take the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter without substance. 88. The sirdari right is more or less on a par with the bhumidhari rights. Except as regards the right to transfer, the rights of a tenure holder of the two classes are akin to a great extent. There are good reasons for it. Both these tenures are comprised of the same classes of tenants mentioned in Secs. 88. The sirdari right is more or less on a par with the bhumidhari rights. Except as regards the right to transfer, the rights of a tenure holder of the two classes are akin to a great extent. There are good reasons for it. Both these tenures are comprised of the same classes of tenants mentioned in Secs. 18 and 19 of the Principal Act, For instance a person who was a hereditary or occupancy tenant before vesting would be sirdar on the 1st July, 1952, under Sec. 19. But if he has obtained a sanad under Section 6 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition or Privileges) Act, 1949 (U.P. Act X of 1949), he would be a bhumidhar under Sec. 18(2), and it is also open to a sirdar to obtain a sanad and become a bhumidhar under Secs. 134 and 137 of the Principal Act. It means, roughly speaking, that the sirdar and bhumidhar enjoy the same rights under the Act, except in relation to the right of transfer. Both hold title to the land, and the question of adjudication of rights as bhumidhari or sirdar has been treated as a question of title. While the issue relating to the bhumidhari right continued to be cognizable by the Civil Court, in the above situation the issue regarding the sirdari right cannot be said to have been left to the Revenue Court exclusively, in the absence of a definite provision to that effect. 89. Once it is conceded that the purpose of Sec. 23(i) was to exempt certain pending proceedings from the application of the 1956 Act, there does not appear any strong ground for excluding suits from it. On the other hand, there are indications in sub-sec. (i) itself supporting the inclusion of suits within its ambit. The use of the words "heard" and decided" also suggests the same conclusion, as the suits are the most appropriate proceedings in which hearing and decision of questions of title usually takes place. "Hearing" and "decision" are the two basic features of all suits: In fact it is difficult in this context to think of any other proceedings to which this part would usually apply. The use of the words "instituted and Court" also indicates the same, because, in legal parlance, one speaks of a suit as being instituted in Court. "Hearing" and "decision" are the two basic features of all suits: In fact it is difficult in this context to think of any other proceedings to which this part would usually apply. The use of the words "instituted and Court" also indicates the same, because, in legal parlance, one speaks of a suit as being instituted in Court. Further the use of both the words "instituted" as well as "commenced", and of "Court" as well as "authority" shows that the idea was to use the term "proceedings" in its widest sense so as to cover all possible types of proceedings before all conceivable tribunals. A reference to the first two parts of sub-sec. (i) also indicates that the purpose of this sub-section was to widen the ambit of the exemptions as much as possible and not to restrict them. As already shown, the first two parts of sub-sec. (i) do include "suits", and apply to them after a certain stage. These appears, therefore, to be no reason to think why the third part should exclude them. The same conclusion is supported by a reference to sub-sec. (ii). Sub-Sec. (ii) was added to sub-sec. (i) to cover proceedings after the termination of suits, e.g. appeal, review or revision arising out of suits within the exception. Sub-Sec. (i) is merely a supplement to it, and its purpose appears to be to include proceedings before the termination of suits and suits themselves within the same ambit. Both the sub-sections thus supplement each other. Every indication in the section thus irresistibly points to the conclusion that the word "proceeding" is used in the widest possible sense in sub-sec. (i), and at any rate, to include "suits" within it. 90. Another important canon of construction which has to be borne in mind in this connection is that the provisions of a law which result in depriving the ordinary Civil Courts of their normal jurisdiction to decide questions of title have to be very strictly construed. The burden lies on the party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in this regard to show that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts is clear and unambiguous. 91. In Vaidyantha Aiyar v. Yogambul Ammal, AIR 1927 Madras 140 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court relying on Balvant Ram Chandra v. Secretary of State, ILR 29 Bom. 91. In Vaidyantha Aiyar v. Yogambul Ammal, AIR 1927 Madras 140 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court relying on Balvant Ram Chandra v. Secretary of State, ILR 29 Bom. 480 and other cases cited therein held as follows:- "An enactment of a character which deprives the subject of his right to resort to the ordinary Civil Courts of justice for relief in certain cases ought to he construed strictly, and the Court should not extend its operation further than the language of the legislature requires." 92. In Ali Muhammad v. Hakim, AIR 1928 Lahore 121 a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court held as follows:- "It is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts to establish his contention." It was further observed: "It is a well established doctrine that a statute interfering with the established state of law must receive a strict construction, and when the language is doubtful, the Courts should lean against an ouster of jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals." 93. In Maung Ba Lat v. Liquidator Kemmendine Thathanahita Co-operative Society Ltd., A.I.R. 1933 Ran. 124 it is observed as follows:- "The Civil Courts are prima facie entitled to determine all civil matters; legislation that ousts their jurisdiction must be very carefully examined, and unless the courts are satisfied that the conditions upon which they are ousted are fulfilled, and fulfilled to their own satisfaction, they will not hold that they are debarred from inquiring into any matter before them. They will not take the mere ipse dixit of the authority which ousts them, unless the law definitely states that they arc bound to do so." 94. In Popuri Ramayya v. Putcha Lakshminarayana, A.I.R. 1934 PC 84 it was observed: "Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the terms of Section 9, C. P.C. lay down a general rule in favour of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and that the burden of proof is on the party who maintains an exception to the general rule." 95. Even if, therefore, the interpretation of Section 23 is open to two interpretations the interpretation vesting jurisdiction in the Civil Courts is to be preferred to the interpretation divesting Civil Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction to decide questions of title. 96. Even if, therefore, the interpretation of Section 23 is open to two interpretations the interpretation vesting jurisdiction in the Civil Courts is to be preferred to the interpretation divesting Civil Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction to decide questions of title. 96. Further, as I have already indicated earlier, the wider meaning of the term "proceeding" avoids the mischief created by the earlier Act, and thereby fulfils the purpose of the Legislature. The following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 SC 661 are relevant in this connection: "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided that - `........ for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st what was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th the true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and `prov privato commdo', and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makes of the Act `pro bono publico' In - `In re. Mayfair Property Co., 1898 2 Ch. 28 Lindley M. R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported `Heydon's case, 1584 (3) C.O. Rep. 7a, In re. Eastman Photographic Material Co. v. Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 1898 AC 571, Earl of Halsbury Reaffirmed the rule as follows : "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion." 97. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion." 97. In the State of Uttar Pradesh v. C. Tobit, A.I.R. 1958 SC 414, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "It is well-settled that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view." 98. In Commr. of Income-Tax v. S. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 SC 352, it was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a construction fulfilling the objects of the Legislature should be preferred to the one defeating the same. 99. Under the above circumstances it appears to me that the word "proceeding" in Sec. 23(1) of the 1956 Act should be construed to include a suit, unless very clear, cogent and compelling reasons are made out indicating that the Legislature intended to exclude a suit from its ambit. 100. I now propose to discuss the reasons adduced in support of the contrary contention by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Most of them are based on the judgment in the Division Bench case of Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar, 1961 ALJ 991. 101. The first argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the word mentioned in Sec. 23(i) is "proceeding" only and not "suit or proceeding." The obvious answer to this criticism is that if the word "proceeding" itself includes a suit as well as the various stages of a suit, then it was not necessary for the legislature at all to use the word "suit" with the word "proceeding." 102. The next and the most important argument in support of the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is drawn from a contrast between sub-sec. (i) and sub-sec. (ii) of Sec. 23. It is argued that in sub-sec. (i) only the word "proceeding" is used whereas in sub-sec. (ii) of the same section the words "suit or proceeding" are used. This is the main reason given by the Bench in Ram Chandra's case, 1961 ALJ 991 and is contained in the following passage:- "If it was intended that the word "proceeding" should include a suit within the meaning of Sec. 23(i) then why should the Legislature have thought it proper to use both the words `suit' and `proceeding' in sub-sec. This is the main reason given by the Bench in Ram Chandra's case, 1961 ALJ 991 and is contained in the following passage:- "If it was intended that the word "proceeding" should include a suit within the meaning of Sec. 23(i) then why should the Legislature have thought it proper to use both the words `suit' and `proceeding' in sub-sec. (ii)." 103. There is, however, an explanation for the difference in the phraseology of the two sub-sections. In sub-sec. (1) the Legislature had in mind proceedings in general. On the other hand, in sub-sec. (ii) the Legislature was dealing with proceedings of a special type. The Legislature, therefore, had to mention them. Seriatim as "an appeal, review or revision front any suit or proceeding." The particular types of proceedings in which an appeal lies to the Revenue Court are mentioned in Schedule II. Those proceedings comprise both suits as well as applications. The legislature might, therefore, have thought it proper to use both the words `suit' as well as the word `proceeding' in view of the fact that it wanted to relate them to the particular proceedings enumerated and specified therein, and to clarify the fact that in the said cases the forum shall remain the same as that prior to the commencement of the Act, provided that the suit or proceeding itself was instituted before the commencement of the Act. The separate mention of the word `suit' in addition to `proceeding' might, therefore, have been made not for the purpose of modification of the meaning of the word `proceeding' but for the clarification of the particular matters with which it was dealing. It may also be said that in sub-sec. (i) it was not considered necessary to add the word "suit" before the word "proceeding," because suits were already envisaged clearly in the two earlier portions of the same subsection, and must, therefore, be taken to have been envisaged in the third portion as well. No such background exists in sub-sec. (ii). 104. In Ram Chandra's case, 1961 ALJ 991 a reference is also made to Schedule II of the Act as supporting the above line of reasoning. A perusal of this Schedule, however, shows that under the heading of "proceeding" in Col. 3 are comprised both applications, objections as well as suits. Applications are mentioned in serial Nos. (ii). 104. In Ram Chandra's case, 1961 ALJ 991 a reference is also made to Schedule II of the Act as supporting the above line of reasoning. A perusal of this Schedule, however, shows that under the heading of "proceeding" in Col. 3 are comprised both applications, objections as well as suits. Applications are mentioned in serial Nos. 1 to 3, 5 to 7, 9 to 13, 17, 18, 31, 35 to 37 and 40 to 42 of the Schedule. Suits are mentioned at serial Nos. 8, 14 to 16, 19, 21 to 27, 29, 30, 32 to 34, 38 and 39. Objection is mentioned at No. 20. Thus Schedule II makes it quite clear that in it, at any rate, the word proceeding in the heading of Col. 2 is used to include suits. 105. Another argument relied on in the Bench case is "that the Legislature, once it made up its mind that all matters relating to tenancy rights were determinable in a Revenue Court then when it included sirdari rights in section 332-B, it did not think it desirable to confine the decision of that question in the hands of the Civil Court, even though the suit had been filed and was pending in that Court prior to the coining into force of Sec. 23." With due respect, I find some difficulty in holding that the Legislature had made up its mind that "all matters relating to tenancy rights were determinable in a Revenue Court." After the abolition of zamindari, even the bhumidhari tenure became a kind of tenancy right, and the fact that the Legislature, while introducing sirdari right in Sec. 332-B, still refrained from introducing bhumidhari right in it, shows that the Legislature had not at that stage made up its mind that all tenancy rights were to be determined by the Revenue Court. Far from introducing bhumidhari right in Sec. 332-B, by the subsequent amendment Act, i.e. by the 1958 Act, as already observed above, the Legislature swept away both sections above the Legislature swept away both Secs. 332-A as well as 332-B from the Principal Act by deleting them thereby abolishing altogether the procedure of remittance of issues of both by the Civil - Court to the Revenue Court. 106. 332-A as well as 332-B from the Principal Act by deleting them thereby abolishing altogether the procedure of remittance of issues of both by the Civil - Court to the Revenue Court. 106. The next argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is contained in the following passage in Ram Chandra's case, 1961 ALJ 991:- "In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1957 SC 23 their Lordships clearly stressed the fact that the reasonable presumption that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act could be departed from if sufficient reason could be assigned to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the Act but not otherwise." As indicated in the subsequent portion of my judgment, the distinction between the word `proceeding' and the word `suit' has not been consistently maintained in the Act itself, hence the above principle would not apply to the present case. Further, while dealing with the value of this argument one cannot also overlook the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the same case viz. Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1957 SC 23. Reliance was placed on the following passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 10, page 522: `It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act.' The rule of construction contended for by the petitioners is well-settled, but that is only one element in deciding what is the true import of the enactment is, to ascertain which it is necessary to have regard to the purpose behind the particular provision and its setting in the scheme of the statute. `The presumption,' says Craies, `that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight and it is proper,' if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act." (Statute Law Edn. 5, page 159). And Maxwell, on whose statement of the law the petitioners realy, observes further on: `But the presumption is not much weight. 5, page 159). And Maxwell, on whose statement of the law the petitioners realy, observes further on: `But the presumption is not much weight. The same word may be used in different senses in the same statute, and even in the same section:' (Interpretation of Statutes, page 322)." 107. Reference in this connection might also be made to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Anant Gopal v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 SC 915. In this case their Lordships were dealing with Sec. 116. Cr. P. C. (Amendment) Act (Act XXVI of 1955). Sub Cl. (a) of Section 116 used the words `trial or other proceeding' and the saving clause contained in the said section stated that save as aforesaid the provisions of this Act and the amendments made thereby shall apply to all proceedings instituted after the commencement of this Act and also to all proceedings pending in any Criminal Court on the date of such commencement. In spite of the fact that the word `trial' and the word `proceeding' were used separately in sub-C1. (1) their Lordships interpreted the word proceeding in the saving clause to include a trial, and held that the trial in the case before them was governed by the Amendment Act, and the accused, therefore, had the right to take advantage of the benefit conferred by the amendment. That was a criminal case. In the present case the proceedings being Civil, similar reasoning can apply to a suit, which corresponds to a trial in a criminal case. 108. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the word `proceeding' does not include various stages of a suit. Reliance in this connection is placed on the following passage in Ram Chandra's case, 1961 ALJ 991. "In Gari Kapati Veerava v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, A.I.R. 1957 SC 540 their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para. 23 at P. 553 pointed out that `the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.' In our opinion, therefore, the proceedings to which Sec. 23(i) of Act XVIII of 1956 applied must be proceedings apart from those. in a sense, arising out of a suit." 109. in a sense, arising out of a suit." 109. All that the Supreme Court laid down in the above case was that suit, appeal and second appeal are connected by an intrinsic unity so as to be regarded as part and parcel of one legal proceeding. While laving down the said positive proposition in the above case, however, their Lordships did not go further and did not lay down the negative proposition that the various steps in the suit itself. cannot be regarded as proceedings. 110. In Ram Chandra's Case, 1961 ALJ 991 it was held that even if the word `proceeding' is interpreted to include a suit it would not make much difference, because a suit was, in any case, decided by the Court which had seisin of it before Section 23 came into force. The relevant passage in this connection is as follows:- "There is yet another way of looking at the matter: if `proceeding' included a suit then all that can be said is that under sub-sec. (i) of Section 23 the suit was to be heard and decided by the Court in which the suit lay. The suit, it must be pointed out, was decided by the Court which had seisin of it before Section 23 came into force." It appears to me that, as pointed out in the earlier portion of the above passage itself, under Sec. 23(i) a suit should not only be "decided" but also "heard" by the same Court. The words used in Sec. 23(i) are "heard" and "decided" and not merely "decided." A suit might be decided by the same Court, but, as a result of the remittance of the issue of sirdari right to the Revenue Court, it cannot be said that it was heard by the same Court. In fact, as already observed, the most vital part of it would be heard by a different Court. viz. the Revenue Court. 111. Another argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that it was not necessary at all to invoke the provisions of Section 23 of the 1958 Act in the matter. The provisions of Sec. 332-B of the 1954 Act would govern the sirdari rights also as the word sirdari was being introduced into this very provision. The issue would thus have to be remitted to the Revenue Court under the main provisions of Sec. 332-B itself. The provisions of Sec. 332-B of the 1954 Act would govern the sirdari rights also as the word sirdari was being introduced into this very provision. The issue would thus have to be remitted to the Revenue Court under the main provisions of Sec. 332-B itself. This argument seems to ignore the fact that both Section 19 which introduced the sirdari rights into Sec. 332B as well as Section 23 which introduced the saving clause are contained in the same Act. If Section 23 applies to suits, then, so far as the sirdari rights are concerned, the qualification contained in the said section will govern `sirdari' rights, although it may not govern `adhivasi' or `asami' rights. The result would be that Section 23 would be treated as if it were a proviso appended to Sec. 332-B, and, qua the sirdari rights, the exception contained therein will apply. 112. So far as the majority judgment in this case is concerned, I have read it with close attention, and given to it the consideration that it deserves. The earlier part of the answer given in the majority to the first question is that in a suit instituted before the 1956 Act, which was still pending at its commencement, it was necessary that the issue about the sirdart rights should be referred to the Collector under Sec. 332-B of the Principal Act. The body of judgment would, however, indicate that even in sonic pending suits a remittance of the issue to the Revenue Court would not be necessary. This would be borne out from the following passage in the judgment: - "An ample provision is. made in Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act in respect of cases in which an issue relating to sirdari rights may have already been decided as a preliminary issue or in which a preliminary decree involving a finding in respect of such rights may have been passed. The earlier part of Sec. 23(i) of the Act clearly provides: `Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised........ The earlier part of Sec. 23(i) of the Act clearly provides: `Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised........ All cases, therefore, in which a finding in respect of an issue relating to sirdari rights had already been recorded would be cases in which a right, title, obligation or liability has already been acquired, accrued or incurred, or in which jurisdiction has already been exercised. They will, all, therefore, be saved under the earlier part of Section 23 (1) of the 1956 Act." 113. I entirely agree with the above conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges. The said conclusion would, however, lead to two important consequences. First, it would indicate that certain pending suits would, at any rate, be saved by the earlier part of Sec. 23(i). Cases in which a preliminary issue has been framed and -a finding given would obviously be pending cases. Even cases in which a preliminary decree on a finding about title regarding sirdari rights has been given would be pending cases. It is now well settled that a suit does not come to an end with the passing of the preliminary decree. It continues to remain pending until the final decree. This proposition of law is established beyond doubt by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Madan Theatres Ltd. v. Dinshaw, A.I.R. 1945 PC 152, in which it was laid down that " . ... the suit continues until the final decree is passed . . . ." The same was held in a previous Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court viz. Sat Prakash v. Bahal Rai, AIR 1931 Allahabad 386 : 1931 ALJ 508 in which it was observed as follows:- "There can be no question that the suit does not come to an end when the Court passes a preliminary decree, and the passing of the final decree is a further proceeding in that very suit. See the case of Anmol Singh v. Harishankar, AIR 1930 Allahabad 779 : 1930 ALJ 825." 114. The second important result of the above conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge is that the earlier portion of Sec. 23(i) does apply to certain pending suits. See the case of Anmol Singh v. Harishankar, AIR 1930 Allahabad 779 : 1930 ALJ 825." 114. The second important result of the above conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge is that the earlier portion of Sec. 23(i) does apply to certain pending suits. If some pending suits are covered by the earlier portion, then there appears to be no reason why other pending suits should be excluded from the category of proceedings by the latter portion. In the majority judgment itself it has been held that in the Principal Act the word "Proceeding" may cover a suit provided that the contexts indicates that. In the present case, as already observed, it can be said that suits having been envisaged in the earlier portion should be taken to have been comprised in the subsequent portion also. The context of the term "proceeding" in Sec. 23(i) therefore, supports the interpretation that the term "proceeding" includes suits. In this connection the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, A.I.R. 1952 SC 936 are relevant:- "It will be futile to refer to the principle that the same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs in the Act, for the context excludes the application of that principle." 115. Reference in the majority judgment is also made to Section 74, which is the saving clause in the 1954 Act for the purpose of comparing it with Section 23 which is the corresponding saving clause in the 1956 Act. Sec. 74(1) runs as follows:- "74(1) All suits of the nature specified in items 11-A, A-16 and B. 16 of Sch. II of the Principal Act instituted before the commencement of this Act, and all such suits pending in the court of the first instance on the date immediately preceding the said commencement shall be heard and decided by the Court which but for the amendments made in the Principal Act by Section 40 and 44 of this Act would have had jurisdiction to hear and decide them." There is a reference to suits in Section 74 (1). It is, therefore, argued that if it was intended to include suits also in the saving clause under the 1956 Act, there might have been a specific reference to suits in addition to "proceeding" in this section also. It is, therefore, argued that if it was intended to include suits also in the saving clause under the 1956 Act, there might have been a specific reference to suits in addition to "proceeding" in this section also. A perusal of Section 74 of the 1954 Act itself, would, however, disclose the reason for the difference. Sec. 74(1) was confined to suits. It did not even include all suits. It was restricted only to suits of a particular type viz., these specified in items 11-A, A-46 and B-16 of Sch. II. The reason why the word "suit" was not added after the word "proceeding" and the word "proceeding" simpliciter was used in place of the word "suit" appears to be that the intention of the Legislature was to cover not only suits but proceedings of all kinds including applications as well as all other types of proceedings, for example, action taken suo motu by the Court. In other words, the term "proceeding" was considered to be a compendious expression to cover all matters. The purpose of the Legislature in omitting the word "suit", therefore, was not to confine the ambit of application of the saving clause but to widen it. 116. On the contrary, by a reference to Section 74 of the 1954 Act it can be argued that if the intention of the Legislature was to exclude suits from the purview of Sec. 23(i), there is no reason why it should not have explicitly done so by stating in Sec. 23(i) that the suits were excluded from its purview as it actually did in the saving clause in Sec. 74(i). Further, it can also be argued that a hare comparison of the contents of the two saving clauses is enough to indicate that the saving clause of the 1956 Act was in-tended to be far wider in its scope and application. In Section 74 of the 1934 Act, exceptions (1) and (2) present in Section 23 of the 1956 Act are conspicuous by their absence. Further in Section 74 (1) the saving is confined explicitly to suits of a particular nature. On the other hand, there are no such restrictions in Sec. 23. In fact the saving explicitly covers all proceedings without any exception or qualification of any kind. 117. A reference is also made to the addition of Cl. Further in Section 74 (1) the saving is confined explicitly to suits of a particular nature. On the other hand, there are no such restrictions in Sec. 23. In fact the saving explicitly covers all proceedings without any exception or qualification of any kind. 117. A reference is also made to the addition of Cl. (aa) in Sec. 240-B of the Principal Act, by the 1956 Act, in which steps taken in a pending application are referred to as proceedings. From this it is argued that the term "proceeding" is used in the Principal Act as convertible or synonymous with application. It may be noted in this connection that the term "application" corresponds to the term "plaint" in a suit. All the steps that follow the entertainment of an application have, therefore, to be termed as "proceeding". That, however, does not mean that the meaning of the word "proceeding" is identical with the term "application" or that they are used as convertible terms under the Principal Act. It only means that the term "proceeding" is wide enough to cover the various stages in the disposal of art application as well. 118. Reference in this connection is also made to the proviso to Section 13 of the 1956 Act in which the words used are "the application or the proceeding." This proviso relates to the order of costs in applications for review and runs as follows :- "Provided that on any such application the Court may make such order as to the cost of the application or the proceeding as it may deem just and proper." It appears to me that the word "proceeding" in the above proviso is used not as synonymous with the word "application" itself, but in a slightly different sense. The word "proceeding" appears to have been used in the above provision to cover the various stages in the disposal of the main application. While disposing of the application the Court may pass orders awarding costs for adjournment or in respect of other matters incidental to the disposal of the main application itself. These would not be costs in the application, but in the proceedings that take place during the course of its disposal. 119. Reference is also made to serial No. 4 which was added to Sch. These would not be costs in the application, but in the proceedings that take place during the course of its disposal. 119. Reference is also made to serial No. 4 which was added to Sch. II and which relates to proceedings for correction of records of rights as indicating that the terms "proceeding" and "application" are used as convertible terms in the Principal Act. Reference to Section 33 would, however, indicate that the said section lays down that the Compensation Officer can take correction proceedings under the said section in respect of arithmetical mistakes or clerical errors apparent on the face of record "either on his own motion or on the application any person interested." The term "proceeding" in serial No. 4, therefore, appears to have been used because the proceedings referred to therein could be taken not only on the application of a party, but also by the authority concerned suo motu. The term "proceeding" is, therefore, used in serial No. 4 not as convertible with the term "application", but as including matters initiated not on application, but independently of an application as a result of the authority action suo motu, i.e. without an application and apart from it. 120. Further as I have already observed above, once it is conceded that the term "proceeding" includes an application, there appears to be no reasonable ground for the Legislature for making a difference between "applications" and "suits" in this regard. After all, the question to be decided would be the same and the Court deciding it may also be the same. The contrary view would therefore, as already observed, lead to inconsistent and embarrassing situations. 121. In the majority judgment it is further observed that although the words `application' and `proceeding' have been used in an interchangeable sense, "clear distinction has been maintained between `suits' and `proceeding' in the Act itself and subsequent connected legislation." It is further remarked in this connection that in Sch. II and Section 331 the term `proceeding' is used in a generic sense because the context indicates it. A reference, however, to the provisions of the Principal Act would indicate that in some other sections of the said Act, the term `proceeding is clearly used to include suits even though the term "proceeding" has been used therein simpliciter, and there is nothing in the context to indicate that it was used in a generic sense. A reference, however, to the provisions of the Principal Act would indicate that in some other sections of the said Act, the term `proceeding is clearly used to include suits even though the term "proceeding" has been used therein simpliciter, and there is nothing in the context to indicate that it was used in a generic sense. Reference, by way of illustration, may be made to Sec. 334(1), 341 and 344 of the Principal Act. Sec. 334(1) lays down as follows: "334. Protection of action under this Act. - (1) No officer or servant of the Government shall be liable in any civil or criminal proceeding in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or under any rules made thereunder, if the Act was done in good faith and in the course of execution of the duties or the discharge of functions, imposed by or under this Act." In the above provision, the term `proceeding' must be interpreted to include `suits'. Further it does not appear to be used as synonymous with `application'. It is difficult to hold that the immunity provided in the above provision of law is confined to `applications' and does not extend to `suits'. In fact, it is more necessary to provide for immunity in respect of suits than in respect of applications. It must, therefore, cover both. Similarly Sec, 341 provides as follows:- "341 Application of certain Acts to the proceedings of this Act - Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provision of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to the proceedings under this Act." The expression "proceedings under this Act" referred to therein obviously covers not only applications but also suits. The question of Court Fees Act also arises primarily in connection with suits. In this section also, therefore, the term `proceedings' both in the marginal note as well as in the body of the section, although used simpliciter, should be interpreted to include both `suits' as well as `application.' Similarly, Sec. 344(1) (h) which relates to the rule making power runs as follows: - "344. Rules in general. - (1) Every power to make rules given by this Act shall be deemed to include the powers to provide for............... Rules in general. - (1) Every power to make rules given by this Act shall be deemed to include the powers to provide for............... (h) the transfer of proceedings from one authority or officer to another." R. 399 which has been framed under the aforementioned provision has applied various provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act (XIX of 1939) including Secs. 277, 280 and 281 of the said Act to the proceedings under the Principal Act. Sec. 277 relates to the power of the Board to transfer "any suit, application or appeals or class of suits." Similarly, Secs. 280 and 281 refer to the power of the Collector or Asstt. Collector to transfer or withdraw "any case or class of cases." This would obviously include all suits. It is, therefore, apparent that the term `proceeding' in Sec. 344(1) (h) is used to include suits as well as applications and is not used therein as synonymous with applications only nor can it be said to be confined to applications alone. It is not necessary to multiply illustrations. The above instances bear out the contention that the term `proceedings' is used in the Principal Act in a number of places simpliciter so as to embrace not only all applications but also all suits. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the proposition that the term "proceeding" is used throughout the Act consistently as excluding suits as including applications only within its ambit. 122. On the question of jurisdiction, I entirely agree with my learned brothers that mere cognizance of a suit by the Civil Court will not attract the second exception for the simple reason that at that stage the Court has not exercised any jurisdiction on the part of the case relating to the adjudication on the question of title. I also agree entirely with the following observation made in the majority judgment. I also agree entirely with the following observation made in the majority judgment. "The question of exercising jurisdiction in respect of it, it appears to us, arises stage by stage according to the progress of the suit to the extent it may be permissible under the law." Applying the same test to the present case, as already indicated by me in the earlier portion of the judgment, the Court begins exercising its jurisdiction on the part of the case relating to title as soon as it frames an issue on it, and continues the same process while taking evidence, hearing arguments and pronouncing judgment on it. All the stages, therefore, subsequent to the frame of the issue on the question of title would be covered by the second exception. In the majority judgment, however, it is observed that prior to the coming into force of the 1956 Act, there could be no question of the Civil Courts exercising any jurisdiction in the matter, because the Act itself being not in existence the Court could never apply its mind to the question whether it had jurisdiction to decide the matter or not. The relevant observation in the judgment runs as follows: "Civil Courts cannot, therefore, be said to have applied their minds in such cases to the question whether an issue was to be referred to the Collector at the time of framing the issues, as there was no occasion for them to do so, and there was, therefore, no question of the Civil Courts exercising any jurisdiction in this respect at that stage." With all respect to the learned Judges, I find great difficulty in agreeing with the above observations. The words used in exception 2 carved out by Section 23 are "any jurisdiction already exercised." All that these words connote is that jurisdiction should already have been exercised by the Court. Under this exception it is not made a condition precedent that the Courts should not only have already exercised their jurisdiction but should also have applied their mind to the question whether they actually have jurisdiction in the matter or not. As observed in the judgement itself, no question of the application of the mind by the Court at that stage could possibly arise, because the Act itself was not in existence. As observed in the judgement itself, no question of the application of the mind by the Court at that stage could possibly arise, because the Act itself was not in existence. Once, therefore, the jurisdiction has already been exercised by the Court, that by itself should be quite enough to, attract the provisions of this exception, regardless of the question of the application of the mind by the Court. Once the Court has embarked on the stage of the framing of the issue, the Court has exercised jurisdiction in the matter. In any case, once the Court has started taking evidence, or, after taking evidence, has started hearing arguments in the case, it must be held that the Court has already exercised jurisdiction in the matter. If the view pronounced is accepted as correct, then, even though the Court has not only framed an issue on the question of jurisdiction, but has also taken all the evidence, and the parties having closed their cases, the Court has even heard the entire arguments and has only reserved the case for judgment, yet the Court cannot be said to have exercised any jurisdiction on this part of the case just because it has not applied its mind to the question whether it has jurisdiction to decide the issue or not. In other words, unless the Court has framed an issue on the question of jurisdiction and has determined the same or has otherwise given an explicit finding on this issue, the Court cannot be said to have exercised any jurisdiction in the matter, I feel constrained to hold that this extreme view will not be warranted by the plain wording of the Statute. It will be conceded that where the Court has pronounced judgment disposing of the issue of title on merits without applying its mind to the question of jurisdiction, the Court has already exercised its jurisdiction in the matter, even though the question of jurisdiction never arose in the mind of the Court. 123. In this connection, it is also argued that the intention of the Legislature in so far as the exclusion of the jurisdiction brought about by the 1951 Act is concerned admits of no doubt. 123. In this connection, it is also argued that the intention of the Legislature in so far as the exclusion of the jurisdiction brought about by the 1951 Act is concerned admits of no doubt. The reason assigned is that under the 1954 Act Sec, 332-B began with the words "if in any suit relating to land instituted after the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954, in a Civil Court." These words are clear and certain in the 1954 Act, and they applied also to the sirdari rights which was added in Sec. 332-B (1) by Section 19 of the 1956 Act. So far, I find myself in entire agreement with my learned brothers. If the matter had rested with the change effected by Section 19 only, there would have been no ambiguity and the position would have been quite clear, as the above provisions of the 1954 Act would have governed sirdari rights also. The ambiguity, however, has arisen by virtue of the saving clause contained in Section 23 of the 1956 Act. The saving clause, although contained in a different section namely Section 23, has to be deemed to be a part and parcel of Sec. 332-B (1), and would govern Sec. 332-B(1) in so far as sirdari rights is concerned. In other words, as already observed by me, for the purpose of interpretation of Sec. 332-B as it stands after the 1956 Act, Sec. 23 would have to be treated just as if it were a proviso appended to Sec. 332-B (1). The 1954 Act contained no such saving clause. It was, therefore, clear. The 1956 Act does contain such a saving clause. This has created ambuguity. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the argument that because the matter is clear in the 1954 Act, it is also clear in the 1956 Act. 124. The learned Judges were also of opinion that in the present case "no substantive rights are affected by the amendment which concerns a pure question of procedure." The reason given is that the law relating to sirdari rights was not altered. It is no doubt correct that in the present case the law relating to sirdari rights remained unaltered. The law may, however, cease to be purely procedural in two ways. First, it may cease to be purely procedural because the substantive law is itself altered thereby. It is no doubt correct that in the present case the law relating to sirdari rights remained unaltered. The law may, however, cease to be purely procedural in two ways. First, it may cease to be purely procedural because the substantive law is itself altered thereby. Secondly it may cease to be purely procedural, because the substantive rights already determined may be affected. In the present case, if at all, it is the second and not the first consideration that could apply. I have already quoted above the relevant passage in the majority judgment with which I agree and, as a result of which it would further appear that in certain cases a right already determined by the Court would have to be referred to the Revenue Court under Sec. 332-B of the 1954 Act. If that is so, then, so far as Sec. 332-B standing by itself in the 1954 Act is concerned, it would affect substantive rights. The same would be the position under the 1956 Act without the saving clause. As observed by the learned Judges, it is only as a result of the earlier portion of the saving clause introduced by Section 23 of the 1956 Act that the redetermination of the rights already determined will not be necessary. According to the answer given to question No. 1 in the majority judgment, however, the saving clause does not affect any pending case. In view of this answer, which is all embracing and makes no exceptions whatever a door is left open for argument that so far as the amendment introduced in Sec. 332-B itself is concerned, it is not purely procedural. It is, however, not necessary to pursue this matter further, because, as I have already observed, on the interpretation placed by me on the wording of Section 23 this question would not arise. Whatever view, therefore, is taken on this aspect of the case, the reply to the question will not be affected. 125. Lastly, reliance is placed on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, A.I.R. 1962 SC 547 in which it is observed that where the Legislature intends that disputes of a particular kind are to be tried by special tribunals, the relevant words should receive a liberal construction. 125. Lastly, reliance is placed on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, A.I.R. 1962 SC 547 in which it is observed that where the Legislature intends that disputes of a particular kind are to be tried by special tribunals, the relevant words should receive a liberal construction. It may, however, be noted that while discussing the said principle, and, after referring to it, their Lordships also observed as follows:- "While bearing this principle in mind we must have regard to another important principle of construction, and that is that if a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts it must do so either by express terms or by the use of such terms as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion. As the Privy Council has observed in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., 67 Ind. App. 222 at p. 236 : A.I.R. 1940 PC 105. `It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied.' There can be no doubt that ordinarily a dispute in regard to the relationship between the parties such as that between a landlord and a tenant would be a dispute of a civil nature and would fall within the competence of the Civil Court. "If the respondents contend that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with such a civil dispute has been taken away by Sec. 7(1) we must enquire whether Sec. 7(1) expressly takes away the said jurisdiction or whether the material words used in the section lead to such an inference or the scheme of the Act inescapably establishes such an inference." 126. Following the above principle, after discussing the provisions of Sec. 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act (III of 1948), their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court holding that the Collector had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the case. They accordingly, allowed the appeal and held that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not excluded. 127. Applying the above principles, laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to be present case two questions will call for an answer. They accordingly, allowed the appeal and held that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not excluded. 127. Applying the above principles, laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to be present case two questions will call for an answer. The first is :- "What inference does the scheme of the Act inescapably establish? I have already indicated that the purpose of the Legislature in introducing the saving clause appears to be to remedy the mischief and the hardship by the operation of the 1954 Act. The purpose of the Act will, therefore, be achieved, only if the saving clause is made applicable not only to applications but also to suits. In fact, if there are any proceedings towards which the saving clause can be said to be particularly directed, it would be suits rather than applications, because the question of title arises in acute form more often in suits than in applications. The second question that would arise would be :- "Has the Legislature expressed its intention to exclude suits from the category of exception contained in Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act in terms that are express, explicit and clear and admit of no ambiguity ? "Bearing in mind the above discussion of the matter, and remembering further that at least two learned Judges of this Court have in their judgment definitely taken a contrary view, I venture to say that the matter cannot be said to be completely free from doubt. In this situation, applying the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case, I am of opinion that the interpretation maintaining the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is to be preferred. In fact the same conclusion was actually arrived at by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case. 128. The conclusions flowing from the above discussion of the interpretation of Sec. 23(i) of the 1956 Act may now be briefly stated as follows:- (1) Pending cases in which a finding is given on a question of title before the case is finally disposed of would be covered by exception No. 1. This is conceded in the majority judgment as well. This is conceded in the majority judgment as well. (2) The stage from the framing of an issue on the question of title upto the termination of the suit including the taking of evidence, hearing of arguments and the delivery of judgment on the question of title would be covered by exception No. 2. (3) In any case, the entire stage from the commencement of the suit upto the termination of the suit would be covered by exception No. 3, because the term "proceeding" is used therein to include "suits" as well as applications and all other matters. (4) The above view is in accord with the well known canon of interpretation according to which the meaning which sub-serves the intention of the Legislature, avoids inconvenience and hardship to the parties and steers clear of the anomalies and embarrassing situations is to be preferred to the one that has the contrary effect. (5) It is also supported by the application of two other basic principles of interpretation laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, viz. first, that an interpretation that avoids the mischief sought to be cured and advances the relief intended to be afforded by the Act is to be preferred vide Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 SC 661. State of Uttar Pradesh v. C. Tobit, A.I.R. 1958 SC 414 and Commissioner of Income-Tax Delhi v. S. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 SC 352 and secondly; an interpretation that fits in with the ordinary connotation of a term is to be accepted unless excluded by express words or any compelling circumstances vide Hariprasad Shivshanker v. A. D. Divelkar, A.I.R. 1957 SC 121. (6) It is also in accord with another general principle of interpretation enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as well as of the Privy Council, viz., that a law divesting the Civil Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction to decide questions of title is to be strictly construed; and, in case of doubt, the interpretation vesting them with jurisdiction is to be preferred vide Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, A.I.R. 1962 SC 547. (7) The above interpretation further fully fulfils the twin tests laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, A.I.R. 1962 SC 547 in a case like this, and would, therefore, be also in consonance with the view expressed by them in the said case. (8) The conclusions arrived at in this case would also find indirect support from the view taken and the line of reasoning adopted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Anant Gopal v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 SC 915 in Aswini Kumar's case, A.I.R. 1952 SC 369 and in S.V. Parulekar's case, A.I.R. 1957 SC 23. 129. In the light of the above conclusions, my answers to the three questions formulated by the learned single Judge are as follows:- (1) In a suit which was instituted in the Civil Court before the 28th May, 1956, that is prior to the enforcement of the 1956 Act and which was still pending on the said date, the issue about sirdari rights should not be referred to the Revenue Court. (2) The jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such cases for deciding sirdari issue is governed with reference to the law applicable on the date of the institution of the suit, and not with reference to the law applicable on the date of its decision. (3) This question really relates to exception No. 2, and, as rightly observed in the majority judgment, it would arise "stage by stage." The applicability of this exception would, therefore, depend on the stage of the suit. Further, as observed in the majority judgment, mere intertainment of suit would not attract this exception, because the Court at that stage does not exercise any jurisdiction on the part of the case relating to the determination of the issue of title. If, however, on the crucial date, i.e. the 28th May, 1956, the suit has reached a stage when the Court has already framed an issue on the question of title relating to sirdari rights, or has crossed that stage, and the Court has started taking evidence or hearing arguments on the said question, or has given judgment, or has done any other act indicating that it has embarked on the determination of the said issue, the Court has already exercised jurisdiction in the matter and this exception would be attracted. In view, however, of the interpretation placed by me on the meaning of the term "proceeding" in the third exception, and the answers given by me to the first two questions, the third question does not call for an answer. 130. By the Court.-130. In accordance with the opinion expressed in the majority judgment the answers to the three questions referred to shall be as follows:- (1) In a suit instituted before the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1956, and which was still pending at such commencement, it was necessary for the issue about the sirdari rights being referred to the Collector under Sec. 332-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1 of 1951. But if the issue was not submitted to the Collector under that section before 7th November, 1958, i.e. before the commencement of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, XXXVII of 1958, Sec. 332-B ceased to apply and it was no longer necessary or possible for the aforesaid issue being submitted to the Collector for a finding. (2) The jurisdiction of the Court for deciding sirdari issues is governed by the law applicable on the date of the decision of the suit and not by the one in force on the date of its institution. (3) There was no exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Courts relating to the decision of sirdari rights merely by the entertainment of such suits. Issues relating to sirdari rights, therefore, became referable to Revenue Courts by amendment of Sec. 332-B of the Act, the saving clause incorporated under Sec. 23(1) of the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act XVIII of 1956, not being applicable to suits. 131. Let this opinion be placed before the Judge concerned.