Modi, J.—This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for declaration and possession which has been dismissed by both courts below. 2. The dispute relates to a house situate in the town of Nagaur and which is fully described in para three of the plaint. The facts found by the two courts below may be summarised as follow :— (1) Nagraj was the last male owner of the suit house. He died some time in S. 1974. (2) Nagraj and his two brothers Ramdayal and Maganmal were not proved to be the members of a joint Hindu family and were separate in estate, and of these Ramdayal had predeceased Nagraj, having died some time in Smt. 1953/54. (3) After Nagrajs death, Ramdayals widow Mst. Kasumbi entered into possession of the suit house. This widow had no right of residence or maintenance with respect to the estate of Nagraj. That is to say, Mst. Kasumbi assumed possession of the suit house some time in Smt. 1974 corresponding to 1917 A.D. (4) Mst. Kasumbi died on the 11th February, 1949; but before her death, she had executed a gift deed with respect to the house in question in favour of Balabux defendant, who having died during the pendency of the suit is represented by his sons Devi Lal and Vijai Lal alias Vijaibux. (5) The possession of Mst. Kasumbi under the circumstances was adverse against the plaintiff Mohan Lal, nephew of Nagraj, and son of his brother Magan Lal. 3. On these findings, the courts below have held that the plaintiff was neither entitled to a declaration in his favour that the gift made by Mst. Kasumbi with respect to the suit house in favour of Balabux was inoperative against him nor to possession. 4. Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant strenuously argues that Mst. Kasumbis possession of the suit house should not have been held to be adverse by the courts below, the reason being that she was the plaintiffs aunt and used to live in the house in question as being a relation of the family and not in the exercise of her right thereto. It is also submitted in this connection that Mst. Kasumbi never asserted that her possession was of a hostile nature qua the plaintiff. 5. I have carefully considered this contention and am of the opinion that it is without any substance. It is also submitted in this connection that Mst. Kasumbi never asserted that her possession was of a hostile nature qua the plaintiff. 5. I have carefully considered this contention and am of the opinion that it is without any substance. For, the principle seems to me to be well established that the possession of a person who is not the widow of last male-holder but is the widow of another member of the family is prima facie adverse. And if that is so, it would be for the plaintiff to establish that her possession was with his permission or was by virtue of inheritance, in which case she must be deemed to claim a limited estate only. Thus it was held in Mata Baksh Singh Vs. Ajodhiya Bakhsh Singh(l) that where possession is not founded on right, the party who wishes to say that such possession was not adverse has to prove that it was with his consent and therefore the possession of a woman when it is without right, is prima facie adverse, leaving it to the person alleging that it is not adverse to prove so. It was further held in this case that where such woman transfers the property to another person, the transferees possession is also adverse from the date of the transfer. 6. Similarly it was held in Mata Prasad Vs. Brij Kishore(2) that if a widow of a predeceased son having no right to any share in the property left by her father-in-law succeeds in getting possession of certain property out of the property left by her father-in-law from time to time and holds it for more than twelve years and it is not established that her possession was by the consent of the rightful heirs, it must be held that she acquired full title by adverse possession, and if, after holding the property for more than 12 years, she transfers the same by gift, the rightful heirs cannot succeed in obtaining possession from the widows donee. 7. The same principle seems to have the approval of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sham Koer Vs. Dah Koer(3). The facts of this case were that one B who was a member of an undivided Hindu family died in November, 1862. He was possessed of considerable property including certain villages in the suit. 7. The same principle seems to have the approval of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sham Koer Vs. Dah Koer(3). The facts of this case were that one B who was a member of an undivided Hindu family died in November, 1862. He was possessed of considerable property including certain villages in the suit. He was survived at his death by his widow and his daughter-in-law who was the widow of his predeceased son. The two widows obtained possession of the three villages. Bs widow died in June, 1879. After her deaths the daughter-in-law remained in sole possession. In February 1884, the latter executed a Hibanama in favour of one S by which she gave the three villages to him with immediate possession and authorised him to apply for mutation of names in the revenue record. This was obtained by S. in December, 1890. The plaintiffs as reversioners of B brought their suit in 1891 for a declaration that the hibanama was ineffectual against the interest of the plaintiffs and for possession. The trial court granted a declaration that the hibanama would be ineffectual against any interest of the plaintiffs or their heirs after the death of the daughter-in-law but it refused to grant a decree for possession during the latters life-time. The High Court dismissed the suits holding them to be barred by limitation. This is how their Lordships summed up the legal position: — "Assuming that Bhau Nath Singh was a member of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, as the lower court found and the High Court assumed, neither his widow nor his sons widow would be entitled to anything more than maintenance out of his estate. Their possession therefore of the three villages in question would be adverse to the reversionary heirs, unless it was the result of an arrangement with them. Their possession therefore of the three villages in question would be adverse to the reversionary heirs, unless it was the result of an arrangement with them. If the possession was adverse, the rights of the reversionary heirs would ofcourse be barred at the expiration of 12 years from the date of Bhau Nath Singhs death or the date of the widows taking possession which seems to have been at or shortly after his death." Their Lordships then posed the only further question which arose in the case namely whether the appellants had given satisfactory proof of an arrangement with the two widows which would be an answer to the plea of limitation, and found that there was none, and in this view of the matter upheld the decision of the High Court. 8. The present case seems to me to stand on a higher footing inasmuch as Mst. Kasumbi did not have and could not claim any right of maintenance against Nagraj or the plaintiff Mohan Lal. That being so., her possession must be held to be prima facie adverse against the plaintiff, and the possession of the donees would also be adverse after the gift had been made to them. 9. The only question which may then arise for consideration is whether the possession of Mst. Kasumbi was in consequence of any arrangement arrived at between her and the plaintiff. Of this there is no allegation, much less proof. The correct possession in law, therefore, is that the possession of Mst. Kasumbi over the suit property must be held to be adverse from Smt. 1974 corresponding to 1917 A.D. immediately after the death of Nagraj and that this possession had fully matured into a perfected title by adverse possession in 1946 when she made a gift of the property in question in favour of Balabux, and the possession of the latter and his heirs must also have the same quality after the gift had been made to them; and that being so I am clearly of opinion that the plaintiffs suit has been rightly dismissed. I hold accordingly. 10. The result is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed; but having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs of this court as of the courts below.