MEHROTRA, C. J- In response to the notice issued by this Court Sri Bharat Chandra Das, Advocate practi­sing in this Court had appeared in person to show cause why he should not be dealt with under the Contempt of Courts Act for his con­duct on the 30th August, .1961, towards Sri H. Deka the retired Chief Justice of this Court. An application had been filed on his behalf. He wag represented by a counsel. (2) The facts leading to the present notice are that on the 31st August, 1961, a communica­tion was received from Sri H. Deka retired Chief Justice of this Court, addressed to the Registrar. In the letter, it was stated that this Court takes such action as it considered necessary and proper in the circumstances of the case. The re­levant extract of the letter is as follows:- "On the evening of 30th August last while I was coming out of the Panbazar Dharma Sabha premises after presiding over a public function at 7-30 p. m. and was proceeding to my car parked on the road to the west, of the Dharma Sabha premises Shri Bharat Chandra Das, an Advocate, and a practising lawyer of the Gauhati Bar, who lives quite near the place stopped me and asked me in a challenging mood, "why did you condemn me before hearing?"' I asked him "What is the matter with you?" He again repeated "You condemned me before hearing me”. I remembered that there was a certain reference to the Bar Council about this gentleman while I was a Judge of the High Court. I asked him "What do you want of me now?" He said in a threatening manner, "I am not going to spare you/' In the meantime, I reached my car and got into it when Shri Das shouted "I will teach you a good lesson1'. I then drove off.'' In a certain criminal matter, which came up for decision before Shri H. Deka, when he was the Chief Justice of this Court be passed cer­tain remarks against the conduct of Shri B. G, Das and recommended that the matter be taken up by the Bar Counci1. The matter was taken up by the Par Council, but as the new Act was to come into force and a new Bar Council was to be constituted, proceedings were stayed. The matter was taken up by the Par Council, but as the new Act was to come into force and a new Bar Council was to be constituted, proceedings were stayed. (3) The contemner has in his application stated as follows; "1. That I have greatest respect to the learn­ed and respected Courts on the administration Of Justice. I never intended to do anything which even remotely could reflect upon the Courts or any of the Judges or on the administration of justice. 2. That in the alleged incident dated 30-8-61 I had not the remotest intention in a»y w -y to "reflect on the dignity of the Court or on the administration of justice, nor did I in any way make such reflections or statements as alleged-I tender my most sincere apology if by anything I had said there, I had directly or indirectly cast any reflection on the Court or the adminis­tration of justice or any of the Judges of the Court.1' In paragraph 3 however, he has denied that the incident took place as alleged in the letter of the 8.1st August, 1961, written by Sri H. Deka. The incident is described as follows in his peti­tion: "What happened actually was that, when Mr. Deka came out from the Sanatan Dharma Sabha and proceeding towards his car, when seeing me witnessing the performance along with about 200 men from the road he pitted my bade and said ' (ki hay, ki hay), then told him "please don't touch the back of a condemned man. I have enough love and affec­tion from you which I shall always remember". This incident was witnessed by a large crowd. And I beg to submit that in the agitation of the moment Mr. Deka might have honestly taken me amiss”. (4) Mainly two points have been raided in the petition. Firstly, it is denied that he threat­ened in the manner suggested in the letter, that he said that he was not going to spare him and that he shouted that he would teach him a good lesson. Secondly, it is urged that as Shri H. Deka was not a Judge of the Court at the time when the incident is alleged to have taken place, the petitioner cannot be guilty of contempt of Court. Secondly, it is urged that as Shri H. Deka was not a Judge of the Court at the time when the incident is alleged to have taken place, the petitioner cannot be guilty of contempt of Court. (5) It cannot be doubted that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court in punishing contempt of the Court's authority exist1; for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts. The object of con­tempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is- intended to be a protection to the public whose interest would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened. One of the ways by which attempt can be made to hinder or obstruct the due administration of justice is caused by scandalising the Court or by doing an act or publication, which constitutes scandalising the Court itself. As observed by Lord Hardwicke to "In re Read and Huggonson" (1742) 2 Atk 469 at p. 47.1: "This scandalising might manifest itself in various ways but, in substance, it is an attack on individual Judges or the Court as a whole with or without reference to particular cases casting un­warranted and defamatory aspersions upon the-character or ability of the Judges. Such conduct is punished as contempt for this reason that it-tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair confidence of people in the Courts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. If the imputation on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judi­cial duties is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism, which every citi­zen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice it may not constitute contempt. As observed by Lord Aitkin in '"Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago", AIR .1936 PC 141 at PP- .145 and 146 : '"The path of criticism is a public way. As observed by Lord Aitkin in '"Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago", AIR .1936 PC 141 at PP- .145 and 146 : '"The path of criticism is a public way. The wrong headed are permitted to err therein; pro­vided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice arid are genuinely exercising 4 fight of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempting to impair the administra­tion of justice they are immune.1' Secondly, the criticism must tend to interfere with the due administration of justice. This his been settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Brahma Prakash Sharma v- State of Uttar Pra­desh, AIR 1954 SC 10 . It is also clear that the contempt need not be committed in the presence of the Judge. If there is criticism of the Judge in respect of his conduct as a Judge no matter whether it is done outside or before the Judge, it will constitute contempt. (6) The question, however in the present case is whether any statement cruising the conduct of retired Judge will constitute contempt, "It is immaterial whether the attack on the Judge is with reference to a cause about to be tried, or actually under trial or recently adjudged. The test is whether its tendency is to poison the fountain of justice, to create distrust, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the Courts. Applying these principles in the case Emperor v Murli Manohar Prasad, AIR 1929 Pat 72 it was held that where an article in a newspaper distinctly imputed to a Judge the reproach of passing monstrous sentences, of unjustifiably convicting a man OH the uncorroborated testimony of an ap­prover and with accusing the people of India or the people of a province, of being habitual liars and none of these reproaches was justified and the cumulative effect of the statements having regard if the preceding articles, was to lead to the be­lief that the Judge was unfit for his office, it was a contempt of Court as it undoubtedly tended to debase his authority. (7) In Cyan Singh v. Ram Bhejja Lal AIR 1959 Punj 319, the question which came us for consideration was whether a libellous arid defamatory statement made against a retired Judge of a High. (7) In Cyan Singh v. Ram Bhejja Lal AIR 1959 Punj 319, the question which came us for consideration was whether a libellous arid defamatory statement made against a retired Judge of a High. Court relating to his judicial conduct and character constituted contempt of Court; the contempt of court consists of disrespect to the fountain head of justice or to the authority of Sovereign State exercised through Courts of Law. In the case of a quondam Judge, any criticism relating to his judicial conduct or character can neither be said to constitute disrespect to the Court or to the fountain head of justice or to the authority of Sovereign State, exercised through Courts of law, nor can it interfere or obstruct the due course of justice. As Bowen LJ has observed in Re. Johnson. (1887) 20 QBD 68 : "The law has armed the High Court of Jus­tice with the power and imposed on it the duty of preventing brevi manu and by summary pro­ceedings any attempt to interfere with the admi­nistration of justice. It is on that ground and not on any exaggerated notion of the dignity of indi­viduals that insults to judges are not allowed.....The principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a court of justice are protected by the law, and shielded on their way to the discharge of such duties, while discharging them and on their return therefrom, in order that such persons may safely have resorts to courts of justice. " It should be pointed that in the case referred to above a solicitor, who had attended the hearing of an application before a judge at chambers in the Royal Courts of Justice, immediately after such hearing and while the parties were on their way from the judge's room to the entrance gate of the building, made use of grossly abusive expres­sions and threatening gestures to the solicitor on the other side in relation to such application, and it was held that such conduct in relation to proceedings before a judge at chambers was a con­tempt of Court. The argument was that as the contempt was committed not in the face of the Court, it did not constitute contempt Of Court. This argument was repelled. The next contention raised in that case was that the Judge at Cham­bers had no powers to commit for contempt. The argument was that as the contempt was committed not in the face of the Court, it did not constitute contempt Of Court. This argument was repelled. The next contention raised in that case was that the Judge at Cham­bers had no powers to commit for contempt. This argument was also repelled, but the law has been summarised as indicated above. (8) The argument is that the criticism °f a Judge even though he has retired, in a public place or threatening him in a public place in con­nection with his judicial orders, even though he has retired, amounts to disrespect to Court and tends to shake the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and thus tends to inter­fere with the due administration of justice. It is difficult to accept that any criticism of a retired Judge is likely to interfere with the due adminis­tration of justice. Even though the conduct of Shri Bharat Chandra Das may not be worthy of an Advocate of this Court and even though we may have been inclined to Hold that the guilt has been aggravated by the denial of the occur­rence as alleged in the letter of the retired Chief Justice, still, in our opinion the conduct in ques­tion does not constitute contempt. (9) The Rule must be discharged, (10) S. K. DUTTA J. : I agree. DF/V.B.B. Rule discharged.