Judgment :- 1. The first defendant is the appellant in this Second Appeal which is from concurrent decrees allowing the suit. The three plaintiffs, of whom plaintiffs 2 and 3 were minors, sued for a declaration that the suit property, 74 cents in R.S. No. 3498/1, Irumpayil Kanakulam pakuty, belonged to them and that the first defendant was attempting to take possession of the same in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 186 of 1124. According to the plaintiffs, the property was obtained in Puduval Registry by their father, Mytheenkannu (deceased) on payment of tharavila to the Government and that it was not included either in the mortgage for the redemption of which the decree in O.S. No. 186 of 1124 was obtained or in the sale of the equity of redemption to the first defendant. The 1st defendant contended that the suit was barred by res judicata by reason of the decree in O.S. No. 186 of 1124 to which the plaintiffs and other heirs of Mytheenkannu were parties and that the suit property was an accretion to the mortgaged property. The case for the plaintiffs was that the decree was not binding on them. After the plaintiffs adduced some evidence the first defendant was examined and, apparently on the strength of his deposition, his counsel conceded that the first defendant did not want recovery of possession of the property. The suit was accordingly decreed without entering into the question raised by the parties. On appeal by the first defendant, the lower appellate court confirmed the decree holding that the trial court was entitled to act on the concession of the first defendant's counsel which could not be said to be unauthorised. The first defendant has therefore preferred this Second Appeal. 2. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that an admission, unless it has been acted upon by the opposite party to his prejudice, is not conclusive and that it can be seen from the evidence that the admissions made by the first defendant were the result of a mistake made by him regarding the identity of the property. According to him, the suit property was included in item No.1 of O.S. No. 186 of 1124 and the first defendant was actually referring to another plot of 79 cents covered by Ext. According to him, the suit property was included in item No.1 of O.S. No. 186 of 1124 and the first defendant was actually referring to another plot of 79 cents covered by Ext. I in O.S. No. 186 of 1124 which was excluded from the decree on the contentions of other parties. It is useful in this connection to refer to some of the admissions made by the first defendant when he was examined as Dw.1 on 20-3-1957. In his chief examination he stated: "There is no decree in O.S. No. 186 for redemption of the suit property. The decree in O. S. No. 186 was only for redemption of the improvements in item No. 2. Was O.S. No. 186 decreed excluding 79 cents inclusive of these 74 cents? Yes.There are other properties included in item No.1 of O.S. No. 186." (Translation) Naturally there was no cross-examination on these points. However his examination was not over on that day and it was resumed on 18-6-57 and 25-11-57. In re-examination his counsel again attempted to make the first defendant depose according to his case in the pleadings and failed, as the following passage will show. "It was decreed in O. S. No. 186 that 1 acre and 30 cents including this 74 cents could of be redeemed. Is that the suit property? Yes" (Translation) Thus the first defendant struck to his chief examination in spite of the endeavours of his counsel, even though it took eight months to complete his examination. Thereafter the trial was closed and the case heard when his counsel conceded that he was not claiming the suit property. 3. The argument that the 1st defendant's admissions were the result of a mistake cannot be accepted. He had ample opportunity to rectify the alleged mistakes if he cared. The admissions in chief examination were made when he was examined on 20-3-1957. Since then he was examined on 18-6-1957 and 25-11-1957. He could at least have filed an affidavit in the trial court to clarify the position. This was not done even in the lower appellate court. It cannot be said that the plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if the alleged mistakes are rectified now. It is possible that the plaintiffs could have adduced more evidence to prove their case if these admissions had not been made. This was not done even in the lower appellate court. It cannot be said that the plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if the alleged mistakes are rectified now. It is possible that the plaintiffs could have adduced more evidence to prove their case if these admissions had not been made. In view of the unambiguous statements made by the 1st defendant on oath, his counsel was perfectly justified in conceding that he did not oppose to passing of a decree as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The Federal Court has observed in Prithwi Chand v. Sukhraj Rai (AIR. 1940 F.C. 25) as follows: "We have one other observation to make. Counsel for the appellant, in answer to questions put to him by the Court, made what purported to be statements of fact relating to matters arising out of the litigation, which on further inquiry were found to be no more than surmises or guesses on his part. When counsels take on themselves the responsibility of making statements of fact to the Court, the Court is entitled to assume that those statements are true in every particular, so that it may implicitly rely upon them. This is a rule which admits of no qualification. It is an honourable obligation of the Bar and of great value in the administration of justice; and we trust that we shall not have occasion to draw attention to it again." The law on the point has been thus summarised in Sarkar's Law of Evidence (10th Edition): "On questions of fact parties are bound by admissions made by their lawyers whether made in the course of trial in the court of first instance or in the appellate court. A Vakil's general powers in the conduct of a suit include the abandonment of" an issue which, in his discretion he thinks inadvisable to press. It is a rule which admits of no qualification that when counsel take upon themselves the responsibility of making statements of fact to the court, the court is entitled to assume that those statements are true in every particular, so that it may implicitly rely on them. It is a rule which admits of no qualification that when counsel take upon themselves the responsibility of making statements of fact to the court, the court is entitled to assume that those statements are true in every particular, so that it may implicitly rely on them. Admission by counsel after deliberation cannot be resiled from merely on the ground that the party or his counsel was hot in full possession of facts." Thus, the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit on the admissions of the first defendant and the concession made by his counsel in the trial court. 4. In these circumstances the concurrent decrees must be confirmed and I do so. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.