JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This second appeal raises some interesting questions about what is called 'Streedhanam' among the Marumakkathayee Muslims of Malabar. 2. The suit is for partition of plaintiff's eleven-eighteenths share in five items of immovable property purchased under Ext. A4 dated May 6, 1933, in the names of plaintiffs 1 to 8, defendants 1 to 7 and Kathiyachumma, Katheesumma and Alima Umma who were the mothers of plaintiffs 1 to 3, 5 to 7, and 10 respectively. Defendants 1 and 2 contend that at the time of the 1st defendant's marriage in 1908, Moideenkutty the then karnavan of the tarwad, promised a stridhanam of 500 seers of paddy and Rs. 25/- per annum and assigned suit items 1 and 2 in lieu of 300 seers of paddy per annum leaving the balance of 200 seers of paddy and Rs. 25/- to be collected from the tarwad annually, and that the assignment Ext. A4 by the heirs of Moideenkutty could not affect the prior assignment by Moideenkutty himself and therefore did not convey any right in suit items 1 and 2 to the vendees thereunder to entitle the plaintiffs to claim a share therein. The plaintiffs do not dispute the promise of stridhanam having been made at the time of the 1st defendant's marriage, but contend that the promise was not acted upon and that the stridhanam, suit items 1 and 2 have never been assigned to the 1st defendant under any arrangement. The Munsif repelled the plea of stridhanam, and decreed partition of all the suit properties. The District Judge, on appeal, found the stridhanam arrangement true, but held it enured for the life of the 1st defendant only and therefore directed partition subject to such life - estate. It is against the exclusion of a life - estate in favour of the 1st defendant that the plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal. 3. It is freely conceded in this case that the suit properties were the self acquisitions of Moideenkutty. The appellants therefore contend that the suit properties could not have been given for stridhanam which even according to the plea of the defence, was a liability of the tarward. 3. It is freely conceded in this case that the suit properties were the self acquisitions of Moideenkutty. The appellants therefore contend that the suit properties could not have been given for stridhanam which even according to the plea of the defence, was a liability of the tarward. Reliance was also placed on the testimony of DW 1, the husband of the 1st defendant, that the possession of defendants 1 and 2 of suit items 1 and 2 was not under any stridhanam arrangement but under an oral will by which Moideenkutty demised the properties in absolute rights to them. Counsel for the defence on the other hand disowned the statement of DW 1 and relied on Ext. B1 in support of the plea. Ext. B1 is a marupat (counter lease) dated April 16, 1929, executed in favour of Moideenkutty and the 2nd defendant by Ahammadkutly, the father-in-law of P. W. 1, the eldest son of Moideenkutty. It makes express mention of suit items 1 and 2 having been granted by Moideenkutty as stridhanam to the 1st defendant in 1908 and of the 1st defendant having assigned the same as stridhanam to her daughter, the 2nd defendant. Nothing has been made out in evidence to discredit the recitals in Ext. B1 which came to be so early as 1929. The grant of stridhanam to 1st defendant by Moideenkutty may therefore be taken as true 4. But, the execution of the marupat in favour of Moideenkutty and the undertaking made therein to satisfy him of regular payments of the rent of the properties indicate that the grant of stridhanam did not imply an absolute conveyance of the properties to the recipient, as in the case of Hindus. 'Stridhanam' in Hindu Law means Woman's property; but it is not pretended that the expression is understood in the same sense by the Marumakkathayee Muslims of Malabar. It then becomes necessary to investigate the nature and extent of the rights conferred by a grant of immovable property as stridhanam among the community. 5. No text on Mahomedan law dealing with stridhanam has been brought to my notice. Sundara Ayyar, who is an authority on the customary laws of Marumakkathayees in Malabar has observed in his well known treatise on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law, pp. 236-37, as follows : "142. 5. No text on Mahomedan law dealing with stridhanam has been brought to my notice. Sundara Ayyar, who is an authority on the customary laws of Marumakkathayees in Malabar has observed in his well known treatise on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law, pp. 236-37, as follows : "142. The recognition of the Marumakkathayam rule of inheritance and at the same time of the Mahomedan rule as to marriage has led to the growth among Mappillahs (Muslims)of certain customs. For instance, in Bappan v. Makki (ILR 6 Mad. 259) it was found that among the Mappillahs of North Malabar, there existed a custom according to which the junior members of Mappilla tarwards were entitled to maintenance from the tarwad when living in the houses of their consorts and also to a higher rate of maintenance when living with their consorts than when living single. There is also the practice for the relations of the wife to make what is called a Stridhana gift to the husband to enable him to maintain her. The gift ordinarily reverts to the family, though not invariably on the death of the wife without issue or on divorce .......... The husband has no duty to maintain the wife if she lives away from him. On wasting the stridhana a second claim cannot be made for maintenance from the tarwad." In Pakrichi v. Kunhacha (ILR 36 Madras 385), a Bench to which Mr. Justice Sundara Ayyar (the author of the above treatise) was a party observed: "The document says that the property is given to the donee as stridhanam though that word means woman's property and the gift was to a man. It would appear that amongst the Marumakkathayam Moplas of Malabar gifts are often made to the husband of a girl given in marriage apparently as a contribution towards the maintenance of the girl and her future children. It was held in Mariyam v. Abdulla that such a gift became void on the death or divorce of the girl. It would appear that amongst the Marumakkathayam Moplas of Malabar gifts are often made to the husband of a girl given in marriage apparently as a contribution towards the maintenance of the girl and her future children. It was held in Mariyam v. Abdulla that such a gift became void on the death or divorce of the girl. Now according to Marumakkathayam Law the tarwad is bound to maintain the women of the tarward even after their marriage, and, if property is given to a husband for the support of his wife it stands to reason that, when he divorces her, he should give back the property to the donor." In Adiyalath Katheesumma v. Adiyalath Beechu (1949-II MLJ 268) Viswanatha Sastri J. cited the above ruling, ILR 36 Madras 385, and observed: "If the stridhanam gift is to the husband with a view to enable him to maintain the wife, the gift on the death of the husband or on divorce reverts back to the tarwad, the reason obviously being that the duty of maintaining the wife is on the tarwad." 6. It is clear from the above citations that stridhanam among the Marumakkathayee Muslims of Malabar denotes the allotment that a tarwad makes for the maintenance of a female member thereof at the time of her marriage. Whether it is given to herself or to her husband, it is meant for the maintenance of the woman and her children, who as members of the tarwad are entitled to be maintained by it in spite of their stay away from the tarwad house. The stridhanam pleaded to have been promised to the 1st defendant in this case is not of any property but of an annuity of 500 seers of paddy and Rs. 25/-. Apparently it savours of a maintenance agreement rather than an assignment of property, and is in tune with the characterisation of stridhanam among Muslims made in the text and precedents referred to above. Though the defendants have also claimed to have been given possession of suit items 1 and 2, the averment is that it was in part satisfaction of the promised annuity only. It must then follow that the 1st defendant's claim to possession of suit items 1 and 2 would cease when her right to maintenance from the tarwad ceases. Though the defendants have also claimed to have been given possession of suit items 1 and 2, the averment is that it was in part satisfaction of the promised annuity only. It must then follow that the 1st defendant's claim to possession of suit items 1 and 2 would cease when her right to maintenance from the tarwad ceases. It is trite law that all claims and arrangements made for maintenance of members of a tarwad would cease on partition of its estate among the members. The defendants' claim to continue in possession of suit items 1 and 2 unaffected by the partition sought in the suit is therefore unsustainable and deserves only to be repelled. It then follows that the decree of the Munsif was correct and the modification made therein by the District Judge unwarranted. 7. The second appeal succeeds. The decree of the District Judge is discharged and that of the Munsif restored to effect. Decree accordingly.